Deterrence asymmetry and strategic stability in Europe

ABSTRACT

Strategic stability can mitigate the security dilemma that mutual deterrence efforts produce. If two parties agree on what the most destabilising peacetime or wartime behaviour is, they are more likely to agree on risk-reduction measures. However, contemporary security actors rarely share views of what constitutes destabilising behaviour, given political disagreements and asymmetries in deterrent measures due to varying military capabilities, technology adaptations and threat perceptions. This paper examines the deterrence dynamics between NATO and Russia, demonstrating how asymmetric views of strategic stability add potential security dilemmas to the already-severe political confrontation between them.

KEYWORDS:

• NATO
• Russia
• deterrence
• strategic stability
• security
• Nordic

Acknowledgments

The author is grateful for comments provided by the anonymous reviewers, and to the Center for International Security and Cooperation Seminar at Stanford University, the Center for Global Security and Cooperation Seminar Series at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and the Oslo Nuclear Project workshop on ‘Deterrence and Reassurance in the Nordic region’ for providing helpful advice in the preparation of this paper. The author reports no conflict of interest in conducting this work.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

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² Kremlin, ‘Presidential Address to Federal Assembly’, 29 Feb. 2024, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/messages/70565; Aleksey Arbatov, “The Ukrainian Crisis and Strategic Stability’, Polis. Political Studies 4/10 (2022), 10–31.

³ Richard Milne and Andy Bounds, ‘“Naïve” Europe Must Spend More to Deter Russia, Says Danish PM’, Financial Times, 27 Feb.2024).

⁴ Lidia Kelly, ‘Russia’s Military Reforms Respond to NATO’s Expansion, Ukraine Chief of General Staff’, Reuters, 24 Jan. 2023, sec. Europe.

⁵ Lawrence Freedman, ‘The Russo – Ukrainian War and the Durability of Deterrence’, Survival 65/6 (2023), 7–36; Bryan Frederick et al., ‘Pathways to Russian Escalation against NATO from the Ukraine War’, July (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 2022).

⁶ Robert Jervis, ‘Cooperation under the Security Dilemma’, World Politics 30/2 (1978), 167–214.

⁷ Henry Foy et al., ‘Why NATO Members are Sounding the Alarm on Russia’s Aggressive Posture’, Financial Times, 16 Feb. 2024.

⁸ Kremlin, ‘Presidential Address to Federal Assembly’.

⁹ Henry Foy, Demetri Sevastopulo and Ben Hall, ‘Russia’s “Dangerous” Move Raises Fears of New Nuclear Arms Race’, Financial Times, 24 Feb. 2023.

¹⁰ ‘Russia Says It Will Take Military-Technical Steps in Response to Sweden’s NATO Accession’, Reuters, 28 Feb. 2024, sec. Europe.

¹¹ James Cameron. (2024). ‘Deterrence, reassurance, and strategic stability: The enduring relevance of Johan Jørgen Holst’. Journal of Strategic Studies, 1–24. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2024.2321135

¹² Bonnie S. Glaser, Jessica Chen Weiss and Thomas J. Christensen, ‘Taiwan and the True Sources of Deterrence’, Foreign Affairs (30 Nov. 2023); Shipin Tang, ‘The Security Dilemma: A Conceptual Analysis’, Security Studies 18 (2009), 587–623; Henrik Stålhane Hiim, M. Taylor Fravel and Magnus Langset Trøan, ‘The Dynamics of an Entangled Security Dilemma: China’s Changing Nuclear Posture’, International Security 47/4 (2023), 147–87; Ziegler (2020/2021

¹³ Dave Johnson, ‘Russia’s Deceptive Nuclear Policy’, Survival 63/3 (2021), 123–42.

¹⁴ Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 1985); Charles L. Glaser, ‘Why Do Strategists Disagree about the Requirements of Strategic Nuclear Deterrence?’, in Lynn Eden and Steven E. Miller (eds.), Nuclear Arguments Understanding the Strategic Nuclear Arms and Arms Control Debates, (Ithaca: Cornell UP 1989), 109–72.

¹⁵ Ben B. Fischer, A Cold War Conundrum: The 1983 Soviet War Scare, Intelligence Monograph (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1997); Susan Colbourn, Euromissiles (Ithaca: Cornell UP 2022).

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¹⁷ For an examination of the sources of Russian behavior, see Elias Götz and Jørgen Staun, ‘Why Russia Attacked Ukraine: Strategic Culture and Radicalized Narratives’, Contemporary Security Policy 43/3 (2022), 482–97.

¹⁸ Frederick et al., ‘Pathways to Russian Escalation against NATO from the Ukraine War’; Bryan Frederick, Mark Cozad and Alexandra Stark, ‘Escalation in the War in Ukraine: Lessons Learned and Risks for the Future’, Sep. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 2023).

¹⁹ Alberque, ‘Strategic Stability in Europe after the Russian Invasion of Ukraine’.

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²² Alexander Lanoszka and Luis Simon, ‘The Post-INF European Missile Balance: Thinking About NATO’s Deterrence Strategy’, Texas National Security Review 3/3 (2020), 12–30. One exception is Richard Sokolsky, ‘Not Quiet on NATOs Eastern Front’, Foreign Affairs (29 June 2016).

²³ Joshua Posaner, ‘NATO Official Warns West: Be Ready for Anything’, Politico, 17 Jan. 2024. https://www.politico.eu/article/nato-needs-warfighting-transformation-says-military-chief/.

²⁴ See, for example, Sergei Rogov, ‘Yadernoye sderzhivaniye: Segodniya i zaftra’, Krasnaia Zvezda 14 December (1993); A.V. Nedelin, V.I. Levshin and M.E. Sosnovsky, ‘O primenenii Iadernogo Oruzhiia Dlia Deeskalatsii Voennikh Deistvii’, Voyennaya Mysl 3 (1999); M.A. Gareev, ‘Problemy strategicheskogo sderzhivaniya v sovremennykh usloviyakh’, Voennaia Mysl 4 (2009); S.A. Bogdanov and S.G. Chekinov, ‘Strategicheskoe sderzhivanie i natsional’naia bezopasnost’ Rossii na sovermennom etape, Voyennaya Mysl 3 (2012). For an overview of the concept’s evolution, see Kristin Ven Bruusgaard, ‘Russian Strategic Deterrence’, Survival 58/4 (2016), 7–26.

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²⁶ Dmitry Trenin, ‘It’s time for Russia to give the West a nuclear reminder’, Russia in Global Affairs (Opinion), (3 April 2024)

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²⁹ David E. Sanger et al., ‘U.S. Makes Contingency Plans in Case Russia Uses its Most Powerful Weapons’, The New York Times, 23 Mar. 2022., sec. U.S.

³⁰ Mallory King, ‘New Challenges in Cross-Domain Deterrence’, Apr. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 2018); Eric Gartzke and Jon R. Lindsay, Cross-Domain Deterrence: Strategy in an Era of Complexity (Oxford: Oxford UP 2019); Jim Garamone, ‘Concept of Integrated Deterrence Will Be Key to National Defense Strategy, DOD Official Says’, DoD News, 20 Dec. (2023); James Wirtz and Jeffrey Larsen, ‘Who Does Deterrence?’ RUSI Journal 168/6 (2023), 14–20.

³¹ Gartzke and Lindsay, Cross-Domain Deterrence.

³² James Johnson, ‘“Catalytic Nuclear War” in the Age of Artificial Intelligence & Autonomy: Emerging Military Technology and Escalation Risk between Nuclear-Armed States’, Journal of Strategic Studies (2021), advance online publication, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2020.1867541

³³ Dmitry (Dima) Adamsky, ‘Cross-Domain Coercion: The Current Russian Art of Strategy’, IFRI Report Nov. (Paris: IFRI 2015). See also Clint Reach et al., ‘Russia’s Evolution toward a Unified Strategic Operation: The Influence of Geography and Conventional Capacity’, Feb. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 2023), 34–36.

³⁴ Kristin Ven Bruusgaard, ‘Russian Nuclear Strategy and Conventional Inferiority’, Journal of Strategic Studies 44/1 (2021), 3–35; Hiim, Fravel and Trøan, ‘The Dynamics of an Entangled Security Dilemma’.

³⁵ Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon (Ithaca: Cornell UP 1989); Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better, Adelphi Papers Number 171 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies 1981).

³⁶ Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton UP 1976), 58–113.

³⁷ Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense Toward a Theory of National Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1961).

³⁸ Richard Ned Lebow, ‘The Deterrence Deadlock: Is there a Way Out?’, in Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein (eds.), Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 1985).

³⁹ Arthur Chan, Michael J. Mazarr, Alyssa Demus, Bryan Frederick, Alireza Nader, Stephanie Pezard, Julia A. Thompson and Elina Treyger, ‘What Deters and Why: Exploring Requirements for Effective Deterrence of Interstate Aggression’ (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 2018).

⁴⁰ Robert Jervis, ‘Rational Deterrence: Theory and Evidence’, World Politics 41/2 (1989), 183–207.

⁴¹ James M. Acton, ‘Escalation through Entanglement: How the Vulnerability of Command-and-Control Systems Raises the Risk of an Inadvertent Nuclear War’, International Security 43/1 (2018), 56–99.

⁴² Sechser, Narang and Talmadge, ‘Emerging Technologies and Strategic Stability’.

⁴³ Kristin Ven Bruusgaard and Jaclyn A. Kerr, ‘Crisis Stability and the Impact of the Information Ecosystem’, in Herb Lin, Harold Trinkunas and Benjamin Loehrke (eds.), Three Tweets to Midnight: Effects of the Global Information Ecosystem on the Risks of Nuclear Conflict (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press 2020).

⁴⁴ Thomas C. Schelling and Morton H. Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control (New York: Twentieth Century Fund 1961).

⁴⁵ John W.R. Lepingwell, ‘START II and the Politics of Arms Control in Russia’, International Security 20/2 (1995), 63–92.

⁴⁶ James M. Acton, ‘Reclaiming Strategic Stability’, Feb. (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2013), 117–118.

⁴⁷ Sarah Bidgood, ‘What We Talk about When We Talk about US–Russia Strategic Stability’, Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament 6/1 (2023), 9–27.

⁴⁸ Kühn, ‘Strategic Stability in the 21st Century’.

⁴⁹ See, for example, A.G. Savelyev, Politicheskie i Voenno-Strategicheskie Aspekty Dogovor SNV-1 i SNV-2 (Moscow: Rossiiskaya Akademiya Nauk Institut Mirovoi Ekonomiki i Mezhdunarodnykh Otnoshenii 2000).

⁵⁰ Even Hellan Larsen, ‘Deliberate Nuclear First Use in an Era of Asymmetry: A Game Theoretical Approach’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 68/5 (2023), advance online publication, https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027231185154; Tong Zhao, ‘Conventional Challenges to Strategic Stability: Chinese Perceptions of Hypersonic Technology and the Security Dilemma’, July (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2018).

⁵¹ Sechser, Narang and Talmadge, ‘Emerging Technologies and Strategic Stability’; Andrew Futter and Benjamin Zala, ‘Strategic Non-Nuclear Weapons and the Onset of a Third Nuclear Age’, European Journal of International Security 6/3 (2021), 257–77.

⁵² Cameron, ‘Deterrence, reassurance, and strategic stability: The enduring relevance of Johan Jørgen Holst’.

⁵³ Bruusgaard, ‘Russian Strategic Deterrence’.

⁵⁴ Fiona S. Cunningham, ‘Strategic Substitution: China’s Search for Coercive Leverage in the Information Age’, International Security 47/1 (2022), 46–92.

⁵⁵ Garamone, ‘Concept of Integrated Deterrence Will Be Key to National Defense Strategy, DOD Official Says’.

⁵⁶ NATO, ‘Strengthened Resilience Commitment (2021)’, June (Brussels: NATO 2021), https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_185340.htm.

⁵⁷ Dave Johnson, ‘Russia’s Deceptive Nuclear Policy’.

⁵⁸ NATO, ‘The Warsaw Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Warsaw, 9 July’ (Brussels: NATO 2016); NATO, ‘Brussels Summit Declaration Issued by NATO Heads of State and Government’, July (Brussels: NATO 2018); ‘Vilnius Summit Communiqué Issued by NATO Heads of State and Government’, July (Brussels: NATO 2023).

⁵⁹ Mathieu Boulegue, ‘The Russia–NATO Relationship between a Rock and a Hard Place: How the “Defensive Inferiority Syndrome” Is Increasing the Potential for Error’, Journal of Slavic Military Studies 30/3 (2017), 361–80.

⁶⁰ ‘NATO 2022: Strategic Concept’, June (Brussels: NATO 2022).

⁶¹ Andrew Gray, Johnny Cotton and Sabine Siebold, ‘NATO’s Stoltenberg: Ukraine War Must End Russian Cycle of Aggression’, Reuters, 23 Feb. 2023.

⁶² David A. Shlapak and Michael W. Johnson, ‘Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern Flank: Wargaming the Defense of the Baltics’, Jan. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 2016).

⁶³ Brad Roberts, The Case for US Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century (Redwood City, CA: Stanford UP 2016); U.S. Department of Defense, ‘Nuclear Posture Review Report’, (2018), https://www.defense.gov/News/SpecialReports/2018NuclearPostureReview.aspx; Vergun, David, ‘Officials Outline Strategy in Nuclear Posture Review’, DoD News, 24 Feb. 2023.

⁶⁴ Brett Simpson, ‘Scandinavia is Preparing for War’, Foreign Policy, 9 Feb. 2024.

⁶⁵ Foy et al., ‘Why NATO Members are Sounding the Alarm on Russia’s Aggressive Posture’.

⁶⁶ Gregory Weaver, ‘The Urgent Imperative to Maintain NATO’s Nuclear Deterrence’, NATO Review, 29 September (2023).

⁶⁷ Kofman, Michael, Anya Fink and Jeffrey Edmonds, ‘Russian Strategy for Escalation Management: Evolution of Key Concepts’, CNA Report, April (Arlington, VA: CNA 2020).

⁶⁸ NATO (2023c).

⁶⁹ Janice Gross Stein, ‘Escalation Management in Ukraine: “Learning by Doing” in Response to the “Threat That Leaves Something to Chance”’, Texas National Security Review 6/3 (2023).

⁷⁰ Sergei A. Karaganov, ‘A Difficult but Necessary Decision’, Russia in Global Affairs (blog), 13 June 2023.

⁷¹ Hanna Notte, ‘The West Cannot Cure Russia’s Nuclear Fever’, War on the Rocks (blog), 18 July 2023.

⁷² Dmitry Trenin, ‘It’s time for Russia to give the West a nuclear reminder’.

⁷³ The President of the Russian Federation, ‘Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence’, Executive Order, 8 June (Moscow: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 2020), https://archive.mid.ru/en/web/guest/foreign_policy/international_safety/disarmament/-/asset_publisher/rp0fiUBmANaH/content/id/4152094.

⁷⁴ Kristin Ven Bruusgaard, ‘Understanding Putin’s Nuclear Decision-Making’, War on the Rocks (commentary), 22 March 2022.

⁷⁵ Paul K. Davis et al., ‘Exploring the Role Nuclear Weapons Could Play in Deterring Russian Threats to the Baltics,’ Research Report (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 2019).

⁷⁶ Wilton Park, ‘NATO’S New “Deterrence Baseline” and the Future of Extended Nuclear Deterrence’, Conference Report WP3131, July (West Sussex, UK: Park 2023).

⁷⁷ U.S. Department of Defense, ‘Statement on the Fielding of the W76–2 Low-Yield Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile Warhead’, 4 Feb. 2020

⁷⁸ Claire Mills, ‘Increasing the Cap on the UK’s Nuclear Stockpile’, Integrated Review 2021, House of Commons Library Research Briefing, 19 Mar. 2021.

⁷⁹ Associated Press, ‘NATO Will Hold Major Nuclear Exercise as Russia Plans to Pull Out of Test-Ban Treaty’, RadioFreeEurope/Radio Liberty, 12 Oct. 2023.

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⁸¹ Sean Monaghan, ‘Five Steps NATO should take after the Nord Stream Pipeline Attack’, Oct. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies 2022).

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⁸³ Roger N. McDermott and Tor Bukkvoll, ‘Tools of Future Wars: Russia Is Entering the Precision-Strike Regime’, Journal of Slavic Military Studies 31/2 (2018), 191–213; Dmitry Stefanovich, ‘Proliferation and Threats of Reconnaissance-Strike Systems: A Russian Perspective’, Nonproliferation Review 27/1–3 (January 2020), 97–107.

⁸⁴ James Cameron, ‘Putin Just Bragged about Russia’s Nuclear Weapons: Here is the Real Story’, Washington Post, 5 Mar. 2018.

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⁸⁶ President of the Russian Federation, ‘Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence’.

⁸⁷ Stefanovich, ‘Proliferation and Threats of Reconnaissance-Strike Systems’.

⁸⁸ Timothy L. Thomas, ‘Russian Forecasts of Future War’, Military Review, May-June (2019), 84–93.

⁸⁹ Johan Norberg, ‘Training for War: Russia’s Strategic-Level Military Exercises 2009–2017’, FOI Report FOI-R-4627-R, Oct. (Stockholm: FOI 2018).

⁹⁰ From the Russian perspective, it would make little sense in such an attack for NATO not to target Russia’s nuclear capabilities, as per Krista Langeland, Anthony Vassalo, Clint Reach, Christopher Dictus and Gabrielle Tarini, ‘Building U.S. Responses to Russia’s Threats to Use Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons: A Game Theoretic Analysis of Brinkmanship’ (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 2023), 19.

⁹¹ Reach et al., ‘Russia’s Evolution toward a Unified Strategic Operation’, 3. See also Jacek Durkalec’,Russian net assessment and the European Security Balance’, Livermore Papers on Global Security, No 13 (March 2024).

⁹² Ibid., 6.

⁹³ Matt Murphy, ‘NATO Plans Huge Upgrade in Rapid Reaction Force’, BBC News, 27 June 2022.

⁹⁴ Konstantin Sivkov, ‘Ukraine Is Just the Beginning’, Military Review, May (2022); Yulia Kesaieva, ‘Russia: Putin Warns of “Problems” with Neighboring Finland after West “Dragged it into NATO”’, CNN, 17 Dec. 2023.

⁹⁵ Thomas, ‘Russian Forecasts of Future War’.

⁹⁶ Vergun, ‘Officials Outline Strategy in Nuclear Posture Review’.

⁹⁷ The 2023 Nuclear Notebook assesses a Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons arsenal of some 1,816 warheads. See Hans M. Kristensen, Matt Korda and Eliana Reynolds, ‘Russian Nuclear Weapons, 2023’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 79/3 (2023), 174–99.

⁹⁸ United Nations, ‘Deployment of Nuclear Weapons to Belarus Debated in First Committee, as Delegates Rethink Global Security’, Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, accessed 1 Apr. 2024, https://press.un.org/en/2023/gadis3712.doc.htm.

⁹⁹ NATO, ‘Secretary General: NATO Response to INF Treaty Demise Will Be Measured and Responsible’, Aug (Brussels: Nato 2019).

¹⁰⁰ Sergei A. Karaganov and Dmitry V. Suslov, ‘The New Understanding and Ways to Strengthen Multilateral Strategic Stability’, Russia in Global Affairs Dec. (2019), 5.

¹⁰¹ Weaver, ‘The Urgent Imperative to Maintain NATO’s Nuclear Deterrence’.

¹⁰² Dave Johnson, ‘Russia’s Conventional Precision Strike Capabilities, Regional Crises, and Nuclear Thresholds’, Livermore Papers on Global Security (Feb. 2017).

¹⁰³ V.M. Burenok and O.B. Achasov, ‘Neyadernoye Sderzhivaniye’ [Non-nuclear Deterrence], Voennaia Mysl 12 (2007), 12–15; V.I. Polegayev and V.V. Alferov, ‘O Neyadernom Sderzhivanii, Ego Roli i Meste v Sisteme Strategicheskogo Sderzhivaniya’, Voennaia Mysl (2015), 3–10; S.A. Ponomaryev, V.V. Poddubniy and V.I. Polegayev, ‘Kriterii i Pokazateli Neyadernogo Sderzhivaniya: Voenniy Aspekt’, Voennaia Mysl (2019), 97–100.

¹⁰⁴ Marina Favaro and Heather Williams, ‘False Sense of Supremacy: Emerging Technologies, the War in Ukraine, and the Risk of Nuclear Escalation’, Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament 6/1 (2023), 28–46; Giles David Arceneaux, ‘Whether to Worry: Nuclear Weapons in the Russia – Ukraine War’, Contemporary Security Policy 44/4 (2023), 1–15.

¹⁰⁵ Reach et al., ‘Russia’s Evolution toward a Unified Strategic Operation’.

¹⁰⁶ Christopher Woody, ‘US B-52s and Fighters from what May soon Be NATO’s Newest Member Teamed Up for a First-of-its-Kind Operation’, Business Insider, 18 Aug. 2022.

¹⁰⁷ Götz and Staun, ‘Why Russia Attacked Ukraine’.

¹⁰⁸ Stefanovich, ‘Proliferation and Threats of Reconnaissance-Strike Systems’; Dmitry (Dima), Adamsky, ‘Moscow’s Aerospace Theory of Victory’, Feb. (Arlington, VA: CNA 2021). https://www.cna.org/reports/2021/03/moscows-aerospace-theory-of-victory.

¹⁰⁹ Carl Rehberg, ‘Integrated Air and Missile Defense: Early Lessons from the Russia – Ukraine War’, Jun. (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments 2022).

¹¹⁰ NATO, ‘NATO’s Military Presence in the East of the Alliance’ (Brussels: NATO), accessed 1 Jan. 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_136388.htm.

¹¹¹ Kremlin, ‘Address by the President of the Russian Federation’, 1 Mar. 2022, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67843; Sergey Lavrov, ‘Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s remarks and answers to questions at the Primakov Readings International Forum, Moscow, December 7, 2022’ Dec. (Moscow: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 2022), https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1842506/.

¹¹² Clint Reach et al., ‘Russian Military Forecasting and Analysis: The Military-Political Situation and Military Potential in Strategic Planning’, June (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 2022).

¹¹³ Kesaieva, ‘Putin Warns of “Problems” with Neighboring Finland after West “Dragged it into NATO”’; Konrad Muzyka, ‘Russian Forces in the Western Military District’, June (Arlington, VA: CNA 2021.

¹¹⁴ Reach et al., ‘Russia’s Evolution toward a Unified Strategic Operation’.

¹¹⁵ Forsvaret, Focus 2017: The Norwegian Intelligence Service Assessment of Current Security Challenges (Oslo: Etterretningstjenesten 2017).

¹¹⁶ Forsvaret, ‘A Strategic Mistake,’ in Focus 2023: The Norwegian Intelligence Service Assessment of Current Security Challenges (Oslo: Etterretningstjenesten 2023), Chap. 1.

¹¹⁷ Guy Faulconbridge, ‘Russia Warns of Nuclear, Hypersonic Deployment if Sweden and Finland Join NATO’, Reuters, 14 Apr. 2022.

¹¹⁸ Michael Ruhle, ‘Deterring Hybrid Threats: The Need for a More Rational Debate’, ETH Zurich 16 Aug. 2019.

¹¹⁹ NATO, ‘(NATO 2022): Strategic Concept’.

¹²⁰ Lilly Pijnenburg Muller, ‘Military Offensive Cyber-Capabilities: Small-State Perspectives’, Policy Brief 2019-1 (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs 2019).

¹²¹ J. Andrés Gannon, Erik Gartzke, Jon R. Lindsay and Peter Schram, ‘The Shadow of Deterrence: Why Capable Actors Engage in Contests Short of War’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 68/2–3 (2023) advance online publication, https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027231166345.

¹²² Rod Thornton and Marina Miron, ‘Winning Future Wars: Russian Offensive Cyber and Its Vital Importance; in Moscow’s Strategic Thinking’, Cyber Defense Review 7/3 (2022), 117–35.

¹²³ Herbert Lin, ‘Russian Cyber Operations in the Invasion of Ukraine’, Cyber Defense Review 7/4 (2022), 31–46. See also Eggen, ‘Designing around NATO’s deterrence: Russia’s Nordic information confrontation strategy’.

¹²⁴ Thomas, ‘Russian Forecasts of Future War’.

¹²⁵ Kremlin, ‘Voennaia Doktrina Rossiiskoy Federatsii’, 5 Feb (Moscow: Kremlin 2010); Kremlin, ‘Strategiya Natsionalnoy Bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii’, Dec. (Moscow: Prezident Rossiiskoi Federatsii 2015); Kremlin, ‘Osnovy Goudarstvennoy Politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii v Oblasti Yadernogo Sderzhivaniya’, Ukaz No. 355 (Moscow: Prezident Rossiiskoi Federatsii 2020); Kremlin, ‘Ukaz o Strategii Natsionalnoy Bezopasnosti Rossiiskoy Federatsii’.

¹²⁶ Kremlin, ‘Voennaia Doktrina Rossiiskoi Federatsii’; Kremlin, ‘Ukaz o Strategii Natsionalnoy Bezopasnosti Rossiiskoy Federatsii’.

¹²⁷ Tracey German, ‘Harnessing Protest Potential: Russian Strategic Culture and the Colored Revolutions’, Contemporary Security Policy 41/4 (2020), 541–63.

¹²⁸ Patrick Reevell, ‘Russia Makes Sweeping Demands for Security Guarantees from US amid Ukraine Tensions’, ABC News, 17 Dec. 2021.

¹²⁹ Kremlin, ‘Voennaia Doktrina Rossiiskoy Federatsii’.

¹³⁰ A.A. Bartosh, ‘NATO Hybridization as a Threat to National Security of Russia’, Vestnik Akademii Voennykh Nauk 1/62 (2018); German, ‘Harnessing Protest Potential’. For a discussion of the adaptation of hybrid warfare concepts in the Western discourse, see Chiara Libiseller, ‘“Hybrid Warfare” as an Academic Fashion’, Journal of Strategic Studies 46/4 (2023), 858–80.

¹³¹ Ivan Timofeev, ‘Hybrid War and Hybrid Peace’, Oct. (Moscow: Russian International Affairs Council 2023); Sivkov, ‘Ukraine Is Just the Beginning’; Reuters, ‘Russia’s Lavrov Says US and NATO Are Direct Participants in Ukraine War’, Alarabiya News, 1 Dec. 2022

¹³² Arbatov, ‘The Ukrainian Crisis and Strategic Stability’.

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Notes on contributors

Kristin Ven Bruusgaard

Kristin Ven Bruusgaard is the Director of the Norwegian Intelligence School. Her research focuses on Russian and Soviet deterrence strategy and nuclear weapons, comparative deterrence strategy, security dilemmas and European security, including Northern Europe. She holds a Ph.D. from King’s College London, an MA in Security Studies from Georgetown University and a BA (Hons) in Politics and International Studies from Warwick University.