The seaborne/airborne concept: Littoral Manoeuvre in the 1960s?

Abstract

This article examines the seaborne/airborne concept, an approach to expeditionary warfare developed in Britain in the early 1960s. It identifies the strategic challenges that forced Britain to reassess its approach to the projection of power overseas and identifies the ways in which the new concept sought to meet these challenges. The ‘lessons’ learned from experience at Suez (1956) and Kuwait (1961) and their impact on procurement and on inter-service relations is addressed. The study also examines modern British doctrine for maritime expeditionary warfare and argues that contemporary concepts such as ‘Littoral Manoeuvre’ reflect the basic principles established in the 1960s.

Key Words:

• amphibious
• airborne
• expeditionary

Notes

¹British doctrine defines the ‘littoral’ as ‘Coastal sea areas and that portion of the land which is susceptible to influence or support from the sea’. BR1806. British Maritime Doctrine, 3rd edition, (London: The Stationary Office 2004), 268.

²In the 1998 Strategic Defence Review the Minister of Defence, George Robertson, stated that ‘In the post Cold War world we must be prepared to go to the crisis, rather than have the crisis come to us’, Strategic Defence Review: Modern Forces for the Modern World (London: HMSO 1998).

³ British Maritime Doctrine. For details of current British amphibious capabilities see Ewen Southby-Tailyour, ed., Jane's Amphibious and Special Forces (Coulsdon, UK: Jane's Publishing Group 2005).

⁴For example see C.J. Bartlett, The Long Retreat: A Short History of British Defence Policy 1945–1970 (London: Macmillan 1972); Philip Darby, British Defence Policy East of Suez, 1947–1968 (London: Oxford UP 1974); Jeffrey Pickering, Britain's Withdrawal from East of Suez: The Politics of Retrenchment (Basingstoke: Macmillan 1998) and Saki Dockrill, Britain's Retreat from East of Suez: The Choice between Europe and the World (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2002).

⁵ British Maritime Doctrine, 204–7. The timeframe quoted in BR1806 is 2015 however, the latest online version of these documents identifies 2020 and beyond as the relevant timeframe for the Future Maritime Operational Concept. The Future Navy Paper, Future Maritime Operational Concept, and The Naval Strategic Plan are all available online from RN Reference Site, <www.rnreference.mod.uk/>. Downloaded on 20 July 2005.

⁶ Future Navy Paper.

⁷ Future Maritime Operational Concept.

⁸C4ISR refers to command, control, communications, computing, information, surveillance and reconnaissance.

⁹Royal Navy, Future Navy – Littoral Manoeuvre Concept. Available from the RN Reference Site, <www.rnreference.mod.uk>. Downloaded on 20 July 2005.

¹⁰US Marine Corps, Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare. Marine Corps Capstone Concept, Nov. 2001. Available from the USMC website, <www.usmc.mil>. Downloaded on 21 July 2005.

¹¹ Future Navy – Littoral Manoeuvre Concept.

¹²Cm 6269, Delivering Security in a Changing World. Future Capability (London: The Stationary Office 2004) Chapter 1, p2.

¹³‘East of Suez’ was a rather vague cover-all term that encompassed the Indian Ocean littoral, including the Persian Gulf, and extended as far east as Hong Kong.

¹⁴this heading was inspired by anthony nutting's account of the suez crisis, no end of a lesson. The story of suez (london: Constable 1967). Nutting resigned his position as minister of state at the foreign office due to his opposition to government policy during the crisis.

¹⁵For further details on Operation Musketeer see UK National Archives [henceforth NA]: DEFE 7/1081, Operations in Egypt – November to December 1956: Official despatch by General Sir Charles Keightley; NA:WO 288/77, Report by Commander 2 (Br) Corps on Operation Musketeer; NA:ADM 202/455, 3 Commando Brigade – Operation Musketeer Report; NA:ADM 116/6209, Naval Report on Operation Musketeer; NA:AIR 20/10746, Report by Air Task Force Commander on Operation Musketeer. Useful secondary sources include Keith Kyle, Suez (New York: St. Martin's Press 1991), Roy Fullick and Geoffrey Powell, Suez: The Double War (London: Hamish Hamilton 1979) and Derek Varble, The Suez Crisis (Oxford: Osprey 2003).

¹⁶See Géneral d'Armée André Beaufre, The Suez Expedition (London: Faber 1969) and Kyle, Suez, esp. 434–5 and 473–4.

¹⁷British policy towards amphibious operations post-1945 was influenced by recent experience during World War II. This implied a need for small-scale raiding from the outbreak of war and large scale operations at a later date once Allied resources had been mobilised and enemy strength degraded. For further details see Ian Speller, The Role of Amphibious Warfare in British Defence Policy, 1945–1956 (Basingstoke: Palgrave 2001).

¹⁸Maj.-Gen. J.L. Moulton, ‘Bases or Fighting Forces?’, in Brassey's Annual. The Armed Forces Year-Book, 1964 (London: William Clowes 1964), 149. Moulton had commanded No.3 Commando Brigade in the early 1950s and in 1957 became Chief of Amphibious Warfare. In this capacity he was instrumental in the development of the seaborne/airborne concept.

¹⁹It had originally been intended to use the helicopters to land the marines of No.45 Commando at Raswa to the south of Port Said where they would secure vital bridges required for the breakout down the canal. This was cancelled due to a fear about the vulnerability of helicopters operating in this novel role flying into a defended area. In the event, French parachute forces secured the bridges after a daring low-level drop. Vice-Admiral Manley Power had suggested landing No.45 Commando by helicopter in support of the British airborne forces landed at Gamil airfield on 5 Nov., raising the possibility that, thus reinforced, the paratroops could have taken Port Said a day before the seaborne landing scheduled for the following morning. The idea was rejected. Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge: MANP, Memoirs of Admiral Sir Manley Power, 102.

²⁰British forces were withdrawn from Egypt under the terms of the 1954 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty.

²¹For example, see National Archives (NA) : DEFE 5/59, COS (55) 176, 25 July 1955.

²²Cmnd. 124, Defence: Outline of Future Policy (London: HMSO 1957); Colin McInnes, Hot War, Cold War. The British Army's Way in Warfare 1945–95 (London: Brassey's 1996) Ch.1.

²³Eric Grove, Vanguard to Trident. British Naval Policy since World War II (London: Bodley Head 1987), 174–5.

²⁴NA: DEFE 5/70, COS (56) 280, The Future Role of the Navy, 20 July 1956.

²⁵Cmnd. 124, Defence: Outline of Future Policy 1957 (London: HMSO 1957).

²⁶Grove, Vanguard to Trident, 210.

²⁷Dockrill, Britain's Retreat, 28.

²⁸NA: DEFE 5/123, COS (62) 1, British Strategy in the 1960s, 9 Jan. 1962. This file is closed until 2012, however details of COS (62) 1 are available from the following sources, NA: DEFE 7/221, NA:DEFE 7/2234, NA: DEFE 7/2235, NA: PREM 11/2946.

²⁹NA: DEFE 7/2235, COS (61) 499, 20 Dec. 1961 and COS (62) 49, 31 Jan. 1962.

³⁰NA: DEFE 5/85, COS (58) 219, 18 Sept. 1958.

³¹The commando ships were initially equipped with Whirlwind helicopters that could only lift a very limited load. These were later replaced with the far more capable Wessex.

³²NA: DEFE 4/118, JP (58) 21, 11 May 1959, report at annex to COS (59) 32 meeting, 26 May 1959.

³³Humphrey Wynn, Forged in War. A History of RAF Transport Command 1943–1967 (London: The Stationary Office 1996), 1–4.

³⁴Comprising 23 Britannias, 11 Comets, 48 Hastings, 28 Beverleys, 27 Twin Pioneers, 4 Pembrokes, 26 Whirlwinds, 10 Sycamores and 18 Belvederes. The Whirlwind, Sycamore and Belvedere were helicopters. Ibid.

³⁵Air Marshal Sir Kenneth Cross, ‘Transport Command, Royal Air Force’ in Brassey's Annual. The Armed Forces Year-Book 1965 (London: William Clowes 1965), 183–87.

³⁶Wynn, Forged in War, 121.

³⁷Ibid., 128.

³⁸Cross, ‘RAF Transport Command’, 185–86.

³⁹NA: DEFE 5/87, COS (58) 283, 12 Dec. 1958. Amphibious Warfare Headquarters was an inter-service headquarters based in London. Under the command of the Chief of Amphibious Warfare it was responsible for the development of policy and new techniques pertaining to amphibious warfare. For further details see Speller, Role of Amphibious Warfare.

⁴⁰The Land/Air Warfare Committee had responsibility for formulating joint policy on all matters relating to land/air warfare and was composed by the Vice Chief of the Imperial General Staff, the Vice Chief of the Air Staff, other less senior representatives from the War Office and the Air Ministry and a representative from the Admiralty.

⁴¹NA: DEFE 5/110, COS (61) 12, 13 Jan. 1961.

⁴²NA: DEFE 4/134, COS (61) 22 meeting, 28 March 1961. NA: DEFE 5/114, COS (61) 180, Seaborne/Airborne/Land Concept, 8 June 1961.

⁴³NA: DEFE 5/123, COS (62) 12, Seaborne/Airborne/Land Operations, 4 Jan. 1962 and COS (62) 84, Joint Warfare Sub-Committees and Joint Warfare Staff, 28 Feb. 1962. NA: DEFE 5/144, COS 365/63, Joint Warfare Committee – Terms of Reference, 8 Nov. 1963. NA: DEFE 5/131, COS (62) 426, Joint Warfare. Training and Development, 31 Oct. 1962. NA: DEFE 4/148, COS (62) 68 meeting, 20 Oct. 1962.

⁴⁴COS (61) 180.

⁴⁵Ibid.

⁴⁶The seaborne tank force consisted of ageing Royal Navy LSTs from the Amphibious Warfare Squadron. These vessels had had air conditioning fitted prior to deployment to the Middle East in June 1960. Unfortunately it was not possible to keep two such vessels available permanently. When two RN ships could not be made available an LST operated by the Army and manned by civilian crew was employed. Army LSTs, while having the same basic design as the RN LSTs, did not have air conditioning.

⁴⁷NA: DEFE 11/220. NA: DEFE 5/111, COS (61) 73, 2 March 1961.

⁴⁸NA: DEFE 2/2074, Joint Warfare Staff, 31 July 1962.

⁴⁹Ibid.

⁵⁰Speller, The Role of Amphibious Warfare, passim.

⁵¹DEFE 2/2074, Ch.10.

⁵²In Jan. 1964 Marines from No.45 Commando were landed by helicopters from the aircraft carrier HMS Centaur directly at a barracks held by mutinous Tanganyikan soldiers. Supported by gunfire from a destroyer offshore they were able to disarm the mutineers and restore order to Dar-es-Salaam. The proximity of the barracks to the coast facilitated this early example of ship-to-objective manoeuvre. NA: ADM 1/129063, 45 Commando Royal Marines. Preliminary Report on Operations in Tanganyika, 8 Feb. 1964.

⁵³During Operation ‘Vantage’ in 1961 it had originally been intended to land marines from HMS Bulwark inland at a defensive feature, the Mutla Ridge rather than at the airfield that they actually deployed to. This plan was abandoned due to a fear that Kuwaiti soldiers already stationed at the ridge might mistake them for Iraqis and open fire.

⁵⁴DEFE 2/2074.

⁵⁵Maj.-Gen. J.L. Moulton, ‘Amphibious Warfare in the Late 1960s: Seaborne/Airborne Operations’, The Journal of the Royal United Services Institute, 107 (Feb.–Nov. 1962), 19–28.

⁵⁶Julian Thompson, The Royal Marines. From Sea Soldiers to a Special Force (London: Sidgwick & Jackson 2000), 489.

⁵⁷NA: AIR 9/2135, brief prepared for the Chief of the Air Staff prior to discussion by the Chiefs of Staff Committee of the Future Role of the Navy (COS (56) 280) in 1956.

⁵⁸NA: DEFE 73/1, Manual of Joint Warfare. Volume 1. Concept, planning and control of operations. Volumes 2 to 6, plus annexes are available at NA:DEFE 73/2, DEFE 73/3, DEFE 73/4, DEFE 73/5, DEFE 73/6 and DEFE 73/7.

⁵⁹For details of the origins of the crisis see Mustafa Alani, Operation Vantage. British Military Intervention in Kuwait, 1961 (Surbiton: LAAM 1990); Monice Snell-Mendoza, ‘In Defence of Oil: Britain's Response to the Iraqi Threat towards Kuwait, 1961’, Contemporary British History 10/3, (Autumn 1996), 39–62; Nigel Ashton, ‘Britain and the Kuwait Crisis, 1961’, in Diplomacy and Statecraft 9/1 (March 1998), 163–81; Richard Mobley, ‘Gauging the Iraqi Threat to Kuwait in the 1960s’, Studies in Intelligence 11 (Fall–Winter 2001) Available from the CIA website, <www.cia.gov/csi/studies/fall-winter_2001/article03.html>. Downloaded on 3 April 2005.

⁶⁰Nos. 8 and 208 Squadrons re-deployed from Aden and Nairobi respectively.

⁶¹W.B.R. Neave-Hill, British Support for the Amir of Kuwait, 1961 (The Historical Section, Ministry of Defence Library, 1968). NA: DEFE 5/118, COS (61) 378, Report by the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East on Operations in Support of the State of Kuwait in July 1961, 18 Oct. 1961.

⁶²NA: CAB 128/35 pt1, CC (61) 38th conclusions, 3 July 1961. Also see Harold Watkinson, Turning Points. A Record of Our Times (Salisbury: Michael Russell 1986), 134–35.

⁶³NA: DEFE 5/124, COS (62) 58, Examination of the C-in-C's Report of Operations in Support of the State of Kuwait in July 1961, 15 Feb. 1962; NA: DEFE 4/142, COS (62) 5th meeting, 16 Jan. 1962.

⁶⁴There were some ways around this problem. Half a squadron of tanks were maintained in Kuwait for use by British forces should the need arise. These tanks were owned by the Kuwaitis, reducing the political problem associated with the permanent presence of British forces on Kuwaiti soil.

⁶⁵NA: DEFE 13/89, Intervention in Kuwait.

⁶⁶Political restrictions on Canberra photo-reconnaissance flights over Iraqi territory made it difficult to decide subsequently whether any attack had been planned. Certainly no compelling evidence was found to support the idea that an attack had been imminent.

⁶⁷See Ian Speller, ‘Naval Diplomacy, Operation Vantage, 1961’ in Ian Speller, ed., The Royal Navy and Maritime Power in the Twentieth Century (London: Frank Cass 2005), 164–80.

⁶⁸COS (61) 378.

⁶⁹Ibid. In contrast see, NA: WO 32/20721, Army Operational Research Group No. 6/61. ‘Operation Vantage’, 18–23.

⁷⁰WO 32/20721, 8–13 + 29.

⁷¹Air Chief Marshal Sir David Lee, Flight from the Middle East. A History of the Royal Air Force in the Arabian Peninsula and adjacent territories 1945–1962 (London: HMSO 1980), 180.

⁷²HMS Bulwark had been ordered to proceed from Karachi to Kuwait on 28 June. HMS Striker, in company with the headquarters ship HMS Meon, was ordered to Kuwait the following day. All of the vessels were instructed to remain out of sight of land, available to act at short notice should the need arise. Bulwark was based at Singapore and was not permanently assigned to Vantage. She was at Karachi en route to the Gulf to conduct hot weather trials. Her presence in the region in the immediate aftermath of Kuwaiti independence may not have been entirely coincidental although, usefully, it could be portrayed as such.

⁷³COS (61) 378.

⁷⁴For example see Cmnd. 1629, Explanatory Statement on the Navy Estimates, 1962–1963 (London: HMSO 1962).

⁷⁵NA: ADM 1/29638. NA: ADM 205/192, Presentation of Alternative Long Term Naval Programme, 17 May 1961. Eric Grove, ‘Partnership Spurned: The Royal Navy's Search for a Joint Maritime-Air Strategy East of Suez, 1961–1963’, in N.A.M. Rodger, Naval Power in the Twentieth Century (Basingstoke: Macmillan 1996), 227–41.

⁷⁶For details of the island strategy, sometimes referred to as the ‘island stance’, see NA: AIR 8/2354.

⁷⁷NA: AIR 20/11423, report by Vice-Admiral Frewen (Vice Chief of the Naval Staff) sent to Peter Thorneycroft (Minister of Defence) 9 Jan. 1963.

⁷⁸The second ship would have been called HMS Duke of Edinburgh. As these names were not made public the carrier was known by the designation CVA-01; it is referred to as such in most of the literature. NA: ADM 1/29044.

⁷⁹The American swing-wing F-111 was chosen to replace the RAF's ageing Canberra bombers after the British designed TSR2 was cancelled in April 1965.

⁸⁰For a generally ‘pro-Navy’ view of this decision see Grove, Vanguard to Trident, 269–79; Paul Beaver, The British Aircraft Carrier (Cambridge: Patrick Stephens 1982), 191–92; David Wettern, The Decline of British Seapower (London: Jane's 1982) Chapter 20; Tim Benbow, ‘British Naval Aviation: Limited Global Power Projection’, in Geoffrey Till, ed., Seapower at the Millennium (Stroud: Sutton 2001), 60–61.

⁸¹Cmnd. 2901, Statement on the Defence Estimates 1966. Part 1. The Defence Review (London: HMSO 1966).

⁸²Cmnd. 3701, Supplementary Statement on Defence Policy 1968 (London: HMSO 1968).

⁸³‘unity is strength’ is the motto of the UK joint services command and staff college, established in 1997 after the amalgamation of the three separate staff colleges.

⁸⁴For details of the plans for action in Zanzibar see NA: WO 276/372, NA: WO 276/370, NA: DEFE 5/154, Intervention in Zanzibar, 9 Oct. 1964.

⁸⁵The modern Royal Navy describes these attributes as: access, mobility, versatility, sustained reach, resilience, lift capacity, poise and leverage. British Maritime Doctrine, 28–34.

⁸⁶Peter Carrington, Reflection on Things Past: The Memoirs of Lord Carrington (London: Collins 1988), 160.