New technology, old strategy: Cyberspace and the international politics of African agency

ABSTRACT

In this article, we offer a theoretical framework explaining how African actors achieve influence in cyberspace despite possessing comparatively limited cyber capabilities. We argue that digital technology is characterized by low costs, rapid diffusion, and limited coercive utility. We argue these characteristics serve as antecedent conditions amplifying strategies of capability acquisition and partner diversification African elites have long used to limit foreign influence and pursue local political objectives. We illustrate our argument through comparative case studies of Ethiopia’s acquisition of digital infrastructure and surveillance technology and information operations in support of the Libyan warlord Khalifa Haftar.

KEYWORDS:

• Cyber
• cyberspace
• disinformation
• Africa
• strategy
• international relations

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Steven Feldstein, Noelle Van der Waag-Cowling, Travis Sharp, John Speed Meyers, and Joseph Siegle for providing helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

¹ International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), ‘Cyber capabilities and national power: A net assessment’, IISS Research Paper, 28 June 2021, https://www.iiss.org/globalassets/media-library—content–migration/files/research-papers/cyber-power-report/cyber-capabilities-and-national-power—a-net-assessment___.pdf.

² DW News, ‘Will China’s 5 G “digital silk road” lead to an authoritarian future for the internet?’, 26 April 2019, https://www.dw.com/en/will-chinas-5g-digital-silk-road-lead-to-an-authoritarian-future-for-the-internet/a-48497082; DW News, ‘Investing in Africa’s tech infrastructure. Has China won already?’, 5 March 2019, https://www.dw.com/en/investing-in-africas-tech-infrastructure-has-china-won-already/a-48540426; Žilvinas Švedkauskas, Chonlawit Sirikupt and Michel Salzer, ‘Russia’s disinformation campaigns are targeting African Americans’, Washington Post, 24 July 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/07/24/russias-disinformation-campaigns-are-targeting-african-americans/.

³ Joseph Marks and Tonya Riley, ‘The cybersecurity 202: How Huawei helped extend China’s repressive view of Internet freedom to African nations’, Washington Post, 15 August 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/paloma/the-cybersecurity-202/2019/08/15/the-cybersecurity-202-how-huawei-helped-extend-china-s-repressive-view-of-internet-freedom-to-african-nations/5d547a72602ff15f906576c3/; Elizabeth C. Economy, ‘Yes, Virginia, China is exporting its development model’, 11 December 2019, Council on Foreign Relations Blog, https://www.cfr.org/blog/yes-virginia-china-exporting-its-model.

⁴ Shelby Grossman, Daniel Bush, and Renee DiResta, ‘Evidence of Russia-Linked Influence Operations in Africa’, White Paper, (Stanford CA: Stanford University Internet Observatory 2019), https://fsi.stanford.edu/publication/evidence-russia-linked-influence-operations-africa; Africa Center for Strategic Studies, ‘Mapping Disinformation in Africa’, 26 April 2022, https://africacenter.org/spotlight/mapping-disinformation-in-africa/.

⁵ See for example: Josh Meservey, ‘Government Buildings in Africa are a Likely Vector for Chinese Spying’, The Heritage Foundation, Backgrounder No. 3476, May (Washington DC: Heritage Foundation 2020), 7; Alina Polyakova and Chris Meserole, ‘Exporting Digital Authoritarianism: The Russian and Chinese models’, Policy Brief, (Washington DC: Brookings Institution 2019), 6.

⁶ Iginio Gagliardone, China, Africa and the Future of the Internet (London: Zed 2019), 7.

⁷ Michael Schwirtz and Gaelle Borgia, ‘How Russia meddles abroad for profit: Cash, trolls and a cult leader’, New York Times, 11 November 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/11/world/africa/russia-madagascar-election.html; Shelby Grossman, Khadija H. Ramali and Renee DiResta, ‘Blurring the lines of media authenticity: Prigozhin-linked group funding Libyan broadcast media’, Stanford Internet Observatory, 20 March 2020, https://fsi.stanford.edu/news/libya-prigozhin.

⁸ CSIS, ‘China’s digital silk road’, 11 February 2019, https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-digital-silk-road.

⁹ Adrian Shabaz, ‘The Rise of Digital Authoritarianism: Fake News, Data Collection, and the Challenge to Democracy’, Freedom of the Net 2018, (Washington DC: Freedom House 2018).

¹⁰ Steven Feldstein, ‘The Road to Digital Unfreedom: How Artificial Intelligence Is Reshaping Repression’, Journal of Democracy 30/1 (January 2019), 40–52.

¹¹ Meservey, ‘Government Buildings’, 7.

¹² Shelby Grossman, ‘Russia wants more influence in Africa. It’s using disinformation to get there’, Washington Post, 3 December 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/12/03/russia-wants-more-influence-africa-its-using-disinformation-get-there/; Grossman et al., ‘Evidence of Russia-Linked influence operations in Africa’.

¹³ Davey Alba and Sheera Frankel, ‘Russia tests new disinformation tactics in Africa to expand influence’, New Times, 30 October 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/30/technology/russia-facebook-disinformation-africa.html.

¹⁴ Valentin Webber, ‘The sinicization of Russia’s cyber sovereignty model’, 1 April 2020, Council on Foreign Relations Blog, https://www.cfr.org/blog/sinicization-russias-cyber-sovereignty-model.

¹⁵ Jean-François Bayart, The State in Africa. The Politics of the Belly (Cambridge: Polity 2009).

¹⁶ Ian Taylor, The International Relations of Sub-Saharan Africa (New York: Continuum 2010), 2.

¹⁷ Ian Taylor, The International Relations of Sub-Saharan Africa.

¹⁸ Folashadé Soulé, ‘“Africa +1” Summit Diplomacy and the “New Scramble” Narrative: Recentering African Agency’, African Affairs, 120/480 (July 2021), 633–646.

¹⁹ Iginio Gagliardone and Frederick Golooba-Mutebi, ‘The Evolution of the Internet in Ethiopia and Rwanda: Towards a ‘Development Model?’ Stability: International Journal of Security and Development 5/1 (August 2016), 8.

²⁰ Bulelani Jili, ‘Locating African agency in Africa-China relations’, 20 April 2020, Africa is a Country,

https://africasacountry.com/2020/04/locating-african-agency-in-africa-china-relations.

²¹ See Michael Amoah, ‘Sleight is Right: Cyber Control as a New Battleground for African Elections’, African Affairs, 119/474 (January 2020), 68–89; William Brown and Sophie Harman, African Agency in International Politics (New York: Routledge 2013); Ian Taylor and Paul Williams, ‘Understanding Africa’s Place in World Politics’, in Ian Taylor and Paul Williams (eds), Africa in International Politics: External Involvement on the Continent (New York: Routledge 2004).

²² For relevant debates on this subject, see Carl Death, ‘Introduction: Africa’s International Relations’, African Affairs 122/486 (August 2015), e11-e16; Rita Abrahamsen, ‘Africa and International Relations: Assembling Africa, Studying the World’, African Affairs 116/462 (January 2017), 125–139.

²³ Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science (Ithaca: Cornell UP 1997), 12–15.

²⁴ Dan Swinhoe, ‘How much does it cost to launch a cyberattack?’ CSO Online, 1 May 2020, https://www.csoonline.com/article/3340049/how-much-does-it-cost-to-launch-a-cyberattack.html.

²⁵ Joseph Cox and Lorenzo Franchesi-Biccchieri, ‘Meet NSO group, The new big player in the government spyware business’, Motherboard, 26 August 2016, https://www.vice.com/en/article/wnxpjm/nso-group-new-big-player-in-government-spyware; Dinesh Narayanan and Venkat Ananth, ‘Pegasus spyware can target up to 50 phones at once’ Economic Times of India, 2 November 2019, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/tech/internet/pegasus-spyware-can-target-up-to-50-phones-at-once/articleshow/71860858.cms?from=mdr.

²⁶ Nate Allen, Matthew La Lime, and Tomslin, Samme-Nlar, ‘The Downsides of Digital Revolution: Confronting Africa’s Evolving Cyber Threats’, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, December (Geneva: 2022), https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/digital-revolution-africa-cyber-threats/.

²⁷ Simone Dossi ‘On the Asymmetric Advantages of Cyberwarfare. Western Literature and the Chinese Journal Guofang Keji’, Journal of Strategic Studies 43/2 (April 2020), 281–308.

²⁸ Michael C. Horowitz, The Diffusion of Military Power: Causes and Consequences for International Politics (Princeton: Princeton UP 2010), 221.

²⁹ Council on Foreign Relations, ‘Cyber Operations Tracker’, 2005- present, https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations#Takeaways; Max Smeets, ‘The Strategic Promise of Offensive Cyber Operations’, Strategic Studies Quarterly 12/3 (Fall 2018), 90–113.

³⁰ Smeets, ‘The Strategic Promise of Offensive Cyber Operations’.

³¹ Yoram Evron, ‘4IR Technologies in the Israel Defence Forces: Blurring Traditional Boundaries’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 44/4 (August 2021), 572–293.

³² Travis Sharp, ‘Theorizing Cyber Coercion: The 2014 North Korean Operation Against Sony’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 40/7 (December 2017), 898–926.

³³ Marczak et al. ‘Hide and Seek: Tracking NSO group’s Pegasus Spyware to Operations in 45 countries’, Citizen Lab Research Report 113, September (Toronto: University of Toronto 2018), 14–15.

³⁴ Steven Feldstein, ‘The Global Expansion of AI Surveillance’ Sept. (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 2019), https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/09/17/global-expansion-of-ai-surveillance-pub-79847.

³⁵ Samantha Bradshaw, Hannah Bailey and Philip Howard, ‘Industrialized Disinformation: 2020 Global Inventory of Organized Social Media Manipulation’, Jan. (Oxford: Oxford Internet Institute, University of Oxford 2021).

³⁷ This argument has been most famously laid out by Thomas Rid, ‘Cyber War Will Not Take Place’, Journal of Strategic Studies 35/1 (February 2012), 5–32 and Erik Gartzke, ‘The Myth of Cyberwar: Bringing War in Cyberspace Back Down to Earth’ International Security 38/2 (Fall 2013), 41–73. For excellent review of this extensive literature, see Samuel Zilincik and Isabelle Duyvesteyn, ‘Strategic Studies and Cyber Warfare’, Journal of Strategic Studies 46/4 (2023), 836–857.

³⁸ Rid, ‘Cyber war’; Ben Buchanan, The Hacker and the State: Cyber Attacks and the New Normal of Geopolitics (Cambridge: Harvard UP 2020).

³⁹ Richard J. Harknett and Max Smeets, ‘Cyber Campaigns and Strategic Outcomes’, Journal of Strategic Studies 45:4 (2022), 534–567; Erica D. Borghard and Shawn W. Lonergan, ‘The Logic of Coercion in Cyberspace’, Security Studies 26/3 (2017), 452–481.

⁴⁰ Brandon Valeriano, Benjamin M. Jensen, and Ryan C. Maness. Cyber Strategy: The Evolving Character of Power and Coercion (Oxford: OUP, 2018).

⁴¹ Buchanan, The Hacker and the State, 3.

⁴² Warwick Ashford, ‘African bank foils suspected North Korean cyber attack’, Computer Weekly, 6 August 2019, https://www.computerweekly.com/news/252467937/African-bank-foils-suspected-North-Korean-cyber-attack.

⁴³ Shane Harris, ‘U.S. blames North Korea for “WannaCry” cyberattack’, Wall Street Journal, 19 December 2017, https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-blames-north-korea-for-wannacry-cyberattack-1513701911.

⁴⁴ Zacharia Zelalem, ‘An Egyptian cyber attack on Ethiopia by hackers is the latest strike over the Grand Dam’, Quartz Africa, 27 June 2020, https://qz.com/africa/1874343/egypt-cyber-attack-on-ethiopia-is-strike-over-the-grand-dam/.

⁴⁵ Frederick Cooper, Africa Since 1940 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 2002).

⁴⁶ Soulé, ‘“Africa +1” summit diplomacy and the “new scramble” narrative’.

⁴⁷ See, for example, Brandon Valeriano, et al, 2018. Cyber Strategy.

⁴⁸ Gagliardone, China, Africa and the Future of the Internet, 74–78.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Gagliardone, China, Africa and the Future of the Internet, 78.

⁵² Felix Horne and Cynthia Wong, ‘“They know everything we do”: telecom and internet surveillance in Ethiopia’, Human Rights Watch, 14 March 2014.

⁵³ See Meservey, ‘Government Buildings in Africa’.

⁵⁴ Morgan Marquis-Boire, Bill Marczak, Claudio Guanieri, and John Scott-Railton, ‘You Only Click Twice. FinFisher’s Global Proliferation’, Research-targeted threats, March (Toronto: University of Toronto Citizen Lab, 2013).

⁵⁵ Bill Marczak, John Scott-Railton, and Sarah McKune, ‘Hacking Team Reloaded? U.S.-based Ethiopian Journalists Again Targeted with Spyware’, March (Toronto: University of Toronto Citizen Lab, 2015).

⁵⁶ Bill Marczak, Geoffrey Alexander, Sarah McKune, John Scott-Railton, and Ron Deibert, ‘Champing at the Cyberbit. Ethiopian Dissidents Targeted with New Commercial Spyware’, December (Toronto: University of Toronto Citizen Lab, 2017).

⁵⁷ Matthew Dalton, ‘Telecom deal by China’s ZTE, Huawei in Ethiopia faces criticism’, Wall Street Journal, 6 January 2014, https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303653004579212092223818288.

⁵⁸ Steven Feldstein, ‘Testimony Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission-Hearing on China’s Strategic Aims in Africa’, U.S. Government U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, May (Washington DC: 2020), https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Feldstein_Testimony.pdf.

⁵⁹ Joan Tilouine and Ghalia Kadiri, ‘A Addis-Abeba, le siège de l’Union africaine espionné par Pékin’, Le Monde, 28 January 2018, https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2018/01/26/a-addis-abeba-le-siege-de-l-union-africaine-espionne-par-les-chinois_5247521_3212.html.

⁶⁰ Eric Olander, ‘Why China is pushing back so hard against spying accusations in Africa’, Medium, 17 February 2018, https://medium.com/@eolander/why-china-is-pushing-back-so-hard-against-spying-accusations-in-africa-ae241751ff1e; Khulekani Magubane, ‘China “had no need to spy” on AU headquarters’, Business Day, 5 February 2018, https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/world/africa/2018-02-05-china-had-no-need-to-spy-on-au-headquarters.

⁶¹ Mailyn Fidler, ‘African Union bugged by China: Cyber espionage as evidence of strategic shifts’, Council on Foreign Relations, 7 March 2018, https://www.cfr.org/blog/african-union-bugged-china-cyber-espionage-evidence-strategic-shifts.

⁶² Mailyn Fidler, ‘African Union bugged by China: Cyber espionage as evidence of strategic shifts’.

⁶³ Africa Center for Strategic Studies, ‘A light in Libya’s fog of disinformation’, 9 October 2020, https://africacenter.org/spotlight/light-libya-fog-disinformation/.

⁶⁴ Africa Center for Strategic Studies, ‘A light in Libya’s fog of disinformation’.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Nathaniel Greenberg, ‘Russia opens digital interference front in Libya’, Middle East Research and Information Project, April 10 2019, https://merip.org/2019/10/russia-opens-digital-interference-front-in-libya/#_edn1.

⁶⁷ Declan Walsh and Suliman Ali Zway, “A Facebook war: Libyans battle on the streets and on screens’, New York Times, 4 September 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/04/world/middleeast/libya-facebook.html.

⁶⁸ Matt Herbert, ‘Libya’s war becomes a tech battleground’, Institute for Security Studies, 8 October 2019,https://issafrica.org/iss-today/libyas-war-becomes-a-tech-battleground.

⁶⁹ Stanford Internet Observatory, ‘Libya: Presidential and parliamentary elections scene setter’, 2 October 2019, <https://cyber.fsi.stanford.edu/io/news/libya-scene-setter.

⁷⁰ Stanford Internet Observatory, ‘Libya: Presidential and parliamentary elections scene setter’.

⁷¹ Nathaniel Greenberg, ‘Russia opens digital interference front in Libya’.

⁷² Digital Forensics Research Lab, ‘Facebook disabled assets linked to Egypt and UAE-based firms’, Medium, 14 August 2019, https://medium.com/dfrlab/facebook-disabled-assets-linked-to-egypt-and-uae-based-firms-a232d9effc32.

⁷³ Social Strategic Studies, ‘Information warfare in Libya: the online advance of Khalifa Haftar’, Report, May (Rome: Centro Studi Internazionali and Culture Digital Media 2019).

⁷⁴ Wolfram Lacher, ‘Drones, deniability, and disinformation: Warfare in Libya and the new international disorder’, War on the Rocks, 3 March 2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/03/drones-deniability-and-disinformation-warfare-in-libya-and-the-new-international-disorder/.

⁷⁵ Thomas Arnold, ‘Exploiting chaos: Russia in Libya’, Center of Strategic and International Studies, 23 September 2020, https://www.csis.org/blogs/post-soviet-post/exploiting-chaos-russia-libya.

⁷⁶ Pierra Vaux, ‘On the situation in Libya’, 12 September 2019, The Interpreter, https://www.interpretermag.com/on-the-situation-in-libya/.

⁷⁷ Pierra Vaux, ‘On the situation in Libya’.

⁷⁸ Shelby Grossman et al., ‘Evidence of Russia-linked Influence Operations in Africa’.

⁷⁹ Shelby Grossman et al., ‘Blurring the Lines of Media Authenticity’.

⁸⁰ Ibid. The poem read: ‘Yes, he really hafterised it/from Ghat to Sebha ./and He ruined it ./The green channel, he Hafterized it’.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Frederic Werhey, ‘This war is out of our hands: the internationalization of Libya’s Post-2011: Conflicts from proxies to boots on the ground’, New America Foundation, 11 September 2020, https://d1y8sb8igg2f8e.cloudfront.net/documents/This_War_is_Out_of_Our_Hands_FINAL.pdf.

⁸³ For a good discussion of these limits in the context of broader economic policy in Africa, see Jon Phillips, ‘Who’s in Charge of Sino-African Resource Politics? Situating African State Agency in Ghana’, African Affairs, 118/470 (October 2019), 101–124.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Nate D. F. Allen

Nate D. F. Allen is Associate Professor of Security Studies at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies at the National Defense University and Research Fellow at Security Institute for Governance and Leadership at South Africa’s Stellenbosch University. His expertise includes cyber issues, emerging technology, civil-military relations, and regional security partnerships, primarily in North and West Africa.

Matthew La Lime

Matthew La Lime interests include development, the postcolonial state, and emerging technology in Africa. He received his Ph.D. in African History from Georgetown University. His research in Guinea and Senegal has been supported by the Fulbright and Boren Programs.