A Systemic Theory of the Security Environment

Abstract

This article develops a systemic theory of security environment and explores the theory's implication for managing security. The central theme here is to argue that becuase security environment is a system, a systemic approach, not the conventional approach by identifying threats, is the way to go for understanding security environment and making strategy. The article first identifies the factors shaping security environment and elaborates on how the factors interact to shape the security environment. After offering several tests for the theory, the article concludes by laying out the theory's implication for understanding security and managing security.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

For discussions and critical comments, I thank Amitav Acharya, Thomas Christensen, Alan Collins, Avery Goldstein, Richard New Lebow, Robert Powell, Jisi Wang, Xuetong Yan, Yunling Zhang, and an anonymous reviewer. I also thank the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies of Nanyang Technology University in Singapore for supporting my stay there as a Sasakawa Peace Foundation fellow and for providing me with a chance to test my ideas in front of a live audience. Part of the paper was presented at the conference ‘International Relations Theory and South Asia Security’, organized by the University of Pennsylvania Institute for the Advanced Study of India in New Delhi (27–28 August 2003). This article is dedicated to Robert Jervis, whose systemic approach toward international politics has been part of the inspiration.

Notes

Shiping Tang is Associate Research Fellow and Deputy Director of the Center for Regional Security Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, China. He is also co-director of the Sino-American Security Dialogue, funded by the Ford Foundation and the Mershon Center for Security Studies at Ohio State University.

While scholars and policy makers have long based their discussion of security strategy on assessment of security environment, they have never defined the concept of security environment explicitly, perhaps because it is difficult to define and most consider it to be self-evident (but in reality, everybody has his own notion of what constitutes the security environment). For a similar observation, see Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, ‘Competing Visions for US Grand Strategy’, International Security 21/3 (Winter 1996–97) pp.5–53, at p.7. For different notions of security environment, see Robert J. Art, ‘A Defensible Defense: America's Grand Strategy after the Cold War’, International Security 15/4 (Spring 1991) pp.5–43; Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, ‘The International Source of Soviet Change’, International Security 16/3 (Winter 1991–92) pp.74–118; Li Bin, ‘China's Security Environment in the Early 21st Century’, Beijing Review 43/2 (Jan. 2000) pp.17–20; Akhtar Majeed, ‘India's Security Perceptions’, Asian Survey 30/11 (Nov. 1990) pp.1084–98. My definition will become clear at the end.

‘State as a rational actor’ remains one of the core assumptions of the dominating realism school in international politics. See Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Is Anybody Still a Realist?’, International Security 24/2 (Fall 1999) pp.5–55. Major works of different versions of the realism school include: Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 5th edn. (NY: Knopf 1973); Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addision-Wesley 1979); John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (NY: Norton 2001). For rational choice (or strategic choice) and its place in international relations (IR) theory, see David A. Lake and Robert Powell (eds.), Strategic Choice and International Relations (Princeton UP 1999).

Charles A. Kupchan, The Vulnerability of Empire (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1994) pp.14–15, 35.

Formal modeling has taken the problem of ‘incomplete information’ more seriously, but it has yet to offer any practical guidance on how to assess the environment under incomplete information. For exceptions that addressed the difficulties of assessing individual factors shaping security environment, see Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War (NY: Free Press 1988); William C. Wolhforth, ‘The Perception of Power: Russia in the Pre-1914 Balance’, World Politics 39/3 (April 1987) pp.353–81; Jack Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1984); Stephen Van Evera, ‘The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War’, International Security 9/1 (Summer 1984) pp.58–107; Thomas J. Christensen, ‘Perceptions and Alliance in Europe, 1865–1940’, International Organization 51/1 (Winter 1997) pp.65–97. For a general survey of misperception, see Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton UP 1976). The author thanks Tom Christensen for bringing up this point.

This is the so-called neo-classical realism. For reviews, see Gideon Rose, ‘Neo-classical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy’, World Politics 51 (Oct. 1998) pp.144–72; Ethan B. Kapstein, ‘Is realism dead?’, International Organization 49/4 (Autumn 1995) pp.751–74. Important works include: Michael Mastanduno, David A Lake and G. John Ikenberry, ‘Toward a Realist Theory of State Action’, International Studies Quarterly 33/4 (Dec. 1989); Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1991); Richard Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein (eds.), The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1993); Thomas J. Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Domestic Mobilization and Foreign Policy (Princeton UP 1996); Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role (Princeton UP 1998). For a neo-liberal application of the approach, see Robert Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’, International Organization 42/3 (Summer 1988) pp.427–60.

Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2nd edn. (Reading, MA: Longman 1999); Graham Allison and Morton Halperin, ‘Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications’, World Politics 24 (supplement, Spring 1972) pp.40–79; Morton Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington DC: Brookings Institution 1974).

Barry P. Posen, The Source of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1984); Snyder (note 4).

Irving L. Janis, Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin 1982).

Jervis (note 4); Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP 1981); James M. Goldgeier, ‘Psychology and Security’, Security Studies 6/4 (Summer 1997) pp.137–66.

Ernest May, ‘Lessons’ of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy (London: Oxford UP 1973); Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War (Princeton UP 1992); Dan Reiter, Crucible of Beliefs: Learning, Alliance, and World Wars (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1996).

Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton UP 1995); Elizabeth Kier, Imaging War: French and British Military Doctrine between the Wars (Princeton UP 1997); Kupchan (note 3).

I adopt Jervis's definition of system: a system exists ‘(a) when a set of units or elements is interconnected so that changes in some elements or their relations produce changes in other part of the system, and (b) the entire system exhibits properties and behaviors that are different from those of the parts.’ Robert Jervis, System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life (Princeton UP 1997) p.6.

Therefore, contrary to what Kupchan suggested, understanding ‘change in the international constellation of power and the opportunities and constraints associated with such changes’ does not equal to understanding security environment.

Hence, the primary objective here is to advance a theory about how things should be understood, not about how things were really understood (although the framework does possess potent explanatory power). For a call for such attempts, see Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods For Students of Political Sciences (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1997) p.4. For counterargument, see Kupchan (note 3) p.6.

The Pentagon's latest Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) provided the latest example of this approach. By explicitly stating that it will no longer base its strategy on what other states may do (intent), but on what other states can do (capability), the QDR is explicitly planned on the worst scenario. US Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review (30 Sept. 2001) pp.3–5. Most states plan their defense based on a similar approach.

The mechanism behind the phenomenon of ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’ is, of course, ‘security dilemma’. John Herz, ‘Idealist Internationalists and the Security Dilemma’, World Politics 2/2 (Jan. 1950) pp.157–80; Robert Jervis, ‘Cooperation under the Security Dilemma’, World Politics 30/2 (Jan. 1978) pp.189–214; Charles Glaser, ‘Political Consequences of Military Strategy: Expanding and Refining the Spiral and Deterrence Models’, World Politics 44/4 (July 1992) pp.497–538; Charles L. Glaser, ‘The Security Dilemma Revisited’, World Politics 50/1 (Oct. 1997) pp.171–201.

A typical argument for peripheral entanglement and imperial expansion goes like this: ‘Unwillingness to defend a far outpost would lead to the collapse at the core; therefore the frontier has to be defended. And in order to secure the frontier, an empire will have to expand even further.’ See Jervis (note 16) p.169; Snyder (note 5) pp.3–4. For an explanation of the British Empire's expansion along this line, see John S. Galbraith, ‘The “Turbulent Frontier” as a Factor in British Expansion’, Comparative Studies in Society and History 2 (Jan. 1960) pp.150–68.

Snyder (note 5); Kupchan (note 3).

A fourth factor, the arrangement of the units and the differentiation among them, is of no help because it will remain anarchy in international politics. Barry Buzan, ‘A Framework for Regional Security Analysis’, in Barry Buzan and Gowher Rizvi et al. (eds), South Asian Insecurity and the Great Powers (London: Macmillan 1986) pp.3–33; Barry Buzan, People, States, and Fear, 2nd edn. (NY: Harvester Wheatsheaf 1991) ch.3.

Stephen M. Walt, The Origin of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1987). For refinements, see James D. Morrow, ‘Alliance and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliance’, American Journal of Political Science 35/4 (Nov. 1991) pp.904–33; Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, ‘Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: predicting alliance patterns in multipolarity’, International Organization 44/2 (Spring 1990) pp.137–68; James D. Morrow, ‘Arms versus Allies: Trade-offs in the Search for Security’, International Organization 47/2 (Spring 1993) pp.207–33; Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1997) Part I. To some extent, Walt's framework can subsume Buzan's ‘security complex’.

Morgenthau (note 2) p.4; Waltz (note 2) ch.6.

Walt (note 20) ch.2. Considering that Walt was Waltz's student, it was surprising that Walt did not include international structure in his theory. Walt did stress that regional states are more tuned to regional distribution of power, but he did not pursue its implication further.

Buzan (note 19) pp.140–42. For the difficulty associated with measuring intention (therefore threat itself), see Robert Jervis, ‘Perceiving and Copying with Threat’, in Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow and Janice G. Stein (eds.), Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins UP 1985) pp.13–34.

A survey of International Security's readers strongly indicated that elites tend to disregard intention even when there is strong evidence that the potential opponent may not harbor a belligerent purpose. Cheryl Koopman, Jack Snyder and Robert Jervis, ‘Theory-driven versus Data-driven Assessment in a Crisis: A Survey of International Security Readers’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 34/4 (Dec. 1990) pp.694–722.

To be fair, Walt did not intended to develop a particular framework for understanding security environment, although he did use his theory to draw a large picture of US security environment in the 1980s. Walt (note 20) pp.282–5.

On the surface, this definition is similar to Kydd's probabilistic definition of states' security. In reality, though, they differ in two important aspects. First, while my conception of security covers only vital survival interest, Kydd's formulation seems to allow for non-vital security interest such as colonial expansion. Second, while Kydd factors in the probability of surviving after defeat, I leave this out. See Andrew Kydd, ‘Sheep in Sheep's Clothing: Why Security Seekers Do not Fight Each Other’, Security Studies 7/1 (Autumn 1997) pp.114–54, at pp.121–2.

For other, but much less parsimonious attempts to identify factors shaping security environment, see Buzan (note 19) pp.163–4, and citations under fn.1.

Kenneth N. Waltz, ‘Reflection on Theory of International Politics: A Response to My Critics’, in Robert O. Keohane (ed.), Neorealism and Its Critics (NY: Columbia UP 1986) p.329. For instance, states' alliance policy is at least partly shaped by the international structure. See Jervis (note 12) pp.197–209; Christensen and Snyder (note 20).

I choose geographical barrier, instead of the widely abused ‘geopolitical factor’ because the later is a mix of at least two independent factors (geography and state-to-state interaction). A conflated concept does not help in systemic analysis. On the other hand, the new wave of ‘critical geopolitics’ is simply too loosely defined: geopolitics seems now to cover virtually all the possible factors in international politics. For an overview of geopolitical thoughts, see Jeffery Parker, Western Geopolitical Thought in the Twentieth Century (London: Croom Helm 1985). For critical geopolitics, see Gearoid O. Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press 1996); Gearoid O. Tuathail and Simon Dalby, Rethinking Geopolitics (London: Routledge 1998).

I draw inspiration from Waltz and Keohane/Nye's discussion on ‘sensitivity’ and ‘vulnerability’. Waltz (note 2) pp.139–46; Robert Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, 2nd edn. (Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman 1989) pp.8–19.

John Keegan, A History of Warfare (NY: Vintage Books 1993) p.68.

Ibid., pp.68–70.

Rao Shengwen, Buju Tianxia [Geo-military Settings in Ancient Chinese History] (Beijing: People's Liberation Army Press 2002) p.11.

In Measheimer's words, oceans possess ‘great stopping power (of water)’. Mearsheimer (note 2).

In a perfect dichotomy, power should be the ends for offensive realists, and the means (toward security) for defensive realists. In reality, many seem undecided on this point. See Glenn H. Snyder, ‘Mearsheimer's World: Offensive Realism and the Struggle for Security’, International Security 27/1 (Summer 2002) pp.149–73, at pp.151–5; Waltz (note 2) pp.126–7; Mearsheimer (note 2) ch.2, esp. pp.29–36, endnote 21; Snyder (note 5) pp.11–12.

Walt (note 20) pp.22–3.

This has been a debating point between defensive and offensive realists. Defensive realists argued that balancing has been common, while offensive realists argued that balancing has never been that prevalent. There are, however, at least two problems with offensive realism's interpretation. First, they often take failures to achieve balance because threatened states lack resources as indications that states did not intend to balance. Second, offensive realists tend to look at events in a shorter timeframe while defensive realists tend to do the opposite (Snyder (note 5) p.12); therefore, offensive realists tend to take temporary gains by expansive powers as indications that balancing is rare. For instance, Mearsheimer argued that balancing was rare because the initiator won 60 per cent of the 63 wars between 1815 and 1980 (Mearsheimer (note 2) p.39). The problem with this argument is that an initiator won the war does not necessarily mean other states did not balance, nor does it indicate that balancing eventually failed. Looking back at history, it is fair to say that balancing became easier and conquest became more difficult after Westphalia: by then, the numbers of states had decreased to a point where each individual state possessed far more aggregate power than they used to, and an aggressor will be hard pressed to overwhelm a large coalition of states. For defensive realists' arguments, see Walt (note 20); Snyder (note 5). For offensive realists' arguments, see Mearsheimer (note 2) p.39.

Germany's pursuit of greater naval power aroused Britain's fear about Germany and eventually contributed to Germany's isolation in World War I was a classic case. Paul Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860–1914 (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Ashfield 1987); A.J.P. Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848–1918 (Oxford: Oxford UP 1954) pp.446–7, 459–62.

Andrew Kydd, ‘Game Theory and the Spiral Model’, World Politics 49/3 (April 1997) pp.371–400; idem., ‘Trust, Reassurance, and Cooperation’, International Organization 54/2 (Spring 2002) pp.325–57. Self-restraining behaviors can range from refraining from pursuing unnecessary military power, to pursuing cautious objectives, cooperation, respecting institutions and norms, and outright unilateral arms reduction. On the other hand, un-restraining behavior can range from unilateral action, to defection from cooperation, arms race, territorial expansion, and preemptive war. Cooperation is an important form of self-restraining because it is essentially equal to tying one's own hands with commitment and limiting one's freedom of action voluntarily. For the original formulation, see Charles L. Glaser, ‘Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-help’, International Security 19/3 (Winter 1994–95) pp.50–90.

On surface, because there is always a chance that a state will face a revisionist or a predator state and an aggressor may conceal its true intention when it is relatively weak (as Hitler did before 1939), self-restraining can be a foolhardy policy at a particular juncture. This dilemma is solved in two ways. First, it is difficult for an aggressor to cover its true identity for long because its revisionist goal necessitates it to seize opportunities of expansion and forsaking opportunities of expansion is costly for it (Kydd, ibid.). Second, just as an aggressor is less likely to view other states' counterbalancing as threatening, a non-aggressor state is also less likely to view their fellow non-aggressor states as threatening (or lacking self-restraint) when they are taking active measures to balance the aggressor (in fact, non-aggressor states are more likely to encourage such moves among them). If a state arms excessively when there is no aggressor in sight, however, it is more likely to be viewed as the potential aggressor and face counter-balancing. Either way, behaving with self-restraint is the preferred strategy.

The disagreement between offensive realism and defensive realism on security dilemma, therefore, is twofold. While defensive realists believe that security dilemma is real and states can take measures to alleviate it (but never eliminate it), some offensive realists dispute the existence of security dilemma (e.g. Schweller), while some offensive realists (e.g. Mearsheimer) believe that security dilemma is real but there is little states can do about it (hence, ‘there will be a lot of security competition but little security ‘dilemma’ in Mearsheimer's world’). See Snyder (note 35) p.156; Randall L. Schweller, ‘Neorealism's Status Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?’, Security Studies 5/3 (Spring 1996) pp.122–66; Mearsheimer (note 2) p.36.

Kenneth N. Waltz, ‘The Stability of Bipolarity’, Daedalus 93/3 (Summer 1964) pp.881–901; Waltz, Theory of International Politics, ch.8, pp.204–5, 161–2; William C. Wohlforth, ‘The Stability of a Unipolar World’, International Security 24/1 (Summer 1999) pp.5–41; Karl Deutsch and J. David Singer, ‘Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability’, World Politics 16/3 (April 1964) pp.390–406.

Frequent interventions by the Soviet Union and United States within their respective spheres of influence during the Cold War illustrated the point. For the similarity between Soviet's conduct in Eastern Europe and America's conduct in Latin America, see Jan F. Triska (ed.), Dominant Powers and Subordinate States: the United States in Latin America and the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe (Durham, NC: Duke UP 1986).

As Walt noted, ‘regional states are largely indifferent to global balance of power. Instead, they (states in the Middle East) often form alliance in response to threats from other regional actors’. Walt (note 20) pp.30, 148, 264. Buzan's security complex was also an attempt to underscore the local dimension of security. Essentially, only great powers have the ‘luxury’ to think more globally.

Even a cursory look into the American debate of foreign policy would indicate that calls for assertive unilateral actions in the United States increased significantly after the Cold War.

Mearsheimer (note 2). See also Snyder (note 35) pp.162, 167–8; Richard Rosecrance, ‘War and Peace’, World Politics 52/1 (Oct. 2002) pp.137–66. As Rosecrance noted (pp.157–9) and I will get to later, polarity alone cannot dictate war and pace. For earlier treatment of multipolarity and stability focusing on the uncertainty associated with alliance formation, see Deutsch and Singer (note 42).

For an excellent historical overview, see Keegan (note 31).

Levy first pointed out the necessity of differentiating the two versions of the balance. Jack S. Levy, ‘ The Offensive/Defensive Balance of Military Technology: A Theoretical and Historical Analysis’, International Studies Quarterly 28/2 (June 1984) pp.219–38. For a discussion on the ‘core’ and ‘broad’ approach, Kier A. Lieber, ‘Grasping the Technological Peace: The Offense-Defense Balance and International Security’, International Security 25/1 (Summer 2000) pp.77–104. Major works on offense-defense balance include: Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1999) esp. ch.2; Jervis (note 16); George H. Quester, Offense and Defense in the International System (NY: Wiley 1977); Charles Glaser, ‘What Is the Offense-Defense Balance and How Can We Measure It?’, International Security 22/3 (Winter 1997–98) pp.44–82. Stephen Van Evera, ‘Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War’, ibid. pp.5–43. For criticism, see ‘Correspondence: Taking Offense at the Offense-Defense Theory’, International Security 23/3 (Winter 1998/99), pp. 179–206; Sean M. Lynn-Jones, ‘Offense-Defense Theory and Its Critics’, Security Studies 4/4 (Summer 1995) pp.672–4. The ‘force employment’ version of the balance developed by Biddle is a mix of the two versions, and it renders the theory less parsimonious. See Stephen Biddle, ‘Rebuilding the Foundation of Offense-Defense Theory’, Journal of Politics 63/3 (Aug. 2001) pp.741–74.

Levy made a similar point: ‘Hypothesis regarding the consequences of war … are properly defined in terms of the “objective balance”’. See Levy (note 48) p.222. Lieber contended that technology has never had that much impact on the outcome of the war. But his cases do not support his argument that a particular technology lacks potential impact on the battlefield. Rather, they merely indicate that leaders often failed to appreciate, therefore fully utilize that potential. Moreover, when he sought to illustrate that the impact of technology had never been so great using evidences from late stages of technology innovation, he forgot that diffusion of technology (and its countermeasures) and learning from battlefield experience would inevitably lead to erosion of the initial advantage derived from the technology. To some extent, he deviated from the ‘core’ approach that he advocated. See Lieber (note 48).

Van Evera (note 48) p.21.

Because balancing is more common, a state with an impermeable geographical barrier but exercising little self-restrain is more likely to face a formidable balancing alliance, thus the worse its security environment (the United States may be an exception). Plus, a state lacking self-restraint may well expand thus making its geographical barrier more permeable and vulnerable. Together with increasing difficulty to project power effectively from its core, an expanding empire eventually will reach its stage of ‘over-extension’.

Under a structure with robust constraint, states are less likely to initiate conflicts while states exercising little self-restraint are more likely to be punished, thus the better states' security environment.

Again, because balancing is common, a state exercising little self-restraint is more likely to be balanced, thus the worse its security environment.

See fn. 52.

Even under a structure with weak constraint, a state exercising less self-restraint is more likely to be punished. Therefore, self-restraint is still the preferred strategy.

Van Evera (note 48).

For a summary, see Desmond Ball, ‘Arms and Affluence: Military Acquisition in the Asian-Pacific Region’, International Security 18/3 (Winter 1993–94) pp.78–112. Ball did not identify the 1991 Gulf War as a factor behind the accelerating pace of the arms buildup in East Asia.

The impact of the 1991 Gulf War on the evolution of China's military doctrine has been well documented. See Nan Li, ‘The PLA's Evolving Warfighting Doctrine, Strategy and Tactics, 1985–95: A Chinese Perspective’, in David Shambaugh and Richard H. Yang (eds.), China's Military in Transition (Oxford: Clarendon 1997) pp.179–99, at pp.192–4; Paul H.B. Godwin, ‘The PLA Faces the Twenty-First Century: Reflects on Technology, Doctrine, Strategy, and Operation’, in James R. Lilley and David Shambaugh (eds.), China's Military Faces the Future (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe 1999) pp.39–63, at pp.54–7; You Ji, The Armed Forces of China (London: Allen & Unwin 1999) pp.21–8.

Robert J. C. Butow, Tojo and the Coming of the War (Stanford UP 1969); Saburo Ienega, The Pacific War, 1931–1945 (NY: Pantheon 1978).

George Bush senior was quoted in Maureen Dowd, ‘War Introduced Nation to a Tougher Bush’, New York Times, 2 March 1991.

A USA Today poll taken immediately after the 1991 Gulf War found that 78 per cent of Americans has ‘a great deal of confidence’ in the military. In contrast, in a similar Gallup poll taken in 1977, two years after the fall of Saigon, the figure was only 23 per cent. See Stephen Budiansky and Bruce B. Auster, ‘A Force Reborn’, US News & World Report 110/10 (18 March 1991) pp.30–2. Admittedly, the US public remains ‘pretty prudent’ toward the actual use of force. For an explanation, see Bruce W. Jentleson and Rebecca L. Britton, ‘Still Pretty Prudent: Post-Cold War American Public Opinion on the Use of Military Force’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 42/4 (Aug. 1998) pp.395–417.

Falk predicted that US elite would be more willing to consider the option of force almost immediately after the 1991 Gulf War. See Richard Falk, ‘Recycling Interventionism’, Journal of Peace Research 29/2 (May 1992) pp.129–34. Of course, under unipolarity, the structural restraint on US action was also greatly weakened.

For a general survey of the impact of recent RMAs on future warfare, see Michael O'Hanlon, Technological Change and the Future of Warfare (Washington DC: Brookings 2000).

Mearsheimer argued in an earlier study that PGWs favored defense. John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1983) ch.3.

This was Finland's strategy versus the Soviet Union, and Serbia's strategy versus the United States. For detailed discussion of deterrence by denial and deterrence by punishment, see Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense (Princeton UP 1961); Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale UP 1966) pp.78–86; Robert Powell, Nuclear Deterrence: the Search for Credibility (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 1990) ch.3.

Van Evera (note 48) ch.8; Charles L. Glaser and Steve Fetter, ‘National Missile Defense and the Future of US Nuclear Weapons Policy’, International Security 26/1 (Summer 2001) pp.40–92; Steven E. Miller, ‘The Flawed Case for Missile Defence’, Survival 43/3 (Fall 2001) pp.95–110.

Walt (note 20); Barry Buzan, ‘Regional Security as a Policy Objective: The Case of South and Southwest Asia’, in A.Z. Rubinstein (ed.), The Great Game: The Rivalry in the Persian Gulf and South Asia (NY: Praeger 1983) ch.10; Buzan and Rizvi et al. (note 19); Stephen Walt, ‘Testing Theories of Alliance Formation: The Case of Southwest Asia’, International Organization 42/2 (Spring 1987) pp.275–316; Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 1998), p.59.

For an earlier statement on East Asian multipolarity, see Doak Barnnet, China and the Major Powers in East Asia (Washington DC: Brookings 1977) ch.IV. Robert Ross contended that East Asia might have already evolved into a bipolar structure after the Cold War. Robert Ross, ‘The Geography of the Peace: East Asia in the Twenty-first Century’, International Security 23/4 (Spring 1998–99) pp.81–118.

Buzan and Rizvi labeled external powers' foray into the subcontinent as ‘overlaying’. See Buzan and Rizvi et al. (note 19).

As Jervis had pointed out, the worse off for both states when they both defect, the less likely they will defect and the more likely they will cooperate (in the case of China and Russia), and vice versa (in the case of China and India). Jervis (note 16) p.171. For an analysis of the India-China case along this line of argument, see Shiping Tang, ‘The China-India Relationship Game and China's Grand Strategy in South Asia’, Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi 9 [World Economics and Politics] (Beijing) (Sept. 2000) pp.24–9.

John Mearsheimer, ‘Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War’, International Security 15/1 (Summer 1990) pp.5–56.

Waltz (note 42); Idem. (note 2) ch.8, pp.204–5, 161–2. Waltz had so much faith in the stability of bipolarity that he actually insisted that the world remained bipolar even after the collapse of the Soviet Union, although he later revised his view. See Waltz, ‘The Emerging Structure of International Politics’, International Security 18/2 (Fall 1993) pp.44–79.

Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, Rex Warner trans. (London: Penguin 1972); Donald Kagan, On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace (Doubleday, NY: Anchor 1995) pp.232–80.

For similar argument, see Robert Jervis, The Meaning of Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1989) p.25; John Lewis Gaddis, ‘The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System’, International Security 10/4 (Spring 1986) pp.99–142; Ted Hopf, ‘Polarity, the Offense-defense Balance, and War’, American Political Science Review 85/2 (June 1991) pp.475–93. Waltz later admitted that the presence of nuclear weapon did contribute to the Long Peace. See Waltz (note 72) p.44.

Robert Jervis, ‘The Future of World Politics: Will It Resemble the Past?’, International Security 16/3 (Winter 1991–92) pp.39–73, at p.40; Rosecrance (note 46) pp.157–9.

For similar point, See Buzan (note 19) pp.160–66; Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, ‘Risk, Power Distribution, and the Likelihood of War’, International Studies Quarterly 25/4 (Dec. 1981) pp.541–68, at pp.566–7. For a review, see Patrick James and Michael Brecher, ‘Stability and Polarity: New Paths for Inquiry’, Journal of Peace Research 25/1 (March 1988) pp.31–42. For critics of the quantitative approach, see Paul W. Schroeder, ‘Quantitative Studies in the Balance of Power: A Historian's Reaction’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 21/1 (March 1977) pp.3–22; Wohlforth (note 4).

John Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (NY: Basic Books 1989).

Stephen Van Evera, ‘Primed for Peace: Europe after the Cold War’, International Security 15/3 (Winter 1990–91) pp.7–57; Jervis (note 75); Buzan (note 19) pp.169–72; James M. Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, ‘A Tale of Two Worlds: Core and Periphery in the post-Cold War Era’, International Organization 46/2 (Spring 1992) pp.467–91.

Deutsch and Singer (note 42).

The fallacy of traditional geopolitics thought, thus, lies in its belief that geography alone dictates states' action.

One point to be kept in mind is that because the theory offered here is the first of its kind, comparison with other theories will be difficult. Walt's balance-of-threat theory is the close thing we have, but his theory is more about explaining how alliance forms, not about how states should understand security environment in order to form alliances

A related prediction will be that getting all the factors right but ignoring their interactions can also lead to misreading into security environment and strategic failures. Such cases may be difficult to find, though, because most states cannot even get the factors right.

For ‘doubly decisive’ tests, see Van Evera (note 14) p.32.

Jervis (note 12).

Van Evera dubbed such tests as ‘smoking-gun’ tests. Van Evera (note 14) p.31–2.

Another possible but less rigorously documented case is the different perception of power before World War I. See Wohlforth (note 4).

Snyder (note 4); Van Evera (note 4).

Kupchan (note 3) ch.5; Van Evera (note 48) pp.191–2. Also see the discussion below.

Robert Jervis, ‘The Impact of the Korean War on the Cold War’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 24/4 (Dec. 1980) pp.563–92; John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (London: Oxford UP 1982) pp.109–26; Christensen (note 5).

For a debate on whether there was a ‘lost chance’ during 1949–50 for the United States and the new People's Republic of China to be less hostile against each other, see Warren I. Cohen, Chen Jian, John Garder, Michael Sheng and Odd Arne Westad, ‘Symposium: Rethinking the Lost Chance in China’, Diplomatic History 21/1 (Winter 1997) pp.71–115. For Truman and Acheson's thoughts on the possibility of engineering schism between the Soviet Union and China, see Gaddis (note 89) pp.68–9, 102.

For the domestic impact of the Korean War on the United States, see Paul G. Pierpaoli, Truman and Korea: The Political Culture of the Early Cold War (Columbia, MO: Univ. of Missouri Press 1999).

For US nuclear policy, see Desmond Ball, Politics and Force Levels: The Strategic Missile Program of the Kennedy Administration (Berkeley, CA: Univ. of California Press 1980); Aaron L. Friedberg, ‘A History of US Strategic ‘Doctrine’ – 1945 to 1980’, Journal of Strategic Studies 3/2 (Dec. 1980) pp.37–71. For Soviet Union's nuclear policy, see Roman Kolkowicz and Ellen P. Mickiewicz (eds.), The Soviet Calculus of Nuclear War (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath 1986).

The numbers are from Robert S. Norris and William M. Arkin, ‘Nuclear Notebook: Estimated US and Soviet/Russian Nuclear Stockpiles, 1945–1997’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 53/6 (Nov.–Dec. 1997), on web at:  < http://www.thebulletin.org/issues/nukenotes/nd97nukenote.html > . Accessed on 7 Oct. 2002.

For a similar argument, see Jennifer W. See, ‘An Uneasy Truce: John F. Kennedy and Soviet-American Détente, 1963’, Cold War History 2/2 (Jan. 2002) pp.161–94. For the argument that the crisis was a turn point, see John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (NY: Oxford UP 1997) p.261; Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, ‘One Hell of a Gamble’: Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958–1964 (NY: Norton 1997) p.337–8; Valdislav Zubok and Constaine Pleshakov, Inside Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev (Boston, MA: Harvard UP 1996) p.237.

Kupchan (note 3) pp.362–3, Snyder (note 5) p.83.

In fact, many had argued that Bismarck used colonial expansion mainly for bargaining with Britain and France, and for domestic political reasons. For a review, see Kupchan (note 3) pp.368–72.

Germany can perhaps survive with an alliance with England, Russia, or France (extremely unlikely after the bitter war) but not with Austria alone. For Bismarck's alliance policy, See David Calleo, The German Problem Reconsidered: Germany and the World Order, 1870 to the Present (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 1978) p.10; Walt (note 20) pp.8–9; Snyder (note 5) p.69.

Considering the fact that most of the major European powers were revisionists at that time, Bismarck had done a remarkable job. Hence, even a highly critical biography of Bismarck had to give him some credit. See Erick Eyck, Bismarck and the Germany Empire (NY: Norton 1968) pp.187–8.

For an overview, see Wolfram Kaiser and Gillian Staerck (eds.), British Foreign Policy, 1955–1964: Contracting Options (NY: St Martin's Press 2000); David Sanders, Losing an Empire, Finding a Role (London: Palgrave-Macmillan 1990); Joseph Frankel, ‘Britain's Changing Role’, International Affairs 50/4 (Oct. 1974) pp.574–83.

Peter Weiler, ‘British Labour and the Cold War: The Foreign Policy of the Labor Government 1945–51’, Journal of British Studies 26/1 (Jan. 1987) pp.54–82.

A document, ‘Stocktaking after VE Day’, prepared by then Deputy Under-Secretary of State Sir Orme Sargent in 1945 put it bluntly: ‘(Britain) is numerically the weakest and geographically the smallest of the three Great Powers … In the minds of our big partners, especially that of the United States, there is a feeling that Great Britain is now a secondary power and can be treated such.’ Quoted in Anthony Adamthwaite, ‘Britain and the World, 1945–9: The View form the Foreign Office’, International Affairs 61/2 (Spring 1985) pp.223–35, at p.226, emphasis added.

While some British elite did argue that Britain should maintain its oversea presence, the fact that Britain never put up a serious fight indicated that the dominating opinion was just the opposite.

By 1947, the British Foreign Office came to admit: ‘too great independence of the United States would be a dangerous luxury’. Quoted in Adamthwaite (note 101) p.227.

For the development of Anglo-American ‘Special Relationship’, see David Reynolds, ‘A “Special Relationship”? America, Britain and the International Order Since the Second World War’, International Affairs 62/1 (Winter 1985–86) pp.1–20.

This actually equals to recognizing the security dilemma dynamics, and Singapore's then Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew played an instrumental role in re-shaping Deng's understanding of this dimension of China's security environment. Lee Kuan Yew, From Third World to First: The Singapore Story 1965–2000 (Singapore: Straits Times Press and Times Media 2001) pp.663–8.

In 1985, Deng firmly reached his conclusion that ‘large-scale war is preventable’. See his speech to the Central Military Committee, in Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping 3 (Beijing: Peoples' Press 1993) pp.126–9.

For the ideational change behind the evolution of China's security strategy, see Shiping Tang and Peter Hay Gries, ‘China's Security Strategy: From Offensive to Defensive Realism and Beyond’, EAI Working Paper No. 97 (Singapore: East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore, Nov. 2002).

In fact, it can be argued that the objective of states' security strategy is to improve their security environment (not necessarily for relative gains, though), or at least prevent it from deteriorating.

Much of the discussion here can be understood as ‘system effects’ or ‘system dynamics’. See Jervis (note 12).

Schweller (note 41) pp.122–66.

Kissinger reached the same conclusion from a narrower angle. Henry A. Kissinger, The Necessity for Choice: Prospect of American Foreign Policy (NY: Harper & Row 1961) p.148.

For an earlier statement of security interdependence, see Helga Haftendorn, ‘The Security Puzzle: Theory-building and Discipline-building in International Security’, International Studies Quarterly 35/1 (March 1991) pp.3–17, at p.9; Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (note 67) p.11. Of course, economic interdependence and its implication for managing international political economy has been the focus of neoliberalism. For a classical statement, see Keohane and Nye (note 30). On the interdependence between security and economy (or economic security in general), see Barry Buzan, ‘The Interdependence of Security and Economic Issues in the ‘New World Order’’, in Richard Stubbs and Geoffrey Underhill (eds.), Political Economy and the Changing Global Order (Toronto: McClelland & Steward 1994) pp.89–102.

Reconciliation between two former rivals (e.g. France and Germany, Russia and China) underscores the point that two states can gain more security when they give the other side more security.

Waltz made a similar point in a different context. Waltz (note 2) pp.208, 195. Yet he also made the opposite point in another place. See Waltz, ibid., pp.170–2; Wohlforth (note 42) p.39.

For instance, strong US support for Israel may have severely hindered its ability of shaping its images among Arabs (and Muslims in general). Likewise, China's policy of supporting insurgency in its neighboring countries during the 1960s had made improving its relationship with them difficult.

The fact that the United States has been an active interventionist since the nineteenth century but has yet to face an encircling alliance supports this argument. Of course, many Americans recognize the danger of lack of self-restraint and argue that the United States has to exercise self-restraint in order to sustain US dominance. See Joseph J. Nye, The Paradox of America Power: Why the World's only Superpower Can't Go It Alone (London: Oxford UP 2001) pp.xii, 16–17, 25–6; Walt (note 20) pp.282–3; Charles Kupchan, ‘After Pax-Americana: Benign Power, Regional Integration and the Sources of Stable Multipolarity’, International Security 22/2 (Fall 1998); John Ikenberry, ‘Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of American Postwar Order’, International Security 22/3 (Winter 1998–99) pp.43–78; Idem., ‘America's Imperial Ambition’, Foreign Affairs 81/5 (Sept.–Oct. 2002) pp.44–60. For more assertive views about the US role, see Wohlforth (note 42); Charles Krauthammer, ‘The New Unilateralism’, Washington Post, 8 June 2001, p.29. For an earlier explanation why other states did not try to balance the United States, see Michael Mastanduno, ‘Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realists Theories and US Grand Strategies after the Cold War’, International Security 21/4 (Spring 1997) pp.49–88.

As Walt noted, one reason why the United States adopted a strategy different from his prescriptions is because US policymakers generally had a less optimistic view of the security situation. Walt (note 20) ch.7.

Paul Nitze was quoted saying ‘Most of what has been written and taught under the heading of ‘political science’ by Americans since World War II has been of …limited value, if not counterproductive, as a guide to the actual conduct of policy.’ Quoted in Van Evera (note 48) p.2.

Stephen M. Walt, ‘The Progressive Power of Realism’, American Political Science Review 91/4 (Dec. 1997) pp.931–5.

Worse still, ‘securitization’ of more and more issues that were not in the traditional security arena is in danger of making the concept of security lose its boundary and become incomprehensible. Moreover, the practice may actually exacerbate the security dilemma (rather than alleviating it), because it will lead states toward a more threat-based understanding of issues that cannot and should not be coped by traditional political and military means. For a summary of the debate between the ‘widening’ and ‘narrowing’ approach toward security, see Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (note 67) pp.2–5.

One possibility may be modifying the ‘systems dynamics approach’ that has been used to analyze strategic problems in business and government. R.G. Coyle, Systems Dynamics Modelling: A Practical Approach (Netherlands: Chapman & Hall 1996).

Put it another way, defensive realists act according to probability, while offensive realists according to possibility. For this point, see Stephen Brooks, ‘Dueling Realisms’, International Organization 51/2 (Summer 1997) pp.445–77. Glaser might have the same point in mind when he called defensive realism ‘contingent realism’. Glaser (note 39) pp.50–90. For definition of defensive realism, see Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, ‘Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited’, International Security 25/3 (Winter 2000–01) pp.128–61. See also Robert Jervis, ‘Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate’, International Security 24/1 (Summer 1999) pp.42–63. Mearsheimer is the quintessential offensive realist, while Walt is the quintessential defensive realist. Mearsheimer (note 2) esp. ch.2; Snyder (note 5) p.12.

Powell's reformulation of the problem of relative and absolute gain may be an interesting guide. See Robert Powell, ‘Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory’, American Political Sciences Review 85/4 (Dec. 1991) pp.1303–20. Kydd's model on security dilemma may be helpful too. Kydd (note 39).

For a more detailed discussion of this assumption, see Shiping Tang, ‘Different Theories of International Politics for Different Time’, China Social Science 3 (June 2003) pp.140–50.

In this sense, anarchy is really what states make of it. Alex Wendt, ‘Anarchy Is What States Make of it: the social construction of power politics’, International Organization 46/2 (Spring 1992) pp.391–425.

For an argument why certain well-established generalizations about world politics may no longer hold, see Jervis (note 75).

Snyder (note 35) pp.157–9.

March W. Zacher, ‘The Territorial Integrity Norm: International Boundaries and the Use of Force’, International Organization 55/2 (Spring 2001) pp.215–50. And I will be happy to admit that defensive realism is more suitable for the present and some length of the future even though it may not be suitable for the past jungle age before Westphalia, when an offensive realist state would have a better chance of survival.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Shiping Tang

Shiping Tang is Associate Research Fellow and Deputy Director of the Center for Regional Security Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, China. He is also co-director of the Sino-American Security Dialogue, funded by the Ford Foundation and the Mershon Center for Security Studies at Ohio State University.