Deterrence, reassurance and strategic stability: The enduring relevance of Johan Jørgen Holst

ABSTRACT

Focusing on the academic and policy career of Norwegian scholar-statesman Johan Jørgen Holst, this article explores the history of Norway’s attempt to ensure its security through a balance between deterrence and reassurance of the Soviet Union. It argues that Holst’s concept of balancing deterrence and reassurance provided an intellectually coherent rationale for Norwegian policy, tailored to its specific needs. However, Holst encountered increasing difficulties in implementing his concept during his time in government in the 1970s and 1980s. Holst’s government experience underlines the importance of combining any future reassurance measures with a coherent deterrence package, in consultation with NATO allies.

KEYWORDS:

• Strategic stability
• deterrence
• NATO
• Norway
• Russia

Introduction

This article explores the intellectual history of Norway’s Cold War attempt to secure itself through pursuing a balance between deterrence and reassurance of the Soviet Union and assesses its effectiveness in practice. The Norwegian concept of balancing deterrence and reassurance is closely associated with its primary progenitor, the scholar-statesman Johan Jørgen Holst. Holding the positions of State Secretary (deputy minister) of the Norwegian Ministry of Defence (1976–1979) and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1979–1981), President of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI, 1981–1986, 1989-1990), Defence Minister (1986–1989, 1990–1993), and Foreign Minister (1993–1994), Holst was probably the most significant Norwegian strategic thinker of his generation. This article analyses the intellectual background of Holst’s conceptual work and then employs declassified documents from Norwegian archives to assess the extent to which Holst was able to apply it successfully during his time in government.¹

Holst’s most important contribution to the Norwegian security debate was his distillation of Oslo’s security objectives as maintaining a balance between deterrence and reassurance of Moscow. Norway would, on the one hand, deter the Soviet Union through its membership of NATO and strong relations with the United States (US). On the other, it would reassure Moscow that Norway would not become a base for a NATO attack on the Soviet Union through unilateral restrictions on the basing of troops and nuclear weapons on Norwegian territory in peacetime.² It would also restrict NATO exercises, naval and air activity near the Soviet border. Post-war Norwegian governments had developed policies on nuclear weapons, basing and exercises that sought to reconcile the country’s complex security environment with domestic constraints.³ Holst conceptualised this policy toward the Soviet Union as striking a balance between deterrence and reassurance.

Holst’s approach was fundamentally supportive of maintaining strategic stability between East and West, but through means that were more appropriate to Norway’s resources, constraints and long-term foreign and security policy objectives. His academic work displayed an acute understanding of strategic stability’s inadequacies when applied to situations beyond the US-Soviet confrontation. Strategic stability’s emphasis on military capabilities implied a distinctly secondary role for small states like Norway on the frontline of the Cold War. This drastically limited their autonomy, given their dependence on support from others to maintain the existing balance of forces. Domestic constraints were a subject that strategic stability hardly touched on but were fundamental for defining Norway’s defence posture. There was strong domestic opposition to further integration into NATO, which manifested itself in the Norwegian reservations.⁴ The conservative emphasis on maintaining the existing strategic stability implied a limited potential for fostering progressive change within the international system to a more integrated one based on interdependence and the rule of law, a key aim of Norwegian foreign policy.

Holst’s formulation provided an elegant way to justify and explain Oslo’s policy towards the Soviet Union. Despite this, he faced increasing difficulties in implementing it effectively during his time as a member of several Norwegian Labour governments in the 1970s and 1980s. His early years were marked by notable successes. During controversies over NATO’s dual-track decision on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) and the pre-stockage of US Marine Corps equipment in Norway in 1979–1981, Holst played a pivotal role in balancing the need to strengthen deterrence of the Soviet Union during a time of increasing East-West tensions with growing Norwegian domestic political pressure to pursue reassurance through nuclear disarmament.⁵ Holst’s balancing act failed in 1981, however, over the Norwegian Labour Party’s advocacy of a nuclear weapon-free zone (NWFZ) for the Nordic area, which the United States and other NATO allies strongly opposed. The NWFZ case illustrates the limits of Holst’s approach in cases where the Norwegian Labour Party’s desire to press its vision for progressive change in the international system was not coordinated and clashed with its commitment to NATO. In these instances, a balance between deterrence and reassurance became simply impossible. The NWFZ incident presaged a further US-Norwegian clash in 1986 during Holst’s tenure as Defence Minister over the Reagan administration’s plans for the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), a space-based missile defence system.⁶

Holst’s formulation of Norwegian security policy seeking a balance between deterrence and reassurance provided a conceptually elegant means to explain and justify Oslo’s pursuit of stability under conditions of significant power asymmetry with the Soviet Union and Norwegian domestic constraints. However, Holst’s intellectual creativity had limits when Norwegian reassurance policy was poorly coordinated, and often outran, NATO’s broader strategy of deterrence. In this, Holst’s experience holds lessons for Norwegian and other European NATO policymakers considering the possible role of reassurance measures during another period of heightened tension with Moscow today.

The article begins with an analysis of the shortcomings that Holst identified during the 1960s in the then-emerging literature on strategic stability when applied to Norway. The second section shows how Holst’s formulation of deterrence and reassurance sought to provide a strategic concept that was more appropriate to Norwegian conditions. The third section assesses the extent to which Holst was successful in balancing deterrence and reassurance during his time in government during the 1970s and 1980s. The article concludes by summarising the findings and reflecting on the lessons of Holst’s experience for the present.

Holst, strategic stability and its limitations

Born in Oslo in 1937 and spending majority of his professional life in senior positions within the Norwegian government and academic world, Johan Jørgen Holst exercised significant influence over the study and practice of Norwegian security policy. He was partly educated in the United States and fluent in the new language of US nuclear strategy, including the emerging study of strategic stability. His undergraduate years at Columbia University from 1958 to 1960 marked the beginning of a path that would see him integrated into a ‘transatlantic network’ of thinkers and policymakers on strategic issues.⁷ During the early 1960s, he worked as a researcher at the Harvard Center for International Affairs, a key focal point for the elaboration of theories of nuclear strategy and arms control.⁸ Afterwards, he returned to Norway, working at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (Forsvarets forskningsinstitutt, FFI) between 1963 and 1966. He completed his master’s thesis at the University of Oslo in 1965.⁹ In 1969, Holst became head of research (effectively deputy director) at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt, NUPI), a post he held until 1976 when he became State Secretary of the Ministry of Defence.¹⁰

Holst maintained a strong relationship with the US strategic community throughout his life.¹¹ His papers show that he maintained active correspondence and participation in non-governmental transatlantic security forums throughout the 1970s, even when he was in government.¹² This level of engagement and integration with the US strategic studies community was rare in Norway at the time, particularly among those aspiring to high political office. This, combined with his vertiginous professional rise, placed him as ‘primus inter pares’ among Norwegian strategic thinkers when he became State Secretary of the Ministry of Defence.¹³

Holst’s exposure to US defence intellectuals came at a key moment in the history of nuclear strategy and arms control. From the late 1950s onwards, a generation of primarily American thinkers, including Albert Wohlstetter, Herman Kahn, Thomas Schelling and Morton Halperin, laid the conceptual foundations of nuclear weapons policy, including on strategic stability. Traditionally understood, strategic stability has two components: arms-race stability and crisis stability. Arms-race stability refers to the containment of pressures for an uncontrolled spiral of competitive acquisition of weapons by two or more states. Crisis stability refers to the lowering of incentives for a state to use nuclear weapons first during a period of high tension. A state’s acquisition of a secure second-strike capability against its competitors is key to both arms-race and crisis stability. The mutual ability to absorb a nuclear strike and retaliate by inflicting an unacceptable level of damage in return would minimise a state’s incentive to launch an attack against another during a crisis. The development of a secure second-strike capability, particularly if codified through binding arms control agreements, could also minimise pressures for competitive arming and thereby play a key role in securing arms-race stability. Strategic stability was both a foundational and highly contested concept. As Benjamin Wilson has argued, ‘The history of arms-control debates after 1960 could be told largely as a set of arguments over policies that were praised or criticised for their allegedly stabilising or destabilising effects’.¹⁴

Holst was well acquainted with the new nuclear-strategic literature and integrated it into his own work. While using Norway as a case study, Holst relied almost entirely on US arms control writing in developing the theoretical foundation of his 1965 University of Oslo master’s thesis, ‘Arms Stability in the Cold War’.¹⁵ His early English-language work from the mid-1960s is littered with American-style references, from the importance of credibility, to Norway’s ‘manipulation of risks and costs’ and the ‘potentiality for inflicting pain and damage’ on Moscow, as well as the concept of ‘implicit cooperation’ between Norway and the Soviet Union during times of tension.¹⁶

While deeply imbued in the US strategic conversation and its basic premises, Holst was not a prisoner of it.¹⁷ He combined a level of ‘expertise at least the equal of any of his American contemporaries’, in the words of Sir Michael Howard, with a ‘perspective that was distinctively European’.¹⁸ He recognised that strategic stability was necessary ‘so as not to impose upon international society the burden of pre-emptive instability at the strategic nuclear level’.¹⁹ Yet it was only a precondition, and sometimes not even a decisive one, in the evolution of East-West relations.²⁰ While Holst shied from direct criticism of strategic stability, it is nevertheless clear that he believed it exhibited significant shortcomings when applied to the Norwegian context.

Strategic stability as it emerged in the 1960s offered limited guidance for Norway and could potentially relegate Oslo to the status of a superpower pawn. Holst recognised that ‘American thinking about arms control … reflected the geopolitical circumstances of the United States’. US thinking focused primarily on ‘the core dyad of Soviet-American relations’, akin to ‘a two-person game’.²¹ This logic threatened to strip Oslo of any autonomy. Norway’s size and resources meant that the weight it could contribute to the military balance, even with its conventional forces, was relatively small. During the 1960s and 1970s, Oslo could dispose of a peacetime strength of approximately one brigade in Northern Norway and a few smaller units, numbering fewer than 6,000 troops. Mobilisation of the country’s reserves could render a total of 12 brigades in wartime, but only two of those would be assigned to the north initially. Meanwhile, the Soviet Army stationed two motorised infantry divisions on the Kola Peninsula, numbering approximately 24,000 soldiers in peacetime, not counting enablers. As such, the Norwegian armed forces were designed to delay an initial Soviet assault, but the country was ultimately reliant on its NATO allies, principally the United States, to deploy sufficient ground, air and naval forces to defeat a Soviet invasion.²²

Norway’s strategic location had the potential to limit its room for manoeuvre yet further. The neighbouring Kola Peninsula was home to the Soviet Northern Fleet. By the 1980s, the Northern Fleet hosted sixty percent of the Soviet Union’s ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), which played a key role in the US-Soviet strategic nuclear balance.²³ Until the introduction of longer-range submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) during the 1970s, most Soviet SSBNs had to pass through the Norwegian Sea on their way to their patrol areas in the Atlantic Ocean. Once Soviet SSBNs could fire from or near their home bases, Soviet naval, ground and air units would be deployed to form a ‘bastion’ protecting them from NATO counterforce operations. Consequently, any NATO-Soviet action in and around northern Norway and Kola could develop strategic dimensions ‘over which [Norway] would have little influence’.²⁴

The strategic stability literature was also largely silent on domestic politics. Yet, as Holst knew, Norwegian foreign and security policymakers had to pay attention to domestic constraints. Opposition to the presence of nuclear weapons on Norwegian territory ran particularly strong in the Labour Party, Holst’s political home.²⁵ As the dominant force in post-war Norwegian politics, Labour had been instrumental in establishing a series of restrictions on Norway’s participation in NATO. Since its accession to the alliance in 1949, Norway refused to accept the permanent basing of foreign troops on its territory. Oslo had also prohibited the deployment of nuclear forces in the country through a series of steps, most notably the 1957 refusal to host non-strategic nuclear weapons. Norway also did not allow foreign forces to exercise in Finnmark county bordering the Soviet Union. Any revision of these basic positions would be domestically controversial. Thus, Norwegian policymakers had to pay greater day-to-day ‘respect’ to ‘domestic society’ than their American counterparts by constantly working to maintain the domestic legitimacy of Norway’s membership of NATO as a deterrent to the Soviet Union.²⁶

For Holst, political obligations also played a key role in Norway’s security. Given its military weakness versus its most proximate threat and the absence of permanently stationed foreign forces on its territory, Norway’s security rested on NATO’s political commitment to come to its aid. Thus, Norway’s membership of NATO, according to Holst, had ‘always been viewed primarily in political terms’.²⁷ The importance of maintaining the political integrity of this relationship is not really captured by the strategic stability literature, which has little to say about why, for example, the United States would extend a security guarantee to its allies. Holst, by contrast, did not take such a relationship between Washington and Western Europe for granted and understood that it had to be nurtured.

Finally, the bipolar and symmetrical focus of strategic stability literature did not coincide with the situation in the Nordic region during the Cold War. Holst criticised those, such as fellow Norwegian political scientist Arne Olav Brundtland, who framed security in Norway’s neighbourhood as constituting a ‘Nordic balance’. Brundtland argued that this balance was based on Norway and Denmark’s prohibition of permanently based NATO troops and restrictions on nuclear weapons, as well as Sweden’s armed non-alignment and Finland’s neutrality secured through the 1949 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union.²⁸ Holst noted, however that no such balance existed among the Nordic states, ‘since they are not poised against each other’. Rather, the Nordic region constituted ‘not so much a balance’ as ‘a pattern exhibiting a decreasing degree of inclusion into the connecting tissue of the Western system of security as we move through the Nordic area from west to east’. As such, a balance was an inappropriate metaphor.²⁹

Deterrence, reassurance and strategic stability

Holst provided a framework for Norwegian security policy that took account of these factors. While supporting US containment of the Soviet Union, he advocated a dual approach, designed ‘to achieve a reasonable and viable balance between deterrence and reassurance vis-à-vis the Soviet Union’.³⁰ Schelling had touched on the importance of assuring the adversary that the deterring state would not inflict pain if the adversary did not take a certain action to increase its incentive to back down. From the 1970s, other scholars, notably Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein followed up on Schelling’s early insight. However, the role of reassurance has remained marginal in the study of deterrence.³¹ In Holst’s 1960s formulation, by contrast, balancing deterrence and reassurance was the conceptual lodestar of Norwegian peacetime security policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union in a way that took account of the broader descriptive and prescriptive deficiencies of strategic stability based narrowly on maintaining the military balance.

Holst’s employment of deterrence of the Soviet Union to characterise one side of Norwegian policy signalled a fundamental and essential congruence between immediate Norwegian and US objectives in the Nordic region and Europe. This helped foster the political ties with Washington that formed the basis of Norway’s security. It was only ‘the interposition of American power’, Holst argued, that prevented the Soviet Union from dominating Europe.³² Credible US commitment to Norway required plans and infrastructure to receive NATO forces at the critical moment of an unfolding crisis or conflict and the regular exercising of NATO capabilities in and around Norway.³³ Oslo could not afford any rupture with Washington on the fundamental importance of containing Soviet power.

Despite this basic congruence of short-term aims, however, Holst argued that Norway’s approach to achieving the containment of the Soviet Union had to be adapted to fit the country’s resources and domestic political conditions. Instead of focusing on containing the Soviet Union through the interposition of a sufficiently large military force, Norway had to concentrate on ‘influencing Soviet intentions rather than containing her capabilities per se’.³⁴ Norway’s restrictions on foreign bases, nuclear weapons and exercises, Holst argued, constituted the practical expression of Oslo’s ‘reassurance’ of the Soviet Union: that its membership of NATO was purely defensive and would not provide a platform for a Western attack on the USSR. According to Holst, such a stance would ‘avoid provocations that might generate Soviet incentives for pre-emptive or compensatory actions on the Northern flank’, thus safeguarding both Norwegian security and the integrity of the Alliance’s position in the Nordic region through a policy of unilateral restraint.³⁵

Yet, Holst posited, Norway’s policy of unilateral restraint regarding basing, nuclear weapons and exercises also bound the Soviet Union. Oslo made its adherence to these self-denying ordinances conditional on Soviet behaviour. Restrictions on stationing foreign forces would only hold, Holst emphasised, if ‘Norway is not attacked or exposed to threats of attack’. It was in the Soviet interest to maintain the existing favourable balance of peacetime forces in the Nordic region. To do so, it would have to avoid taking steps that might undermine Oslo’s perception of the existing security situation. The Norwegian government left the definition of ‘threats of attack’ deliberately vague, Holst claimed, to maximise Soviet uncertainty over the moves that might precipitate Norwegian renunciation of these reassuring policies.³⁶ Thus, Norway’s reassurance policy had a deterrent sting in its tail.

It also meant that Norway could retain some escalation control of any East-West crisis in the Nordic region. Holst argued a rapid build-up of NATO forces on Norwegian territory early in a crisis could precipitate Soviet escalation. To manage this, Norway could seek to control the nature of reinforcement during this period, for example, by limiting the early build-up to airlift units that could ferry Norwegian troops further north. If NATO troops were to be introduced into the theatre, the Norwegian government could insist that they be equipped for defensive missions only, such as anti-aircraft units. Norway could thereby contribute to maintaining crisis stability, but on its terms and in a way that could potentially minimise an escalatory spiral.³⁷

The flexibility afforded by the concept of deterrence and reassurance also fit well with Holst’s vision of the Nordic region as constituting ‘a pattern’ of relationships rather than a balance of forces. Holst argued that the Nordic countries should uphold the ‘presumption of mutual sympathetic consideration’ in their security relations with each other. For Holst, that sympathy applied especially to domestic constraints on Sweden’s military alignment and the Finnish need to preserve its independence through a closer relationship with the Soviet Union.³⁸ Thus, the Nordic security system for Holst was based less on a balance of military power than on a common political interest in maintaining the relatively tranquil military status quo and each member’s reassurance of the others that they would not take steps to endanger it.

Thus, Holst shifted the focus away from a simple balance of military power that defined writing on strategic stability toward one more focused on political tools. This also shaped his view of how a longer-term evolution of East-West relations could establish ‘a more viable political order than one which is constructed around the East-West conflict in general and the Soviet-American rivalry in particular’.³⁹ Holst supported the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 and wrote extensively on how to develop its limited provisions on confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) to support this goal.⁴⁰ Holst proposed modifications to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) CSBMs. These included the lowering of the threshold above which military exercises became liable for advance notification and the provision of basic data on budgets and weapons systems, many of which were eventually included in the Vienna Document from 1990 onwards, as well as a system of ‘on-call surveillance’, including through an open skies agreement.⁴¹ Holst believed that CSBMs could play a significant role in limiting the intrusion of military matters on what he considered ‘the normal flow of politics on the continent of Europe’, thereby ‘preventing the pressure from the military might of the great powers from crushing the aspiration of smaller powers for a greater freedom of political choice’.⁴² A world in which political rather than military factors dominated would not only enhance Norwegian security, but also strengthen its ability to play an autonomous international role.

Deterrence and reassurance in practice

During Holst’s first period in government between 1976 and 1981, however, East-West relations were moving from cooperation to confrontation. Progress on strategic arms control slowed, while domestic US controversies over Moscow’s record on human rights, continuing superpower competition in the Global South, Soviet deployments of intermediate-range SS-20 missiles and debates over a NATO counter-deployment all suggested that détente was in trouble and its early achievements were more apparent than real. Finally, Moscow’s invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 sent US-Soviet relations back into the deep freeze.⁴³ These were hardly favourable circumstances for Holst. He sought to maintain good relations with Norway’s main provider of deterrence, the United States, as its strategy towards the Soviet Union took a more confrontational turn. This, in a context of intensifying Norwegian public and Labour Party enthusiasm for pursuing policies designed to promote low tension and disarmament with Moscow.⁴⁴

Holst initially managed the tension between deteriorating superpower relations and Norwegian domestic politics very well. He played a pivotal role in securing Norwegian support for NATO’s December 1979 ‘dual-track decision’ to deploy a new generation of theatre-range nuclear missiles to Europe, as well as bolstering the US commitment to Norway’s defence through the negotiation of a pre-stockage agreement for United States Marine Corps equipment in the country, finalised in 1981. However, by that year the gap between the Norwegian Labour Party’s enthusiasm for disarmament and the Second Cold War was becoming too wide to bridge, with a public and damaging collision between Oslo and Washington over the Norwegian government’s support for the creation of a nuclear weapon-free zone (NWFZ) in the Nordic region. This set the stage for a further clash between Norway and the United States over the Reagan administration’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) missile defence programme later in the decade.

Holst’s early experience managing the balance between deterrence and reassurance as State Secretary in the Norwegian Ministry of Defence set the tone for much of his tenure in government between 1976 and 1981. Norway and the United States had scheduled the visit of a US nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN), USS Seahorse, to Norway’s main naval base of Haakonsvern, near Bergen, in April 1976. However, the previous year the government of Trygve Bratteli had decided that Norway’s prohibition on the storage of nuclear weapons on Norwegian territory in peacetime would also preclude the docking of allied warships with nuclear weapons on board.⁴⁵ The visit of a US submarine could breach these conditions, but the US government would not publicly confirm or deny the presence of nuclear weapons on board its naval vessels.⁴⁶ Holst played a role in bridging the gap between Norwegian and US policy so that the visit could take place. He drafted speaking notes for Minister of Defence Rolf Arthur Hansen’s meeting with US Ambassador Thomas Ryan Byrne on 22 March, in which he explained that, although the Bratteli policy was ‘neither practical nor desirable’ and should be changed, it had to be adhered to in this case.⁴⁷ The US maintained its policy of ambiguity regarding the presence of nuclear weapons onboard the submarine, but privately assured Oslo that it ‘would be able to accommodate the conditions’ set forth by the Norwegian side.⁴⁸ To quiet domestic press speculation, the Norwegian government made it known that USS Seahorse would not be carrying nuclear weapons during its visit.⁴⁹ Holst further corrected erroneous reporting that Seahorse was a Polaris nuclear ballistic missile submarine (SSBN).⁵⁰ A minor incident, the Seahorse episode nevertheless was an early illustration of the role that Holst would play in balancing deterrence and reassurance between 1976 and 1981. He managed to bridge the gap between US and Norwegian positions through compromise measures that could satisfy the key requirements of both sides. Simultaneously, he conveyed the resulting agreement to domestic Norwegian audiences through his established command of both technical and policy details.

During the later 1970s, the security issues Holst dealt with would become more consequential, prominent and controversial. Holst became a member of the NATO High-Level Group (HLG) that helped to craft the Alliance’s response to the Soviet deployment of SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic missiles.⁵¹ In this capacity, he played a major role in maintaining a balance between increased deterrence through US intermediate-range force (INF) modernisation and defending Norway’s reassurance policy on the non-deployment of nuclear weapons on its territory in peacetime, while offering arms control talks to the Soviet Union. Holst upheld Norway’s nuclear-free status at the HLG, pushing back against report language that would have criticised NATO members that imposed such restrictions. As controversy over NATO deployment of INF heated up at home, Holst and others also pressed for late modifications to include a firmer commitment to the arms control track in NATO’s deployment announcement – an initiative that met with partial success. However, unlike Denmark and despite considerable domestic opposition, Holst and the Labour government remained firm in their commitment to the agreed timetable for INF modernisation, on the understanding that Washington would not move on this key issue. Norway’s delicate but successful reconciling of the deterrence and reassurance aspects of the dual-track decision resulted from balancing US priorities with domestic sensitivities. It also reflected and helped to smooth over significant divisions within the Alliance over the appropriate mix of INF modernisation and arms control. Holst’s dual-track diplomacy, in the words of Norwegian historian Helge Danielsen, illustrated his personal transition from ‘an analyst … to … a politician capable of promoting Norwegian interests on the international stage’.⁵² It also increased his domestic profile. Holst advocated strongly for the dual-track decision in print and speeches, while Norwegian media described him as a ‘key person’ pushing INF deployment at the international level.⁵³

Holst and the Labour government were also successful in maintaining a balance of deterrence and reassurance in respect to US plans to pre-stock equipment for the US Marine Corps in Norway. More effective Soviet maritime strike capabilities against Atlantic sea lanes made pre-stockage for one Marine amphibious brigade a necessity to maintain credible conventional deterrence. Some Norwegian opponents, including those within the Labour Party, were concerned that the US military’s presence in the country, its access to advanced equipment, and its proximity to the Soviet border could undermine Norway’s reassurance policy towards foreign basing and nuclear weapons. They feared that the prepositioning of dual-capable systems could escalate tensions and compromise Norway’s stance on these issues. The Labour government agreed to pre-stockage of equipment, but only if was placed in Trøndelag, mid-Norway, rather than North Norway closer to the Soviet border. It also insisted that the dual-capable A-6 Intruder aircraft not be pre-stocked because could facilitate the introduction of nuclear weapons into Norway during a crisis or war.⁵⁴

Now State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Holst played a key role in all stages of the pre-stockage affair, taking charge of the government’s effort to implement the policy.⁵⁵ He helped formulate the original recommendation for strengthening Norway’s NATO reinforcements through his co-chairmanship of a bilateral US-Norwegian study group. Holst also pushed the group’s recommendations inside the Norwegian bureaucracy, urging the government to move forward with a decision on key issues, including pre-stockage of US Marine Corps equipment.⁵⁶

However, Holst leavened his recommendations with an added dose of reassurance as political circumstances demanded. Initially favouring positioning the equipment in North Norway, closest to the most likely route for a Soviet invasion, Holst changed his position to advocate for pre-stockage away from the Soviet border. He argued it would ensure that the ‘defensive’ nature of the measures would not be misperceived by the Soviet Union. In addition, the location would facilitate flexibility for the Marines in case Soviet forces should attack through Sweden. Given the increasing domestic controversy over the issue, Holst further argued that pre-stockage in mid-Norway would ensure the continuation of ‘broad cross-political support’ for Norwegian defence policy.⁵⁷

In September 1980, Holst travelled to Washington DC as part of a Norwegian delegation to hammer out a deal that would balance US military’s requirements with Norwegian domestic reservations.⁵⁸ Employing his expertise gained from a long dialogue with the Americans on these issues, Holst argued that pre-stockage in Trøndelag made sense from a military standpoint. He maintained that this option would allow the Marines to be deployed elsewhere in Norway if necessary and that Trøndelag was less vulnerable to Soviet strike aircraft. Commandant of the US Marine Corps Robert H. Barrow was not entirely convinced, but the Americans eventually agreed to pre-storage in mid-Norway and to replace the A-6 with the non-nuclear A-4 Skyhawk. In return, Oslo pledged to take responsibility for redeploying the Marines to North Norway by sea and pre-stock one more brigade’s-worth of equipment for Norwegian forces in the north. As with the dual-track decision, Holst played an active role in justifying the policy publicly, including by defending the positioning of the USMC supplies in mid-Norway as a way to preserve the ‘reassurance of [Norway’s] neighbours’.⁵⁹ Having again achieved a complex balance between deterrence and reassurance, the Norwegian government gained parliamentary approval and signed a memorandum of understanding with the outgoing Carter administration in January 1981.⁶⁰

The Norwegian government was unable to maintain such a good record into the 1980s. Desirous of making a significant contribution to disarmament efforts, the Norwegian Labour Party increasingly pursued a Nordic nuclear weapon free zone (NWFZ). Finland had long advocated a Nordic NWFZ, but Norway had rejected it on the grounds that Oslo did not want to be bound without significant progress on disarmament by the Soviet Union.⁶¹ However, the concept was significantly boosted when Norwegian Prime Minister Odvar Nordli advocated it in his 1981 national New Year’s address. The Norwegian Labour Party also decided to include a pledge to work towards a Nordic NWFZ in its work programme for the 1982–1985 parliament. Allied reactions were strongly negative. The United Kingdom and West Germany saw the proposal as weakening their efforts to implement the controversial decision to deploy US intermediate-range nuclear missiles on their territories. The United States saw the proposal as undermining NATO cohesion at a key moment in the INF deployment debate.⁶² Fundamentally, adherence to a NWFZ could place Norway’s adherence to established NATO military policy on the possible first use of nuclear weapons – and hence established plans for the defence of Europe – in doubt.

Holst initially reacted with strong disapproval criticising the NWFZ as ‘unrealistic’ and damaging to Norway’s relations with key allies.⁶³ The diplomatic mess, Holst argued, necessitated a ‘clean-up’.⁶⁴ Moscow stirred the pot further when Brezhnev endorsed the concept and offered that the Soviet Union would pledge not to use nuclear weapons against any members of such a zone in an interview with the Finnish newspaper Suomen sosiali-demokraatti.⁶⁵ However, with strong support for a NWFZ at the highest levels of the Norwegian government and Labour Party, it would be impossible to simply renounce the proposal. If left unchecked a NWFZ proposal could conceivably evolve into a concept that could place Norway in conflict with NATO’s deliberate ambiguity regarding first use of nuclear weapons and thereby place the country’s position under the Alliance’s nuclear umbrella in question.⁶⁶

As he had previously, Holst set about attempting to diffuse the controversy by crafting a compromise. He did so by maintaining the ambition of a Nordic NWFZ but surrounding it with qualifications designed to diminish its impact on Norway’s NATO commitments. Both Nordli’s speech and the Labour Party’s Work Programme were short on detail. The Work Programme, Holst noted, pledged that, ‘Norway [would] work for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Nordic area as part of the work to reduce nuclear weapons in a wider European context’. Holst urged ‘flexibility’ on each key point in this statement. This included the content of measures constituting a nuclear weapon-free zone, the exact geographical definition of the Nordic area, and what he referred to as ‘the time factor’ – or the sequencing of any NWFZ in relation to the ongoing talks on INF and Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR). The crafting of Oslo’s position on all these points, Holst argued, should be based on the premise that ‘a zone neither in content or in form shall change Norway’s protection or obligations in NATO’.⁶⁷ Holst advocated closer contacts with allies, particularly the United States, in order to ‘explain’ Norway’s position, firstly as a damage limitation exercise, and later to gain Washington’s ‘understanding’ – if not support – regarding Oslo’s efforts.⁶⁸

Out of this framework emerged Norway’s significantly hedged position on a Nordic NWFZ. Talking points for Norwegian officials emphasised that advocacy for a NWFZ did not place Oslo’s commitment to NATO’s dual-track decision in doubt. A zone could be a useful complement to ongoing talks on theatre-range nuclear forces, but would only come into existence in coordination with, or after the conclusion of ‘broader’ measures for the reduction of nuclear forces in Europe. However, the Norwegian government’s position was somewhat vague on the issue of a projected NWFZ and nuclear weapons use. It emphasized that a Nordic NWFZ ‘should not affect in any way Norway’s commitments or assurances within NATO’, but also highlighted existing prohibition of nuclear weapons storage and that ‘Norwegian forces [were] not trained in the employment of nuclear weapons, and ‘Norway [had] no POC (Programme of Cooperation) agreement with the US in the nuclear weapons area’.⁶⁹ This nuanced formulation lacked clarity and was perhaps drowned out by more forthright pronouncements, such as that by Defence Minister Thorvald Stoltenberg, who stated that Norway ‘would be willing to give up’ nuclear-armed NATO reinforcements in the case that it joined a NWFZ.⁷⁰ This is illustrative of the fundamental tension between Norway’s NATO membership and a political leadership advocating nuclear disarmament. This tension ultimately undermined Holst’s attempt to gain NATO’s acceptance of Norway’s advocacy of a Nordic NWFZ.

Any hopes that Holst’s compromise could provide the basis for allied acceptance of Norway’s position were irrevocably dashed during a July 1981 meeting between Foreign Minister Knut Frydenlund and US Secretary of State Alexander Haig. While Frydenlund attempted to explain the Norwegian government’s domestic political predicament, according to the official historian Rolf Tamnes, Haig angrily told Frydenlund that the Nordic region already presented difficulties from a defence standpoint and if Norway adopted a NWFZ ‘he could not recommend [to Reagan] to send troops’ to defend the country.⁷¹ Though Holst had counselled that Haig would be a poor choice of interlocutor on this question, given his focus on military issues rather than the broader political context, the strength of the US Secretary of State’s statements nevertheless shocked the Norwegian delegation.⁷² Holst later believed that Stoltenberg’s statement on foreswearing NATO nuclear weapons use on Norwegian territory had triggered the strong reaction from the American side.⁷³

It was not only the United States that continued to be unhappy with Norway’s new enthusiasm for a Nordic NWFZ during the summer of 1981. British officials delivered a similarly negative message to Holst on a visit to London, telling him that they would ‘“infinitely prefer” … that the discussion of the Norwegian zone ideas not go any further’.⁷⁴ Perhaps having got wind of Haig’s reaction, Danish officials told Holst that they would prefer to avoid any substantive discussion of Denmark’s role in such a scheme. They feared that any indication that Copenhagen diverged from established NATO policy on nuclear weapons use could derail their ongoing negotiations with Washington on US reinforcements earmarked for their country’s defence during a war.⁷⁵

By August 1981, Holst himself acknowledged defeat in his attempt to gain NATO states’ acceptance of the Norwegian position on a Nordic NWFZ. Holst argued instead for a scaling back of Oslo’s efforts and the effective postponement of the Nordic NFWZ issue until after the conclusion of INF negotiations. In this way, Norway and its allies ‘could live with different opinions’ without endangering Oslo’s position within NATO.⁷⁶

The Nordic NWFZ represented Holst’s first significant failure to reconcile US and Norwegian positions on the necessary balance between deterrence and reassurance. He acknowledged that the NWFZ issue could have been handled more effectively on a tactical level. However, Holst also argued that broader trends in international and Norwegian domestic politics made his balancing act more difficult. He highlighted the deteriorating international security environment that precipitated a series of tough policy decisions, such as on advance storage and INF. Holst believed these policy questions had drawn the attention of youth and women’s groups, as well as the church, to nuclear issues. He also argued that the Norwegian public had become more educated and therefore less willing to passively accept the government’s position on foreign-policy questions.⁷⁷ Holst’s arguments can be read as an attempt to deflect the blame for the Nordic NWFZ affair, but also illustrate the limits of his own ability to bridge the gap between US and the Norwegian left through artfully crafted compromises.

Oslo’s pursuit of a Nordic NWFZ damaged relations with the Reagan administration. However, there are also indications that the United States’ strong reaction to Norway’s initiative had an impact on Holst. He lay part of the blame for Haig’s confrontation with Frydenlund at Washington’s door. In Holst’s view, US officials should have ‘tried to clarify’ Norway’s view on the relationship between a NWFZ and nuclear weapons use before objecting to Oslo’s policy based on Stoltenberg’s statement.⁷⁸

An attachment to his artfully crafted compromise may partly explain why Holst continued to advocate for a Nordic NWFZ. Rather than back away from the idea, and in contrast to his earlier hostility towards the concept, Holst argued in favour of a Nordic NWFZ during Labour’s period in opposition between 1981 and 1986.⁷⁹ As contemporary critics pointed out, however, in pressing for the Nordic NWFZ, Holst violated some of the rules set down in his earlier writings. In downplaying the extent to which a NWFZ would mark a departure from Norway’s existing policy, Holst now described Norway’s prohibition on the basing of nuclear weapons as a near-permanent situation. This ran against his previous argument that Norway’s nuclear policy was fundamentally conditional on Soviet behaviour. If this condition was removed through adherence to a NWFZ, critics noted, that meant that the alleged deterrent effect of Norway’s nuclear abstinence would be eliminated.⁸⁰

The Nordic NWFZ episode was a precursor to further clashes between the Norwegian Labour governments and the Reagan administration in the later 1980s. In opposition, the Labour Party heavily criticised the Conservative government’s cautious endorsement of SDI research in a March 1985 NATO Nuclear Planning Group communique. In March 1986, now as Minister of Defence in a new Labour government, Holst reserved Norway’s position in a NATO Defence Planning Committee communique that expressed ‘strong support for the United States’ stance concerning … defence and space systems’.⁸¹ Holst was forced to proceed with the reservation after failing to water down the language on SDI and have the communique support talks to limit the system.⁸² In this, Holst’s tactics were quite similar to those in the HLG discussions on INF, when he had stated that he would reserve Norway’s position if the HLG report did not remove language criticising Oslo’s nuclear policy.⁸³ However, in the case of SDI, no compromise was possible. Denmark and Greece joined Norway in reserving their positions on SDI.⁸⁴

The United States strongly criticised the Norwegian reservation and answered it by cancelling an agreement to part-finance the upgrade of Norway’s Hawk air defence systems and postponing a planned meeting of the US-Norway Bilateral Study Group. US Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle even proposed cancelling American support for Norway’s modernization of its P-3 Orion maritime surveillance aircraft. However, Washington’s desire that Oslo improve its capabilities in this area meant that it did not pursue this.⁸⁵ Nevertheless, it was clear that a combination of strong Norwegian opposition to SDI combined with a US unwillingness to bend had upset the balance between deterrence and reassurance that Holst and previous Labour governments had been able to maintain on INF and pre-stockage.

Holst renewed his attempt to find a compromise, including through ‘tough negotiations’ with Perle.⁸⁶ The new language, included in the October 1986 NATO Nuclear Planning Group communique, ‘fully endorsed’ the Reagan administration’s position on ‘defence and space systems’ taken at the recent Geneva Summit with Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev and ‘strongly support[ed] the United States’ exploration of space and defence systems’.⁸⁷ However, this approval only stretched as far as activities ‘permitted by the [1972] Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty’ limiting national missile defence systems. This compromise suited both sides. Norway could argue that reference to the ABM Treaty constrained US ambitions, while the Reagan administration could continue to hold that SDI in its current form was compatible with the ABM Treaty. The Labour government encountered significant domestic criticism for the change in its stance from the Centre and Socialist Left Parties. However, recent improvements in US-Soviet relations through Reagan’s summit meetings with Gorbachev eased Norwegian concerns and would soon render the issue practically moot.⁸⁸

Conclusion: The legacy of Holst and Nordic security

With the rise of Gorbachev and the transformation of Soviet foreign and defence policy, Cold War politics evolved rapidly in the late 1980s. This freed Holst’s hopes for the evolution of East-West relations and eventually led to a more ambitious post-Cold War Norwegian reassurance policy towards Russia.⁸⁹ As Ingeborg Bjur explains in this issue, in the early 1990s, Norwegian Foreign Minister Holst helped lay the groundwork for a significant shift away from deterrence toward an expanded definition of reassurance in order to capitalise on this transformative moment.⁹⁰ However, the full transformation of the European security order that Holst hoped for never took place. Russia’s renewed challenge to that order, represented by its 2014 and 2022 invasions of Ukraine, and the resulting accession of Finland and imminent accession of Sweden to NATO, have provoked new debate within Norway on the extent to which deterrence and reassurance remain relevant.⁹¹

The strength of Holst’s academic work suggests that the conceptual pairing of deterrence and reassurance addresses several important elements of Norway’s strategic situation that are not adequately accounted for in major-power-centric concepts such as strategic stability. Through greater coordination and defence in depth, the admission of Finland and imminent accession of Sweden into NATO will ameliorate the problem of Norwegian military weakness vs. Russia to some extent. However,Oslo will still rely on rapid allied reinforcement for its defence and play a greater role in supporting forward defence of the new Nordic membership. This means that Norway will continue to depend on strong transatlantic security ties, supported by regular NATO exercises, balanced against continued domestic wariness regarding a larger permanent NATO military presence in the country or dramatic increases in defence spending. It is notable that, while the 2023 Norwegian Defence Commission report recommended ‘a special investigation’ into ‘the principles and practice of Norwegian deterrence and reassurance policy’ in this new era, no alternative concept has yet emerged to replace this pairing as the guiding metric for Norwegian security.⁹²

Deterrence and reassurance’s utility is also evident in Holst’s governmental service, though the work was more slanted towards alliance and domestic-political management, rather than manipulation of Moscow’s intentions per se.⁹³ While taking place in the context of a deteriorating security environment with the Soviet Union, Holst’s efforts in government illustrate that Norwegian treading of a middle ground between deterrence and reassurance was aimed less at Moscow directly. Rather, it sought to balance US and NATO requirements for effective deterrence of the Soviet Union and Norwegian domestic, and especially Labour Party, reservations regarding stoking tensions with the Soviet Union. This Holst managed to achieve in cases where he sought to moderate increased NATO deterrence measures at the margins in deference to Norwegian domestic political constraints, such as the NATO dual-track decision and Marine Corps pre-stockage.

Holst’s attempts at compromise failed, however, in the case of Norway’s advocacy of a Nordic NWFZ during the early 1980s, when a proposal rooted in Norwegian domestic politics clashed so openly and jarringly with NATO’s efforts to enhance deterrence of the Soviet Union. Holst’s efforts to leaven Norway’s NWFZ proposal by attempting to reconcile it with NATO’s military and arms control policies could not compensate for the fact that Washington believed the NWFZ placed Norway’s commitment to transatlantic security ties in doubt. As such, it ran against Holst’s own arguments that strong relations with the United States constituted the basis of Norway’s security. Rather than fully acknowledge this error, Holst continued to advocate for a Nordic NWFZ and confront the Reagan administration’s SDI programme for little gain.

All of this suggests that Norway would be well served in maintaining the conceptual pairing of deterrence and reassurance, within limits. The history of Holst’s involvement in the dual-track decision and advance storage suggests that the balance is most effective when reassurance is employed to modify a broader deterrence package. Norway and other states should focus on using reassurance measures to manage domestic political resistance to necessary increases in defence preparedness and enhanced NATO deterrence measures in the Nordic region and beyond in light of Russia’s new aggressiveness. By contrast, ambitious Norwegian reassurance efforts were much less effective, because they clashed with NATO strategy at a time when the Alliance was attempting to strengthen deterrence vs. the Soviet Union. As such, any future Norwegian attempt to move dramatically ahead of the Alliance through disarmament activism is likely to end in failure, regardless of elaborate attempts to fit such reassurance efforts within a broader deterrence framework.

Acknowledgments

The author would like to thank participants in the Oslo Nuclear Project’s ‘Deterrence and Reassurance in the Nordic Region’ workshop and the two anonymous reviewers for the Journal of Strategic Studies for their feedback. The author is particularly grateful to Professor Målfrid Braut-Hegghammer, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation and the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs for their support of this special issue.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the Royal Norwegian Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs and the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation [grant number 18-1805-153176-NCP].

Notes on contributors

James Cameron

James Cameron is Associate Professor of Modern North American History at the University of Oslo. His research focuses on the history of arms control from the nineteenth century to the present and the lessons it holds for contemporary policy. He is the author of The Double Game: The Demise of America’s First Missile Defense System and the Rise of Strategic Arms Limitation (Oxford University Press, 2018). He holds a PhD and BA in History from the University of Cambridge and an MPhil in Russian and East European Studies from the University of Oxford.

Notes

¹ Olav Fagelund Knudsen, ‘Johan Jørgen Holst’, Store norske leksikon, https://snl.no/Johan_Jørgen_Holst.

² Johan Jørgen Holst, ‘Norwegian Security Policy: The Strategic Context’, Cooperation and Conflict 1/4 (1966), 64–79.

³ Robert K. German, ‘Norway and the Bear: Soviet Coercive Diplomacy and Norwegian Security Policy’, International Security 7/2 (Fall 1982), 55–61.

⁴ German, ‘Norway and the Bear’, 59, 63–4.

⁵ Helge Danielsen, ‘Norway and the Dual-Track Decision: The Role of Johan Jørgen Holst’, in Leopoldo Nuti, Frédéric Bozo, Marie-Pierre Rey, and Bernd Rother (eds.), The Euromissile Crisis and the End of the Cold War (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2015), 213–30; Rolf Tamnes, The United States and the Cold War in the High North (Oslo: Ad Notam, 1991), 250, 265–8.

⁶ Rolf Tamnes, Oljealder, 1965–1995: Norsk utenrikspolitikks historie Bind 6 (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1995), 124–6; Tamnes, The United States and the Cold War, 292–3.

⁷ Danielsen, ‘Norway and the Dual-Track Decision’, 216.

⁸ Sir Michael Howard, ‘Johan Jørgen Holst and Arms Control’, in Olav F. Knudsen (ed.), Strategic Analysis and the Management of Power: Johan Jørgen Holst, the Cold War and the New Europe (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996), 33.

⁹ Knudsen, ‘Johan Jørgen Holst’.

¹⁰ Anders C. Sjaastad, ‘Et liv i krig, fred og utvikling: NUPIs første femti år, 1959–2009’, Internasjonal Politikk 67/4, 690–1.

¹¹ Tamnes, The United States and the Cold War, 243–48; Danielsen, ‘Norway and the Dual-Track Decision’, 218–9.

¹² Johan Jørgen Holst to Henry S. Rowen, 6 July 1978, Folder: Inngående og utgående brev, Juni-juli 1978, Box 8, Johan Jørgen Holst Papers (JJHP), Norwegian National Archives (NNA); Robert Legvold to Johan Jørgen Holst, 19 January 1978, Folder: Inngående brev, Jan-mars 1978, Box 3, JJHP, NNA; Albert Wohlstetter to Johan Jørgen Holst, 23 May 1978, Inngående og utgående brev, Juni-juli 1978, Box 8, JJHP, NNA.

¹³ Tamnes, The United States and the Cold War, 243.

¹⁴ Benjamin Wilson, ‘Keynes Goes Nuclear: Thomas Schelling and the Macroeconomic Origins of Strategic Stability’, Modern Intellectual History 18/1, 171–201.

¹⁵ Johan Jørgen Holst, ‘Arms stability in the Cold War’, Master’s thesis, (Univ. of Oslo, 1965).

¹⁶ Holst, ‘Norwegian Security Policy: The Strategic Context’, 65–8.

¹⁷ On Holst’s Cold War realism, see: Stian Ruud, ‘Fag og politikk: Johan Jørgen Holst som strategisk analytiker 1960–1976’, Master’s thesis (Univ. of Oslo, 2009).

¹⁸ Howard, ‘Johan Jørgen Holst and Arms Control’, 33.

¹⁹ Holst, ‘Strategic Arms Control and Stability’, 282.

²⁰ Johan J. Holst, ‘Missile Defense: Implications for Europe’, in Johan J. Holst and William Schneider (eds.), Why ABM? Policy Issues in the Missile Defence Controversy (New York: Pergamon 1969),193.

²¹ Johan Jørgen Holst, ‘Arms Control in the Nineties: A European Perspective’, Daedalus 120/1 (Winter 1991), 85.

²² Johan Jørgen Holst, ‘Norwegian Security Policy: Options and Constraints’, Cooperation and Conflict Vol. 7, Nos. 3–4, 223. At least one declassified US document suggests that Norwegian military weakness was a persistent concern. See: CIA Directorate of Intelligence, ‘Nordic Forces in the 1980s’, November 1984, https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP85S00316R000300040006-9.pdf.

²³ Johan Jørgen Holst, ‘The Pattern of Nordic Security’, Daedalus 113/2 (Spring 1984), 204.

²⁴ Holst, ‘Pattern of Nordic Security’, 201.

²⁵ German, ‘Norway and the Bear’, 63.

²⁶ Holst, ‘Pattern of Nordic Security’, 202; Sverre Lodgaard and Nils Petter Geditsch, ‘Norway – the Not So Reluctant Ally’, Cooperation and Conflict 12/4 (1977), 211–2.

²⁷ Holst, ‘Norwegian Security Policy: The Strategic Context’, 79.

²⁸ Arne Olav Brundtland, ‘The Nordic Balance: Past and Present’, Cooperation and Conflict 1/4, 30–63.

²⁹ Holst, ‘Pattern of Nordic Security’, 199–200.

³⁰ Holst, ‘Norwegian Security Policy: The Strategic Context’, 65.

³¹ Jeffrey Knopf, ‘Varieties of Assurance’, Journal of Strategic Studies 35/3 (June 2012), 379, 383–7; Ingeborg Bjur, ‘The dual “dual” policy: two conceptions of “deterrence and reassurance” in Norwegian security policy and analyses’, this issue, 6–9; Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge MA: Harvard, 1960), 6–7; Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale UP, 1966), 74.

³² Holst, ‘Norwegian Security Policy: The Strategic Context’, 65.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ibid., 65, 69.

³⁶ Ibid.,69–70.

³⁷ Ibid., 68.

³⁸ Holst, ‘The Pattern of Nordic Security’, 200.

³⁹ Johan Jørgen Holst, ‘Confidence and Security in Europe: A Long-Term View’, Bulletin of Peace Proposals 15/4 (1984), 291.

⁴⁰ Johan Jørgen Holst, ‘Confidence-Building Measures: A Conceptual Framework’, NUPI notat no. 253 (September 1982); Johan Jørgen Holst, ‘Confidence-Building through Openness about Military Activity’, NUPI notat no. 270-A (May 1983); Johan Jørgen Holst, ‘Confidence-Building and Nuclear Weapons in Europe’, NUPI notat no. 277 (B) (August 1983); Johan Jørgen Holst, ‘Confidence- and Security-Building in Europe: Achievements and Lessons’, NUPI notat no. 436 (October 1990).

⁴¹ Holst, ‘Confidence-Building through Openness’, 5–9.

⁴² Holst, ‘Confidence and Security in Europe’, 292.

⁴³ Raymond L. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan Revised edn (Washington DC: Brookings Institution 1994), 1125–46.

⁴⁴ Tamnes, The United States and the Cold War, 265; ‘Norwegian Premier, On Visit, Bids Senate Approve Arms Treaty’, The New York Times, 14 June 1979, 11.

⁴⁵ Tamnes, Oljealder, 1965–1995, 128.

⁴⁶ Hans M. Kristensen, ‘The Neither Confirm Nor Deny Policy: Nuclear Diplomacy at Work’, Working paper (2006), https://www.nukestrat.com/pubs/NCND.pdf, accessed 23 Dec. 2023.

⁴⁷ Johan Jørgen Holst to Rolf Arthur Hansen, ‘Anløp av orglogsfartøyer som kan ha atomvåpen ombord’, 22 March 1976, Folder: Utgående notater, 1976, Box 6, JJHP, NNA.

⁴⁸ ‘Nuclear Powered Warship (NPW) Visits, 3 April 1976, 1976STATE080274, Central Foreign Policy Files, Department of State, Access to Archival Databases (AAD).

⁴⁹ ‘“Seahorse” til Bergen uten a-våpen’, Morgenbladet, 20 April 1976, 2.

⁵⁰ ‘Atom-besøk fra vå største allierte’, Bergens Tidene, 22 April 1976, 9; Johan Jørgen Holst to Bergens Arbeiderblad and Bergens Tidene, ‘Ang reportasjer om USS Seahorse’, 3 May 1976, Folder: Utgående brev, Feb-Aug 1976, Box 5, JJHP, NNA.

⁵¹ Susan Colbourn, Euromissiles: The Nuclear Weapons That Nearly Destroyed NATO (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 2022), 59–60, 84, 158; Danielsen, ‘Norway and the Dual-Track Decision’, 213–30.

⁵² Danielsen, ‘Norway and the Dual-Track Decision’, 213–230.

⁵³ Sven A. Ellefsen, ‘Holst nøkkelperson bak nye A-våpen i Vest-Europa’, Dagbladet, 10 December 1979; Olav Trygge Storvik, ‘Ingen “selger” av a-våpen’, Aftenposten, 12 December 1979, Section 4, 1.

⁵⁴ Tamnes, United States and the Cold War in the High North, 248–250, 266–267.

⁵⁵ Johan Jørgen Holst to Knut Frydenlund, ‘Timeplanen for den videre behandling av forhåndslagringssaken’, 18 September 1980, Folder: Notater ang. forhåndslagring, Box 9, JJHP, NNA.

⁵⁶ Johan Jørgen Holst to Knut Frydenlund, ‘Diverse saker, UD/FD’, 29 January 1980, Folder: Notater ang. forhåndslagring, Box 9, JJHP, NNA; Johan Jørgen Holst to Knut Frydenlund, ‘Bilateral norsk-amerikansk studie om forsvar og forsterkning av Norge’, 31 January 1980, Folder: Notater ang. forhåndslagring, Box 9, JJHP, NNA.

⁵⁷ Johan Jørgen Holst to Knut Frydenlund, ‘Forhandslagringssaken’, 1 September 1980, Folder: Notater ang. forhåndslagring, Box 9, JJHP, NNA.

⁵⁸ Bjur, ‘The dual “dual” policy’, 18–9; Tamnes, United States and the Cold War in the High North, 245–50, 267–8.

⁵⁹ Johan Jørgen Holst, Forhåndslagring og norsk sikkerhet, Norwegian Atlantic Committee Series No.58 (1980); Johan Jørgen Holst, ‘Norwegian Security Policy and Peace in Nordic Europe’, The World Today 37/1 (1981), 25; German, ‘Norway and the Bear’, 74; Tamnes, United States and the Cold War in the High North, 245–50, 267–8.

⁶⁰ Tamnes, United States and the Cold War in the High North, 245–50, 267–268.

⁶¹ Third Political Department, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Norske offisielle uttalelser i anledning Kekkonen-planen’, 30 January 1981, Folder: Notater ang. atomvåpenfri sone, 1980-1981, Box 9, JJHP, NNA.

⁶² Johan Jørgen Holst to Knut Frydenlund, ‘Den utenrikspolitiske behandling av forslaget om atomvåpenfri sone’, 21 January 1981, Folder: Notater ang. atomvåpenfri sone, 1980-1981, Box 9, JJHP, NNA.

⁶³ Tamnes, Oljealder, 57. Johan Jørgen Holst to Knut Frydenlund, ‘Oppklaring omkring arbeidet for atomvåpenfrie soner’, 27 January 1981, Folder: Notater ang. atomvåpenfri sone, 1980-1981, Box 9, JJHP, NNA.

⁶⁴ Johan Jørgen Holst to Knut Frydenlund, ‘Oppklaring omkring arbeidet for atomvåpenfrie soner’, 27 January 1981, Folder: Atomvåpenfri sone, Box 9, JJHP, NNA.

⁶⁵ Leonid Brezhnev, ‘Replies to Questions by a Correspondent of the Finnish Newspaper ‘Suomen Sosiali-Demokraatti’, 27 June 1981, Leonid Illyich Brezhnev, Our Course: Peace and Socialism (Moscow: Novosti Publishing House, 1982), 149–50.

⁶⁶ Johan Jørgen Holst to Knut Frydenlund, ‘Redegjørelse på sendemannsmøtet 1981 – om sikkerhetspolitikken’, 30 July 1981, Folder: Notater ang. atomvåpenfri sone, 1980–1981, Box 9, JJHP, NNA; Tamnes, Oljealder, 125–6.

⁶⁷ Johan Jørgen Holst to Knut Frydenlund, ‘Oppfølging av DNA’s arbied for kjernevåpenfri sone i nordisk område’, 29 May 1981, Folder: Notater ang. atomvåpenfri sone, 1980–1981, Box 9, JJHP, NNA.

⁶⁸ Johan Jørgen Holst to Knut Frydenlund, ‘Den utenrikspolitiske behandling av forslaget om atomvåpenfri sone’, 21 January 1981, Folder: Notater ang. atomvåpenfri sone, 1980–1981, Box 9, JJHP, NNA; Johan Jørgen Holst to Knut Frydenlund, ‘Klargjøring av de norske motive, overveielser og opplegg vedrørende en mulig kjernevåpenfri sone I nordisk område’, 3 July 1981, Folder: Notater ang. atomvåpenfri sone, 1980–1981, Box 9, JJHP, NNA.

⁶⁹ Johan Jørgen Holst to Knut Frydenlund, ‘Klagjøring av den norske motiver, overveielser og opplegg vedrørende en mulig kjernevåpenfri sone i nordisk område’, 3 July 1981, and attached speaking notes, Folder: Notater ang. atomvåpenfri sone, 1980–1981, Box 9, JJHP, NNA.

⁷⁰ ‘Thorvald Stoltenberg: Det haster med forhandlinger. Målet er at rakettene ikke skal utplasseres’, Arbeiderbladet, 1 July 1981, 7.

⁷¹ Tamnes, Oljealder, 124–5.

⁷² Johan Jørgen Holst to Knut Frydenlund, ‘Vårt forhold til USA og den nye situasjon vedrørende atomvåpenfrie soner’, 30 June 1981, Folder: Notater ang. atomvåpenfri sone, 1980–1981, Box 9, JJHP, NNA. ‘Utenriksminister Knut Frydenlunds redegjørelse på Stasjonssjefsmøtet fredag 28 august 1981 kl. 0900’, Folder R18 Atomvåpenfrisone, Box Dc – L005, Knut Frydenlund Papers, NNA; Tamnes, Oljealder, 125.

⁷³ Johan Jørgen Holst to Knut Frydenlund, ‘Kjernevåpenfri sone i nordisk område, NATOs vedtatte forsvarsstrategi og Norges stilling i krig’, 18 August 1981, Folder: Notater ang. atomvåpenfri sone, 1980–1981, Box 9, JJHP, NNA.

⁷⁴ Johan Jørgen Holst to Knut Frydenlund, ‘Samtaler i London 3.7.81 om kjernevåpenfri sone i nordisk område’, 3 August 1981, Folder: Notater ang. atomvåpenfri sone, 1980–1981, Box 9, JJHP, NNA.

⁷⁵ Johan Jørgen Holst to Knut Frydenlund, ‘Konsultasjoner i Københaven 20.8.81 om kjernevåpenfri sone i nordisk område’, 21 August 1981, Folder: Notater ang. atomvåpenfri sone, 1980–1981, Box 9, JJHP, NNA.

⁷⁶ Johan Jørgen Holst to Knut Frydenlund, ‘Refleksjoner angående status for og det videre arbeid med “sonesaken”: Grunnlag for et modus vivendi i NATO’, 6 August 1981, Folder: Notater ang. atomvåpenfri sone, 1980–1981, Box 9, JJHP, NNA.

⁷⁷ Johan Jørgen Holst to Knut Frydenlund, ‘Redegjørelse på sendemannsmøtet 1981 – om sikkerhetspolitikken’, 30 July 1981, Folder: Notater ang. atomvåpenfri sone, 1980–1981, Box 9, JJHP, NNA.

⁷⁸ Johan Jørgen Holst to Knut Frydenlund, ‘Kjernevåpenfri sone i nordisk område, NATOs vedtatte forsvarsstrategi og Norges stilling i krig’, 18 August 1981, Folder: Notater ang. atomvåpenfri sone, 1980–1981, Box 9, JJHP, NNA.

⁷⁹ Johan Jørgen Holst, ‘A Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone in the Nordic Area: Conditions and Options – A Norwegian View’, Bulletin of Peace Proposals 14/3 (1983), 227–38.

⁸⁰ Holst, ‘A Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone’, 227; George Maude, ‘Conflict and Cooperation: The Nordic Nuclear-Free Zone Today’, Co-operation and Conflict 18/4 (1983), 237.

⁸¹ Jakob Linnet Schmidt, ‘Danish and Norwegian Responses to SDI: Between Low-Voiced Scepticism and Outspoken Opposition’, in Luc-André Brunet (ed.), NATO and the Strategic Defense Initiative: A Transatlantic History of the Star Wars Programme (Abingdon: Routledge 2023), 170, 173; Tamnes, The United States and the Cold War, 293; Defence Planning Committee of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, ‘Final Communique’, 22 May 1986, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_23347.htm.

⁸² Schmidt, ‘Danish and Norwegian Responses to SDI’, 173–4.

⁸³ Danielsen, ‘Norway and the Dual-Track Decision’, 222–3.

⁸⁴ DPC NATO, ‘Final Communique’.

⁸⁵ Tamnes, United States and the Cold War in the High North, 293–4; Tamnes, Oljealder, 127.

⁸⁶ Tamnes, Oljealder, 127.

⁸⁷ NATO Nuclear Planning Group, ‘Final Communique’, 21–22 October 1986, https://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49–95/c861022a.htm.

⁸⁸ Tamnes, United States and the Cold War in the High North, 293; Rolf Tamnes, Oljealder, 127; Schmidt, ‘Danish and Norwegian Responses to SDI’, 175.

⁸⁹ Bjur, ‘The dual “dual” policy’, this issue, 20–5.

⁹⁰ Bjur, ‘The dual “dual” policy’, this issue, 21–2.

⁹¹ Ingeborg Bjur, ‘Tre lærdommer om «avskrekking» og beroligelse overfor Russland’, Forsvaretsforum, 6 November 2022, https://www.forsvaretsforum.no/kronikk/tre-laerdommer-om-avskrekking-og-beroligelse-overfor-russland/293059; Julie Wilhelmsen, ‘Rapport til forsvarskommisjonen: Avskrekking og beroligelse. Hvilken effekt har denne politikken, herunder basepolitikken, hat for Russlands politikk overfor Norge?’ https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/8b8a7fc642f44ef5b27a1465301492ff/no/sved/10wilhelmsen.pdf.

⁹² Forsvarskommisjonen av 2021: Forsvar for fred og frihet (May 2023), 258–9, www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/8b8a7fc642f44ef5b27a1465301492ff/no/pdfs/nou202320230014000dddpdfs.pdf, accessed 23 Dec. 2023.

⁹³ On the importance of domestic politics, see: Lodgaard and Geditsch, ‘Norway – The Not So Reluctant Ally’, 211–2.