Transformation and Technology in the Fisher Era: the Impact of the Communications Revolution1

I am indebted to the following for their comments and advice on earlier drafts of this paper: Emily Goldman, Keith Neilson, Jeremy Read, Dennis Showalter, Joe Strazek, Jon Sumida, Jonathan Winkler and especially Norman Friedman.

Abstract

The Fisher naval revolution of 1904–10 represented a deliberate attempt to achieve defense transformation to bolster Britain's pretensions to global naval supremacy. The vision called for smaller, more capable forces to do the work of larger, more expensive conventional formations. It consisted of three main elements. First, the replacement of the traditional station fleet system for protecting overseas interests by rapid deployment forces comprised of battlecruisers that could be ‘maneuvered’ by wireless to combat specific enemy threats. Second, at home, instead of a sea control strategy based upon a superior battle-fleet, a sea denial strategy based on flotilla defense commanded and controlled from London via wireless. The third element of the Fisher revolution depended upon ‘plunging’, or shaping and directing technological change through a special relationship with armaments firms. A sophisticated information-communications network was integral to the revolution.

Notes

I am indebted to the following for their comments and advice on earlier drafts of this paper: Emily Goldman, Keith Neilson, Jeremy Read, Dennis Showalter, Joe Strazek, Jon Sumida, Jonathan Winkler and especially Norman Friedman.

John Arbuthnot Fisher: Admiral, 1901; Admiral of the Fleet, 1905. First Sea Lord, Oct. 1904–Jan. 1910, and Oct. 1914–May 1915. The leading biographies of Fisher are: Admiral Reginald H. Bacon, The Life of Lord Fisher of Kilverstone (London: Hodder & Stoughton 1929) by the former assistant to Admiral Fisher – this is the most tantalizing; Ruddock F Mackay, Fisher of Kilverstone (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1973) provides the best overall survey of his career; Jan Morris, Fisher's Face (London: Viking-Penguin Press 1996) provides the best insight into the admiral's character.

The ‘master plot’ of British naval policy during the Fisher era was codified by Arthur J. Marder who conducted much of his research during the 1940s before many official and private papers were made available to scholars. Marder's titles include: The Anatomy of British Sea Power: A History of British Naval Policy in the Pre-Dreadnought Era, 1880–1905 (London: Alfred Knopf 1940), reprinted (Hamden, CT: Archon 1964) hereafter cited as Anatomy; Fear God and Dread Nought: The Correspondence of Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher of Kilverstone, 3 vols. (London: Jonathan Cape 1952–59) cited as FDSF; From The Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 5 vols. (London: OUP 1961–70) hereafter cited as FDSF.

Marder, FGDN, i, pp.6–45. The title of Chap. 3 is ‘The Fisher Revolution’; idem, FDSF, ii, pp.22–6.

Marder, Anatomy (note 3), pp.491, 538; FDSF, I, vii, pp.40–43, 182–5, 432; see also Peter Kemp (ed.) in The Fisher Papers (London: Naval Records Society 1964) vol. ii, pp.xi–xii.

HMS Dreadnought: laid down Feb 1906, 17,900 tons, 10 x 12-inch, 24 x 12 pdr, 21 knots; as compared with HMS King Edward: laid down July 1903, 16,350 tons, 4 x 12-inch, 4 x 9.2-inch, 10 x 6-inch, 12 x 12 pdr, 18 knots.

Jon Sumida, In Defence of Naval Supremacy: Finance, Technology and British Naval Policy, 1889–1914 (Boston, MA: Unwin Hyman 1989; paperback edn. 1993) hereafter cited as In Defence; see also additional evidence cited by Nicholas Lambert ‘Admiral Sir John Fisher and the Concept of Flotilla Defense’, Journal of Military History 59/4 (Oct. 1995) p.644.

Charles Fairbanks, ‘The Origins of the Dreadnought Revolution: a Historiographical Essay’, International History Review 13/2 (1991) pp.246–72.

Nicholas A. Lambert, Sir John Fisher's Revolution (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina 1999) hereafter cited as Fisher's Revolution; Lambert, ‘British Naval Policy 1913/14: Financial Limitation and Strategic Revolution’, The Journal of Modern History, 67/3 (Sept. 1995); Lambert, ‘Admiral Sir John Fisher’ (note 7); Lambert, ‘Economy or Empire: The Fleet Unit Concept and Quest for Collective Security in the Pacific, 1909–1914’, in Keith Neilson and Greg Kennedy (eds.), Far Flung Lines: Studies in Imperial Defence (London: Frank Cass 1995); Lambert, ‘The Opportunities of Technology: British and French Strategy For the Pacific, 1905–09' in Nicholas Rodger (ed.), The Parameters of Naval Power (London: Macmillan 1996); see also Sumida, In Defence (note 7); idem, ‘A Matter of Timing: British Battle Fleet Tactics in the Dreadnought Era, 1912–1916’, Journal of Military History 67 (Jan. 2003) pp.85–136; idem, ‘Demythologizing the Fisher Era: the Role of Change in Historical Method,’ Militärgeschichtliches Forchungsamt, 59 (2000); idem, ‘The Quest for Reach: The Development of Long-Range Naval Gunnery in the Royal Navy, 1901–1912’ in Stephen Chiabotti (ed.), Tooling for War: Military Transformation in the Industrial Age: Proceedings of the Sixteenth Military History Symposium of the United States Air Force Academy (Chicago, IL: Imprint 1996); idem, Sir John Fisher and the Dreadnought: the Sources of Naval Mythology,’ Journal of Military History (Oct. 1995); ‘The Historian as Contemporary Analyst: Julian Corbett and Admiral Sir John Fisher, 1904–1910’ in John Hattendorf and James Goldrick (eds.), Mahan is Not Enough: The Influence and Contemporary Relevance of Sir Julian Corbett and Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond (Newport, RI: Naval War College 1993).

The idea that Russia remained the uppermost concern in the minds of British policymakers is consistent with the latest research in the field of British diplomatic history for which see: Keith Neilson, Britain and the Last Tsar: British Policy and Russia, 1894–1917 (Oxford: OUP 1995).

See minute (21 Nov. 1904) by Selborne (1st Lord) on ‘Secret & Confidential’, ‘Redistribution of the Fleet in Home & Foreign Waters: minutes on the first, second, third and fourth reports of progress of committee presided over by the DNI’, 6 Dec. 1904, ADM 1/7736 (Admiralty archives, Public Records Office, Kew, UK).

Lambert, Fisher's Revolution (note 9) Chap. 4.

The first British naval base to be connected to the net was Malta, in the early 1850s. The first transatlantic cable was laid 1858, but it was not until 1866 that a reliable service was finally established. In 1870, Bombay (India) and Hong Kong (China) were connected to London and in 1871 Sydney and Melbourne (Australia) were added. By 1902, all 24 overseas naval bases were connected to the cable net.

Guglielino Marconi successfully demonstrated the practicality of wireless telegraphy (W/T) in the summer of 1896 and on 2 June registered his first patent. Captain Henry Jackson, RN, another wireless pioneer, matched Marconi's achievement two months later in Aug. 1896. The first attempt by the RN to use wireless on board warships occurred during the maneuvers of 1899. The first successful W/T transmission across the Atlantic occurred in 1901.

Marder, FDSF (note 3) i, p.40; also see Marder, Anatomy (note 3) p.355.

The traditional histories contain several similar anomalies: the most notorious being the canard that before 1914 the Admiralty consistently opposed the development of the submarine.

A.T. Mahan, ‘The Dispositions of Navies’, National Review, July 1902, p.194.

Lambert, Fisher's Revolution (note 9).

Ibid., pp.38–55,

Ibid., pp.142–57.

Marder, FDSF (note 3) i, pp.401–4.

Testimony of Sir Arthur Wilson to sub-committee of Committee of Imperial Defence appointed to investigate certain questions raised by Admiral Lord Charles Bereford, May 1909, Q.2585-Q.2590, p.313, CAB 16/9A (Cabinet Office Archives, PRO, Kew, UK).

Avner Offer, The First World War: an Agrarian Interpretation (Oxford: OUP 1989).

What follows is taken from Lambert, Fisher's Revolution (note 9) and Sumida, In Defence (note 7).

Leading French theorist was Admiral Francois Fournier: see Fisher's Revolution (note 9) pp.21–9, 76–8. For French theory of Guerre Industrielle, see Admiral Francoise Fournier, Notre Marine de Guerre: Reforms Essentielles, par un Marin (Paris: 1904); Edouard Lockroy, La Defence Navale (Paris: 1899); Edouard Lockroy, La Marine de Guerre: Six Mois au Rue Royale (Paris: 1899); archival material cited in Nicholas Lambert, ‘The Impact of the Submarine Upon Naval Strategic Thinking, 1896–1914’, unpublished Oxford D.Phil. thesis.

‘Sir John Fisher, the Fleet Unit Concept and the Creation of the Royal Australian Navy’ in David Stevens and John Reeve (eds.), Southern Trident: Strategy, History and the Rise of Australian Naval Power (Canberra: Allen & Unwin 2001).

William McNeil, The Pursuit of Power (Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press 1982) pp.265–90.

Fisher to Churchill, 6 and 30 Dec. 1911, in Randolph Churchill, Winston S Churchill: Young Statesman (London: Heinemann 1967) companion vol. 2, pp.1351, 1365.

Fisher to Churchill, 13 Feb 1912, FGDN ii, p.431.

Admiral Sir Arthur Hezlet, Electronics and Sea Power (New York: Stein & Day 1975) Chaps. 2 and 3.

For example, see Battenberg to Lloyd's, 15 Jul. 1903, Lloyd's Ms. 31663 (File: Admiralty – Suez Canal and Alexandria); Lloyd's to Admiralty, 9 Dec. 1901, Lloyd's Ms. 31658 (File: Admiralty – Wireless); Noel to Lloyd's, 20 Dec. 1904, Lloyd's Ms. 31658. Lloyd's Archive, Guildhall Library, London.

See remarks by Fisher on implications of wireless in a speech given at Royal Academy Banquet, 1903, as reported in The Times, London, 4 May 1903.

: class A stations at Horsea and Cleethorps in UK; Malta and Gibraltar; class B stations at Aberdeen, Pembroke and Harwich.

A 1908 memorandum reported that the battlecruiser Indomitable had successfully transmitted as far as 1,400 miles with the new sets, for which see: Admiralty [Captain Edmond Slade], ‘Wireless Telegraphy in War’, printed 4 Aug. 1908, misc. papers, ADM 116/1043B1.

Maurice Hankey, The Supreme Command, 1914–1918 (London: George Allen & Unwin 1961) 2 vols., i, pp.23, 40–42, 71–2.

Stephan Roskill, Hankey: Man of Secrets (London: Collins 1970) i, p.81.

Lord Fisher, Memories & Records (New York: George Doran 1920) I, pp.104–5; for confirmation of this story and the location of the ‘central focus’ (Eastern Telegraph Company office at Syra) and the identity of the key informant (Mr Cottrell, Consul and local manager of ETC) see Fisher, ‘Notes for Successor’, 14 May 1902 in ‘Mediterranean’, ADM 1/7597; also Jan Morris, Fisher's Face (note 2) pp.109–11.

In Dec. 1904 additional centers were established at Colombo, Singapore and Hong Kong. In 1911, additional intelligence centers were established at St Vincent, Pernambuco, Monte Video, Cape Town, Fremantle and Sydney. For which see: NID 10388/21, ‘Naval Intelligence Organization Abroad’, 1921, copy supplied from Australian Archives courtesy of Joe Strazek.

Ibid, para 7.

Ibid.

Best summary provided in Christopher Andrew, Her Majesty's Secret Service: the Making of the British Intelligence Community (New York: Viking-Penguin 1986) Chap. 2; for evidence of Naval Secret Service effort before 1909, see Slade Diary 1907–09, Slade Mss (Papers of Admiral Sir Ernest Slade, Queens University, Kingston, Ontario).

Confidential Testimony to Royal Commission on Supply and Food & Raw Materials by Director of Naval Intelligence, Captain H.S.H. Prince Louis of Battenberg, 5 Nov. 1903, q.71, p.9, ADM 137/2872. See also Q.158, p.15; Q.190. p.18.

Admiral Edward Inglefield (ret.) to Captain Henry Campbell (DTD), 14 Nov 1907, ADM 137/2864; see also remarks by Captain Richard Webb to C[hief] O[f] [S]taff, nd. [1913] ADM 137/2864.

Fisher to Esher (1908), cited in Fisher, Memories (note 37) p.187; Samuel Pepys issued orders that ‘not a cat should swing in the Navy Office but he should know it’. I have not found the original Pepys quote in the diary. The quote here, attributed to Peyps, is taken from a minute (20 May 1921) by Oswyn Murray (Admiralty Permanent Secretary) on Admiralty Docket ‘Care of Office Cat’, (c.II 3964/1921) ADM 1/9237 (document courtesy of Professor Jon Sumida).

Admiralty, ‘Wireless Telegraphy in War’, printed 4 Aug. 1908, misc. papers, ADM 116/1043B1. Author was Captain Edmund Slade (DNI) for which see copy of draft in Slade Mss, microfilm reel 3.

Ibid.

Ibid.

What follows is explained in detail in Lambert, Fisher's Revolution (note 9) and Sumida, In Defence (note 7).

Fisher, ‘The Strategical Distribution of the Fleet’, (Aug. 1904), Kemp, Fisher Papers (note 5) I, p.161.

Ibid. For almost identical expressions of these ideas in 1902 see: Fisher, ‘Mediterranean Fleet Lectures’, 1901/02, FP 4702, Fisher Mss 8/1; see also Fisher to Selborne, 25 Feb. 1902 enclosing print on ‘The Strategic Distribution of our Fleets’, FP 90, FISR 1/2. (Papers of Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher, Roskill Archives Centre, Churchill College, Cambridge.)

See, e.g., the attempt by A.K. Wilson to control from Whitehall the movements of the 2nd Battle Squadron participating in maneuvers off Spain. Sanders to Balfour, 7 Mar. 1910, f.154, Add. Mss, 49766 (Papers of Arthur Balfour, British Library, London).

Lambert, Fisher's Revolution (note 9) Chap. 7.

Jellicoe to Fisher, 18 April 1909, FP413, FISR 1/8. NB: marginalia by Fisher.

Battenberg to Churchill, 7 July 1912, Battenberg Mss MB1/ T20/103B (Papers of Admiral Prince Louis of Battenberg, Southampton University Library, UK).

What follows is based upon Sumida, ‘A Matter of Timing’ (note 9); for an explanation and the consequences of the Royal Navy's desire to shoot more rapidly see Nicholas Lambert, ‘Our Bloody Ships or Our Bloody System; Jutland and the Loss of the Battle cruisers, 1916’, The Journal of Military History 63 (Jan. 1999).

For Jellicoe's views on command and control see Andrew Gordon, The Rules of the Game (London: John Murray 1996); for details of ‘1912 gunnery revolution’ see Sumida, ‘Matter of Timing’ (note 9).

Fisher's Revolution (note 9) pp.111–15.

Fisher, ‘Admiralty House Portsmouth’, 14 May 1904; Kemp, Fisher Papers (note 5) I, 20.

On France see Jellicoe (2SL) to Churchill, 19 Dec. 1913, Battenberg Mss MB1/T49/25; On the Russians see Battenberg (1SL) to Asquith, 28 June 1912, enclosing telegram from Foreign Office 25622 (17 June 1912) f.150, Asquith 24 (Papers of HH Asquith, Bodleian Library, Oxford).

Akin to the tale of paleontologist Charles Walcott's mistaken interpretation of the fossil record he found in the Burgess Shale. For which see Steven Jay Gould, Wonderful Life: The Burgess Shale and the Nature of History (New York: Norton 1989).

Remarks in quotes refer to Goldman, ‘Introduction’, p.2. and p.7.