Uncharted Waters: Information in the First Modern Joint Campaign – Norway 1940

Abstract

The 1940 Norway campaign was the first truly modern joint operation in which ground, sea and air forces all played major roles. With three services involved over a huge theater of war, the normal friction in obtaining and disseminating intelligence and information that one finds in a joint operation was multiplied. As the two sides were fairly evenly matched, effective use of intelligence and information provided a decisive advantage. This paper analyzes the use of information and intelligence of both sides at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. Both sides performed poorly at the strategic level but the Germans proved far superior to the British at the operational and tactical levels. The paper challenges several common assumptions on the importance of intelligence and information in joint campaigns.

Notes

There are several good histories of the campaign in Norway. On the German operations, see Hans-Martin Ottmer, Weserübung: Der deutsche Angriff auf Dänemark und Norwegen in April 1940 (Munich: R. Oldenbourg 1994) and Walther Hubatsch, Weserübung: Die deutsche Besetzung von Dänemark und Norwegen 1940 (Göttingen: Musterschmidt 1960). On the air operations, see Adam Claasen, Hitler's Northern War: the Luftwaffe's Ill-Fated Campaign 1940–1945 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas 2001). On British operations, see T.K. Derry, The Campaign in Norway (London: HMSO 1952); J.R.M. Butler, Grand Strategy, Vol. 2, September 1939-June 1941 (London: HMSO 1957); and S.W. Roskill, The War at Sea (London: HMSO 1954) Vol. 1.

E.R. Hooten, Phoenix Triumphant (London: Arms and Armour 1994) p.236.

See Wolfgang Wegener, The Naval Strategy of the World War, ed. and trans. H. Herwig (Annapolis, MD: US Naval Institute 1989).

On the influence of Admiral Wegener on German strategic thought, see Carl-Axel Gemzell, Organization, Conflict, Innovation: A Study of German Naval Strategic Planning 1888–1940 (Lund, Sweden: Esselte Studium 1971) pp.373–90.

Claasen (note 1) pp.3–6.

James Corum, ‘The German Campaign in Norway 1940 as a Joint Operation’, Journal of Strategic Studies 21/4 (Dec. 1998) pp.50–77. See pp.55–6.

Christina Goulter, A Forgotten Offensive (London: Frank Cass 1995) pp.115–17 and footnote 21, p.129.

Ibid., p.117.

On Plan R 4, see J.L. Moulton, The Norwegian Campaign of 1940: A Study of Warfare in Three Dimensions (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode 1966) pp.69–71; and Butler (note 1) pp.109–24.

Moulton (note 9) pp.71–3.

Corum, ‘The German Campaign in Norway’ (note 6) pp.68–9.

Der Adler, ‘Handstreich aus der Luft’ and ‘Sturm der Motoren’ in Heft 2, 1939, p.10.

Hugh Thomas, The Spanish Civil War (New York: Harper and Row 1961) p.244. See also Raymond Proctor, Hitler's Luftwaffe in the Spanish Civil War (Westport: Greenwood Press 1983) p.31.

On the Norwegian armed forces in 1940, see Ronald Tarnstrom, The Sword of Scandinavia (Lindsborg, KS: Trogen Books 1996) pp.124–37; and Terj Holm, 1940-Igjen? (Oslo: Forsvaretmuseet 1987) pp.27–8.

Hubatsch (note 1) p.96.

Claasen (note 1) pp.14–17.

Ibid., p.16.

Claasen (note 1) pp.14–17.

Ottmer (note 1) pp.38–40.

David Kahn, Hitler's Spies: German Military Intelligence in World War II (New York: Collier Books 1978) pp.117–21.

The intelligence annexes to the final Weserübung operations order list accurately the Norwegian army garrisons as well as the major reserve units and their depots. See Anlage 2–7, ‘Operationsbefehl X Fliegerkorps’ (20 March 1940), in USAF Historical Research Agency (HRA) Doc. K113.305.

Ibid.

Ottmer (note 1) p.49.

Hooten (note 2) p.226.

Moulton (note 9) p.106.

Jürgen Rohwer, ‘Radio Intelligence in the Battle of the Atlantic’ in Walter Hitchcock (ed.), The Intelligence Revolution: A Historical Perspective (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History) pp.77–110, see p.79.

Claasen (note 1) pp.85–6.

Rohwer (note 26) p.79.

See Martin Middlebrook and Chris Everitt (eds.), The Bomber Command War Diaries (London: Penguin 1985) pp.24–32 on Bomber Command reconnaissance efforts over the North Sea, Oct. 1939–April 1940.

S.W. Roskill (note 1) pp.158–9; Moulton (note 9) pp.100–105.

Ibid., p.160.

Derry (note 1) pp 33–7. See also Moulton (note 9) pp.158–60.

Alistair Horne, To Lose a Battle: France 1940 (London: Penguin Books 1979) p.204.

F.H. Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War: its Influence on Strategy and Operations (London: HMSO 1979) Vol. 1, p.140.

Moulton (note 9) p.177.

C. Shores, Fledgling Eagles: The Complete Account of Air Operations During the Phony War and in the Norwegian Campaign, 1940 (London: Grub Street 1991) p.277.

Hendrik Skov Kristensen, Vesallierede Luftangreb I Danmark under 2. Verdenskrig (Aarhus: Universitetsforlag 1990) p.729.

Oberst Dürr, ‘Die Luftnachrichten-Truppe im Norwegen Feldzug’, Study for the Luftwaffe Generalstab, Abt. 8, 21 Aug. 1944, in NARA T-971, Roll 3.

Corum, ‘The German Campaign in Norway’ (note 6) p.54. See also James S. Corum, The Luftwaffe: Creating the Operational Air War, 1918–1940 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas 1997) pp.253–5.

Butler (note 1) pp.129–31.

On the organization of the British forces in the Norway campaign see Butler (note 1) pp.129–32; see also Roskill (note 1) pp.134–7.

Nigel Lee, ‘Command in Central Norway 1940: A Cautionary Tale’ in Gary Sheffield and Geoffrey Till (eds.), Challenges in High Command in the Twentieth Century (Strategic and Combat Studies Institute, Issue 38, Dec. 1999) pp.52–7.

T.K. Derry, ‘British Plans and Operations’, in Karl Rommetveit (ed.), Narvik 1940 (Oslo Institut for Forvarsstudier 1991) pp.63–84.

Hooten (note 2) pp.228–30.

Roskill (note 1) p.141; Butler (note 1) p.133.

Moulton (note 9) pp.174–5.

Ibid.

‘Expeditionary Force Instruction No. 1’ from HQ 5th Corps, 22 April 1940, para 8. Reproduced in Derry (note 1) pp.256–7.

Corum ‘The German Campaign in Norway’ (note 6) p.59.

General Speidel (ed.), ‘Der Feldzug in Norwegen’ in USAF HRA Doc. K113.305, p.9

John Vasco and Peter Cornwell, Zerstörer: The Messerschmitt 110 and its Units in 1940 (Norfolk, VA: JAC Publications 1995) pp.11–15.

Ibid., p.223.

Ibid., p.228.

Moulton (note 9) p.72.

Derry (note 1) pp.36–7.

Lee (note 42) p.58.

For an overview of the Luftwaffe's liaison system, see James Corum, ‘The Luftwaffe's Army Support Doctrine, 1918–1941’ in The Journal of Military History 59 (Jan. 1995) pp.53–76. See pp.58–61.

On the Heeresflieger, see General Paul Deichmann, Spearhead for Blitzkrieg: Luftwaffe Operations in Support of the Army, 1939–1945 (New York: Ivy Books 1996) pp.90–100.

Claasen (note 1) pp.112–13.

Corum ‘The Luftwaffe's Army Support doctrine (note 57) pp.60–61.

Ibid., p.61.

Gruppe XXI, ‘Erfahrungsberichte der Gruppe XXI’, (7 Oct. 1940) in BA/MA (Bundesarchiv/Militärarchiv Freiburg) RH 24-21/50. p.19.

See Kapitän zur See Heye, ‘Die Unternehmung gegen Drondheim’ in Fregattenkapitän Georg von Hase (ed.), Die Kriegsmarine erobert Norwegens Fjorde (Leipzig: Hase und Koehler 1940) pp.279–90, and Kapitänleutnant Hans Bartels, in Die Kriegsmarine erobert Norwegens Fjorde ‘Auf einem Minensuchtboot’ pp.206–22 for accounts of the numerous small army/navy operations in Norway's fjords and inland waters during April–May 1940.

The idea that with information superiority the US military can drastically reduce friction and cut force structure is a central part of Joint Vision 2010. See Joint Staff, Joint Vision 2010 (US Defence Department, Washington, DC: 1999) pp.13–18. On the promise of information dominance in future war, see Jeffrey Barnett, Future War (Maxwell AFB: Air University Press 1996) pp.11–13. For a critique of the notion that information dominance eliminates friction in war and decision-making, see Barry Watts, Clausewitzian Friction and Future War (Washington, DC: National Defense University 1996) especially pp.1–5.