NORTH KOREA'S ‘FIRST’ NUCLEAR DIPLOMACY, 1993–94 by NARUSHIGE MICHISHITA in JSS 26/4 (Dec. 2003) pp.47–82.
The Editors apologise to Dr Narushige Michishita of Japan's National Institute for Defense Studies for the following corrections that should have been made to his article in the previous issue.
LOWERCASE ‘a’ in ‘Agreed conclusions.’ (19th line from the top, p. 53)
DELETE single quotation marks for Team Spirit (11th line from the bottom, p. 53)
UNBOLD AND ITALICIZE the headline ‘Consideration of Sanctions and Assessment of Military Consequences’ (p.57)
DELETE ‘However’ to make it ‘To Kim it was clear…’ (9th line from the top on p.58)
REPLACE ‘the’ with ‘North Korea's’ to make it ‘On 27 September, North Korea's Ministry of …’ (11th line from the top on p.61)
REPLACE ‘yield’ with ‘have yielded’ to make it ‘it could have yielded enough plutonium….’ (11th line from the bottom on p.62)
DELETE four single quotation marks to make it ‘With its entire population armed and the entire country fortified’. (2nd line from the bottom on p.63)
ADD ‘In other words, North Korea did not have the capability to ‘deny’ but had the capability to ‘punish’. after ‘impose unbearable costs on the US-ROK side in the event of war.’ (13th line from the top on p.64)
REPLACE ‘a paper’ with ‘a memo’ to make it ‘North Korea presented a memo entitled’ (1st line below the headline ‘The Political Results’ on p.68)
ADD ‘(The KEDO Executive Board decided in November 2003 to suspend the LWR Project for a period of one year, beginning 1 December.)’ after ‘The turnkey contract went into effect in February 2000.’ (3rd line from the top on p.70)
DELETE ‘Finally’ to make it ‘The South Korean approach … ’ (4th line from the top on p.72)
DELETE eight lines following ‘In this sense,’ (9th line from the bottom on p. 75), and REPLACE it with ‘it is not clear which side has better hands than the other.’ to make it ‘In this sense, it is not clear which side has better hands than the other.’
DELETE ‘Similarities and differences described above suggest that’ to make it ‘We are facing a ‘high-risk, high-return’ situation…’ (13th line from the bottom on p.76)
ADD ‘much’ to make it ‘bring the situation much closer to the brink than before’. (13th line from the top on p.77)
REPLACE ‘Thomas Mahnken and an anonymous reviewer’ with ‘Thomas G. Mahnken and Jonathan D. Pollack’ (Acknowledgements)
REPLACE ‘The’ with ‘Kyungnam University's’ to make it ‘Kyungnam University's Institute for Far Eastern Studies in Seoul’ (Acknowledgements)
DELETE ‘The views expressed in this article are strictly those of the author.’ (Acknowledgements)
Notes
‘Gist of a Press Briefing by Spokesman Lee Kyung-Jai for President Kim Young Sam of the Republic of Korea, Upon Receiving a Briefing by the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Unification Han Wan-Sang on the Work of the National Unification Board’, Seoul, 15 March 1993, reprinted in Korea and World Affairs 17/1 (Spring 1993) pp.167–8.
‘Statement Issued by Vice Unification Minister Song Young-Dae on Li In-Mo's Visit to North Korea, made at the ‘Unification Strategy Commission”’, Seoul, 11 March 1993, reprinted in Korea and World Affairs 17/1 (Spring 1993) pp.165–6.
For example, see Pyongyang Times, 20 Sep. 1993, p.3; Pyongyang Times, 5 Feb. 1994, pp.1 and 3; and Pyongyang Times, 19 Feb. 1994, p.8.
Tongilwon [Ministry of National Unification], Tongil Baegseo 1995 [Unification White Paper] (Seoul: Tongilwon 1995) pp.215–21.
Sung Deuk Hahm (ed.) Gim Yeong Sam Jeongbu-ui Seonggong-gwa Silpae [The Kim Young Sam Government: Its Success and Failure] (Seoul: Nanam 2001) p.37.
David Albright and Holly Higgins, ‘The Agreed Framework: Status Report’, in Albright and O'Neill (note 5) pp.32–9 and 42–4.
‘North Korean Nuclear Program’, Press Statement, Richard Boucher, Spokesman, US Department of State, Washington DC, 16 Oct. 2002.
PAO (note 118).
Pyongyang Times, 23 April 1992, p.1.
Pyongyang Times, 10 April 1993, p.2.
‘Conclusion of non-aggression treaty between DPRK and US called for’ (note 104).
In February 2000, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency testified, ‘North Korea's capability to successfully conduct complex, multi-echelon, large-scale operations to reunify the Korean peninsula declined in the 1990s’. Vice Admiral Thomas R. Wilson, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, ‘Military Threats and Security: Challenges Through 2015’, Statement for the Record, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 2 Feb. 2000.
‘Statement of fm [Foreign Ministry] spokesman blasts UNSC's discussion of Korean nuclear issue’, KCNA, April 6, 2003.
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