The weakest link: The vulnerability of U.S. and allied global information networks in the nuclear age

ABSTRACT

The arrival of the nuclear age highlighted the inadequacy of U.S. and allied information networks for transmitting vital messages across the globe. Submarine cables could be cut and radio easily jammed. U.S. and allied officials looked to emerging space technologies to compensate for the inadequacies of radio and submarine cables and to reduce their dependence on terrestrial telecommunications hardware. But satellites were also vulnerable and insufficient for meeting all communications requirements. Consequently, creating layered telecommunications networks that stretched from under the sea, across the land, and into space emerged as the optimal strategy for strengthening information security.

KEYWORDS:

• Information security
• satellites
• submarine cables
• electronic warfare
• command and control

Acknowledgments

The author would like to thank Austin Carson, Fiona Cunningham, John Krige, Bill Leslie, Alison McManus, Jeff Rogg, and Jonathan Winkler for very helpful comments on early drafts of this article. Timothy Sayle deserves much gratitude for alerting the author to the existence of the Canadian Foreign Intelligence History Project whose archival collection made this project possible. Finally, the author would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers whose comments were very helpful in improving the article.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

¹ ‘Speech Delivered by Major General Spencer B. Akin, Chief Signal Officer of the Army, to Army Field Forces Staff at Fort Monroe Virginia’, March 24, 1949, RG 0111, Entry A1 1043: Department of the Army, Office of the Chief, Administrative Records 1950–1960, Signal Corps Mobilization Plan, Container 17, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA hereafter).

² Here, the term ‘information networks’ refers to telecommunications technologies used for sending and receiving data.

³ I include both reliability and survivability as distinct attributes. The former refers to the dependability of a telecommunications technology under ordinary circumstances, whereas the latter pertains to its ability to function in the face of natural disaster or attack.

⁴ There is a growing body of scholarship that explores the nuclear age through the lenses of imperialism and de-colonization. For recent examples, see Gabrielle Hecht, Being Nuclear: Africans and the Global Uranium Trade (Cambridge: MIT Press 2014); Christopher Robert Hill, ‘Britain, West Africa, and “The New Nuclear Imperialism”: Decolonisation and development during French Tests’, Contemporary British History 22/2 (2019); Vincent J. Intondi, African Americans against the Bomb: Nuclear Weapons, Colonialism, and the Black Freedom Movement ;(Stanford, CA: Stanford UP 2015). For an in-depth history on the role of ‘invisible’ infrastructure and the American empire, see Daniel Immerwahr, How to Hide an Empire: A History of the Greater United States (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux 2019).

⁵ Canada was also an important political actor in shaping the telecommunications infrastructure of the transatlantic alliance as will be shown below. The United States and the United Kingdom receive the preponderance of attention because they were the only two Western allies with global command and control infrastructures.

⁶ I am specifically drawing attention to the infrastructural dimensions of information security. To date, much of the literature has focused on encryption with comparatively less focus on the security of the information technologies used for sending and receiving messages.

⁷ There is a growing body of scholarship that explores telecommunications and international security in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, but telecommunications during the Cold War remains an understudied topic. For studies of the security dimensions of American and British telecommunications in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, see Headrick, The Invisible Weapon; Jonathan Winkler, ‘Information Warfare in World War I’, The Journal of Military History 73/3 (2009); Jonathan Winkler, Nexus: Strategic Communications and American Security in World War I (Cambridge: Harvard UP 2013).

⁸ For an overview of submarine cables and the British Empire, see Paul Kennedy, ‘Imperial Cable Communications and Strategy, 1870–1914’, The English Historical Review, 86/341 (1971); Daniel Headrick, The Invisible Weapon: Telecommunications and International Politics, 1851–1945 (Oxford: Oxford UP 2012); Bruce Hunt, Imperial Science: Cable Telegraphy and Electrical Physics in the Victorian British Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 2022).

⁹ ‘Nuclear Blackout of Tactical Communications’, a report prepared by the United States Army Nuclear Agency, August 1976, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA044561.pdf.

¹⁰ ‘Preliminary Design of an Earth-Circling Spaceship’, RAND Corporation, May 2, 1946, https://www.rand.org/pubs/special_memoranda/SM11827.html.

¹¹ Arthur C. Clarke, Letter to the editor, ‘Peacetime Uses for V2’, Wireless World, February 1945.

¹² Headrick, Invisible Weapon, 17–18.

¹³ Ibid., 202–206.

¹⁴ For an overview of cable and radio security considerations in the First World War, see Winkler, ‘Information Warfare in World War I’. For the Second World War, see Headrick, Invisible Weapon, 243.

¹⁵ Prior to advent of submarine telephone cables, only telegraph lines extended across the oceans. Submarine telephone cables permitted secure voice conversations to take place between two people on opposite sides of the world rather than text only transmitted by telegraph.

¹⁶ ‘TAT-1 Opening Ceremony, September 25, 1956’, undated, History of the Atlantic Cable & Undersea Communications, https://atlantic-cable.com/Cables/1956TAT–1/.

¹⁷ Copy of a letter from the Chairman British Communications – Electronics Board, to the Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee, April 10, 1951, DEFE 5/30, UK National Archives (TNA hereafter). For a good overview of electronic warfare during the early Cold War, see Jonathan Winkler, ‘The Forgotten Menace of Electro-Magnetic Warfare in the Early Cold War’, Diplomatic History 42/2 (April 2018), 254–280.

¹⁸ Copy of a letter from the Chairman British Communications – Electronics Board, to the Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee, April 10, 1951/DEFE 5/30, TNA.

¹⁹ Memorandum from Frank Cowan to Jane Morris, August 9, 1955, CREST, CIA-RDP78S05450A000300010015-3.

²⁰ ‘Interruptions in the Transatlantic Cables’, UK JIC (59), 19^th meeting, March 11, 1959, Canadian Foreign Intelligence History Project Archives (CFIHP hereafter).

²¹ Initially, intelligence analysts observed that severing a cable required a lift capacity of about ten tons to bring the cable up from 200 fathoms, and they maintained that ‘it was doubtful if a trawler could manage such a lift’.

²² ‘The Threat from Soviet Maritime Forces’, Canadian JIC 531 (66), June 29, 1966, CFIHP.

²³ U.K. JIC Assessment, ‘Military activities and Capabilities of the Soviet and Satellite Fishing Fleets’, UK JIC (62) 66, October 9, 1962, CFIHP.

²⁴ Extract UK JIC (59) 19^th meeting, ‘Interruptions in the Transatlantic Cables’, CFIHP.

²⁵ Memorandum from Captain L.L. Atwood to JIC Secretary, ‘Transatlantic Cables’, March 28, 1960, DNI Documents – Distribution of Intelligence 60—2–29 to 64-08-31 from DNI files, CFIHP.

²⁶ U.K. JIC Assessment, ‘Military activities and Capabilities of the Soviet and Satellite Fishing Fleets’, UK JIC (62) 66, October 9, 1962, CFIHP.

²⁷ JIC Assessment, ‘The Threat from Soviet Maritime Forces’, June 29, 1966, CFIHP.

²⁸ For an in-depth perspective on inadvertent escalation stemming from insufficient command and control networks, see Barry Posen, Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 19.

²⁹ By 1970, the Tripartite Alert Network was largely replaced by the CRITICOMM network, which included American, British, and Canadian intelligence and defense organizations. See Memorandum, ‘Alternatives to the Tripartite Network’, March 17, 1970, IAC Docs 72-03-75-01, Tripartite Intelligence Alerts Communications, CFIHP. For a more information on CRITICOMM, see David Hatch, ‘Eisenhower and the NSA: An Introductory Survey’, in Forging the Shield: Eisenhower and National Security for the 21^st Century’, ed. Dennis Showalter (New York: Imprint Publishing 2005).

³⁰ Memorandum for the JIC, ‘Tripartite Intelligence Alerts Agreement – Interpretation and Procedures, January 19, 1959, JIC Docs 58-08 – 59-05, CFIHP.

³¹ Letter from P.H. Dean to Allen Dulles, April 30, 1959, JIC Docs 58-08 – 59-05, Tripartite Intelligence Alerts Agreement, CFIHP.

³² ‘Notes on the use of Tripartite Indications Communications System Tripartite Intelligence Agreement’, Annex A, JIC Docs 58-08 – 59-05, Tripartite Intelligence Alerts Agreement, CFIHP.

³³ N.K. O’Neill and K.J. Hughes, History of CBNRC Vol. IV, August 1987, 23, Canadian Foreign Intelligence History Project Archives, CFIHP.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Letter from Major HE Koehler to Director of Signals, Canadian Forces Headquarters, ‘Hydra Communications’, November 6, 1964, DND Documents – Hydra Communication System 64-10-01 to 65-02-26 from DND files.

³⁶ Message for Chairman JIC and Secretary JIC from Black, ‘Alerts’, February 2, 1959, JIC Docs 58-08 – 59-05, Tripartite Intelligence Alerts Agreement, CFIHP.

³⁷ The British and Canadian governments established arrangements with the U.K. GPO and Canadian Overseas Telecommunications Corporation to rent two circuits, one primary and one reserve. The primary was a high-grade circuit, costing £60,000 per year and had a transmission rate of over 60 words per minute. See letter from John Starnes to P. Dean, ‘May 28, 1959, JIC Doc 59-05-28, Tripartite Intelligence Alerts Communications, CFIHP.

³⁸ Cable, May 7, 1959, ‘Transatlantic Communications’, CFIHP.

³⁹ Memorandum for the JIC, ‘Tripartite Intelligence Alerts- Transatlantic Communications’, May 27, 1959, CFIHP.

⁴⁰ ‘A Note on Soviet Ability to Disturb Strategic and Tactical Communications and Warning Systems by Nuclear Explosion’, JIC Assessment, September 16, 1958, DEFE 44/283, TNA.

⁴¹ Notably, even though Australia and New Zealand were both part of the Five Eyes, and therefore depended on cable and radio links to communicate with the other members of the intelligence partnership, the communications vulnerabilities study was confined to the North Atlantic region. Nevertheless, information about Soviet interest in cutting transatlantic cables was indeed shared with intelligence officials in Canberra and Wellington.

⁴² Project Memorandum, ‘Submarine Communication Cables of the Soviet Bloc and Other Nationals of Potential Soviet Invasion’, Project Number 1104, November 20, 1953, CREST, CIA-RDP79T01149A000300130004-6.

⁴³ Memorandum for Chief, Manufacturing and Services Division, ORR, ‘Search for Submarine Cable Terminal in the Ust-Khayruzovo Area, USSR, December 16, 1964, CREST, CIA-RDP78T05439A000400230087-7.

⁴⁴ Report by the Joint Planning Staff, Chiefs of Staff Committee, ‘Destruction of Submarine Cables of Use to the Enemy in Time of War’, October 23, 1950, DEFE 6/12, TNA.

⁴⁵ Michael Goodman and Huw Dylan stress the importance of the submarine cable network for connecting Europe and North America. See Michael Goodman and Huw Dylan, ‘British Intelligence and the Fear of a Soviet Attack on Allied Communications’, Cryptologia 40/1 (2016), 4.

⁴⁶ Brigadier General Frank James letter to Secretary Canadian JIC, ‘Interruptions to Transatlantic Telecommunications Cables’, December 16, 1959, JIC Doc 59-02-59-07, Soviet Threat to Tripartite Intelligence Alerts Comms, CFIHP.

⁴⁷ Letter from Secretary, Joint Telecommunications Committee (Canada) to JIC Secretary (Canada), ‘Tripartite Intelligence Alerts – Trans-Atlantic Communications, June 24, 1959, JIC Doc 59-07 - 60-07 - Soviet Threat to Tripartite Intelligence Alerts Comms, CFIHP.

⁴⁸ Winkler, ‘The Forgotten Menace of Electro-Magnetic Warfare in the Early Cold War’, 273.

⁴⁹ Letter from P.J. Pratley, Secretary of Joint Telecommunications Committee (Canada), to Secretary JIC (Canada), ‘USAF Transatlantic Tropospheric Scatter Communications System’, June 6, 1960, JIC Doc 59-07 - 60-07 - Soviet Threat to Tripartite Intelligence Alerts Comms, CFIHP.

⁵⁰ ‘Proposal for a Protected North Atlantic Submarine Telephone Cable Link’, May 26, 1964, CAB 21/5439, TNA.

⁵¹ Letter to Col. W.J. Morris (GCHQ) from G.H. Foot (Submarine Cables Limited), August 10, 1964, CAB 21/5439, TNA.

⁵² ‘Proposal for a Protected North Atlantic Submarine Telephone Cable Link’, May 26, 1964, CAB 21/5439, TNA.

⁵³ Presentation by Lieutenant General Alfred Dr. Starbird (DCA director) to the Senate Aeronautics and Space Sciences Committee, January 25, 1960, Defense Military Communications Satellites US/UK Cooperation, 1961–1968, RG 59, Subject Files 1961–1968, Def Projects – Miscellaneous to Def Military Communications Satellites US/UK Cooperation, Box 24, NARA.

⁵⁴ L. Wainstein et al, ‘The Evolution of U.S. Strategic Command and Control and Warning’, Institute for Defense Analyses, June 1975, 310, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA331702.pdf.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ ‘Programme Analysis and Review, Defence Satellite Communications’, July 27, 1973, DEFE 13/669, TNA.

⁵⁷ ‘Historical Background of the South East Asia Cable Conference’, Appendix 1’, FV 4/46, TNA.

⁵⁸ ‘Policy for Joint Communications’, undated, DEFE 59/10, TNA.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Archibald Spicer Hurd, ‘An All-British Cable System: Cables as Auxiliary Weapons of Imperial Defence’, January 1, 1899, 227, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Collection, https://www.jstor.org/stable/60231612.

⁶¹ Draft of Overseas Policy and Defence Committee, ‘Operational Use by the UK of the US Interim Defence Communications Satellite Project’, undated, AVIA 65/2070, TNA.

⁶² Presentation by Lieutenant General Alfred Dr. Starbird (DCA director) to the Senate Aeronautics and Space Sciences Committee, January 25, 1966, Defense Military Communications Satellites US/UK Cooperation, 1961–1968, RG 59, Subject Files 1961–1968, Def Projects – Miscellaneous to Def Military Communications Satellites US/UK Cooperation, Box 24, NARA.

⁶³ Presentation by Lieutenant General Alfred Dr. Starbird (DCA director) to the Senate Aeronautics and Space Sciences Committee, January 25, 1966, Defense Military Communications Satellites US/UK Cooperation, 1961–1968, RG 59, Subject Files 1961–1968, Def Projects – Miscellaneous to Def Military Communications Satellites US/UK Cooperation, Box 24, NARA. In December 1958, the United States launched SCORE, the first dedicated communications satellite. Four years later, AT&T launched Telstar that could transmit signals across the Atlantic. NASA launched the first geostationary communications satellite, Syncom III, in 1964. For a history of these technologies, see David Whalen, The Origins of Satellite Communications (Washington DC: Smithsonian Institution Press 2002).

⁶⁴ Programme Analysis and Review (PAR), Defence Satellite Communications, undated, FCO 46/1076, TNA.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ For a history of Intelsat, see Hugh Slotten, Beyond Sputnik and the Space Race: The Origins of Global Satellite Communications (Johns Hopkins UP 2022).

⁶⁷ Dwayne Day, ‘Aiming too High: The Advent Military Communications Satellite’, The Space Review, September 25, 2022, https://www.thespacereview.com/article/4455/1.

⁶⁸ Presentation by Lieutenant General Alfred Dr. Starbird (DCA director) to the Senate Aeronautics and Space Sciences Committee, January 25, 1966, Defense Military Communications Satellites US/UK Cooperation, 1961–1968, RG 59, Subject Files 1961–1968, Def Projects – Miscellaneous to Def Military Communications Satellites US/UK Cooperation, Box 24, NARA.

⁶⁹ David N. Spires and Rick W. Sturdevant, ‘From Advent to Milstar: The U.S. Air Force and the Challenges of Military Satellite Communications’, in Beyond the Ionosphere, ed. Andrew Butrica (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997), 67

⁷⁰ Presentation by Lieutenant General Alfred Dr. Starbird (DCA director) to the Senate Aeronautics and Space Sciences Committee, January 25, 1966, Defense Military Communications Satellites US/UK Cooperation, 1961–1968, RG 59, Subject Files 1961–1968, Def Projects – Miscellaneous to Def Military Communications Satellites US/UK Cooperation, Box 24, NARA.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² For an overview of Compass Link, see Jack Gould, ‘Best U.S. Surveillance System Reported Moving to Middle East’, August 27, 1970, CREST, CIA-RDP72-00337R000300030006-7.

⁷³ ‘Defense Communications Satellite Programs, with Special Reference to U.K. Satellite, Philco, and Hughes Briefings’, January 12, 1966, RG 59, Subject Files 1961–1968, Def Projects – Miscellaneous to Def Military Communications Satellites US/UK Cooperation, Box 24, NARA.

⁷⁴ Draft of Overseas Policy and Defence Committee, ‘Operational Use by the UK of the US Interim Defence Communications Satellite Project’, undated, AVIA 65/2070, TNA.

⁷⁵ Letter from Healey to McNamara, January 6, 1966, RG 59, Subject Files 1961–1968, Def Projects – Miscellaneous to Def Military Communications Satellites US/UK Cooperation, Box 24, NARA.

⁷⁶ Memorandum from DDR&E to SECDEF, undated, RG 59, Subject Files 1961–1968, Def Projects – Miscellaneous to Def Military Communications Satellites US/UK Cooperation, Box 24, NARA.

⁷⁷ Aaron Bateman, ‘Information security in the space age: Britain’s Skynet satellite communications program and the evolution of modern command and control networks’, Journal of Strategic Studies 47/1 (2024), 3.

⁷⁸ John Krige, Angelina Long Callahan, and Ashok Maharaj, NASA in the World: Fifty Years of Collaboration in Space (New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2013), 59–63.

⁷⁹ Committee on Empire Telecommunications Services, October 14, 1944, DEFE 19/7, TNA.

⁸⁰ Note on the Negotiations in Washington 21^st/24^th March, 1966, April 20, 1966, AVIA 65/2070, TNA.

⁸¹ Memorandum for the record, ‘Defense Communications Satellite Programs, with Special Reference to U.K. Satellite, Philco, and Hughes Briefings’, January 12, 1966, RG 59, Subject Files 1961–1968, Def Projects – Miscellaneous to Def Military Communications Satellites US/UK Cooperation, Box 24, NARA.

⁸² For a history of Skynet, see Bateman, ‘Information security in the space age’.

⁸³ Memorandum between the United States and the United Kingdom, Collaboration by the United Kingdom in the Research and Development Associated with the Defense Communications Satellite Program of the United States’, DEFE 13/389, TNA.

⁸⁴ Memorandum from Scowcroft for Ford, ‘Communications with the Middle East’, November 26, 1975, CREST, LOC-HAK-89-3-5-5.

⁸⁵ For an overview of how countries have used hosting U.S. intelligence facilities as bargaining tools in their relationship with the United States, see Diana Bolsinger, ‘Deception and Manipulation in an Intelligence Liaison Relationship: U.S.-Pakistani Negotiations and the 1980s Afghan Program’, International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 37/1, 2024 and Cullen G. Nutt, ‘’Vital and Irreplaceable facilities’: Explaining Leverage when States host Great Powers’ Spying Operations’, Intelligence and National Security, published online December 2023.

⁸⁶ For an overview of DSCS, see Robert Cook, ‘DSCS – Past, Present, and Future’, March 1994, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA300320.pdf.

⁸⁷ Memorandum from Scowcroft for Ford, ‘Communications with the Middle East’, November 26, 1975, CREST, LOC-HAK-89-3-5-5.

⁸⁸ ‘Annex A’ in ‘Outline Defence Communications Network Plan 1968–72, February 1, 1967, FCO 19/9, TNA.

⁸⁹ ‘Airbus’ Golden Jubilee for Skynet Secure Satellite Communications’, Airbus, November 22, 2019, https://www.airbus.com/en/newsroom/press-releases/2019–11-airbus-golden-jubilee-for-skynet-secure-satellite-communications.

⁹⁰ Bateman, ‘Information security in the space age’, 18.

⁹¹ Memorandum from Scowcroft for Ford, ‘Communications with the Middle East’, November 26, 1975, CREST, LOC-HAK-89-3-5-5.

⁹² ‘A Trailblazer in Military Satellite Communications’, MIT Lincoln Labs, undated, https://www.ll.mit.edu/impact/trailblazer-military-satellite-communications.

⁹³ Pravin C. Jain, ‘Architectural Trends in Military Satellite Communications Systems’, Proceedings of the IEEE 78/7 (July 1990), 1177, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA425230.pdf.

⁹⁴ Jain, ‘Architectural Trends in Military Satellite Communications Systems’, 1180. In the 1980s the Department of Defense began developing a more advanced version of DSCS called Milstar.

⁹⁵ CPRS study on space policy, position paper by MoD, defence requirements for satellite capacity in the 1980s and 1990s Background: Space communications, August 8, 1980, DEFE 69/1204.

⁹⁶ ‘Policy for the Use of Space for Defence’, April 22, 1981, DEFE 69/1204, TNA. For a detailed explanation of the rationale for a third Skynet-4 satellite, see ‘NGASR 7123 – Skynet 4 Stage 1 Programme: Procurement of Third Satellite (Skynet 4C)’, June 12, 1983, DEFE 13/2066, TNA and ‘Skynet 4C: Operational Justification’, November 28, 1984, DEFE 24/2905, TNA.

⁹⁷ William James, ‘Global Britain’s Strategic Problem East of Suez’, European Journal of International Security, 172.

⁹⁸ Bateman, ‘Information security in the space age’, 18–20.

⁹⁹ Policy for the Use of Space for Defence, August 6, 1982, DEFE 69/1204, TNA.

¹⁰⁰ Vance Mitchell, Sharing Space – The Secret Interaction Between the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the National Reconnaissance Office (Chantilly: NRO 2012), 64.

¹⁰¹ Memorandum from Lieutenant General William Hilsman to Caspar Weinberger, ‘DSCS Launch Delay’, May 8, 1981, CREST, CIA-RDP83M00171R001800130002-3.

¹⁰² France, West Germany, and the United Kingdom jointly developed Ariane.

¹⁰³ Memorandum for Director of Central Intelligence, ‘Request for Satellite Communications Support, October 31, 1985, CREST, CIA-RDP96-00990R000100030017-6.

¹⁰⁴ National Intelligence Estimate, ‘The Soviet Space Program’, July 19, 1983, CREST, CIA-RDP00B00369R000100050006-2.

¹⁰⁵ ‘SDI – Technology Threat and Satellite Roles’, a paper by the Deputy Chief Scientific Advisor, July 18, 1989, FCO 46/6954, TNA.

¹⁰⁶ John Bray, Innovation and the Communications Revolution: From the Victorian Pioneers to Broadband Internet (London: Institution of Engineering and Technology 2002), 330.

¹⁰⁷ ‘Cable Signaling Speed and Traffic Capacity’, History of the Atlantic Cable & Undersea Communications, https://atlantic-cable.com/Cables/speed.htm.

¹⁰⁸ For details, see ‘All-Optical Networks’, National Communications System Technical Information Bulletin 00–7, August 2000, https://www.hsdl.org/c/abstract/?docid=440833.

¹⁰⁹ ‘Desert Storm “Hot Wash”’, July 12–13, 1991, HQ Air Force Space Command, 3, National Security Archive, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB39/document7.pdf.

¹¹⁰ For a brief overview of the role of satellite communications in the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs, see Richard H. Van Atta et al, ‘Transformation and Transition: DARPA’s Role in Fostering an Emerging Revolution in Military Affairs Volume 1 – Overall Assessment’, April 2003, Institute for Defense Analyses, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA437248.pdf.

¹¹¹ Robert Griffin, ‘U.S. Space System Survivability: Strategic Alternatives for the 1990s’, November 30, 1982, National Defense University report, 42, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA121957.pdf.

¹¹² For recent analyses of Russian and Chinese counter-space capabilities, see ‘Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, February 6, 2023, https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2023-Unclassified-Report.pdf. In addition to electronic warfare, the Defense Intelligence Agency maintains that China probably intends to pursue additional ASAT weapons that are able to destroy satellites up to GEO [geostationary orbit]’. For details, see ‘2022 Challenges to Security in Space: Space Reliance in an Era of Competition and Expansion’, 2022, 17, https://www.dia.mil/Portals/110/Documents/News/Military_Power_Publications/Challenges_Security_Space_2022.pdf.

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Aaron Bateman

Aaron Bateman is an assistant professor of history and international affairs at George Washington University. He is the author of Weapons in Space: Technology, Politics, and the Rise and Fall of the Strategic Defense Initiative. His new book project explores the ways in which the Nuclear Age shaped the evolution of U.S. and British global information networks.