Beyond Fire and Movement: Command, Control and Information in the German Blitzkrieg1

The argument presented in this paper is distilled from Robert M. Citino, Quest for Decisive Victory: From Stalemate to Blitzkrieg in Europe, 1899–1940 (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas 2002).

Abstract

It is common to attribute the operational difficulties faced by post-Napoleonic armies to an increase in defensive firepower. In fact, the immense ‘mass armies’ of the day also suffered from problems of command, control and information that ultimately worked to their undoing. The German achievement in the interwar period went beyond tanks and aircraft. It also involved harnessing the radio to the service of the field army. Radio made it possible to coordinate mobile masses of men and equipment and to process the huge amounts of information they generated. The smooth flow of information was key to the Wehrmacht's revival of decisive battlefield victory in 1939–40.

Notes

The argument presented in this paper is distilled from Robert M. Citino, Quest for Decisive Victory: From Stalemate to Blitzkrieg in Europe, 1899–1940 (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas 2002).

The body of work by Dennis Showalter has been essential to our understanding of the ‘railroad and rifle revolution’, and to the role of the Prussian army within it. His monograph, Railroads and Rifles: Soldiers, Technology, and the Unification of Germany (Hamden, CT: Archon Books 1976), restored respectability to what many disparaged at the time as ‘drum and trumpet’ military history by demonstrating the key role that hardware, doctrine and military planning had played in German unification. See also his ‘Manifestation of Reform: The Rearmament of the Prussian Infantry, 1806–1813’, Journal of Modern History 44/3 (Sept. 1972) pp.364–80, which places tactics and weaponry squarely within the broader problematic of Prussian state reform in the aftermath of Jena; ‘Mass Multiplied by Impulsion: The Influence of Railroads on Prussian Planning for the Seven Weeks' War’, Military Affairs 38/2 (April 1974) pp.62–7; and ‘The Retaming of Bellona: Prussia and the Institutionalization of the Napoleonic Legacy, 1815–1876’, Military Affairs 44/2 (April 1980) pp.57–63.

For Moltke, see Daniel J. Hughes (ed.), Moltke on the Art of War: Selected Writings (Novato, CA: Presidio 1993), combining a judicious selection of Moltke's most important works, solid translation and insightful commentary. The professional journals of the German army are the source of literally hundreds of articles on Moltke. See, e.g., General of Artillery Ludwig, ‘Moltke als Erzieher’ and the unsigned article, ‘Generalfeldmarschall Graf von Schlieffen über den großen Feldherrn der preußisch-deutschen Armee’, both in Militär-Wochenblatt 125/17 (25 Oct. 1940) pp.802–4 and pp.805–7, as well as Lieutenant Colonel Obkircher, ‘Moltke, der “unbekannte” General von Königgrätz: Zur Erinnerung an den 75. Gedenktag der Schlacht bei Königgrätz am 3. Juli 1866’, Militär-Wochenblatt 125/52 (27 June 1941) pp.1994–7. For Königgrätz, see Geoffrey Wawro, The Austro-Prussian War: Austria's War with Prussia and Italy in 1866 (Cambridge: CUP 1996), a meticulously researched account that presents the Austrian view of the conflict; and Gordon A. Craig, The Battle of Königgrätz (Philadelphia, PA : Lippincott 1964).

For the huge literature on the war in South Africa, the Boer War, see Fred R. van Hartesveldt, The Boer War: Historiography and Annotated Bibliography (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press 2000). The best general work is Bill Nasson, The South African War, 1899–1902 (Oxford: OUP 2000). Useful in part are Thomas Pakenham, The Boer War (New York: Random House 1979), which makes more claims to originality than it can sustain; and Byron Farwell, The Great Anglo-Boer War (New York: Norton 1976), which has all the advantages and disadvantages of popular history. The best account of operations in the war is W. Baring Pemberton, Battles of the Boer War (London: Batsford 1964). In general, all these works focus on the British role in the fighting, British doctrine and British problems in employing the new technology of war, to the general detriment of the Afrikaner view. There is a large literature in Afrikaans, of course, but the language barrier makes it unavailable to most Western scholars. There is a need for a synthesis: a general history of the war incorporating both English and Afrikaans sources.

For the Russo-Japanese War, see two recent scholarly works: Bruce Menning, Bayonets Before Bullets: The Imperial Russian Army, 1861–1914 (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press 1992) includes a solid history of the war (pp.152–99) in the context of an analysis of doctrine, training and organization in the Russian army throughout the period. Richard W. Harrison, The Russian Way of War: Operational Art, 1904–1940 (Lawrence, KN: University Press of Kansas 2001) pp.7–23, looks carefully at operations, and is extremely hard on Kuropatkin, who for much of the war ‘behaved like a division commander’ preoccupied with ‘the minutiae of battle’, rather than a theater commander seeking an operational decision (p.23). The new edition of Tadayoshi Sakurai, Human Bullets: A Soldier's Story of the Russo-Japanese War (Lincoln, NB: University of Nebraska Press 1999) is indispensable for the experience of the Japanese foot soldier. For the pursuit after Liaoyang and the ‘who put those mountains there’ reaction, see Sir Ian Hamilton, A Staff Officer's Scrap-Book (London: Edward Arnold 1912) p.317.

For the battle of the Modder river, see Pemberton, Battles (note 4) pp.55–78; Pakenham, Boer War (note 4) pp.197–207; Farwell, Anglo-Boer War (note 4) pp.91–101. See also Stephen M. Miller, Lord Methuen and the British Army (London: Frank Cass 1999) for a game attempt to rehabilitate Methuen's generalship.

Any historical inquiry into the Balkan Wars must still base itself on the primary sources and period accounts. Lieutenant Hermenegild Wagner, With the Victorious Bulgarians (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin 1913) is a very useful analysis of the Bulgarian war effort by the German correspondent of the Reichspost, although rival correspondents often attacked his veracity. The other side of the hill receives attention in Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett, With the Turks in Thrace (New York: George H. Doran 1913), an account by the special correspondent of the London Daily Telegraph. Philip Gibbs and Bernard Grant cover both sides in The Balkan War: Adventures of War with Cross and Crescent (Boston, MA: Small, Maynard, and Company 1913). Two extremely useful works are A. Kutschbach, Die Serben im Balkan-krieg 1912–1913 und im Kriege gegen die Bulgaren (Stuttgart: Frank'sche Verlagshandlung 1913) and the German translation of the memoirs of Turkish III Corps commander Mahmud Mukhtar Pasha, Meine Führung im Balkankriege 1912 (Berlin: Ernst Siegfried Mittler und Sohn 1913).

The ‘Hentsch mission’ remains the most controversial aspect of the opening campaign in the West. See B.H. Liddell Hart, The Real War, 1914–1918 (Boston, MA: Little, Brown 1930) pp.83–4; C.R.M.F. Crutwell, A History of the Great War, 1914–1918 (Chicago, IL: Academy Chicago 1991) p.34; Cyril Falls, The Great War (New York: Capricorn Books, 1959), pp. 68–69 ; and John Keegan, The First World War (London: Hutchinson 1998) pp.130–33.

For Gallipoli, see Tim Travers, Gallipoli 1915 (Charleston, SC: Tempus 2001), highly detailed and unlikely to be superseded for some time. Edward J. Erickson, Ordered to Die: a History of the Ottoman Army in the First World War (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press 2001) has the attraction of being based on the heretofore untapped Turkish sources.

There is one great book on the Somme: Martin Middlebrook, The First Day on the Somme: 1 July 1916 (New York: W.W. Norton 1972). The rest of the six-month struggle deserves the same treatment.

The interwar period has attracted intense study of late, seen by scholars and military professionals alike as a laboratory of change in doctrine, training and weaponry, in which some succeeded (the Germans), others failed (the French) and still others squandered rich opportunities (the British). For an overview, see two essential works: Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett (eds.), Military Innovation in the Interwar Period (Cambridge: CUP 1996) and Harold R. Winton and David R. Mets, The Challenge of Change: Military Institutions and New Realities, 1918–1941 (Lincoln, NB: University of Nebraska Press 2000). The list of monographs dealing with the era is large and getting larger. See, among others, Robert M. Citino, The Path to Blitzkrieg: Doctrine and Training in the German Army, 1920–1939 (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 1999); James S. Corum, The Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seeckt and German Military Reform (Lawrence, KN: University Press of Kansas 1992); Eugenia C. Kiesling, Arming Against Hitler: France and the Limits of Military Planning (Lawrence, KN: University Press of Kansas 1996); David E. Johnson, Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers: Innovation in the U.S. Army, 1917–1945 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1998); William O. Odom, After the Trenches: The Transformation of U.S. Army Doctrine, 1918–1939 (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press 1999); Harold R. Winton, To Change an Army: General Sir John Burnett-Stuart and British Armored Doctrine, 1927–1938 (Lawrence, KN: University Press of Kansas, 1988).

See, e.g., Lieutenant Colonel Köhn, ‘Die Infanterie im “Blitzkrieg”’, Militär-Wochenblatt 125/5 (2 Aug. 1940) pp.165–6, in which ‘Blitzkrieg’ is used only in quotation marks and is described as a ‘catch-phrase’ or ‘buzzword’ (Schlagwort), as well as Colonel Rudolf Theiss, ‘Der Panzer in der Weltgeschichte’, Militär-Wochenblatt 125/15 (11 Oct. 1940) pp.705–8, which likewise uses the term in quotes. By 1941, German professional literature had dropped the quotes, although the word was still not being used in any sort of precise technical sense. See Lieutenant Colonel Gaul, ‘Der Blitzkrieg in Frankreich’, Militär-Wochenblatt 125/35 (28 Feb. 1941) pp.1513–7.

For Villers-Bretonneux, see Kenneth Macksey, Tank Versus Tank: The Illustrated Story of Armored Battlefield Conflict in the Twentieth Century (New York: Barnes and Noble 1999) pp.30–40. Often forgotten in this context is Heinz Guderian, Achtung – Panzer! The Development of Armored Forces, Their Tactics, and Operational Potential (London: Arms and Armour 1992). Not merely a doctrinal handbook, it is also a fine operational history of armored combat in World War I. For Villers-Bretonneux, see pp.184–6.

Quoted in General Ernst Kabisch, ‘Systemlose Strategie’, Militär-Wochenblatt 125/26 (27 Dec. 1940) p.1235.

See, e.g., the unsigned article ‘Zentralisation und Dezentralisation’, MilitärWochenblatt 115/27 (18 Jan. 1931) pp.1038–9, which discusses in some detail the issues of centralized and decentralized command without ever using the term Auftragstaktik. It is interesting to speculate what the Germans would think of the use of German terms like Blitzkrieg or Auftragstaktik in the US army. A contemporary German officer would never have used foreign terms with such frequency. See the unsigned article ‘Fremdwort und Heeressprache’, Militär-Wochenblatt 113/2 (11 July 1928) pp.48–50, as well as the article by the editor of the Militär-Wochenblatt, General Konstantin von Altrock, entitled ‘Sprach- und Schreibdummheiten’, Militär-Wochenblatt 113/2 (11 July 1928) pp.50–52. For a strongly worded essay on the way in which German terms and concepts can be misused within the contemporary US army, see Daniel J. Hughes, ‘Abuses of German Military History’, Military Review LXV/12 (Dec. 1986) pp.66–76.

For the derivation of the term Auftragstaktik, see Antulio J. Echevarria II, After Clausewitz: German Military Thinkers Before the Great War (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas 2000) pp.32–42, and pp.94–103. Arising in a post-Moltkean debate over infantry tactics, Auftragstaktik stood for a flexible system of organization, with units and doctrines being formed for specific missions in battle; it was opposed to Normaltaktik, the use of standardized formations and procedures in battle. The debate, raging from 1879 to the mid-1890s, featured some of the most developed military minds in the German officer corps: Sigismund von Schlichting (for Auftragstaktik) against Albrecht von Boguslawski and Wilhelm von Scherff (for Normaltaktik). In the course of the debate, the two terms expanded, gradually coming came to stand for specific methods of commanding and controlling troops in modern combat, the former aiming toward flexibility, the latter towards greater centralization. The later Chief of the General Staff, Alfred von Schlieffen, was a proponent of Normaltaktik and tight centralization, for the most part. Echevarria warns that, ‘The term Auftragstaktik has been greatly abused in military publications in recent years’ (p.38), and argues that the Germans managed a synthesis of contending concepts in the years before 1914: with a stress on proper planning at the small unit level and more openness and flexibility for the higher commanders. On the debate, see Daniel J. Hughes, ‘Schlichting, Schlieffen, and the Prussian Theory of War in 1914’, Journal of Military History LIX/2 (April 1995) pp.257–77.

‘Zentralisation und Dezentralisation’ (note 15) p.1038.

‘Der Angriffsschlacht von Cambrai vom 30. November bis 6. Dezember 1917’, Militär-Wochenblatt 112/22 (11 Dec. 1927) pp.803–4.

For a more complete expression of this argument, see Robert M. Citino, ‘“Die Gedanken sind frei”: The Intellectual Culture of the Interwar German Army’, The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin (Canada) 4/3 (Fall 2001).

The phrase is General Erich von Ludendorff's, describing German operations in the Warsaw-Lodz campaign in the fall of 1914. Quoted in Colonel von Schäfer, ‘Die Enstehung des Entschlusses zur Offensive auf Lods: Zum Gedenken an General Ludendorff’, Militärwissenschaftliche Rundschau 3/1 (1938) p.25.

For the Funkübung, see Citino, Path to Blitzkrieg (note 11) pp.208–12.

‘Neugestaltung der Kriegführung’, Militär-Wochenblatt 120/18 (11 Nov. 1935) pp.747–50, and 19 (18 Nov. 1935) pp.787–92.

Heinz Guderian, ‘Die Panzertruppen und ihr Zusammenwirken mit den anderen Waffen’, Militärwissenschaftliche Rundschau 1/5 (1936) pp.607–26.

Colonel Fuppe, ‘Neuzeitliches Nachrichtenverbindungswesen als Führungsmittel im Kriege’, Militärwissenschaftliche Rundschau 3/6 (1938) pp.750–58.

See the article by General of Artillery, General of Artillery, Ludwig, ‘Gedanken über den Angriff im Bewegungskriege’, Militärwissenschaftliche Rundschau 1/2 (1936) pp.153–64.

Major Friedrich Bertkau, ‘Die nachrichtentechnische Führung mechanisierter Verbände’, Militär-Wochenblatt 120/15 (18 Oct. 1935) p.612.

The report by General Wilhelm Adam, chief of the Truppenamt, entitled ‘Einige Gesichtspunkte für die Verwendung motorisierter Aufklärungsabteilungen’, is quite enlightening on the MRD's advantages and difficulties. See Citino, Path to Blitzkrieg (note 11) pp.204–7. For the employment of the MRD, see Lieutenant von Faber du Faur, ‘Mechanisierte Auf-klärungsabteilungen in der operativen und taktischen Aufklärung’, Militär-Wochenblatt 116/46 (11 June 1932) pp.1609–11.

See, e.g., Rolf Bathe, Der Feldzug der 18 Tage: die Chronik des polnischen Dramas (Oldenburg: Gerhard Stalling 1939). Steven J. Zaloga and Victor Madej, The Polish Campaign (New York: Hippocrene 1991) p.158, address the ‘myth of the “eighteen-day war”’, pointing out that Army Group South ‘lost more men killed in the final half of the war than in the first two weeks’.

For the role of the Luftwaffe in the Polish campaign, see James S. Corum, The Luftwaffe: Creating the Operational Air War, 1918–1940 (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas 1997) pp.272–5. For a detailed operational account of the fighting around Modlin, see Major Wim Brandt, ‘Bilder aus der Belagerung von Modlin’, Militär-Wochenblatt 124/30 (19 Jan. 1940) pp.1451–4.

Hans von Luck, Panzer Commander (Westport, CT: Praeger 1989) p.26.

For the battle of the Bzura, see Zaloga and Madej, Polish Campaign (note 28) pp.131–8.