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Abstract
Between 1957 and 1959 the West German company Telefunken and the Bonn government became prime targets in the French army's campaign against the Front de Libération Nationale's (FLN) efforts to establish communications networks. To the French military, the prevention of sales of Telefunken equipment to the FLN or its allies constituted a matter of strategic importance. To the Germans, it was an act of economic protectionism that exposed France's continued misgivings of Germany. The problem exerted a considerable strain between Paris and Bonn, and even threatened to harm German-Arab relations. The Telefunken affair thus highlights the Algerian war's international ramifications. It further reveals the responsibility of the French military in the internationalisation of that war.
Notes
The archival research for this article was made possible through the generous financial support of Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, the Cambridge Commonwealth Trust and the German Historical Institute in Paris. I am particularly grateful to Christopher Andrew, Wolfgang Krieger, Martin Thomas, Andrew Webster and Andrew Barros for their comments on earlier drafts of this article.
1 Vincennes, Service Historique de l'Armée de Terre (hereafter SHAT), 1H/1536Bis/D1, Koenig to General Henri Lorillot, commander-in-chief Algeria, 15 Dec. 1955.
2 Matthew Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era (Oxford: Oxford UP 2002) p.71; Douglas Porch, The French Secret Services: from the Dreyfus Affair to the Gulf War (Basingstoke: Macmillan 1996) p.365f; Stephen Tyre, ‘The Gaullists, the French Army and Algeria before 1958: Common Cause or Marriage of Convenience?’, Journal of Strategic Studies 25/2 (June 2002) p.105.
3 Paris, Ministère des Affaires étrangères (hereafter MAE), SEAA/3, Prime Minister's directives, 10 March 1959.
4 Connelly (note 2) p.8. At the same time, the fact that Algeria constitutionally belonged to France and that France therefore had the sovereign right to prevent subversive activity within its territory also constituted a key argument in the military's justification of its inspections and seizures of foreign supplies. See Martin Thomas, ‘Policing Algeria's Borders, 1956–1960: Arms Supplies, Frontier Defences and the Sakiet Affair’, War & Society 13/1 (May 1995) p.85.
5 Martin S. Alexander and J.F.V. Keiger, ‘France and the Algerian War: Strategy, Operations and Diplomacy’, Journal of Strategic Studies 25/2 (June 2002) p.1, 18f.
6 Constantin Melnik, Mille jours á Matignon: de Gaulle, l'Algérie, les services spéciaux (Paris: Grasset 1988).
7 Quotation from Ulrich Lappenküper, Die deutsch-französischen Beziehungen (1949–1963) (Munich: Oldenbourg 2001) Vol. I, p.833; Jean-Paul Cahn and Klaus-Jürgen Müller, La République fédérale d'Allemagne et la guerre d'Algérie, 1954–1962 (Paris: Le Félin 2003) p.11.
8 SHAT, 1H/1103/D1, Plan to protect North Africa against the Cold War, 4 June 1955; F.-G. Dreyfus, ‘Les Allemagnes contre l'Algérie française’, Revue d'Allemagne et des Pays de langue allemande (hereafter RA) 31/3–4 (juillet/décembre 1999) pp.533–40; Roger Faligot and Rémi Kauffer, Le Croissant et la croix gammée: les secrets de l'alliance entre l'Islam et le nazisme d'Hitler á nos jours (Paris: Albin Michel 1990).
9 Ewald Mahr, ‘Im Kraftfeld von Zeitgeschehen – Zeitgeist – Erfindergeist’, in Erdmann Thiele (ed.), Telefunken nach 100 Jahren: das Erbe einer deutschen Weltmarke (Berlin: Nicolai 2003) pp.14–57; Gert Hautsch, Das Imperium AEG-Telefunken: ein multinationaler Konzern (Frankfurt/Main: Verlag marxistischer Blätter 1979) p.14f.
10 See: SHAT, Fonds Moscou, 1313/D5110, and 1288/D1266. (Thanks to Victor Madeira for indicating these files.)
11 Jürgen Bellers, ‘Außenwirtschaftspolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1949–1989’, (Münster: Lit 1990) pp.43, 77.
12 Die Verfassung von Berlin und das Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Berlin: Landeszentrale für politische Bildung 1991) Art. 26, Para. 2. Laws on foreign trade and the arms industry were ratified in 1961.
13 Thomas Scheffler, Die SPD und der Algerienkrieg, 1954–1962 (Berlin: Das arabische Buch 1995) p.46f; Cahn and Müller (note 7) pp.311f, 330.
14 SHAT, 1H/1740/D2, Notice, délégation générale du gouvernement en Algérie, 26 July 1958.
15 Sven O. Berggötz, Nahostpolitik in der Ära Adenauer: Möglichkeiten und Grenzen, 1949–1963 (Düsseldorf: Droste 1998) pp.64, 72f, 130, 233, 236f, 402; William G. Gray, Germany's Cold War: the Global Campaign to Isolate East Germany, 1949–1969 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press 2003) p.68.
16 Zahir Ihaddaden, ‘La propagande du FLN pendant la guerre de libération nationale’, in Charles-Robert Ageron (ed.), La Guerre d'Algérie et les Algériens, 1954–1962 (Paris: Armand Colin 1997) p.194f; Charles-Robert Ageron, ‘Un aspect de la guerre d'Algérie: la propagande radiophonique du FLN et des états arabes’, in ibid., pp.245ff; Connelly (note 2) pp.26, 28, 239.
17 Daniel R. Headrick, The Invisible Weapon: Telecommunications and International Politics, 1851–1945 (Oxford: Oxford UP 1991) pp.116, 197.
18 Jacques Valette, ‘Le Renseignement militaire et son exploitation pendant la guerre d'Indochine: l'exemple des grandes opérations au Tonkin á l'automne 1947’, in Georges-Henri Soutou, Jacques Frémeaux and Olivier Forcade (eds), L'Exploitation du renseignement en Europe et aux Etats-Unis des années 1930 aux années 1960 (Paris: Economica 2001) pp.196, 199, 206f; Alexander Zervoudakis, ‘ “Le domaine de l'intelligence, au sens complet du mot”: le renseignement français en Indochine: mythes et réalités’, in ibid., pp.223, 228ff.
19 Michael Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 1996) pp.23, 69.
20 SHAT, 1H/1690/D1, Instructions, ALN, Service de Transmissions, 29 Aug. 1957.
21 SHAT, 1H/1555/D1, General Calliès (general inspector, North Africa) to defence minister, 7 Dec. 1955; Directives, Lorillot, 12 Jan. 1956.
22 Idem., Lorillot to defence minister, 11 Jan. 1956. See also: Frédéric Guelton, Geneviève Errera, ‘Transmissions et guerre subversive en Algérie’, Revue historique des Armées (hereafter RHA), 178 (mars 1990) pp.77–82.
23 Connelly (note 2) pp.36, 38, 71, 88f, 179.
24 Christopher M. Andrew, For the President's Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush (London: HarperCollins 1995) p.219; Porch (note 2) p.291f.
25 SHAT, 1H/1555/D3, Note, 29th Infantry Division, 3 Dec. 1957; Notice, Army Corps Oran, 5 Dec. 1957; Defence minister to commander-in-chief Algeria, 17 Jan. 1958; 14th Infantry Division to Army Corps Constantine, 31 March 1958; Order of research, Army Corps Algiers, 10 April 1960.
26 Maurice Faivre, ‘Le renseignement dans la guerre d'Algérie’, in Jean-Charles Jauffret, Maurice Vaïsse (eds), Militaires et guérilla dans la guerre d'Algérie (Brussels: Complexes 2001) p.295.
27 Porch, (note 2) p.386; Roger Faligot and Pascal Krop, La Piscine: the French Secret Service Since 1944, trans. W.D. Halls (Oxford: Blackwell 1989) p.120f.
28 SHAT, 1H/1555/D2, Note, 782nd CER, 9 April 1957.
29 Idem., Instructions, army general staff/transmissions, 14 June 1957; Melnik (note 6) p.204.
30 Alistair Horne, A Savage War for Peace: Algeria, 1954–1962 (London: Pan Books 2002) p.332; Bernard Droz and Evelyne Lever, Histoire de la guerre d'Algérie, 1954–1962 (Paris: Seuil 1982) pp.204, 288; Faligot and Krop (note 27) p.121. Named after the commander-in-chief, General Maurice Challe, this offensive comprised operations by helicopter-borne commandos de chasse and Muslim Harkis and relied on intelligence.
31 Droz and Lever (note 30) p.203; Gilbert Meynier, Histoire intérieure du FLN, 1954–1962 (Paris: Fayard 2002) p.296; Thomas (note 4) p.88.
32 SHAT, 1H/1557/D1, Notice, EMI/2, undated.
33 SHAT, 1H/1552/D1, Notice, EMI/2, 2 Jan. 1957; Notice, EMI/2, 6 March 1957.
34 Idem., STR report, 5 June 1957.
35 SHAT, 1H/1740/D3*, Order of research, EMI/2, 24 June 1957. (Documents marked* may not be cited without the express permission of the French defence ministry.)
36 SHAT, 1H/1552/D1, Minute, service de sécurité, 24 July 1957.
37 Idem., Minute, Office de liaison Algérie-Maroc-Tunisie (OLAMT), 11 Oct. 1957; SDECE report, 21 Oct. 1957; SDECE report, 4 Nov. 1957.
38 Idem., Assessment, CER, 19 Oct. 1957. Telefunken radios employed by NATO forces under the mutual defence plan carried the inscription ‘Signal Corps US Army’.
39 Idem., SDECE report, 2 Oct. 1957.
40 Idem., SDECE report, 4 Dec. 1957.
41 MAE, EU/RFA/1272. Telegram from Bonn, 12 Dec. 1957. This telegram refers to the Quai's initial demarche, which is missing from the files.
42 Ibid.; SHAT, 14S/20*, Le Hingrat to Etat-Major des Armées (Terre), 4 Sept. 1957.
43 MAE, EU/RFA/1272, Michel Legendre (deputy director, Central Europe) to Couve de Murville, 15 Feb. 1958
44 Idem., Telegram from Bonn, 12 Dec. 1957.
45 Idem., Langlais to Lacoste, 18 Dec. 1957.
46 Connelly (note 2) pp.144–54; Tyre (note 2) p.103f; Christopher Goldsmith, ‘The British Embassy in Paris and the Algerian War: An Uncomfortable Partner?’, Journal of Strategic Studies 25/2 (June 2002) p.168f; Irwin M. Wall, France, the United States and the Algerian War (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press 2001) pp.68, 70, 92–6; Martin Thomas, ‘The British Government and the End of French Algeria, 1958–62’, Journal of Strategic Studies 25/2 (June 2002) p.174; idem., The French North African Crisis: Colonial Breakdown and Anglo-French Relations, 1945–1962 (Basingstoke: Macmillan 2000) p.147.
47 MAE, AM/EUA/363, Telegram to Washington, 9 Jan. 1958.
48 Idem., Chaban-Delmas to Foreign Minister Christian Pineau, 8 Jan. 1958.
49 Idem., Telegram from Bonn, 21 Dec. 1957.
50 Idem., Telegrams from Washington, 21 and 31 Jan. 1958.
51 MAE, EU/RFA/1272, Telegram to Bonn, 30 Jan. 1958.
52 SHAT, 10T/531/D3*, SDECE report, 18 Dec. 1957; SDECE report, 31 Jan. 1958.
53 MAE, AM/EUA/363, Telegram to Bonn, 14 Feb. 1958.
54 Thomas (note 4) pp.91ff; Wall (note 46) chap. 4.
55 Berlin, Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts (hereafter PA/AA), B25/12, Memorandum, desk 413 (East-West trade), 29 July 1959.
56 PA/AA, B25/74, Memorandum, desk 413, 19 Feb. 1958.
57 MAE, AM/EUA/363, Telegram to Bonn, 22 March 1958.
58 Idem., Telegrams from Washington, 20 Feb. and 9 April 1958.
59 Idem., Telegram from Bonn, 26 March 1958. Most transmitters from this American offshore order had been exported in unopened boxes. The only reason Telefunken was able to provide 52 of the serial numbers was because these transmitters had been removed from their packaging for repainting. PA/AA, B25/12, Telegrams to Paris, 24 and 28 July 1959.
60 MAE, AM/EUA/363, Telegram to Bonn, 11 April 1958.
61 PA/AA, B25/12, Memorandum, desk 302 (France), 14 April 1958.
62 SHAT, 1H/1541, Message, EMI/2, 28 Oct. 1956. This Egyptian gun-runner was seized by the French navy on 16 Oct. 1956 close to the Moroccan port of Nador. Onboard was a substantial shipment of arms, including four Telefunken transmitters.
63 SHAT, 1H/1552/D1, Letter to prime minister, 16 April 1958.
64 MAE, AM/EUA/363, Telegram from Bonn, 15 April 1958.
65 Idem., Dispatch from Couve de Murville, 22 April 1958.
66 Melnik (note 6) pp.37–8; idem., La mort était leur mission: le service Action pendant la guerre d'Algérie (Paris: Plon 1996) pp.25, 54.
67 SHAT, 1H/1555/D3, Directive, EMI/2, 19 June 1958.
68 MAE, MLA/0, Report, 21 June 1958.
69 Cahn and Müller (note 7) pp.167ff; U. Lappenküper, ‘Adenauer, de Gaulle und der Algerienkreig 1958–1962,’ RA 31/3–4 (juillet/décembre 1999) p.606.
70 PA/AA, B25/12, Note, desk 205 (Maghreb), 10 June 1958.
71 PA/AA, B25/37, Memorandum, desk 410 (commerce ‘West’), 21 June 1958.
72 Idem., Note, Karl Carstens (director, political affairs ‘West’), 26 July 1958.
73 Idem., Telegram from Tunis, 8 July 1958; Thomas (note 45) p.151.
74 MAE, EU/RFA/1272, Quotation from Telegram to Bonn, 4 July 1958; Telegram from Bonn, 11 July 1958.
75 Idem., Telegram from Bonn, 18 July 1958.
76 ‘Bourguiba von Bonn enttäuscht’, Industrie-Kurier, 30 July 1958.
77 MAE, EU/RFA/1272, Telegram from Bonn, 14 Aug. 1958.
78 PA/AA, B25/37, Dispatch from Tunis, 8 Aug. 1958.
79 MAE, EU/RFA/1272, Telegram from Bonn, 14 Aug. 1958.
80 PA/AA, B25/37, Memorandum, dept. 2, 25 Aug. 1958.
81 SHAT, 1H/1552/D2, Minute, EMI/2, 27 Aug. 1958; Salan to joint services minister, 30 Aug. 1958.
82 Idem., Salan to joint services minister, 31 Aug. 1958.
83 PA/AA, B25/12, Aide-mémoire, French embassy, Bonn, 13 Oct. 1958; Desk 413 to desk 204 (France), 20 Oct. 1958. Chanegriha entered Germany with an Egyptian delegation to purchase 150 ANGRC.9 transmitters, conceivably those about which the French had warned the Auswärtige Amt in June 1958. SDECE did not think that these units had yet been delivered. The radios sent from Benghazi were believed by French intelligence to be type ‘S.236’. These transmitters were not considered military equipment.
84 MAE, MLA/2, Minute, armed forces general staff/2ème bureau, 18 Nov. 1958.
85 SHAT, 1H/1552/D1, Salan to joint services minister, 28 Nov. 1958.
86 Verhandlungen des deutschen Bundestages: stenographische Berichte (Bonn, 1957–61), III, 46th session, 17 Okt. 1958, p. 2565D; Scheffler (note 13) p. 79f; J.-P. Cahn, ‘Le parti social-démocrate allemand face á la guerre d'Algérie (1958–1962)’, RA 31/3–4 (juillet/décembre 1999) pp.589–602.
87 PA/AA, B25/37, Memorandum, desk 205, 19 Dec. 1958.
88 PA/AA, B63/124, Memorandum, desk 404 (foreign trade jurisdiction), 21 July 1958.
89 PA/AA, B25/12, Remark, Paul Frank (director, desks 204/5) on note from desk 413, 20 Oct. 1958.
90 PA/AA, B25/12, Brentano to Erhard, 14 Nov. 1958; Response, 20 Feb. 1959.
91 PA/AA, B25/37, Memorandum, Herbert Müller Roschach (deputy director, dept. 2), 31 Dec. 1958; Berggötz (note 15) p.126.
92 MAE, EU/RFA/1272, Jean Jurgensen (director, Central Europe) to Ambassador François Seydoux, Bonn, 22 Dec. 1958. SHAT, 1R/351/D1*, De Gaulle to Foreign Minister Couve de Murville, 13 Dec. 1958.
93 Cahn and Müller (note 7) pp.24, 135–6; Reiner Marcowitz, ‘ “Die Kommunisten stecken dahiner”: Unionsparteien und Algerienkrieg 1954–1962’, RA 31/3–4 (juillet/décembre 1999) pp.562–3.
94 MAE, SEAA/3, Prime Minister's directives, 10 March 1959.
95 Cited in Connelly (note 2) p.201.
96 PA/AA, B25/12, Note, desk 205, 10 April 1959.
97 Lappenküper (note 7) Vol. II, p.1306.
98 PA/AA, B25/37, Desk 413 to desks 204/5, 29 May 1959.
99 PA/AA, B25/12, Memorandum, desk 410, 23 April 1959; Carstens to Dr Harkort (director, dept. 4, foreign trade), 29 April 1959.
100 Idem., Memorandum, Dr von Bargen (deputy director, dept. 4), 27 May 1959.
101 Cahn and Müller (note 7) pp.309–32; Jacques Guillon, ‘La contrebande des armes pendant la guerre d'Algérie’, RHA 200 (sept. 1995) pp.105–18; Jean Kessler, ‘La surveillance des frontières maritimes de l'Algérie 1954–1962’, RHA, 187 (juin 1992) pp.94–101.
102 Faligot and Krop (note 27) Chap. 8; Melnik (note 6); idem. (note 66); Antoine Méléro, La Main rouge: l'armée secrète de la République (Monaco: Rocher 1997); Porch (note 2) pp.371ff.
103 Melnik (note 66) p.77; Phillippe Bernet, SDECE Service 7. L'extraordinaire histoire du colonel Le Roy-Finville et des clandestins (Paris: Presses de la Cité 1980) p. 209. This author failed to find evidence substantiating this allegation.
104 PA/AA, B25/12, Telegrams from Paris, 17 and 18 June 1959. Also accused were the Italian weapons-maker Beretta and the Schweizer Bankverein.
105 MAE, MLA/3, Dispatch from Bonn, 20 June 1959.
106 PA/AA, B25/12, Note, desks 204/5, 18 June 1959; Telegrams to Paris, 19 June and 9 July 1959; Telegram from Paris, 22 June 1959. Telefunken claimed to have made only three minor deliveries to Egypt: 60 ‘Teleport VI’ in Aug. 1956; two ‘S.237’ in Nov. 1957; and four ‘S.237’ in Oct. 1958.
107 SHAT, 1H/1552/D2, Notice, EMI/2, 30 Sept. 1959. In March 1959, Chanegriha apparently informed his superiors that Telefunken had obtained 50 ANGRC.9 units from the US for the FLN. This source never clarified whether Telefunken was aware of Chanegriha's identity, and the French never questioned this point.
108 PA/AA, B25/12, Telegram to Paris, 28 July 1959.
109 SHAT, 1H/1552/D2, Memorandum, cabinet, NATO commander of allied land forces central Europe, 25 Aug. 1959; EMI/2 to Etat-major general de la défense nationale, 12 Oct. 1959. The MAD became involved through General Hans Speidel, NATO commander of allied land forces central Europe. Speidel, in turn, was approached about the affair by General Challe. The MAD's conclusions supported those of the Auswärtige Amt and Telefunken.
110 PA/AA, B25/12, Memorandum, desk 413, 4 Aug. 1959.
111 See note 59.
112 Lappenküper (note 7), vol. II, p.1307.
113 PA/AA, B25/12, Memorandum, desks 204/5, 11 Aug. 1959; Dispatch from Paris, 7 Sept. 1959. Telefunken's former Parisian representative, a Mr Temmerman, apparently had about 30 convictions for theft, embezzlement and cheque forgery.
114 Horne (note 30) pp.398, 400; Melnik (note 6) p.284.
115 Martin S. Alexander and Philip C.F. Bankwitz, ‘From Politiques en Képi to Military Technocrats: de Gaulle and the Recovery of the French Army after Indochina and Algeria’, in George J. Andreopoulos and Harold E. Selesky (eds), The Aftermath of Defeat: Societies, Armed Forces, and the Challenge of Recovery (New Haven, CT: Yale UP 1994) p.79f; Jean Doise and Maurice Vaïsse, Diplomatie et outil militaire, 1871–1969 (Paris: Imprimerie nationale 1987) p.460f.
116 PA/AA, B25/12, Dispatch from Paris, 7 Sept. 1959.
117 PA/AA, B25/35, Memorandum, dept. 4, 3 Dec. 1959.
118 Idem., Note, desk 205, 27 Oct. 1959; Desk 205 to desk 413, 20 Oct. 1960.
119 See: SHAT, 1H/1552/D1,2 and 1H/1553/D1.
120 Horne (note 30) p.346; Droz and Lever (note 30) p.223; Irwin M. Wall, ‘De Gaulle, the “Anglo-Saxons”, and the Algerian War’, Journal of Strategic Studies 25/2 (June 2002) p.134; Charles G. Cogan, ‘France, the United States and the Invisible Algerian Outcome’, Journal of Strategic Studies 25/2 (June 2002) pp.142ff.
121 Doise and Vaïsse (note 115) pp.464, 467, 472. In opposition to conventional accounts of the Algerian war that stress the fact that de Gaulle ultimately decided to grant Algeria its independence in order to regain France's diplomatic freedom and heighten her grandeur, the American historian Irwin M. Wall argues that Algeria's independence actually marked the ‘ignominious collapse of a bold, striking, three-pronged effort by de Gaulle to reorder world affairs’, an effort that in fact required France's continued hegemony over Algeria (though not in the military's sense of assimilation). See: Wall (note 120) pp.118–37, here p.121.
122 Connelly (note 2) p.198.
123 Cahn and Müller (note 7) p.461.
124 PA/AA, B25/12, Memorandum, desk 413, 29 July 1959.
125 Frankfurt/Main, AEG Archive, Letter from Doris Rangnick, 1 Sept. 2003.
126 Arnulf Baring, Außenpolitik in Adenauers Kanzlerdemokratie. Bonns Beitrag zur Europäischen Verteidigungsgemeinschaft (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1969).
127 Porch (note 2) p.372.