The European Union: Just an alliance or a military alliance?

Abstract

Over centuries there have been different definitions and criteria for alliances. Within this, however, there are categories entitled ‘military alliances’. The article arrives at 11 different criteria for categorisation of alliances and applies them to the different facets of the European Union. It concludes that, on the broadest terms, the EU does meet the criteria for an alliance but that the jury is still out on some aspect of the European Union being a military alliance. This conclusion has consequences for the foreign, security and defence policies of several member states and, indeed, for the future of the European Union itself.

Key words:

• European Union
• alliances
• military alliances

Acknowledgements

Thanks are due to Sir William Nicoll, Dr David Brown (Royal Military Academy Sandhurst) and Dr Alistair Shepherd (Department of International Politics, University of Wales, Aberystwyth) for comments on an earlier draft. Trudy Fraser has helped with this article.

Notes

³Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (2005), 37.

¹The European Convention, Final Report of the Working Group VIII – Defence (Brussels 2002), paras. 50 and 51.

²B. Tetrais, ‘The Changing Nature of Military Alliances’, Washington Quarterly 27/2 (2004), 147.

⁴R.L. Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers (New York: Columbia UP 1968), 46–47.

⁵J.D. Morrow, ‘Arms Versus Allies: Trade-offs in the Search for Security’, International Organization 47/2 (1993), 208.

⁶Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers, 46.

⁷B.M. Russet, ‘An Empirical Typology of International Military Alliances’, Midwest Journal of Political Science 15/2 (1971), 262.

⁸Tetrais, ‘The Changing Nature of Military Alliances’, 149.

⁹See Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, trans. by R. Crawley (Dover Public Press 2004).

¹⁰B.A. Leeds, ‘Do Alliances Deter Aggression? The Influence of Military Alliances on the Initiation of Interstate Disputes’, American Journal of Political Science 47/3 (2003), 427.

¹¹‘Open Skies’ was agreed in 1992 and came into force in 2002. Currently 30 states have signed the treaty allowing unarmed aerial observation flights over the entire territory of its participants.

¹²Partnership for Peace was NATO's initiative in 1994 to enhance stability and security in Europe by dialogue and, according to NATO ‘goes beyond dialogue and cooperation to forge a real partnership between each Partner country and NATO’. It consists of bilateral agreements between NATO and individual states. NATO undertakes to consult with Partners if one of them perceives a threat but there is no guarantee of assistance or of commitment and it is different to membership in NATO (Switzerland and Ireland both had Partnership for Peace agreements).

¹³The SALT I Treaty was agreed in 1972 wherein the USA and the USSR agreed, for example, not to start construction of additional fixed land-based ICBMs.

¹⁴Palme Commission, Common Security: A Programme for Disarmament (London: Pan 1982), 6.

¹⁵Treaty of Brussels (1948); NATO Handbook (Brussels: NATO Office of Information 2002).

¹⁶C.B. Marshall, The Exercise of Sovereignty (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins Press 1965), 58–59.

¹⁷H.S. Dinerstein, ‘The Transformation of Alliance System’, in R.B. Grey (ed.), International Security Systems: Concepts and Models of World Order (Itasca, IL: F.E. Peacock Press 1969), 56.

¹⁸J.D. Singer and M. Small, ‘Formal Alliances, 1815–1939: A Quantitive Description’, Journal of Peace Research 3/1 (1996), 6; J.D. Morrow, ‘Alliances and Assymetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances’, American Journal of Political Science 35 (1991), 904–33; K.T. Gaubatz, ‘Democratic States and Commitment in International Relations’, International Organisations 50 (1996), 109–30; D.S. Bennett, ‘Testing Alternative Models of Alliance Duration: 1816–1984’, American Journal of Political Science 41/3 (1997), 846. Singer and Small, for example, omit charters of global or quasi-global international governmental organisations (like UN or OSCE); treaties of guarantee agreed by all on a particular issue (Cyprus); general rules of behaviour (Geneva Conventions); mutual security regarding bases, aid and training; and unilateral and asymmetrical security guarantees. Others list, for example, wartime alliances, e.g. O. Holsti, T.P. Hopmann, and J.D. Sullivan, Unity and Disintegration: International Alliances (New York: Wiley 1973); Russet, ‘An Empirical Typology of International Military Alliances’.

¹⁹For a fuller discussion on these issues see: J.S. Duffield, ‘International Regimes and Alliance Behaviour: Explaining NATO Conventional Force Levels’, International Organisations 46/4 (1992), 819–55; Morrow, ‘Alliances and Asymmetry’, 906; S. Walt, The Origin of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1987); Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers; A. Smith, ‘Alliance Formation and War’, International Studies Quarterly 39/4 (1995), 410; E.H. Fedder, ‘The Concept of Alliance’, International Studies Quarterly 12/1 (1968); W.H. Riker, Theory of Political Coalitions (New Haven, CT: Yale UP 1962); G. Liska, Nations in Alliance (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press 1962).

²⁰H. Morgenthau, ‘Alliances in Theory and Practice’, in A. Wolfers (ed.), Alliance Policy in the Cold War (Baltimore: MD, The John Hopkins Press 1959), 185–86.

²¹J. Bayliss, K. Booth, J. Garnett and P. Williams (eds.), Contemporary Strategy: Theories and Policies (London: Croom Helm 1975), 172.

²²W. Kinnter and R.L. Pfaltzgraff, SALT: Implications for Arms Conrol in the 1970s (Pittsburgh UP 1973), 309.

²³Fedder, ‘The Concept of Alliance’, 68–69.

²⁴J.R. Friedman, C. Bladen and S. Rosen (eds.), Alliance in International Politics (Boston: Allyn and Bacon 1970), 5.

²⁵G.H. Snyder and P. Diesing, Conflict Among Nations (Princeton UP 1977), 428.

²⁶E. Gartzke and M.W. Simon, ‘Political System Similarity and the Choice of Allies: Do Democracies Flock Together or Do Opposites Attract?’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 40/4 (1996), 618.

²⁷Tetrais, ‘The Changing Nature of Military Alliances’, 135–36.

²⁸Morgenthau, ‘Alliances in Theory and Practice’, 191.

²⁹B. Lai and D. Reiter, ‘Democracy, Political Similarity and International Alliances’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 44/2 (2000), 207.

³⁰Lai and Reiter, ‘Democracy, Political Similarity and International Alliances’, 208.

³⁸Sir C. Webster, The Foreign Policy of Palmerston 1830–1841 (London: G. Bell 1951), 386.

³¹D. Reiter, ‘Learning, Realism, and Alliances: The Weight of the Shadow of the Past’, World Politics 46/4 (1994), 495.

³²Walt, Origin of Alliances, 12.

³³G.H. Snyder, ‘Alliance Theory: A Neorealist First Cut’, Journal of International Affairs 44/1 (1990), 103–23; Reiter, ‘Learning, Realism and Alliances’, 495; Leeds, ‘Do Alliances Deter Aggression? The Influence of Military Alliances on the Initiation of Interstate Dispute’, 429; Lai and Reiter, ‘Democracy, Political Similarity and International Alliances’, 205; Smith, ‘Alliance Formation and War’, 410; Bennett, ‘Testing Alternative Models of Alliance Duration: 1816–1984’, 847; H. Gärtner, ‘Small States and Alliances’ in E. Reitner and H. Gartner (eds.), Small States and Alliances (Vienna: Physica-Verlag 2001) p.2; V. Krause and J.D. Singer, ‘Minor Powers, Alliances and Armed Conflict: Some Preliminary Patterns’ in Reitner and Gartner, Small States and Alliances, 16, 26; S. Bergsmann, ‘The Concept of Military Alliance’ in Reitner and Gartner, Small States and Alliances, 35; G. Liska, Nations in Alliance (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press 1962), 3; Holsti, Hopmann and Sullivan, Unity and Disintegration, 4; Singer and Small, ‘Formal Alliances, 1815–1939’, 4; Russett, ‘An Empirical Typology of International Military Alliances’, 262–63.

³⁴J.D. Morrow, ‘Alliances, Credibility and Peacetime Costs’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 38/2 (1994), 270.

³⁵B.A. Leeds, A.G. Long and S.M. Mitchell, ‘Re-evaluating Alliance Reliability: Specific Threats, Specific Promises’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 44/5 (2000), 687.

³⁶According to J.D. Morrow alliances ‘signal other states that the allies are more likely to come to one another's aid’, and ‘operate as signals of the intentions of third parties to come to the aid of a threatened state’. (Morrow, ‘Alliances, Credibility and Peacetime Costs’ 280, 294). According to D.S. Bennett, an alliance is ‘a visible indicator of state commitments … specified and mutually agreed upon set of behaviours.’ (Bennett, ‘Testing Alternative Methods of Alliance Duration 1816–1984’, 846.)

³⁷Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers, 50.

³⁹Tetrais, ‘The Changing Nature of Military Alliances’, 148.

⁴⁰Smith, ‘Alliance Formation and War’; and G.H. Snyder, ‘The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics’, World Politics 36/4 (1984), 461–95.

⁴¹Leeds, ‘Do Alliances Deter Aggression? The Influence of Military Alliances on the Initiation of Interstate Disputes’, 428–29; Leeds, Long and Mitchell, ‘Re-evaluating Alliance Reliability’, 688–92; Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers, 53–57.

⁴²The North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 explicitly restricts the guarantee to ‘in Europe or North America’ (Article V) and ‘the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer’ (Article VI) deliberately to avoid the United States having to bail out the empires of Europe in South-East Asia.

⁴³A.N. Sabrosky, ‘Interstate Alliances: Their Reliability and the Expansion of War’, in J.D. Singer (ed.) The Correlates of War II (New York: Free Press, 1980); Leeds, Long and Mitchell, ‘Re-evaluating Alliance Reliability’.

⁴⁴Morrow, ‘Alliances and Asymmetry’, 931; K. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill 1979), 72–73.

⁴⁵R. Schweller, ‘Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In’, International Security 19/1 (1994), 88.

⁴⁶Liska, Nations in Alliance, 12.

⁴⁷Snyder and Diesing, Conflict Among Nations, 428.

⁴⁸Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 166, quotes Churchill ‘If Hitler invaded Hell I would make at least favourable references to the Devil.’

⁴⁹Partly in connection with arms control agreements. As Liska has noted: ‘an alliance is a means of reducing the impact of antagonistic power, perceived as pressure’. (Liska, Nations in Alliance, 109)

⁵⁰R.M. Siverson and H. Starr, ‘Regime Change and the Restructuring of Alliances’, American Journal of Political Science 38 (1994), 147.

⁵¹Although a state may make an alliance with a weaker state or militarily less capable partner (Gartzke and Simon, ‘Political System Similarity and the Choice of Allies’, 624). According to Fedder, alliances perform the following functions: Augmentive – so that together their power is greater than a potential adversary, Preemptive – to stop another power's power being added to a potential adversary, Strategic – to gain access to territory etc. for one's own purpose (Fedder, ‘The Concept of Alliance’, 67).

⁵²Morrow, ‘Alliances and Asymmetry’, 907; M. Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics (New York: Wiley 1957); H. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York: Knopf 1973); Walt, Origin of Alliances; Waltz, Theory of International Politics).

⁵³Leeds, ‘Do Alliances Deter Aggression?’, 430.

⁵⁴Holsti, Hopman, and Sullivan, Unity and Disintegration.

⁵⁵Bergsmann, ‘The Concept of Military Alliances’, 36.

⁵⁶Tetrais, ‘The Changing Nature of Military Alliances’, 136.

⁵⁷E.D. Mansfield and R. Bronson, ‘Alliances, Preferential Trading Arrangements and International Trade’, American Political Science Review 91/1 (1997), 94.

⁵⁸Baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws[1748], trans. and ed. by A.M. Cohler (Cambridge: CUP 1989), 338.

⁵⁹C.W. Kegley and E.R. Wittkopf, World Politics: Trends and Transformations, 4th edn (New York: St Martin's Press 1993), 466–67.

⁶⁰Lai and Reiter, ‘Democracy, Political Similarity, and International Alliances’, 209.

⁶¹D.M. Gibler, ‘Alliances That Never Balance: The Territorial Settlement Treaty’, Conflict Management and Peace Science 15 (1996), 75–98.

⁶²V. Krause and J.D. Singer, ‘Minor Powers, Alliance and Armed Conflict: Some Preliminary Patterns’ in Reiter and Gartner, Small States and Alliances, 20; Gibler, ‘Alliances That Never Balance’.

⁶³ Casus foederis: Circumstances in a treaty requiring the action of the parties.

⁶⁴E.R.A. Seligman (ed.), Encyclopedia of Social Science (London: Macmillan 1930).

⁶⁵Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (1951).

⁶⁶Treaty of Rome Establishing the European Economic Community (1957).

⁶⁷Treaty on European Union (1992), Article 2.

⁶⁸Commission of the European Union, Agenda 2000: For A Stronger and Wider Union (Brussels 1997), 13–14.

⁶⁹Treaty of Accession (1972), Protocol No. 30.

⁷⁰Single European Act (1986), Bulletin Supplement 2.

⁷¹It was confined to the ‘fields of environment and trans-European networks’.

⁷²S. Hix, The Political System of the European Union, 2nd edn (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan 2005), 279 and 289–95.

⁷³International Monetary Fund, Eurostatm (2 Aug. 2005), <www.europa.eu.int/comm/trade>.

⁷⁶Article 296.1.(b), formerly 223.

⁷⁴Treaty of Amsterdam, Article J.7.1.

⁷⁵D. Keohane, ‘EU on the Offensive About Defence’, European Voice (22–28 July 2004), 22–28.

⁷⁷W. Eichler, Europe Speaks (London: Militant Social International 1944).

⁷⁸Notwithstanding the arguments of Alan Milward in A.S. Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation-State (London: Routledge 1992).

⁷⁹Treaty of Rome (1972).

⁸⁰Treaty on European Union (1992), Preamble.

⁸¹P. Vares, ‘Estonia and Russia: Interethnic Relations and Regional Security’ in O.F. Knudsen (ed.), Stability and Security in the Baltic Sea Region (London: Frank Cass 1999), 161.

⁸²European Council (1999b).

⁸³T.C. Salmon, ‘The EU's Role in Conflict Resolution: Lessons From Northern Ireland’, European Foreign Affairs Review 7/3 (2002), 358.

⁸⁴Treaty on European Union (1992), Article 171.2.

⁸⁵H. Haekkerup, ‘From Adazi To Tuzla’, Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 1997 (Copenhagen: DUPI, 1997), 135–39.

⁸⁶Archer and Jones, 176.

⁸⁷Ibid.

⁸⁸F. Schimmelfennig, The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe (Cambridge: CUP 2003), 73–92.

⁸⁹With some exceptions. For example, the Schengen acquis was not included from the start.

⁹⁰K. Featherstone and C. Radaelli (eds.), The Politics of Europeanization (Oxford: OUP 2003).

⁹¹Statement by the Embassy of France (22 Jan. 2003).

⁹²Sir W. Nicoll and T.C. Salmon, Understanding the European Union (Harlow: Longman 2001), 411–26.

⁹³J.A.S. Grenville, The Major International Treaties 1914–1973: A History and Guide to Texts (London: Methuen 1974).

⁹⁴D. Arter, ‘The EU Referendum in Finland on 16 October 1994: A Vote For the West, Not for Maastricht’, Journal of Common Market Studies 33/3 (1995), 364.

⁹⁵Ibid., 372.

⁹⁶HE L. Meri, ‘The Security of Estonia’, RUSI Journal 143/2 (April 1998), 2.

⁹⁷Britain had the same expectations when the Falklands were invaded in 1982. The main problem was not so much in agreeing the principle that something had to be done, namely economic sanctions, but in deciding how it was to be achieved. For a majority of the war the Community held firm, but towards the end the sanctions were only allowed to continue through qualified majority vote (with Ireland and Italy objecting). See L. Freedman and V. Gamba-Stonehouse, Signals of War: The Falklands Conflict of 1982 (London: Faber 1990), 346–48.

⁹⁸Memoranda of Greek Government (1996).

⁹⁹European Council, ‘General Outline for A Draft Resolution of the Treaties: Comment in Irish Presidency’ (1996); Treaty of European Union (1997), Article 11.1.

¹⁰⁰European Council, ‘European Security Strategy: European Council’, EU Bulletin 12 (2003b).

¹⁰¹J. Solana, Report on the Strategy of the EU (Thessaloniki: European Council June 2003).

¹⁰²‘Proxima’ took over as a police mission from the EU's peacekeeping mission ‘Concordia’ in Macedonia, ‘Artemis’ was in Democratic Republic of Congo, and ‘Althea’ took over from NATO's Stabilisation Force mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

¹⁰³‘Humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks for combat forces in crisis management, including peacekeeping’ (Treaty of European Union, 1997, Article 17.2) But it could be argued that the Petersberg tasks are part of CFSP, CFSP is global, and therefore, Petersberg tasks could be global.

¹⁰⁴Treaty on European Union and Treaty of Amsterdam, Articles J.4 and J.7 (Nicoll and Salmon, Understanding the European Union, 367).

¹⁰⁵Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (2005), Article III-329.

¹⁰⁶Declaration of the Franco-German Defence and Security Council, Chaillot Paper No. 67 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies Dec. 2003).

¹⁰⁷Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (2005), Article 1-41.7.

¹⁰⁸Speech by British Prime Minister T. Blair, ‘A New Challenge for Europe’ (Aachen 1999).

¹⁰⁹European Council, General Affairs and External Relations Council, EU Bulletin 11 (2004b).

¹¹⁰Article 1(i) of the Constitutional Law of Austria stipulates: ‘Austria will never in the future accede to any military alliances’ and Constitution of Malta I(3) states: ‘refusing to participate in any military alliance’.

¹¹¹ EU Bulletin, 2-2004.

¹¹²T.C. Salmon and A.J.K. Shepherd, Towards A European Army: A Military Power in the Making (Boulder,CO: Lynne Rienner 2003), 113–48.

¹¹³‘L'Europe est un géant économique, un nain politique et, pire encore, un ver de terre lorsqu'il s'agit d'élablorer une capacité de défenses.’ (Statement by Mark Eyskens, 1991).

¹¹⁴Salmon and Shepherd, Towards A European Army, 87–148.

¹¹⁵Treaty of Amsterdam, Article F.1.

¹¹⁶A.J.K. Shepherd, ‘The European Union's Security and Defence Policy: A Policy Without Substance?’European Security 12/1 (2003), 42–45.