Strategic terrorism: The framework and its fallacies

Abstract

This article seeks to lay out a comprehensive framework by which those who utilize a campaign of strategic terrorism seek to attain their ends. It identifies a distinctive modus operandi: 1) disorientation: to alienate the authorities from their citizens, reducing the government to impotence in the eyes of the population; 2) target response: to induce a target to respond in a manner that is favorable to the insurgent cause; 3) gaining legitimacy: to exploit the emotional impact of the violence to insert an alternative political message. By elucidating the strategy of terrorism, the analysis also reveals its inherent limitations. Resting on the premise that a militarily more powerful adversary will in some way feel restrained from bringing the full force of its military superiority to bear, the strategy relies exclusively on the exploitation of the psychological effects of armed action, thereby rendering it vulnerable to those who are willing to view the resolution of clashes of interest principally in terms of the tangibles of military power.

Notes

1 Bazzam Baz, Terrorism Survival Handbook (Los Angeles, CA: Costa Communications 2001); Giovanna Borradori, Juergen Habermas and Jacques Derrida, Philosophy in a Time of Terror (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press 2003).

2 Donald H. Rumsfeld, ‘A New Kind of War’, New York Times, 27 Sept. 2001.

3 See Walter Laqueur, ‘Postmodern Terrorism: New Rules for an Old Game’, Foreign Affairs75/5 (1996) pp.24–36.

4 See, for example, Barry R. Posen, ‘The Struggle Against Terrorism: Grand Strategy, Strategy, and Tactics’, International Security 26/3 (2001) pp.39–55.

5 The only scholar to have explored terrorism as a strategy is Martha Crenshaw, whose work continues to be essential in developing a comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon. See, for example, Martha Crenshaw, ‘The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Strategic Choice’, in Walter Reich (ed.), Origins of Terrorism, 2nd edn (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press 1998) pp.7–24; and Martha Crenshaw, ‘Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational Approaches’, in David C. Rapoport (ed.), Inside Terrorist Organizations, 2nd edn (London: Frank Cass 2001) pp.13–31.

6 Bruce Cumings, quoted in Craig Calhoun, Paul Price and Ashley Timmer (eds), Understanding September 11 (New York: New Press/Social Science Research Council 2002) p.198.

7 Quoted in Alastair Sooke, ‘Rimington Hits Out at US Over Detainees’, Daily Telegraph, 18 Aug. 2004.

8 A phrase coined by Tom Utley. See ‘The Moment I Saw Bush Had Grasped the Point of the War’, Daily Telegraph, 28 Sept. 2001.

9 This, of course, reflects Clausewitz’ classical understanding of strategy ‘the use of engagements for the object of war’. See Carl von Clausewitz, On War (trans. and ed.) Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP 1984) p.128.

10 On the issue of state terrorism, see Alexander George (ed.), Western State Terrorism (Cambridge: Polity Press 1991). For single-issue terrorism, see G. Davidson Smith, ‘Single Issue Terrorism’, Commentary 74 (Winter 1998). The full text can be found at <www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/eng/comment/com74_e.html>; also Walter Laqueur, New Terrorism (London: Phoenix, 2001), esp. Chap. 8 (‘Exotic Terrorism’).

11 Ibid., pp.5–6.

12 For definitions based on terrorism as a form of violence against the ‘innocent’, see Christopher C. Harmon, Terrorism Today (London: Frank Cass 2000) p.21; Jessica Stern, The Ultimate Terrorists (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP 1999) p.11.

13 See, for example, Eqbal Ahmad and David Barsmain, Terrorism: Theirs and Ours (New York: Seven Stories Press 2001).

14 For further definitions of terrorism, see Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia UP 1998), esp. Chap. 1 (‘Defining Terrorism’); Alex P. Schmid et al. (eds), Political Terrorism: A Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature(New Brunswick: Transaction Books 1988).

15 T.P. Thornton, ‘Terror as a Weapon of Political Agitation’ in Harry Eckstein (ed.), Internal War: Problems and Approaches (New York: Free Press 1964) pp.71–99.

16 Gerard Chaliand, Terrorism: From Popular Struggle to Media Spectacle (London: Saqi Books 1987) pp.107–12.

17 Ernest Evans, Calling a Truce to Terror (Westport, CO: Greenwood Press 1979) p.29.

18 J. Bowyer Bell, The Myth of the Guerrilla (New York: Knopf 1971) p.55.

19 For a concise explanation of the concept, see Maurice Tugwell, ‘Politics and Propaganda of the Provisional IRA’, in Paul Wilkinson (ed.), British Perspectives on Terrorism (London: George Allen and Unwin 1981) pp.14–16.

20 For an elaboration of the problems with terms like ‘small wars’, ‘insurgency’, ‘irregular’ or ‘low-intensity’ warfare, see M.L.R. Smith, ‘Guerrillas in the Mist: Reassessing Strategy and Low Intensity Warfare’, Review of International Studies 29/1 (2003) pp.20–23.

21 See Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy (Oxford: Oxford UP 1999) pp.281–96.

22 Mao Tse-tung, On Guerrilla Warfare (New York: Anchor Press 1978) pp.25–9.

23 This idea became known as the ‘propaganda of the deed’. See Peter Kropotkin, Paroles d'un Revolte (Paris: Ernest Flammarion 1885) p.286.

24 Thornton, ‘Terror as a Weapon’ (note 15) p.74.

25 Peter Knauss and D.A. Strickland, ‘Political Disintegration and Latent Terror’, in Michael Stohl (ed.), The Politics of Terrorism (New York: Marcel Dekker 1979) p.77.

26 Martha Crenshaw, ‘The Concept of Revolutionary Terrorism’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 6 (1973) p.388.

27 See Irving Janis, Air War and Emotional Stress (New York: McGraw Hill 1979) p.23.

28 See Grant Wardlaw, Political Terrorism: Theory, Tactics and Counter-measures (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 1982) p.7.

29 Doug Struck, ‘One Bombing, Many Versions’, Washington Post, 20 July 2004.

30 Lawrence Freedman, ‘Terrorism and Strategy’, in Lawrence Freedman et al. (eds.), Terrorism and International Order (London: Routledge 1986) p.61.

31 Jason Burke, ‘Think Again: Al Qaeda’, Foreign Policy, May/June 2004.

32 See, for example, Crenshaw, ‘The Logic of Terrorism’ (note 5) pp.13–15.

33 N.O. Berry, ‘Theories on the Efficacy of Terrorism’, in Paul Wilkinson and A.M. Stewart (eds), Contemporary Research on Terrorism (Aberdeen: Aberdeen UP 1987) pp.293–304.

34 Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State (London: Macmillan 1986) pp.296–8.

35 Carlos Marighella, Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla (Montreal: Abraham Guillen Press 2002). The full text can be found at <www.marxists.org/archive/marighella-carlos/1969/06/minimanual-urban-guerrilla/>.

36 For an account of the Soviet experience in Afghanistan, see Scott R. McMichael, Stumbling Bear (London: Brassey's 1991). On the strategy and tactics of the US Army in Vietnam, see Andrew F. Krepinevich, The Army in Vietnam (Baltimore, MA: Johns Hopkins Press 1986) pp.194–214.

37 Leonard Weinberg found that terrorism is more likely to occur in democracies than in non-democracies, but also that it is ‘weak repressive’ regimes rather than those that are ruthless and total which provide a breeding ground for terrorists. See William Lee Eubank and Leonard Weinberg, ‘Does Democracy Encourage Terrorism?’, Terrorism and Political Violence 6/4 (1994) pp.417–43.

38 Berry, ‘Theories’ (note 33) pp.298–300.

39 See Amir Tahiri, The Spirit of Allah: Khomeini and the Islamic Revolution (London: Hutchinson 1985).

40 Berry, ‘Theories’ (note 33) pp.299–300.

41 Reforms carried out during an insurgency raise the question of what is known as relative success. Robert Taber, for example, believes that any government concessions which try to accommodate the insurgents can be regarded as surrender because the government is an agent and protector of the status quo and anything which forces an alteration is a defeat. On the other hand, it could be argued that the very essence of counter-insurgency is not to prevent change but to manage it to one's own advantage. See Robert Taber, War of the Flea (London: Paladin 1970) p.24.

42 Steve Bruce, ‘The Problem of Pro-State Terrorism: Loyalist Paramilitaries in Northern Ireland’, Terrorism and Political Violence 4/1 (1992) pp.67–88.

43 See Brigitte Nacos, Mass-mediated Terrorism: the Central Role of the Media in Terrorism and Counterterrorism (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield 2002); David L. Paletz and Alex P. Schmid (eds), Terrorism and the Media (London: Sage 1992).

44 Walter Laqueur, ‘Terrorism – a Balance Sheet’, in Walter Laqueur (ed.), The Terrorism Reader (Philadelphia, PA: Temple UP 1978) p.261.

45 See, for example, the hijacking of TWA flight 847 by Lebanese Shiite terrorists in 1985: Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (note 14) pp.132–5.

46 See Laqueur, ‘Terrorism – a Balance Sheet’ (note 44) p.258.

47 Ronald D. Crelinsten, ‘Power and Meaning: Terrorism as Struggle over Access to the Communication Structure’, in Paul Wilkinson and A. M. Stewart (eds), Contemporary Research on Terrorism (Aberdeen: Aberdeen UP 1987) pp.419–50: see also Ronald D. Crelinsten, ‘The Internal Dynamics of the FLQ During the October Crisis of 1970’, in David C. Rapoport (ed.), Inside Terrorist Organizations, 2nd edn. (London: Frank Cass 2001) pp.59–89.

48 Crelinsten, ‘Power and Meaning’ (note 47) p.427.

49 See Cynthia L. Irvin, Militant Nationalism: Between Movement and Party in Ireland and the Basque Country (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press 1999); Judith Palmer Harik, Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism (London: I.B. Tauris 2004), esp. Chap. 6 (‘Serving the Umma – Hezbollah as Employer and Welfare Organization’); Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela, The Palestinian Hamas (New York: Columbia UP 2000), esp. Chaps 1 and 6 (‘Social Roots and Institutional Development’ and ‘Controlled Participation’).

50 For example, there are numerous operational and tactical weaknesses resulting from the fact that all terrorist organizations begin as small conspiratorial groups, making them vulnerable to institutional dynamics, deficiencies in command and control, lack of logistical support, etc. Many of these problems are addressed in the writings of Abraham Guillen, who was close to the Uruguayan Tupamaros. See Abraham Guillen, Philosophy of the Urban Guerrilla: The Revolutionary Writings of Abraham Guillen (New York: William Morrow 1973). For a more contemporary, academic assessment of group dynamics within terrorist groups, see Jerrold M. Post, ‘Terrorist Psycho-logic: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Psychological Forces’ in Walter Reich, Origins of Terrorism (note 5) pp.25--40.

51 See Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (note 14) pp.48–58.

52 See Alistair Horne, A Savage War of Peace, Algeria, 1954–1962 (London: Penguin 1987) pp.183–207.

53 Knauss and Strickland, ‘Political Disintegration’ (note 5) pp.87–8.

54 ‘For Prior's Heir, An Even Harder Task’, The Times, 23 Aug. 1984.

55 Wardlaw, Political Terrorism (note 28) pp.35–6. The sources cited by Wardlaw are P.E. Vernon, ‘Psychological Effects of Air Raids’, Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 36 (1941) pp.457–76 and Melitta Schmideberg, ‘Some Observations on Individual Reactions to Air Raids’, International Journal of Psychoanalysis 23 (1942) pp.146–76.

56 See Richard Gillespie, ‘Political Violence in Argentina: Guerrillas, Terrorists, and Carapintadas’, in Martha Crenshaw, Terrorism in Context (University Park, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press 1995) pp.211–48.

57 See Gilles Keppel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam (London: I.B. Tauris 2003), esp. Chap. 12 (‘The Threat of Terrorism in Egypt’).

58 See Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Name of God, 2nd edn (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press 2000); Magnus Ranstorp, ‘Terrorism in the Name of Religion’, Journal of International Affairs 50 (Summer 1996) pp.41–62.

59 Clausewitz, On War (note 9) p.99.

60 Ibid.