The Afghan model in northern Iraq

Abstract

In Operation ‘Iraqi Freedom’, as the Coalition's heavy forces fought in the South, in the North a handful of special operations forces, working with Kurdish rebels, clashed with the Iraqi army along the Green Line. In operations reminiscent of those used a year earlier to defeat the Taliban in Afghanistan, the lightly armed and heavily outnumbered Coalition forces called in air strikes to defeat Iraq's regular and Republican Guard army divisions. This article tells the story of these operations and discusses some of their implications for future US military policy. The success of the Afghan model in Iraq goes a long way toward demonstrating the efficacy of new air-heavy tactics and shows the strategic value of using light indigenous allies to replace heavy US land forces in both conventional combat and occupation operations.

Key Words:

• strategy
• Afghan model
• air power
• OIF
• Iraq
• war
• special forces

Acknowledgment

This article was originally presented at a conference on ‘US Military Operations in Iraq: Planning, Combat, and Occupation’, sponsored by the US Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute and the Philip Merrill Center for Strategic Studies at the Johns Hopkins University's Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Washington DC, on 2 Nov. 2005.

Notes

¹For arguments that the new technology has not gone far toward changing the dynamics of modern war see Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton UP 2004); idem, ‘Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare’, Foreign Affairs 82/2 (March/April 2003), 31–46; idem, Special Forces and the Future of Warfare: Will SOF Predominate in 2020? (Carlisle PA, Strategic Studies Institute: US Army War College 2004); and idem, Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy (Carlisle PA, Strategic Studies Institute: US Army War College 2002). For works arguing that precision technology has changed the dynamics of war see John A. Warden III, ‘Employing Airpower in the Twenty-first Century’, in Richard H. Schultz, Jr. and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. (eds.), The Future of Airpower in the Aftermath of the Gulf War (Maxwell Air Force Base, ALA: Air UP 1992), 57–83; Benjamin S. Lambeth, The Transformation of American Airpower (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 2000). For related work see Tony Mason, Airpower: A Centennial Appraisal (Washington DC: Brassey's 1994); and Robert A. Pape, ‘The True Worth of Airpower’, Foreign Affairs 83/2 (March/April 2004), 116–30.

²See Richard Andres, Craig Wills, and Thomas Griffith, ‘Winning with Allies: The Strategic Value of the Afghan Model’, International Security 30/3 (Winter 2005), 124–60.

³For arguments on why the new model should not work in most situations see Biddle, Special Forces and the Future of Warfare; idem, Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare. For more positive analyses see Max Boot, ‘The New American Way of War’, Foreign Affairs 82/4 (July/Aug. 2003), 41–58; Andrew Krepinevich, Operation Iraqi Freedom: A First-Blush Assessment (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments 2003), 13–24.

⁴For a detailed discussion of the debate see Bob Woodward, Bush at War (NY: Simon & Schuster 2002). For an overview see Thomas Donnelly, Operation Iraqi Freedom: A Strategic Assessment (Washington DC: AEI Press 2004) Ch.2.

⁵For work on this subject see, for instance, John M. Newman, JFK and Vietnam: Deception, Intrigue, and the Struggle for Power (NY: Warner Books 1992), 160; William Rosenau, Special Operations Forces and Elusive Enemy Ground Targets: Lessons from Vietnam and the Persian Gulf War (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 2001); John L. Plaster, SFG: The Secret Wars of America's Commandos in Vietnam (NY: Simon & Schuster 1997); and ‘Project CHECO: USAF Support of Special Forces in SEA’, US Air Force (March 1969). For work on airpower SOF operations in the European and Mediterranean theaters during World War II see Robert Jackson, The Secret Squadrons (London: Robson Books 1983), 112–19; Bernard V. Moore, II, ‘The Secret Air War Over France: USAAF Special Operations Units in the French Campaign of 1944’ (thesis, School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Air University, Maxwell AFB, ALA 1992). For work on World War II's Pacific theaters see Philip D. Chinnery, Any Time, Any Place: Fifty Years of the USAF Air Commandos and Special Operations Forces, 1944–94 (Annapolis, MD.: Naval Institute Press 1994), 14–59; and David M. Sullivan, ‘From Burma to Baghdad: Enhancing the Synergy between Land-Based Special Forces and Combat Air Operations’ (thesis, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Maxwell AFB, ALA 2003), 28–34.

⁶John Tagliabue, ‘Threats and Responses: Europe; France and Germany Agree on Iraq’, New York Times, 3 Oct. 2002, A16.

⁷See for instance, Will Lester, ‘Poll suggests a growing majority doesn't think United States has enough international support for Iraq war’, Associated Press Release, 21 Feb. 2003, accessed through Lexis-Nexis; Judy Woodruff, Dana Bash, Candy Crowley, Bruce Morton, Rhonda Schaffler, Andrea Koppel and Jonathan Karl, ‘United States Clashes With Allies Over War’, CNN Inside Politics Transcript #012300N.V15, 23 Jan. 2003; Gustavo Gonzlez, ‘Latin America: Public Support Weak for U.S. on Afghan and Iraq’, IPS-Inter Press Service/Global Information Network, 9 Sept. 2002, accessed through Lexis-Nexis.

⁸See Ronald E. Zimmerman, ‘Strategic Provocation: Explaining Terrorist Attacks on America’ (thesis, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Maxwell AFB, ALA 2002). The strategy was articulated by bin Laden in a speech: ‘Osama bin Laden vs. the U.S.: Edicts and Statements’, Frontline, April 1995.

⁹Richard B. Andres, ‘The political consequences of a potential war with Iraq’, a presentation given at the RAND Corporation, Washington DC, Dec. 2003.

¹⁰Andres, Wills and Griffith, ‘Winning with Allies’; Benjamin S. Lambeth, Airpower Against Terror: America's Conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 2005).

¹¹After major combat operations in Afghanistan, the country's major urban areas were largely under the control of Afghan groups allied with US and other forces. The country had also stabilized to the point where NATO and the United Nations had sent in large contingents of peacekeeping forces and relief workers. For work comparing stability operations in Iraq to Afghanistan see Andres, Wills and Griffith, ‘Winning with Allies’.

¹²After Operation ‘Enduring Freedom’ in Afghanistan, analysts, searching for a label for the new tactics, termed the operations the ‘Afghan model’ and ‘the new way of war’. Boot, ‘The New American Way of War’; Biddle, ‘Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare’.

¹³Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld noted: ‘It is hard for me to imagine another Afghanistan. If you think about that situation, it is kind of distinctive. Now it doesn't mean that some of the things that are working there won't work elsewhere, but the totality of it is distinctive.’ Quoted in Rowan Scarborough, ‘Air Force Resists More Bombers, Prefers Fighters’, Washington Times, 26 Dec. 2001, 1. See also Donald Rumsfeld, ‘Transforming the Military’, Foreign Affairs 81/3 (May/June 2002), 20–32, particularly, 22; Kim Burger and Andrew Koch, ‘Afghanistan: The Key Lessons’, Jane's Defense Weekly, 2 Jan. 2002; Tony Capaccio, ‘Afghan Lessons Don't Apply to “Axis”, Generals Say’, Bloomberg.com, 20 Feb. 2002; Michael O'Hanlon, ‘A Flawed Masterpiece’, Foreign Affairs 81/3 (May/June 2002), 47–63.

¹⁴Although the Shiite majority in southern Iraq was also opposed to Saddam's rule, a decade of severe repression had broken the back of the resistance and no large armed rebel group existed by 2003.

¹⁵Kurdish troops faced off against Iraqi troops in several wars throughout the twentieth century. Although their guerilla tactics were often successful, when they used conventional tactics the results were disastrous. For an analysis of Kurdish tactical capability in combined arms warfare see Kenneth M. Pollack, Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948–91 (Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska Press 2002), 156–57 and 176–82. In discussing the possibility of using Kurdish troops against Iraq in 2003, Stephen Biddle points out that Kurdish troops had shown themselves in multiple actions against Saddam's Republican Guard to be even less adept than the Iraqis. Biddle, Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare.

¹⁶See for instance, Rosenau, Special Operations Forces and Elusive Enemy Ground Targets.

¹⁷For a description of operations in Afghanistan see Andres, Wills and Griffith, ‘Winning with Allies’; Biddle, Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare.

¹⁸On the importance of testing new military techniques against major power opponents, see Emily Goldman and Richard Andres, ‘Systemic Effects of Military Innovation and Diffusion’, Security Studies 8/4 (Summer 1999), 98–9.

¹⁹Bruce R. Pirnie, Alan Vick, Adam Grissom, Karl P. Mueller and David T. Orletsky, Beyond Close Air Support: Forging a New Air-Ground Partnership (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 2005), 46. The situations in Op. ‘Allied Force’ in Kosovo and Op. ‘Iraqi Freedom’ in northern Iraq were different in important ways. In OAF the United States was more constrained by allies in how it could apply force. Rules of engagement also prevented aircraft from flying at low altitude and topography was more suited to hiding armor and artillery. Most importantly, the NATO airpower did not possess ‘eyes on the ground’ in Kosovo until the very end of the war.

²⁰Biddle, ‘Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare’. Biddle's analysis was widely propagated through the military community via briefings before the publication date of the article. For a more detailed explanation of this argument, see Biddle, Special Forces and the Future of Warfare, 14; and idem, Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare.

²¹Biddle, Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare, 24–41.

²²Ibid., iv.

²³Ibid., 55.

²⁴Fikret Bila, ‘Turkey's Gul Says US, Kurds Told Clearly of Turkey's Position Vis-à-vis N. Iraq’, Global News Wire, 31 March 2003.

²⁵See for instance, Harry Dunphy, ‘Shites, Sunnis, Kurds could battle to take power in Iraq if Saddam toppled’, Associated Press, 5 Oct. 2002.

²⁶‘Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld Holds New Briefing’, FDCH Political Transcripts, 21 March 2003.

²⁷Donnelly, Operation Iraqi Freedom, 34.

²⁸For a summary of the debate, see ibid., 38.

²⁹The total number of ground troops including US Army and Marines and the troops of other Coalition countries amounted to around 350,000. Although, after the war, the debate over the war plan came to center on the number of troops that would be needed for peacekeeping operations, before the war, the main debate was about the number of troops needed to defeat the Iraqi army. A few particularly prescient individuals did, however, base their arguments for more troops on the need for more peacekeepers. Army Chief of Staff Erik Shinseki suggested ‘several hundred-thousand’ peacekeepers might be needed. See Vernon Loeb, ‘Cost of War Remains Unanswered Question’, Washington Post, 1 March 2003, A13. Prof. Peter Schifferle of the Army's School of Advanced Military Studies conducted an analysis suggesting that around seven divisions would be needed. Peter Schifferle, ‘Modern Ground Warfare: Operations, Logistics, and Population Control’, a presentation given to the faculty and students of the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Air University, Maxwell AFB, ALA, Oct. 2002.

³⁰Williamson Murray and Maj. Gen. Robert H. Scales Jr., The Iraq War: A Military History (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard UP 2003), 69–70 and 186–90. See also ‘Global Scouts’, a PowerPoint presentation by US Army Special Operations Command at the National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA) Symposium, 5 Feb. 2004; and Armando Ramirez, ‘From Bosnia to Baghdad: The Evolution of US Army Special Forces From 1995 to 2004’ (thesis, Naval Post Graduate School, Monterey, CA Sept. 2002).

³¹Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack (NY: Simon & Schuster 2004), particularly Chs.33–35. See also Linda Robinson, Masters of Chaos: The Secret History of the Special Forces (NY: Public Affairs 2004).

³²For an analysis of the debate about using special forces in Op. ‘Desert Storm’, see Rick Atkinson, Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin 1993).

³³Saddam deployed 10 divisions in the South and 13 in the North. See ‘Global Scouts’, slide 7.

³⁴Tommy Franks, American Soldier (NY: Regan Books 2004).

³⁵Some elements of 10th SFG had been deployed since Feb. For more on the group's infiltration, see Ramirez, ‘From Bosnia to Baghdad’, p.43.

³⁶Ibid. p.44.

³⁷JSOTF-N consisted of conventional combat and support units as well as special forces. Most significantly, the 173rd Airborne Brigade, containing two light infantry battalions and an armored and mechanized force, arrived late in the operation. However, the operations described in this article were conducted almost entirely by SOF ODAs. Although it played an important strategic role, by establishing a significant conventional presence in northern Iraq, the 173rd did not engage in significant combat during major combat operations. Gregory Fontenot, E.J. Degen and David Tohn, On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press 2004) p.230.

³⁸Patrick Cockburn, ‘US Special Forces Prepare Way for Invasion in Northern Iraq’, London, The Independent, Internet version, 7 March 2003 (accessed through the Foreign Broadcast Information System (FBIS) portal EUP20030307000177).

³⁹Exact numbers are elusive. See Aysla Aydintasbas, ‘The Kurdish Dilemma’, Salon.com, 6 Sept. 2002 <www.salon.com/people/interview/2002/09/06/salih/>; and ‘Kurdish Resistance Forces Must Decide Role in New Iraq’, Washington Post, 13 May 2003 <www.charleston.net/stories/051303/ter_13kurds.shtml>. ODA Team 391 and 392, for example, were expecting 200 Kurds for an operation, and approximately 80 showed up. See Sean D. Naylor, ‘Nightmare at Debecka’, Army Times, 29 Sept. 2003 <www.armytimes.com/archivepaper.php?f=0-ARMYPAPER-2212087>.

⁴⁰Major Mark Grdovic, S-3 for 3rd Battalion 10th Group, in interview with author, 15 Nov. 2005.

⁴¹For more on the Iraqi order of battle, see Anthony H. Cordesman, The Iraq War: Strategy, Tactics, and Military Lessons (Washington DC: The CSIS Press 2003), 36–56; Murray and Scales (note 29), 77–85.

⁴²‘Global Scouts’ (note 30) slide 11.

⁴³Their orders read: ‘Conduct Unconventional Warfare and other Special Operations in JSOA (Joint Special Operations Area) North to disrupt Iraqi combat power, IOT (in order to) prevent effective military operations against CFLCC [Combined Forces Land Component Command] forces.’ ‘Global Scouts’ (note 29) slide 6.

⁴⁴The first operation, ‘Viking Hammer’, involved attacking the Ansar al-Islam terrorist group. See Murray and Scales, The Iraq War, Ch.6.

⁴⁵Grdovic interview (note 40).

⁴⁶Ibid.

⁴⁷As time went by, long range land-based bombers were increasingly used in the North.

⁴⁸Denise Natali, The Kurds and the State: Evolving National Identity in Iraq, Turkey, and Iran (NY: Syracuse UP 2005) Chs.2–3.

⁴⁹Daniel Williams, ‘US Troops Working With Kurdish Fighters: Groups May Help Special Forces Plan Airstrikes for Advance Into Northern Iraq’, Washington Post and Kurdistan Observer, 17 March 2003 <http://home.cogeco.ca/∼dbonni1/18-3-03-us-to-coordinateswith-kurds.html>. See also Ramirez, ‘From Bosnia to Baghdad’, 49.

⁵⁰Grdovic interview.

⁵¹Ibid.

⁵²Ibid. See also Fontenot, Degen and Tohn, On Point, 230.

⁵³Ramirez, ‘From Bosnia to Baghdad’, 51.

⁵⁴Mark Grdovic, ‘Task Force 103 During Operation Iraqi Freedom’, a synopsis of training and operations conducted by 3rd Battalion, 10th SFG (A) in OIF, 15.

⁵⁷Ibid.

⁵⁵Naylor, ‘Nightmare at Debecka’.

⁵⁶Grdovic interview.

⁵⁸Ibid.

⁵⁹Col. Mark Rosengard, director of operations, Task Force Dagger, in an interview by Maj. Mark Davis, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, 27 Feb. 2004.

⁶⁰Grdovic interview.

⁶¹Naylor, ‘Nightmare at Debecka’.

⁶²Capt. Eric Carver, US Army, Commander, ODA 065, Memorandum for Record, Subject: Historical Documentation of ODA 065 Operations during Operation ‘Iraqi Freedom’, 16 April 2003. Available from US Army Center for Army Lessons Learned.

⁶³An Iraqi battalion-sized element is approximately 1,000 troops.

⁶⁴Carver, ‘Memo’.

⁶⁵For a more through description see Andres, Wills and Griffith, ‘Winning with Allies’.

⁶⁶Grdovic interview.

⁶⁷Fontenot, Degen, and Tohn, On Point, 250.

⁶⁸Ramirez, ‘From Bosnia to Baghdad’, 51.

⁶⁹Grdovic interview.

⁷⁰Fontenot, Degen, and Tohn, On Point, 230; Grdovic, ‘Task Force 103’, 15.

⁷¹For more on how much of the Nebuchadnezzar Division made it to the vicinity of Baghdad, see Fontenot, Degen, and Tohn, On Point, Chs.2–3.

⁷²Among others, President George Bush used this analogy. See, George Bush in ‘President Discusses the Future of Iraq’, Washington Hilton Hotel, Washington DC, 26 Feb. 2003 <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030226-11.html>.

⁷³Angelo M. Codevilla, ‘Victory: What it Will Take to Win’, The Claremont Review of Books (Fall 2001) <www.claremont.org/writings/crb/fall2001/codevilla.html>.

⁷⁴Angelo M. Codevilla, ‘Angelo M. Codevilla Responds: A Rejoinder to Buckley, Gaffney, Owens, Podhoretz, and Tucker’, The Claremont Review of Books (Fall 2002) <www.claremont.org/writings/crb/fall2002/codevillareply.html>, 3.

⁷⁵See, for instance, United States Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual (Washington DC: The Corps 1997).

⁷⁶For an example of Army doctrine on this subject, see FM 31-21 Department of the Army Field Manual: Guerrilla Warfare and Special Forces Operations.

⁷⁷Jeffrey Record, ‘How America's Military Performance Aided and Abetted the Enemy’, in Marc Jason Gilbert (ed.), Why the North Won the Vietnam War (NY: Palgrave 2002), 122; William R. Corson, The Betrayal (NY: Norton 1968).

⁷⁸Mike Tucker, Among Warriors in Iraq (Guilford, CT: The Lyons Press 2005), 27.

⁷⁹See Ibid., Ch.1.

⁸⁰Ibid., 27.

⁸¹Grdovic interview.

⁸²Tucker, Among Warriors in Iraq, 27.

⁸³Ibid., 28.

⁸⁴Grdovic interview. The United States airlifted Ahmed Chalabi and an irregular military unit known as the 1st Battalion of the Free Iraqi Forces into northern Iraq to train before the war, however, it did not participate in major combat operations during the war. Chalabi and official US sources differ as to the unit's mission and violence erupted at times between members of the group and US and British troops. For more on the unit's history see, for instance, Marian Wilkinson, ‘Just what Ahmad Chalabi will make of his place in Iraq's future is as uncertain as the role of the Free Iraqi Forces’, Sydney Morning Herald, 18 April 2003, <www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/04/17/1050172705937.html>; ‘Exiles leader and troops join with coalition forces’, 8 April 2003, Tuesday Courier Mail (Queensland, Australia); Linda Robinson and Kevin Whitelaw, ‘Deploying the “Free Iraqi Forces” What role for the arriving anti-Saddam Iraqi fighters?’, 7 April 2003, U.S. News and World Report <www.usnews.com/usnews/news/iraq/articles/fiff030407.htm>.

⁸⁵Tucker, Among Warriors in Iraq, 27.

⁸⁶Ibid.

⁸⁷Biddle, Special Forces and the Future of Warfare, 12.

⁸⁸Ibid., 12, fn27.

⁸⁹See for instance, Carver, ‘Memo’.

⁹⁰The remnants of the two Republican Guard divisions in the north attempted to move south to cut off the US 3rd ID from its drive on Baghdad. ‘No cohesive unit of any brigade of any Republican Guard division’ made it to the South. See William Branigin, ‘It was a brief, bitter war for Iraq army: self-deception a factor in defeat’, Washington Post, 27 April 2003, A25.

⁹¹Grdovic interview. Carver, ‘Memo’.

⁹²Capt. Joseph Swiecki, correspondence, 17 Feb. 2004. The Kurds, viewing SOF forces as high value assets, encouraged this behavior. Like the allied forces in Afghanistan the year before, the Kurds generally held that it was best to spill Kurdish blood for Kurdish freedom.

⁹³Special Forces are not always forthcoming with casualty data, however, numerous special operators interviewed for this article repeated this fact.