The challenge of maritime terrorism: Threat identification, WMD and regime response

Abstract

Policies to counter the threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) have, for the most part, been modeled on strategies originally devised to counter the danger of nuclear proliferation. While useful in countering a traditional CBN (chemical/biological/nuclear)/WMD threat, current counter-proliferation and non-proliferation regimes are insufficient to meet the challenge of maritime terrorism. Maritime terrorism represents a new category of threat; one that partially overlaps with conventional WMD, but for which – due to the scope and nature of the maritime industry – traditional counter-proliferation policies may be inadequate and even inappropriate. This article outlines the means by which maritime shipping can be used as WMD and discusses the policies implemented to deal with these threats, in light of the challenges presented to traditional conceptualizations of WMD and counter-proliferation strategies.

Key Words:

• WMD
• maritime security
• maritime terrorism

Notes

A previous version of this paper was presented at the 2004 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 2–5 September 2004.

1 President George W. Bush has used this definition in his communications with Congress. Nuclear Threat Initiative, see <nti.org>.

2 US Department of Defense, definition provided in <militaryworld.com>.

3 See, for example, Jon Vagg, ‘Rough Seas? Contemporary Piracy in South East Asia’, British Journal of Criminology 35/1 (1995).

4 Peter Chalk, ‘Contemporary Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism (16 March 1997); Adam J. Young and Mark J. Valencia, ‘Conflation of Piracy and Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Rectitude and Utility’, Contemporary Southeast Asia 25/2 (Aug. 2003); Gal Luft and Anne Korin, ‘Terrorism Goes to Sea’, Foreign Affairs (Nov./Dec. 2004).

5 Jack Gottschalk, Brian Flanagan, Lawrence Kahn and Dennis Larochelle, Jolly Roger with an Uzi: The Rise and threat of Modern Piracy (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press 2000) and John Burnett, Dangerous Waters: Modern Piracy and Terror on the High Seas (NY: Dutton Books 2002).

6 The International Maritime Bureau defines piracy as ‘an act of boarding or attempting to board any ship with the intent to commit theft or any other crime and with the intent or capability to use force in furtherance of that act’.

7 Samuel Pyeatt Menefee, ‘Terrorism at Sea: The Historical Development of an International Legal Response’, in Brian A.H. Parritt (ed.), Violence at Sea (Paris: 1986), cited in Adam J. Young and Mark J. Valencia, ‘Conflation of Piracy and Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Rectitude and Utility’, Contemporary Southeast Asia 25/2 (Aug. 2003).

8 Barry R. Schneider, ‘Nuclear Proliferation and Counter-proliferation: Policy Issues and Debates’, Mershon International Studies Review 38/2 (Oct. 1994) p.216.

9 John C.K. Daly, ‘Al-Qaeda and Maritime Terrorism, Part I’, The Terrorism Monitor, Jamestown Foundation (24 Oct. 2003).

10 Michael Richardson, ‘A Time Bomb for Global Trade: Maritime-related Terrorism in an Age of Weapons of Mass Destruction’, Viewpoints, Institute of South East Asian Studies (25 Feb. 2004).

11 Daly (note 8).

12 Richardson, ‘A Time Bomb for Global Trade’ (note 9).

13 John W. Schoen, ‘Ships and Ports are Terrorism's New Frontier’, <MSNBC.com> (21 June 2004). Of these, 317 are ‘official’ ports of entry.

14 ‘Homeland Security Threat Cited from Lack of U.S. Flag Shipping, Crew Presence in U.S. Ports’, <www.MaritimeTV.com>, 28 May 2004.

15 ‘Threats to Oil Transport’, Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, <iags.org>.

16 Daly (note 8).

17 Mark Coultan, ‘Al – Qaeda Attack at Sea on Cards: Expert’, Sydney Morning Herald, 30 March 2004.

18 John Mintz, ‘15 Freighters Believed to be Linked to al-Qaeda’, <washingtonpost.com> (31 Dec. 2002).

19 Michael Richardson, ‘Counter-terrorism: The Mysterious al-Qaeda Navy’, <FreeRepublic. com> (19 May 2004).

20 Gary Jones, ‘Osama's Navy’, <Mirror.co.uk> (12 Feb. 2004).

21 Daly (note 8).

22 Michael Richardson, ‘Fighting Maritime Terrorism’, Asia Time Online <atimes.com>(16 June 2004).

23 These are referred to as ‘twenty-foot equivalent units’ (TEUs) or ‘forty-foot equivalent units’ (FEUs).

24 Richardson, ‘Fighting Maritime Terrorism’ (note 21).

25 ‘Al-Qaeda and Maritime Terrorism, Part II’, The Terrorism Monitor, Jamestown Foundation, 7 Nov. 2003.

26 Richardson, ‘A Time Bomb for Global Trade’ (note 9).

27 John M. Broder, ‘At Ports, Cargo Backlog Raises Security Questions’, New York Times, 27 July 2004; Richardson, ‘Fighting Maritime Terrorism’ (note 21).

28 Richardson, ‘Fighting Maritime Terrorism’ (note 21).

29 Richardson, ‘Counter-terrorism’ (note 18).

30 While it is true for the US that, with the exception of Boston, all LNG terminals are located outside population centers, this is not necessarily true globally. Furthermore, LNG carriers are vulnerable in transit, and not only when they have reached their final destination.

31 ‘The Promise and Limits of the PSI’, The Monitor 10/1 (Spring 2004), Center for International Trade and Security, pp.16–17, at <www.uga.edu/cits/documents/pdf/ monitor/monitor_ sp_2004.pdf>.

32 A radiological device is simply a conventional explosive, such as dynamite, combined with radioactive material. When detonated, the conventional blast disperses the radiation. Also referred to as a ‘radiological dispersal device (RDD)’ or ‘dirty bomb’.

33 According to David Albright and Corey Hinderstein of the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), ‘if al-Qaeda were to build nuclear weapons, it would likely build relatively crude, massive nuclear explosives, deliverable by ships, trucks, or private planes’. See Jack Boureston and Charles Mahaffey, ‘Al-Qaeda and Mass Casualty Terrorism: Assessing the Threat’, Strategic Insights, Center for Contemporary Conflict (Oct. 2003).

34 David Ensor, ‘Al Qaeda Interested in “Dirty Bomb”’, <CNN.com> (4 Dec. 2001).

35 Sebestyén L.V. Gorka, ‘Al Qaeda and the WMD Threat’, Institute for Transitional Democracy and International Security, <itdis.org>, p.2 (Sept. 2002).

36 Ibid.

37 Boureston and Mahaffey (note 32).

38 Richardson, ‘A Time Bomb for Global Trade’ (note 9).

39 Boureston and Mahaffey (note 32).

40 Ibid.

41 Ibid.

42 Gorka (note 34).

43 Ibid.

44 ‘Natural Gas’, US Department of Energy, <doe.gov>.

45 ‘LNG Danger to our Communities’, Law Office of Tim Riley, <timrileylaw.com/lng/htm>.

46 Peter Behr, ‘Higher Gas Price Sets Stage for LNG’, Washington Post, 5 July 2003, p.D10.

47 Paul W. Parfomak, ‘Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Infrastructure Security: Background and Issues for Congress’, Congressional Research Report, 9 Sept. 2003, p.4.

48 Balancing Natural Gas Policy – Fueling the Demands of a Growing Economy: A Report of the National Petroleum Council (25 Sept. 2003), US Department of Energy, Office of Fossil Energy, <fossil.energy.gov>.

49 LNG Seen to Benefit Consumers, Natural Gas Markets, as Imports Rise, US Department of Energy, Office of Fossil Energy, <fossil.energy.gov>, 14 April 2005.

50 Maryland, Georgia, Massachusetts, Louisiana and Alaska, with an additional one in Puerto Rico. Parfomak (note 46), summary page.

51 Energy Information Administration (EIA), <eia.doe.gov>.

52 Parfomak (note 46), p.2.

53 The cloud will ignite if the concentration of natural gas is between five and 15 per cent in air and it encounters an ignition source. See ‘LNG Safety’, California Energy Commission, <energy.ca.gov/lng/safety.html>.

54 Tom Doggett, ‘US Lacks “Real-world” Model to Evaluate LNG Safety’, <Forbes.com> (14 May 2004).

55 Edward Waryas, Lloyd's Register America's, Inc., ‘Major Disaster Planning: Understanding and Managing your Risk’, presented to the Fourth National Harbor Safety Committee Conference, Galveston, Texas, 4 March 2002, p.11. Cited in Parfomak (note 46) p.11.

56 Office of Technology Assessment, US Congress, Transportation of Liquefied Natural Gas (1977) p.61.

57 Mike Hightower, Louis Gritzo, Anay Luketa-Hanlin, John Covan, Sheldon Tieszen, Gerry Wellman, Mike Irwin, Mike Kaneshige, Brian Melof, Charles Morrow and Don Ragland, Guidance on Risk Analysis and Safety Implications of a Large Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Spill over Water, Sandia National Laboratories (Dec. 2004).

58 Charlie Savage, ‘Study Spells Out High Toll on City in LNG Attack’, Boston Globe, 21 Dec. 2004.

59 ‘ITC Releases Report on Competitive Factors Affecting World Trade in Ammonium Nitrate’, International Trade Commission (14 Oct. 1998).

60 Richardson, ‘Counter-terrorism’ (note 18).

61 Ibid.

62 Schoen (note 12).

63 J.M. Berger, ‘Nearly 3,000 Pounds of Ammonium Nitrate Stolen in N.C’, <Intelwire.com> (3 Aug. 2004).

64 The lines between piracy and maritime terrorism are becoming increasingly blurred. However, maritime piracy is done essentially for economic gain, while terrorism is done in support of political, ideological or similar goals.

65 Charles Glass, ‘Terror on the High Seas?’, <ABCNews.com> (10 Sept. 2003).

66 Jim Gomez, ‘Terrorists Train for Seaborne Attacks’, Associated Press, 18 March 2005.

67 Ibid.

68 International Maritime Bureau Piracy Reporting Center, <icc-ccs.org>.

69 ‘Expert: Al Qaeda Planning Seaborne Attack’, <FOXNews.com> (17 March 2004). Richardson goes on to note that in 2001 the International Transport Workers’ Federation said it had bought a First Officer's certificate for $4,500 for its General Secretary – a man with no seafaring experience whatsoever. The certificate authorized him to ‘navigate a vessel and deputize for its captain’. See Richardson, ‘A Time Bomb for Global Trade’ (note 9).

70 Mintz (note 17).

71 Ibid.

72 Kevin Johnson, ‘Coast Guard, FBI Probe of Merchant Mariners Finds Terrorist Ties’, USA Today (4 March 2004).

73 The US academies are located in California, New York, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan and Texas.

74 Mintz (note 17).

75 Ibid.

76 Richardson, ‘Counter-terrorism’ (note 18).

77 Fred Bayles, ‘Shipping Containers Could Hide Threat to U.S.’, USA Today (27 Feb. 2002), <usatoday.com>.

78 Schoen (note 12). The attack killed ten and wounded 18.

79 Jonathan Howland, ‘Hazardous Seas: Maritime Sector Vulnerable to Devastating Terrorist Attacks’, The Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (1 April 2004).

80 ‘Homeland Security Threat’ (note 13).

81 The Cole attack killed 17 and injured 40. The Sullivans attack failed when the suicide dinghy, too heavily-laden with explosives, sank on the way to its target. The Limburg attack killed one, and caused a widespread oil spill.

82 ‘Al Qaeda Statement Claims Iraq Boat Attack’, Reuters, 26 April 2004.

83 Also known as the ‘Prince of the Sea’, al-Nasheri was arrested in 2002 and cooperated with Western authorities.

84 Maki Becker, ‘Terror Lurks on High Seas’, New York Daily News, 21 Sept. 2003.

85 Coultan (note 16).

86 ‘Maritime Terrorist Act Imminent, Experts Warn’, <FreeRepublic.com> (19 Feb. 2004).

87 Becker (note 84).

88 D'Arcy Doran, ‘Analyst Says al-Qaeda May Attack by Sea’, The Guardian, 17 March 2004.

89 Oran Young, ‘The Politics of International Regime Formation: Managing Natural Resources and the Environment’, International Organization 43/3 (Summer 1989), p.350.

90 Gareth Porter and Janet Brown, Global Environmental Politics, 2nd edn (Boulder Westview 1996).

91 Others have noted that the terrorist threat is a function of will, capability and the target's perceived importance. See Dominic Armstrong, ‘Maritime Terrorism is a Ticking Time-bomb’, Lloyd's List, 22 June 2004.

92 Many ship registries do not physically reside in the flag state. For example, the Liberian registry – one of the world's largest flags of convenience, with over 1,400 vessels – is actually located in Maryland.

93 Toby Eckert, “ ‘Flags of Convenience” Raise Shipping Security Concerns’, Copley News Service, 9 Feb. 2003.

94 Mintz (note 17).

95 In this context, the verb ‘to flag’ means to register the ship, and not to note, find, or detect.

96 Liberia is generally regarded as a ‘problem-free’ open registry. See Eckert (note 93).

97 Jones (note 19).

98 Colin Robinson, ‘Al Qaeda's “Navy” – How Much of a Threat?’, Center for Defense Information (20 Aug. 2003).

99 Schoen (note 12).

100 ‘“Terror Probe” Ship Gets All-clear’, BBC News, 24 Dec. 2001.

101 As the PSI is a reciprocal agreement, Panama and Liberia may ask the US for permission to board its flagged vessels.

102 ‘U.S. Applauds Ship-boarding Agreement with Panama’, US Department of State, 12 May 2004.

103 ‘China Formally Joins U.S. Container Security Initiative’, Department of Homeland Security press release, 29 July 2003.

104 Richardson, ‘Fighting Maritime Terrorism’ (note 21).

105 ‘U.S. Navy Pacific Command Launches Vast Maritime Security Plan’, MarEx Newsletter 2/18 (11 May 2004).

106 ‘U.S. Restricts 3 Oil Tankers in Security Crackdown’, Reuters, 7 July 2004.

107 ‘Al-Qaeda and Maritime Terrorism, Part II’ (note 24).

108 Broder (note 26).

109 ‘Defendant Sentenced for Conspiring to Crease False Mariner Documents’, U.S. Department of Justice, Southern District of Florida, 22 Jan. 2004.

110 For more details, see ShipLoc <shiploc.com> and Secure Marine <Secure-marine.com>.

111 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Maritime Transport Committee, ‘Security in Maritime Transport: Risk Factors and Economic Impact’, July 2003.

112 ‘Fact Sheet: Ensuring Security, Promoting Prosperity’, <WhiteHouse.gov> (21 Nov. 2004).