From the editors

Ongoing conflicts in Syria and Ukraine continue to generate new theories and assessments of the character of 21st century warfare. This volume of The Journal of Strategic Studies focuses on two elements associated with modern warfare – managing emerging offensive capabilities in the cyber realm, and assessing the use and utility of proxy and transnational forces.

The first four articles of this volume examine the emergence of cyberspace as a contested realm in international relations and a destabilizing factor in domestic politics.

In ‘Publicly attributing cyber attacks: a framework’, Florian Engloff and Max Smeets of the Center for Security Studies address the question of when and why to publicly attribute the source of cyber attacks. They provide a framework for considering risks and consequences of public attribution of cyber incidents and urge statesmen and leaders to use strategic pragmatism in considering public attribution, recognizing that there are many factors and equities involved in any decision.¹

In ‘Deterrence by denial in cyberspace’, Erica D. Borghard (Columbia University) and Shawn W. Lonergan (75^th Innovation Command) argue that deterrence frameworks drawn from the Cold War nuclear weapons logic of deterrence by punishment are not suited to the cyber environment. They propose instead a form of deterrence by denial using a combination of defenses and counter-cyber operations.²

Lennart Maschmeyer of the Center for Security Studies examines cyber conflict as a phenomenon short of war, and its potential for subversion in ‘A new and better quiet option? Strategies of subversion and cyber conflict’. The author identifies three subversive strategies: manipulation, erosion and overthrow. He concludes that cyber can effectively implement only one of these strategies – erosion – suggesting both the practical limits of cyber effects and possible counter strategies. He urges analysts to move from a military model (offense/defense) to a more intelligence-oriented approach (detection, deception, exploitation).³

Hallvard Notaker of the Norwegian Defence University College discusses the problem of ‘blind spots’: areas where legal or political frameworks preclude intelligence gathering. ‘In the blind spot: Influence operations and sub-threshold situational awareness in Norway’, the author uses Norway as a case study, examines how the tension between national security and civil liberties created a shifting blind spot for influence operations, and identifies the challenges that artificial intelligence and microtargeting will create for managing blind spots in the future.⁴

The next three articles examine the use of foreign fighters and proxy forces in local or regional conflicts.⁵ Tricia Bacon and Grace Ellis of American University and Daniel Milton of the United States Military Academy use Al-Shabaab as a case study to examine how the availability of foreign fighters changed the group’s behavior. ‘Helping or hurting? The impact of foreign fighters on militant group behavior’ concludes that the presence of foreign fighters is positively related to group longevity, use of suicide operations, and the geographic spread of its operations and influence.⁶

In ‘Why jihadist foreign fighters leave local battlefields: Evidence from Chechnya’, Emil A. Souleimanouv of Charles University argues that analysis of the foreign fighter phenomenon has focused on why individuals join foreign wars, but not nearly as much on why they leave. What makes them think their efforts are no longer worthwhile? The author concludes that in the Chechen case, a combination of popular hostility, loss of status, and poor living conditions helps explain why foreign fighters abandoned the struggle in Chechnya.⁷

In ‘Iranian proxies in the Syrian conflict: Tehran’s “forward-defence” in action’, Shahram Akbarzadeh and William Gourlay of Deakin University and Anoushiravan Ehteshami of Durham University examine the role and missions of Iranian proxy forces in Syria, and their role in creating a classical security dilemma. Iran’s proxies are viewed as hegemonic in intent by neighbors and others, but as a form of ‘forward defence’ by Iran. The authors assess that the proxy strategy provides important benefits, allowing Iran to strategically shape the region and demonstrate military capabilities and commitment. They point out that the strategic consequences – increased regional suspicion and hostility – may make the forward defence strategy counterproductive.⁸

This volume also has three book review essays and two book reviews. Todd Greentree (University of Oxford) reviews the latest edition of The New Makers of Modern Strategy and its illustrious predecessors, Makers of Modern Strategy (1943) and Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (1986).⁹ Anthony King (Warwick University) reviews Something Rotten and Command: The politics of military operations from Korea to Ukraine.¹⁰ Andrew Gawthorpe (Leiden University) reviews The insurgent’s dilemma: A struggle to prevail and How civil wars start: And how to stop them.¹¹

In addition, Richard Overy (University of Exeter) reviews The Economic Weapon: The Rise of Sanctions as a Tool of Modern War.¹² Augosto C. Dall’Agnol (Universidad Federal do Rio Grande do Sul) reviews Artificial intelligence and the future of warfare: The USA, China, and strategic stability.¹³

Notes

¹ Thomas Rid and Ben Buchanan, ‘Attributing Cyber Attacks’, Journal of Strategic Studies 38/1–2 (2015), 4–37, DOI: 10.1080/01402390.2014.977382.

² Uri Tor, ‘Cumulative Deterrence’ as a New Paradigm for Cyber Deterrence’, Journal of Strategic Studies 40/1–2 (2017), 92–117, DOI: 10.1080/01402390.2015.1115975; Alex S. Wilner, ‘US cyber deterrence: Practice Guiding Theory’, Journal of Strategic Studies 43/2 (2020), 245–280, DOI: 10.1080/01402390.2018.1563779.

³ Huw Dylan, ‘Super-Weapons and Subversion: British Deterrence by Deception Operations in the Early Cold War’, Journal of Strategic Studies 38/5 (2015), 704–728, DOI: 10.1080/01402390.2015.1029120; Thomas Rid, ‘Cyber War Will Not Take Place’, Journal of Strategic Studies 35/1 (2012), 5–32, DOI: 10.1080/01402390.2011.608939; Michael I. Handel, ‘Intelligence and Deception’, Journal of Strategic Studies 5/1 (1982), 122–154, DOI: 10.1080/01402398208437104.

⁴ Ruud van Dijk and Stanley R. Sloan, ‘NATO’s Inherent Dilemma: Strategic Imperatives vs. Value Foundations’, Journal of Strategic Studies 43/6–7 (2020), 1014–1038, DOI: 10.1080/01402390.2020.1824869; Colin F. Jackson, ‘Information Is Not a Weapons System’, Journal of Strategic Studies 39/5–6 (2016), 820–846, DOI: 10.1080/01402390.2016.1139496; Gjert Lage Dyndal, ‘How the High North became Central in NATO Strategy: Revelations from the NATO Archives’, Journal of Strategic Studies 34/4 (2011), 557–585, DOI: 10.1080/01402390.2011.561094.

⁵ Dan Reiter, ‘Command and Military Effectiveness in Rebel and Hybrid Battlefield Coalitions’, Journal of Strategic Studies 45/2(2022), 211–233, DOI: 10.1080/01402390.2021.2002692; R. Kim Cragin and Susan Stipanovich, ‘Metastases: Exploring the Impact of Foreign Fighters in Conflicts Abroad’, Journal of Strategic Studies 42/3–4 (2019), 395–424, DOI: 10.1080/01402390.2017.1402766; Kersti Larsdotter, ‘Regional Support for Afghan Insurgents: Challenges for Counterinsurgency Theory and Doctrine’, Journal of Strategic Studies 37/1 (2014), 135–162, DOI: 10.1080/01402390.2013.878656.

⁶ Barbara Elias, ‘Why Rebels Rely on Terrorists: The Persistence of the Taliban-al-Qaeda Battlefield Coalition in Afghanistan’, Journal of Strategic Studies 45/2 (2022), 234–257, DOI: 10.1080/01402390.2021.2002691; Paul D. Williams, ‘Building the Somali National Army: Anatomy of a Failure, 2008–2018’, Journal of Strategic Studies 43/3 (2020), 366–391, DOI: 10.1080/01402390.2019.1575210.

⁷ Emil A. Souleimanov and Huseyn Aliyev, ‘Asymmetry of Values, Indigenous Forces, and Incumbent Success in Counterinsurgency: Evidence from Chechnya’, Journal of Strategic Studies 38/5 (2015), 678–703, DOI: 10.1080/01402390.2014.952409; Eugene Miakinkov, ‘The Agency of Force in Asymmetrical Warfare and Counterinsurgency: The Case of Chechnya’, Journal of Strategic Studies 34/5 (2011), 647–680, DOI: 10.1080/01402390.2011.608946; Emil Aslan Souleimanov, ‘Making Jihad or Making Money? Understanding the Transformation of Dagestan’s Jamaats into Organised Crime Groups’, Journal of Strategic Studies 41/4 (2018), 604–628, DOI: 10.1080/01402390.2015.1121871.

⁸ John Logan Mitton, ‘Lessons in deterrence: Evaluating Coercive Diplomacy in Syria, 2012–2019’, Journal of Strategic Studies 45/3 (2022), 411–438, DOI: 10.1080/01402390.2019.1692659.

⁹ Hal Brands (ed.), The New Makers of Modern Strategy: From the Ancient World to the Digital Age (Princeton University Press, 2023); Peter Paret, Gordon A. Craig, Felix Gilbert (eds.), Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Princeton University Press, 1986); Edward Mead Earle (ed.) with Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert, Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought From Machiavelli to Hitler (Princeton University Press, 1943).

¹⁰ Jim Storr, Something Rotten: Land Command in the 21^st Century (Howgate Publishing Limited, 2022); Lawrence Freedman, Command: The Politics of Military Operations from Korea to Ukraine (Oxford University Pres, 2022).

¹¹ David H. Ucko, The Insurgent’s Dilemma: A Struggle to Prevail (Oxford University Press, 2022); Barbara F. Walter, How Civil Wars Start: And How to Stop Them (Crown, 2022).

¹² Nicholas Mulder, The Economic Weapon: The Rise of Sanctions as a Tool of Modern War (Yale University Press, 2022).

¹³ James Johnson, Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Warfare: The USA, China, and Strategic Stability (Manchester University Press, 2021).