From the editors

Throughout its history, The Journal of Strategic Studies has focused on the theory and practice of strategy in both historical and contemporary settings. The articles in this issue of the Journal continue this tradition, with an emphasis on China, nuclear matters, and strategic theory.

Leading off the issue is Caitlin Talmadge and Joshua Rovner’s ‘The Meaning of China’s Nuclear Revolution’.¹ Talmadge, of Georgetown University, and Rovner, of American University, survey U.S. perspectives on the meaning of China’s nuclear modernization. They describe three competing interpretations, each of which reflects a different theory of nuclear strategy: Nuclear Revolution, Nuclear Superiority, and the Stability-Instability Paradox. They also derive future indicators that could help resolve the debate over China’s intent as more evidence becomes available. Next up, Joel Wuthnow, of the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs at the U.S. National Defense University, and M. Taylor Fravel, Director of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, explore the People’s Liberation Army’s 2019 military strategic guidelines.² In ‘China’s Military Strategy for a “New Era”: Some Change, More Continuity, and Tantalizing Hints’. Wuthnow and Fravel argue that the strategy reflected the Chinese leadership’s determination to focus the PLA on the necessary and achievable, but also that a new direction could be influenced by changes in the strategic landscape, rapid modernization, or new operational concepts.

The next pair of essays examine Chinese decision making in peace and crisis. In ‘Explaining China’s Large-Scale Land Reclamation in the South China Sea: Timing and Rationale’, Ketian Zhang of George Mason University argues that China’s construction of artificial features in the South China Sea is the result of capability, rationale, and opportunities that include a calculation of U.S. resolve.³ Continuing with this theme, Jaganath Sankaran of the University of Texas at Austin explores the topic of civil-military relations in Sino-Indian border crises. Contrary to the prevalent rational actor model, Sankaran argues that the PLA uses its operational independence to continuously challenge Indian forces on the contested border.⁴

China’s influence stretches far beyond Asia. Hugo Meijer of Sciences Po examines how France, the European power with the largest strategic footprint in the Asia-Pacific region, has responded to the rise of China in ‘Pulled East: The Rise of China, Europe, and French Security Policy in the Asia Pacific’. Based upon an extensive set of interviews and declassified archival sources, Meijer shows how Beijing’s increasing assertiveness since 2009 has been the key driver of change in French security policy in the region.⁵

Finally, Audrye Wong of the University of Southern California, Leif-Eric Easley of Ewha Womans University, and Hsin-Wei Tang of National Taiwan University explore the Chinese Communist Party’s use of economic statecraft in ‘Mobilizing Patriotic Consumers’. In the article, the authors develop the concept of ‘patriotic consumer mobilization’ to explain how China uses informal boycotts as economic coercion and examine it in the context of Beijing’s coercion of South Korea over the deployment of the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system.⁶

The next group of articles in the issue examines nuclear matters through both theoretical and historical lenses.⁷ Leading off this section is ‘The Rise of the Autocratic Nuclear Marketplace’ by Nicholas L. Miller of Dartmouth College and Tristan A. Volpe of the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School. In it, Miller and Volpe argue that unipolarity put increased pressure on Russia to compete for influence with its nuclear exports. In doing so, Moscow enjoyed an autocratic advantage that insulated its nuclear industry from domestic opposition.⁸ Next up is Adam B. Young’s history of the B-2 Spirit bomber program, ‘Tracing the Origins of the First Strategic Stealth Bomber: Untangling the Interaction between Strategy, Bureaucracy, Politics, and Technology’. Young examines how the stealth bomber program grew out of concern over Soviet conventional numerical strategy as well as the emergence of advanced air defenses that threatened to render penetrating U.S. air power impotent.⁹ The final essay in this section is by Wyn Rees of the University of Nottingham and Azriel Bermant. In ‘Nuclear Divergence Between Britain and the United States: SDI and the ABM Treaty’, the authors draw upon recently declassified documents on both sides of the Atlantic to reveal the depth of the disagreements between Britain and the United States over adherence to the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty during the 1980s.¹⁰

The final section of the journal is devoted to strategic theory. Leading off this collection of essays is ‘Fortuna, Chance, Risk and Opportunity in Strategy from Antiquity to the Nuclear Age’ by Beatrice Heuser of the University of Glasgow.¹¹ In the article, Heuser discusses the development of risk-taking and prudence in strategic theory across history. The next essay, by Samuel Zilincik of Masaryk University, ‘Awe for Strategic Effect: Hardly Worth the Trouble’, questions the wisdom of relying on militarily inspired awe to achieve decisive effects.¹² The last pair of essays shed new light on important strategic thinkers. In ‘Montesquieu: Strategist Ahead of his Time’, John Stone of King’s College London argues that Montesquieu’s body of work contains a sophisticated account of military strategy and influenced Jomini more than previously realized.¹³ Finally, in ‘A Swiss “Columbus” in Clausewitz’s Homeland: How the Works of Antoine-Henri de Jomini were Received by the Prussian Military before 1848’, Jacek Jędrysiak of the University of Wrocław explores Jomini’s influence the Swiss strategist’s influence on Prussian strategy in the first half of the nineteenth century.

We look forward to bringing our readers an insightful and engaging array of articles in 2024.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

¹ Caitlin Talmadge and Joshua Rovner, ‘The Meaning of China’s Nuclear Revolution’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 46/6–7 (2023). doi:10.1080/01402390.2023.2212871.

² Joel Wuthnow and M. Taylor Fravel, ‘China’s Military Strategy for a “New Era”: Some Change, More Continuity, and Tantalizing Hints’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 46/6–7 (2023). doi: 10.1080/01402390.2022.2043850.

³ Ketian Zhang, ‘Explaining China’s Large-Scale Land Reclamation in the South China Sea: Timing and Rationale’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 46/6–7 (2023). doi:10.1080/01402390.2022.2040486.

⁴ Jaganath Sankaran, ‘State or Soldier? Explaining China’s Decisionmaking in India-China Border Crises’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 46/6–7 (2023). doi:10.1080/01402390.2023.2212133.

⁵ Hugo Meijer, ‘Pulled East: The Rise of China, Europe, and French Security Policy in the Asia-Pacific’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 46/6–7 (2023). doi:10.1080/01402390.2021.1935251.

⁶ Audrye Wong, Leif-Eric Easley, and Hsin-Wei Tang, ‘Mobilizing Patriotic Consumers: China’s New Strategy of Economic Coercion’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 46/6–7 (2023). doi:10.1080/01402390.2023.2205262.

⁷ See also Aaron Bateman, ‘Mutually Assured Surveillance at Risk: Anti-Satellite Weapons and Cold War Arms Control’, Journal of Strategic Studies 45/1 (2022), 119–42; and Jeffrey H. Michaels, ‘Visions of the next war or reliving the last one? Early alliance views of war with the Soviet Bloc’, Journal of Strategic Studies 43/6–7 (2020), 990–1013.

⁸ Nicholas L. Miller and Tristan A. Volpe, ‘The Rise of the Autocratic Nuclear Marketplace’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 46/6–7 (2023). doi:10.1080/01402390.2022.2052725. See also Rabinowitz, Or & Sarkar, Jayita, ‘“It isn’t over until the fuel cell sings”: A reassessment of the US and French pledges of nuclear assistance in the 1970s’, Journal of Strategic Studies 41/1–2 (2018), 275–300.

⁹ Adam B. Young, ‘Tracing the Origins of the First Strategic Stealth Bomber: Untangling the Interaction between Strategy, Bureaucracy, Politics, and Technology’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 46/6–7 (2023). doi:10.1080/01402390.2023.2186818.

¹⁰ Wyn Rees & Azriel Bermant, “Nuclear Divergence Between Britain and the United States: SDI and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, The Journal of Strategic Studies 46/6–7 (2023). doi:10.1080/01402390.2021.1907745. See also Timothy Andrews Sayle, ‘A Nuclear Education: The Origins of Nato’s Nuclear Planning Group’, Journal of Strategic Studies 43/6–7 (2020), 920–56.

¹¹ Beatrice Heuser, ‘Fortuna, Chance, Risk and Opportunity in Strategy from Antiquity to the Nuclear Age’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 46/6–7 (2023). doi:10.1080/01402390.2022.2111306.

¹² Samuel Zilincik, ‘Awe for Strategic Effect: Hardly Worth the Trouble’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 46/6–7 (2023). doi:10.1080/01402390.2022.2138355.

¹³ John Stone, ‘Montesquieu: Strategist Ahead of his Time’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 46/6–7 (2023). doi:10.1080/01402390.2022.2160713.