Motivation or capabilities? Israeli counterterrorism against Palestinian suicide bombings and violence

Abstract

Scholars have expressed doubts about the ability of counterterrorism to cope with suicide bombings, resulting in tit-for-tat or loop-like and repetitive violence and counter-violence without meaningful, let alone decisive results for the stronger side. Such skepticism may explain why so much of the recent literature on terrorism and insurgency is focused on the factors motivating the challenger rather than upon the insurgent's capabilities. This article demonstrates the extent to which Israeli offensive measures have reduced considerably the impact of Palestinian violence on the Israeli protagonist corroborating research that counterterrorism should adopt an offensive escalating strategy against the insurgent.

Key words:

• Israel
• suicide-bombings
• terrorism

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank Jonathan Fox, Efraim Inbar, Stuart Cohen and the anonymous reviewer for their comments and the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies (BESA), Bar-Ilan University, Israel, for funding the project.

Notes

¹Mia M. Bloom, ‘Palestinian Suicide Bombing: Public Support, Market Share, and Outbidding’, Political Science Quarterly 119/1 (Spring 2004), 80.

²Ibid., 84.

³Ibid., 87.

⁴Scott Atran, ‘Mishandling Suicide Terrorism’, Washington Quarterly 27/3 (Summer 2004), 67.

⁵Richard Boucher, State Department briefing, 2 July 2001, available at <www.state. gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2001/4656.htm> quoted in Gal Luft, ‘The Logic of Israel's Targeted Killing’, Middle East Quarterly10/1 (Winter 2003), 4.

⁶‘A Volcano of Vengeance – Fury as Israel Assassinates Second Hamas Leader’, The Australian, 19 April 2004.

⁷Atran,’Mishandling Suicide Terrorism’, 67.

⁸Rui de Figueiredo and Barry Weingast, ‘Vicious Cycles: Endogenous Political Extremista and Political Violence’ (paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, Sept. 1998).

⁹H Andrew Kydd and Barbara F. Walter, ‘Sabotaging the Peace: The Politics of Extremist Violence’, International Organizations 56 (Spring 2002), 264.

¹⁰Robert A. Pape, ‘The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism’, American Political Science Review 97/3 (Aug. 2003), 343–61.

¹¹Bloom, ‘Palestinian Suicide Bombing: Public Support, Market Share, and Outbidding’, 80.

¹²In addition to the articles on motivation already cited, see among others Scott Atran, ‘Genesis of Suicide Terrorism’, Science 299 (7 March 2003), 1534–40; Jean Paul Azam, ‘Suicide-Bombings as Intergenerational Investment’, Public Choice 122/1-2 (2005), 201–17; Eli Berman ‘Hamas, Taliban and the Jewish Underground: An Economist's View of Radical Religious Militias’, National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper No.w10004, Sept. 2003, available at <http://www.nber.org/papers/w100004 (accessed 26 Dec. 2004)>; Claude Berrebi, ‘Evidence About the Link between Education, Poverty and Terrorism among Palestinians’, available at <http://www.cprs-alestine.org/polls /94/poll. (2003)>; Basel Saleh, ‘Economic Conditions and Resistance to Occupation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip: There is a Causal Connection’ (2004), available at <http://www.mafhoum.com/press7/197E14.htm; Eyad Sarraj, ‘Suicide Bombers: Dignity, Despair, and the Need for Hope’, Journal of Palestine Studies 31/4 (Summer 2002), 71–77; Yoram Schweitzer, ‘Suicide Terrorism: Development and Characteristics', lecture presented at the International Conference on Countering Suicide Terrorism at ICT, Herzeliya, Israel, 21 Feb. 2000, available at <http://www.ict.org.il/articles /articledet.cfm ?articleid=112>; Jessica Stern, Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill (New York: HarperCollins 2003).

¹³Daniel G Arce and Todd Sandler, ‘Counterterrorism: A Game-Theoretic Analysis’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 49/2 (April 2005), 183–200.

¹⁴Ivan Arreguin-Toft, ‘How The Weak Win Wars’, International Security 26/1 (Summer 2001), 95.

¹⁵Kurt Weyland, ‘A Paradox of Success? Determinants of Political Support For [Peruvian] President Fujimori’, International Studies Quarterly 44/3 (Sept. 2000), 481–502.

¹⁶Christopher Sprecher and Karl Derouen, ‘Israeli Military Actions and Internalization-Externalization Processes’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 46/2 (April 2002), 244–59.

¹⁷Steven R. David, ‘Fatal Choices: Israel's Policy of Targeted Killing’, Mideast Security and Policy Studies No. 51 (Ramat-Gan: Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan Univ.), 7–8.

¹⁸Bruce Hoffman, ‘Responding to Terrorism [by the US] Across the Technological Spectrum’, Terrorism and Political Violence 6/3 (Autumn 1994), 366–90.

¹⁹Sergio Catignani, ‘The Strategic Impasse in Low-Intensity Conflicts: The Gap Between Israeli Counterterrorism Strategy and Tactics During the Al-Aqsa Intifada’, Journal of Strategic Studies 28/1 (Feb. 2005), 72.

²⁰ Palestinian Terrorism in 2005, available at <www.intelligence.org.il/eng/eng_n/pdf/palestinian_terror_e.pdf>, 20.

²¹Even in the 1948 war, GDP declined (by 3.1 percent) but almost doubled the following year in the following year as a result of mass immigration. See Haim Barkai, ‘Hapeilut ha-Kalkalit Ha-Realit shel Milhemet Ha-Hatzmaut’, in Alon Kadish, (ed.), Milchemet Ha-Hatzmaut Tashah-Tashat: Diyun Mehudash (Tel-Aviv: Misrad Habitachon 2005), 767.

²² Suicide-bombing Terrorism during the Current Israel–Palestinian Confrontation (September 2000–December 2005, Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies (CSS), Israel, 1 Jan. 2006), 21, 23.

²³Amir Oren, ‘The Dangers That Did Not Concern the Voter’, Haaretz, 31 March 2006.

²⁴ Palestinian Terrorism in 2005, 20–22.

²⁵Asaf Zussman and Noam Zussman ‘Targeted Killings:

Evaluating the Effectiveness of a Counterterrorism Policy’, Bank of Israel Discussion Paper No. 2005.02 (Jan. 2005), 4–5.

²⁶See <www.phrmg.org/aqsa/list_of_assassination_english.htm>.

²⁷ Palestinian Terrorism in 2005, 8.

²⁸‘World Bank Report: Palestinian Economy Remains Stagnant After Four Years of Intifada’ (2004), available at <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWESTBANKGAZA/Resources/wbgaza-4yrassessment.pdf>, 11.

²⁹‘World Bank Report: Palestinian Economy Remains Stagnant After Four Years of Intifada’, 12.

³⁰Figures derived from maps accessed from <http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/opt/>.

³¹Kydd and Walter, ‘Sabotaging the Peace: The Politics of Extremist Violence’, 265.

³²‘2004 Terrorism Data’, available at <http://www.imra.org.il/story.php3?id = 23521>.

³³JMCC polls June 2002–June 2004 available at <www.jmcc.org/publicpoll/results.html>.

³⁴ Palestinian Terrorism in 2005, 18.

³⁵In fact, the analysis I presented on the impact of the Palestinian violent Intifada is basically summarized in a special report the Hamas publicized at the end of Sept. 2003 commemorating the third anniversary of the outbreak of violence. See ‘Qira'a Daqiqa li-A'thar al-Intifada ‘ala al-Ihtilal al-Sahiyuni’, available at <www.palestine-info.net/arabic/spfiles/4th_year/intefada1.htm. September 26>. The report estimates correctly that GDP per capita declined by six percent in the first two years of the Intifada.

³⁶See www.palestine-info.co.uk/am/publish/article_757.shtml , dated 19 April 2003.

³⁷See <www.palestine-info.co.uk/cgi-bin/am/exec/search.cgi?keyword=israeli%20economy&cat=&template=search%2Fsearch_results.html&perpage=10&start=11>dated 23 Feb. 2003.

³⁸For an excellent analysis of the March offensive and indeed on the tactical novelties of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), see Catignani, ‘The Strategic Impasse in Low-Intensity Conflicts', 63–67.

³⁹Data from <www.btselem.org/english/Statistics/Detainees_and_Prisoners.asp.asp.>

⁴⁰ Palestinian Terrorism in 2005, 18.

⁴¹<www.palestinemonitor.org/new_web/4_years_intifada_anniversary.htm>. See also Edward Kaplan, Alex Mintz, Shaul Mishal and Claude Sambani, ‘What Happened to Suicide Bombings in Israel? Insights from a Terror Stock Model’, Studies in Conflict and Terror Studies 28/3 (May-June 2005) 234.

⁴²Daniel Byman, ‘Do Targeted Killings Work?’Foreign Affairs 85/2 (March–April 2006), 101–2.

⁴³Orit Galili, ‘The Ministry of Police Has Drawn Plans to Separate Israel from the Territories’, Haaretz Supplement, 26 Jan. 1995.

⁴⁴For more general analysis on these aspects see Michael Kobi and Amnon Ramon, Around Jerusalem: General Background and Ramifications on the Functioning of the Metropolitan Zone Surrounding It (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Institute for the Study of Israel 2004) in Hebrew.

⁴⁵Diana Bechor, ‘The Cabinet Approved the Route of the Separation Fence, Ynet, 14 Aug. 2002.

⁴⁶<www.securityfence.mod.gov.il/Pages/ENG/purpose.htm> (accessed 13 Dec. 2005).

⁴⁷‘Data on the Separation Barrier – April 2004’, available at <www.btselem.org>.

⁴⁸Isaac Ben- Israel, Oren Setter, and Asher Tishler, ‘R& D and the War on Terrorism:

Generalizing the Israeli Experience’, in Andrew James, (ed.), Science and Technology: Policies for the Anti- Terrorism Era (Oxford: IOS Press forthcoming).

⁴⁹Dafna Shayek, ‘Meavtehim beMosdot Zibbur uveAsakim Pratiim’[Guards in Public Institutions and Private Enterprises], Hakneset-Merkaz HaMekar vehaMeida First Draft, April 2003, 5, www.knesset.gov.il/mmm/data/docs/m01005.doc.

⁵⁰‘Five Years of Violent Confrontation between Israel and the Palestinians: Data and Characteristics’, <www.intelligence.org.il/eng/eng_n/pro_13_10_e.htm>.

⁵¹Walter Enders and Todd Sandler, ‘The Effectiveness Of Antiterrorism Policies: A Vector-Autoregression-Intervention Analysis’, American Political Science Review87/ 4 (Dec. 1993), 829–44. Isabelle Duyvesteyn, ‘The Paradoxes of Terrorism: an Attempt at Theory’ (paper presented at WISC Conference, Istanbul, Aug. 2005), 12.

⁵²‘2004 Terrorism Data’, 7.

⁵³For a recent article by a Palestinian analyst describing the use of Qassams as detrimental to Palestinian interests, see Umar Hilmi al-Ghawl: ‘Su'al al-Yawm: Ayu Muqawama Nuridu?’Al-Hayat al-Jadida, 13 April 2006.

⁵⁴Catignani, ‘The Strategic Impasse in Low-Intensity Conflicts’, 72.

⁵⁵Many of these issues, principally attacks by Fatah and security service personnel against Hamas cabinet and legislative council members are to be investigated by a special parliamentary committee. See ‘Al-Tashri<i Yuqarir Tashkil Lajna Barlimania li-Taqasi al-Haqa'ig fi al-Ahdath al-Musifa bil-Diffa wal-Qutta’, Al-Quds, 14 June 2006; ‘Al-Tashri<i Yabda al-Tahqiq fi Ahdath al-Shaghab fi Ramallah’, available at <www.palestine-nfo.net/arabic/palestoday/dailynews/2006/june06/13_6/details6.htm#7>. On tensions between the Presidency and the Hamas government, see ‘LiMatha Narfudhu al-Istifta’ Ala Wathiqat al-Usra fi Sijn Hadarim’, available at <www.palestine-info.net/arabic/hamas/statements/2006/14_6_06_1.htm>.

⁵⁶‘News of the Israeli-Palestinian Confrontation’, 1–14 June 2006, available at <www.intelligence.org.il/eng/eng_n/pdf/t14june_e06.pdf> 14.

⁵⁷As the present Hizaballah-Israeli conflagration amply proves.

⁵⁸Efraim Inbar and Shmuel Sandler, ‘The Risks of Palestinian Statehood’, Survival 39/2 (Summer 1997), 23–41.