Wellington's use of deception tactics in the Peninsular War

Abstract

Wellington's use of intelligence developed throughout his military career. Arguably, his experiences in India taught him the importance of intelligence, but it was during the Peninsular War that he honed his analytical techniques. As the war progressed, he developed sophisticated methods for the integration of strategic intelligence – largely gathered by civilian agents – with operational intelligence – collected by military personnel. This allowed him to develop operational conceptualisation, which in turn contributed to the successes he achieved over the French forces in Iberia. However, more than anything, it was his considered use of intelligence, combined with intricate deception operations in the latter stages of the conflict, which deprived the French of reliable intelligence on his own movements, and demonstrated his understanding of the importance of intelligence. This article investigates Wellington's increasing awareness of the importance of intelligence and deception during the Peninsular War.

Key Words:

• Napoleonic Wars
• Duke of Wellington
• intelligence

Notes

¹See J. Ferris and M. Handel, ‘Clausewitz, Intelligence, Uncertainty and the Art of Command in Military Operations’, Intelligence and National Security 10/1 (Jan. 1995), 1–58.

²See D. Croxton, ‘“The Prosperity of Arms is Never Continual”: Military Intelligence, Surprise and Diplomacy in 1640s Germany’, Journal of Military History 64/4 (Oct. 2000), 981–1003, and R. Kaplan, ‘The Hidden War: British Intelligence Operations during the American Revolution’, William and Mary Quarterly 47/1 (Jan. 1990), 115–38.

³See M. Romans, ‘Eyes in the Hills: Intelligence and the Events at Alcantara’, in C.M. Woolgar (ed.), Wellington Studies I (Univ. of Southampton 1996), 164–81, and J. Haswell, British Military Intelligence (London: Weidenfeld 1973).

⁴For more information on this system, see H. Davies, ‘Integration of Strategic and Operational Intelligence during the Peninsular War’, Intelligence and National Security 21/2 (April 2006), 202–23.

⁵2nd Duke of Wellington (ed.), Supplementary Dispatches and Memoranda of Field Marshal Arthur Duke of Wellington, 1797–1818 , 14 vols. (London, 1858) (SD), Vol. II, Memorandum on the system for regulating the Intelligence Department in the Army under the Command of Major-General the Hon. A. Wellesley, Nov. 1804, 464–65.

⁶Ibid.

⁷J. Pemble, ‘Resources and Techniques in the Second Maratha War’, The Historical Journal 19/2 (June 1976), 375–404.

⁸See H. Davies, ‘Secret Intelligence in the Peninsular War: The Case Study of El Bodon, 25 September 1811’, Archives 30/112 (April 2005), 45–60.

⁹Lieutenant-Colonel Gurwood (ed.), The Despatches of Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington, K.G. during his various campaigns in India, Denmark, Portugal, Spain, the Low Countries and France, from 1799 to 1818 (13 vols., London, 1836) (WD), Vol. IV, Wellesley to Frere, Talavera de la Reyna, 30 July 1809, 514–15.

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹ WD, Vol. IV, Wellesley to O'Donoju, Talavera de la Reyna, 31 July 1809, 517.

¹²R.G.S. Cooper, The Anglo-Maratha Campaigns and the Contest for India: The Struggle for Control of the South Asian Military Economy (Cambridge: CUP 2003), 284–312.

¹³ WD, Vol. IV, Wellesley to O'Donoju, Talavera de la Reyna, 31 July 1809, 517.

¹⁴ WD, Vol. IV, Wellesley to Frere, Oropesa, 3 Aug. 1809, 529–30.

¹⁵R. Muir, At Wellington's Right Hand: The Letters of Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Alexander Gordon, 1808–1815 (Stroud, UK: Sutton Publishing for Army Records Society 2003), 40–85.

¹⁶ WD, Vol. IV, Wellesley to Frere, Puerto de Arzobispo, 4 Aug. 1809, 531–33.

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸See J. Grehan, The Lines of Torres Vedras: The Cornerstone of Wellington's Strategy in the Peninsular War 1809–1812 (Staplehurst, Kent: Spellmount 2004).

¹⁹See Muir, At Wellington's Right Hand, Gordon to Aberdeen, Buçaco, 21–30 Sept. 1810, 115–16.

²⁰See Davies, ‘Secret Intelligence in the Peninsular War’, 45–60.

²¹See for example, WD, Vol. IX, Wellington to Graham, Fuente Guinaldo, 1 May 1812, 105–6. ‘I send you the intelligence received last night from Salamanca, which shows the disposition of the enemy's several divisions.’ See also Wellington to Graham, Fuente Guinaldo, 4 May 1812, 117. ‘I enclose papers of the 27th and 30th April, from Salamanca. The former might have been received before.’ Other pieces of intelligence were forwarded on 8 May 1812, 132; 13 May 1812, 144; and 19 May 1812, 158 – five in the first three weeks of May.

²²See WD, Vol. IX, Wellington to Thomas Graham, Fuente Guinaldo, 25 April 1812, p. 88. ‘I send you the last reports from Madrid and Salamanca. You see that they differ a little in respect to the person to command the French armies. They would derive great advantage from this supposed arrangement. I see in a paper of the 10th, that the Russians have declared war on 19 March.’

²³See National Library of Scotland (NLS) MSS 3610, Hill to Graham, 11 June 1812 – forwarding dispatches from Thomas Terrano.

²⁴ WD, Vol. IX, Wellington to Alten, Frenada, 5 March 1812, 4.

²⁵ WD, Vol. IX, Wellington to Graham, Fuente Guinaldo, 4 May 1812, 117.

²⁶ WD, Vol. IX, Wellington to Alten, Frenada, 5 March 1812, 3–4.

²⁷Ibid.

²⁸ WD, Vol. IX, Wellington to Alten, Badajoz, 10 April 1812, 53–4.

²⁹See WD, Vol. IX, Wellington to Graham, Nisa, 16 April 1812, 63.

³⁰ WD, Vol. IX, Wellington to Alten, Castello Branco, 18 April 1812, p. 72.

³¹ WD, Vol. IX, Wellington to Liverpool, Nisa, 16 April 1812, p. 69.

³³ WD, Vol. IX, Wellington to Graham, Fuente Guinaldo, 4 May 1812, 117–18.

³²See WD, Vol. IX, Wellington to Liverpool, Camp before Badajoz, 7 April 1812, 46–47.

³⁴ WD, Vol. IX, Wellington to Graham, Fuente Guinaldo, 24 May 1812, 166, ‘They do not know what to make of the disposition of our troops, which without a knowledge of our circumstances, it is not easy to understand; and they are very anxious to know where head quarters are. This was the object of Marmont's letter to me … It came by the hands of a friend, who is gone back well tutored.’

³⁵NLS MSS 3610, Graham to Wellington, Portalegre, 17 April 1812.

³⁶ WD, Vol. IX, Wellington to Graham, Fuente Guinaldo, 7 June 1812, 220.

³⁷ WD, Vol. IX, Wellington to Henry Wellesley, Fuente Guinaldo, 1 June 1812, 200.

³⁸National Army Museum (NAM) MSS 7409/67, E. Pakenham to Longford, Lisbon, 22 May 1812.

³⁹See WD, Vol. IX, Wellington to Henry Wellesley, Fuente Guinaldo, 7 June 1812, 221–23. See also Wellington to Hill (fn), Fuente Guinaldo, 9 June 1812, 225.

⁴⁰See The National Archives (TNA) Foreign Office Series (FO) 63/151, Stuart to Castlereagh, Lisbon, 30 January 1813.

⁴¹See WD, Vol. X, Wellington to Graham, Freneda, 7 April 1813, 270.

⁴⁶NAM MS 7409/67, Pakenham to Longford, Momenta de Beira, 5 January 1813.

⁴²University of Southampton Library (USL) Wellington Papers (WP) 1/364, Hill to Wellington, nd.

⁴³USL WP 1/364, Hill to Wellington, Coria, 19 Jan. 1813.

⁴⁴See WD, Vol. X, Wellington to Bathurst, Frenada, 17 Feb. 1813, 125.

⁴⁵See USL WP 1/364, Hill to Wellington, Coria, 26 Jan. 1813. Forwarding specific intelligence from the agent named Purcira. ‘Yesterday evening entered by the Puerto de Alcala about 3,500 men of the division of Palombini, many of this division went out of the Puerta de Atacha to sleep at Caramesetel, this morning there marched out a convoy for France, under the command of General Loucat, they took with them a great many persons whom they made prisoners in the night of the 6th we do not know why. They have with them 96 Spanish Prisoners, leaving in the prison, the 26 that they took on the 29th Ultimo towards Huriguela. The Italian Division of Palombini is escorting this convoy.’

⁴⁷See USL WP 1/367, Hillier to Hill, Halia, 10 March 1813.

⁴⁸See WD, Vol. X. Wellington to Bathurst, Freneda 10 March 1813, 177.

⁴⁹See TNA FO 63/151, Stuart to Castlereagh, Lisbon, 3 Jan. 1813.

⁵⁰See WD, Vol. X, Wellington to Murray, 14 April 1813, 297–301 for details of Wellington's orders for the diversionary operation in Catalonia and Valencia. See for example University of Nottingham Library (UNL) Pw Jd 5311/3 and Pw Jd 5548, Zehnpfenning to Bentinck, Igualada, 2 Aug. 1813, for the type of intelligence both were privy to. See also NLS MSS 1413 for Murray's correspondence on the landings.

⁵¹See National Maritime Museum (NMM) KEI 37/10, Collier to Keith, 1813 correspondence.

⁵²USL WP 1/364, Hill to Wellington, Jan. 1813, forwarding a letter from O'Lawler to Hill, Frenada, 4 Jan. 1813.

⁵³See for example, USL WP 1/366, Leith-Hay to Wellington, Piedrabuena, 21 Feb. 1813; and Intelligence received by Hill, Coria, 22 Feb. 1813.

⁵⁴See TNA FO 63/154, Stuart to Wellesley, Lisbon, 15 May 1813.

⁵⁵See USL WP 1/367, Leith-Hay to Hill, Almagro, 7 March 1813.

⁵⁶ WD, Vol. X, Wellington to Bathurst, Freneda, 21 April 1813, 309. See also USL WP 1/368, Leith-Hay to Wellington, Toledo, 11 April 1813.

⁵⁷See USL WP 1/368 and WP 1/369 for the intelligence Wellington received in April and May. Intelligence officers such as Leith-Hay and Bourke watched the enemy in their positions on the Tormes and in Arevalo – as was the case with Leith-Hay, as well as in Palencia and Valladolid – as with Bourke.

⁵⁹ WD, Vol. X, Wellington to Bathurst, Frenada, 11 May 1813, 372.

⁵⁸ WD, Vol. X, Wellington to Beresford, Freneda, 25 April 1813, 322.

⁶⁰See TNA FO 63/152, Stuart to Castlereagh, Lisbon, 6 March 1813. Intelligence had indicated that the French armies were under the sole command of Joseph Bonaparte, that the strength of the Army of Portugal was 36,257 effectives, and that the strength of the Army of Centre was 14,000.

⁶¹NAM MS 7409/67, Pakenham to Longford, St Eulalia, 2 May 1813.

⁶²NAM MS 6807/163/3, Bingham to Gundry, Sandiño, 12 June 1813.

⁶⁴C. Oman, A History of the Peninsular War, 7 vols. (Oxford: OUP 1902–30) (Oman), Vol. VI, 298.

⁶³See for example University of Durham Library (UDL) GRE/B19/123, Gordon to York, Cordovilla, 14 Sept. 1812.

⁶⁵See NLS Adv. MSS 46.2.17, Memorandum from Murray, Frenada, 18 May 1813.

⁶⁶ WD, Vol. X, Wellington to Bathurst, Freneda, 11 May 1813, 372.

⁶⁷NAM MS 7409/67, Pakenham to Longford, Momenta de Beira, 5 Jan. 1813.

⁶⁸ WD, Vol. X, Wellington to Graham, Frenada, 18 May 1813, 387.

⁶⁹ WD, Vol. X, Wellington to Hill, Salamanca, 28 May 1813, 402.

⁷⁰NLS Adv. MSS 46.2.18, Arrangements for the movements of Army on 3 June 1813.

⁷¹The Observe, Orient, Decide and Act (OODA) Cycle was developed following the Korean War by the US Air Force Colonel John Boyd. He argued that providing one could outpace an enemy's OODA Cycle, then victory would eventually be obtained. Although developed in respect to air power, and still used as a guiding principle in current military doctrine, Boyd's principles are applicable to nineteenth century warfare. Napoleon certainly outpaced Austrian, Russian and Prussian OODA Cycles between 1805 and 1807. Wellington did so again in 1813, by judicious use of intelligence sources and operational planning which, in many ways, exceeded the technological constraints of the period. See R. Coram, Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War (London: Little, Brown 2003). See also D.S. Fadok, John Boyd and John Warden: Air Power's Quest for Strategic Paralysis (Maxwell, ALA: Air UP 1995), 1–55.

⁷²USL WP 1/367, Leith-Hay to Hill, Navalmillos de Toledo, 19 March 1813.

⁷³See USL WP 1/369, Churchill to Wellington, La Obadia, 30 May 1813; and Goodriffe to Wellington, Braojos (Sierra Guadarrama), 31 May 1813.

⁷⁴See USL WP 1/369, Graham to Wellington, Miranda do Douro, 27 May 1813; Hill to Wellington, Arbada, 28 May 1813; and unidentified intelligence officer sent to Toro by Hill to Wellington, Fuente la Peneña, 28 May 1813. The final letter contains a note from a correspondent in Toro itself.

⁷⁶NAM MS 6807/163/3, Bingham to his father, Pamplona, 25 June 1813.

⁷⁵See NLS Adv MS 46.2.17, Murray to Arnold, Burgoyne, Hay, Bainbrige, Tongue, April, May and June 1813.