The future of military innovation studies

Abstract

This article assesses the state of the art in military innovation research. It begins with a description of the field's four major schools of thought, summarizing their central tenets, key points of similarity and differentiation, and major empirical cases. It then addresses priorities for future research, observing that while much has been learned about innovation originating among senior officers and civilian policy-makers, far less is known about innovation originating in field formations. Recent empirical studies hint at the importance of such bottom-up innovation but little progress has been made in achieving a conceptual understanding of the phenomenon. Therein lies the next major challenge, and opportunity, for the field.

Key words:

• military innovation
• military effectiveness
• strategic studies

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank Jasen Castillo, Andy Hoehn, David E. Johnson, Jeffrey G. Lewis, Tom Mahnken, Joe Maiolo, Tom McNaugher, John Stone, and Lauri Zeman for their comments on earlier drafts.

Notes

¹Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War (London: Penguin 1972), 324–25. For a discussion of still earlier innovation see Heidi Knecht, ‘Technological Innovation and Design During the Early Upper Paleolithic: A Study of Organic Projectile Technologies’ (PhD diss. New York Univ. 1991).

²On the boundaries of modern strategic studies see James J. Wirtz et al., (eds.), Strategy in the Contemporary World: An Introduction to Strategic Studies (Oxford: OUP 2002) and Thomas G. Mahnken, ‘The Future of Strategic Studies’, Journal of Strategic Studies 26/1 (March 2003), x–xviii.

³As examples see respectively J.F.C. Fuller, Armament and History: A Study of the Influence of Armament on History from the Dawn of Classical Warfare to the Second World War (New York: Scribner's 1945); S.L.A. Marshall, Night Drop: Normandy (New York: Jove 1984), and D. Douglas Dalgleish and Larry Schweikart, Trident (Carbondale: Southern Illinois UP 1984).

⁴Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1984).

⁵For an example of influence on historical research, see David E. Johnson, Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers: Innovation in the U.S. Army, 1917–1945 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1998); for an example of influence on the policy community see Jeffrey A. Isaacson et al., Predicting Military Innovation (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 1999).

⁶For example, Matthew Evangelista's substantive focus is force structure and strategy, and he accordingly defines military innovation as, ‘a major restructuring of military organizations, significant changes in strategy, or both’. Kimberly Zisk primarily addresses intellectual developments and therefore considers military innovation to be, ‘a major change in how military planners conceptualize and prepare for future war’. See Matthew A. Evangelista, Innovation and the Arms Race: How the United States and the Soviet Union Develop New Military Technologies (Princeton UP 1988); Kimberly M. Zisk, Engaging the Enemy: Organization Theory and Soviet Military Innovation 1955–1991 (Princeton UP 1993).

⁷The term ‘field formation’ refers to units that directly conduct military operations, normally corresponding to the tactical and operational echelons of modern Western-pattern military organizations. Field formations are distinct from staff and institutional support organizations that do not have operational responsibilities.

⁸Some authors prefer definitions containing the adjective ‘major’ linked to the scale of bureaucratic adjustments made (see note 6 above). However a survey of the research actually conducted, those cases included and not included in practice, reveals a clear emphasis on measurable improvement to operational praxis rather than bureaucratic changes per se.

⁹Such consequentialism is admittedly problematic from a methodological perspective; nevertheless the field appears to have accepted it in practice.

¹⁰Understood as tactical and operational combat efficiency, broadly paralleling Murray and Millet's definition of military effectiveness and Martin van Creveld's ‘fighting power’ despite the fact that many modern military organizations have deterrence, rather than combat, as their primary mission. See Allan R. Millet and Williamson R. Murray, Military Effectiveness: The First World War (New York: Routledge 1991); and Martin van Creveld, Fighting Power: German and U.S. Army Performance, 1939–1945 (Westport, CT: Greenwood 1982).

¹¹Notably the field's definition does not square with the standard dictionary definition of innovation, which stipulates that any change, positive or otherwise, qualifies as innovation. See ‘innovation’, The Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd edn 1989 (Oxford: OUP 2006) OED Online 25 May 2006 dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50117397.

¹²Correlli Barnett, The Swordbearers: Studies in Supreme Command in the First World War (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode 1963), 11.

¹³It could be argued that there are two additional schools based, respectively, on neo-realism and technological determinism. The neo-realist school would posit that fear of foreign military capabilities is necessary and sufficient to cause innovation. The technological determinism school would posit that a technological imperative necessary and sufficient to drive innovation. Over the past 20 years these two arguments have been undercut and ultimately rejected by the field. The consensus view is that they may, at best, highlight permissive underlying conditions for innovation rather than causal models for any specific innovation. As such, they are not analyzed here in any detail.

¹⁴In fact, each school encompasses a set of closely related models. For the sake of clarity and brevity these have been distilled into an ideal type for each school.

¹⁵The literature on military innovation is vast, and space limits prevent discussion of all relevant works, or even nuanced discussion of the primary works. This article focuses on the key attributes of the key works in the field, but unwarranted omissions undoubtedly remain. Further, this article does not consider the literatures on the Revolution in Military Affairs or the Military Revolution. For an excellent summary of these literatures, see Williamson R. Murray and MacGregor Knox, ‘Thinking about Revolutions in Warfare’, in idem, (eds.), The Dynamics of Military Revolution: 1300–2050 (Cambridge: CUP 2001), 1–14.

¹⁶Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, passim.

¹⁷Posen, Sources of Military Doctrine. On Fighter Command see 171–75, on methodical battle see 135–40, on blitzkrieg see 189–92.

¹⁸Posen, Sources of Military Doctrine, 232–35. Specifically, Posen argues that realist threat perceptions cause political leaders to push for innovation. They are necessary but not sufficient to cause innovation (see also supra note 13).

¹⁹Posen, Sources of Military Doctrine, 224–26. See also Barry R. Posen, ‘The Systematic, Organizational, and Technological Origins of Strategic Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars’ (PhD diss. Univ. of California at Berkeley 1981).

²⁰Posen, Sources of Military Doctrine, 222–36. By ‘mavericks’ Posen means officers with unconventional ideas who are willing to cooperate with civilians to reshape the military.

²¹In addition to the studies discussed below, see Christopher J. Savos, ‘The Irresistible Force vs. the Immovable Object: Civilian Attempts to Force Innovation on a Reluctant Military’ (Cambridge, MA: PhD diss. MIT 1993) and David A. Armstrong, Bullets and Bureaucrats: The Machinegun and the United States Army: 1861–1916 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press 1982).

²²Edmund Beard, Developing the ICBM: A Study in Bureaucratic Politics (New York: Columbia UP 1976). Beard's work predates The Sources of Military Doctrine. At the time it would have been considered part of the subfield of political science focusing on bureaucratic politics, but retrospectively we may also place it into the military innovation subfield.

²³Beard, Developing the ICBM, 145–94. The appointee was Trevor Gardner.

²⁴Zisk argues that the basic thrust of Soviet planning was established as a reaction to changes in NATO doctrine and capabilities, as already discussed. However, the substance of the Soviet response was given its form by a complex interplay between the Soviet officer corps, political authorities, and (late in the Cold War) a growing group of Soviet civilian defense planners. Zisk, Engaging the Enemy, 178–79.

²⁵Zisk, Engaging the Enemy, 55–75 on Flexible Response, 97–115 on Schlesinger Doctrine see 135–56 on Follow-on-Force Attack.

²⁶Zisk, Engaging the Enemy, 183.

²⁷Deborah D. Avant, Political Institutions and Military Change: Lessons from Peripheral Wars (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1994); Deborah D. Avant, ‘The Institutional Sources of Military Doctrine – Hegemons in Peripheral Wars’, International Studies Quarterly 37/4 (Dec. 1993), 409–30.

²⁸Avant, ‘The Institutional Sources of Military Doctrine’, 417–22.

²⁹Ibid., 422–26.

³⁰Ibid., 427.

³¹Harvey M. Sapolsky, Polaris System Development: Bureaucratic and Programmatic Success in Government (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP 1972). Sapolsky's work preceded Posen's Sources of Military Doctrine by more than a decade, and at the time was considered part of the bureaucratic politics field. Retrospectively we may include it in the military innovation field, a judgment Sapolsky's subsequent work would support. See for example Harvey M. Sapolsky, ‘On the Theory of Military Innovation’, Breakthroughs 9/1 (Spring 2000), 35–39.

³²Sapolsky, Polaris System Development, 37–41.

³³Michael H. Armacost, The Politics of Weapons Innovation: The Thor-Jupiter Controversy (New York: Columbia UP 1969). See also Michael H. Armacost, ‘The Thor-Jupiter Controversy’, in Donald A. MacKenzie and Judy Wajcman, (eds.), The Social Shaping of Technology, 2nd edn (Milton Keynes,UK: Open UP 1999), 395–405.

³⁴Owen R. Cote, ‘The Politics of Innovative Military Doctrine: The U.S. Navy and Fleet Ballistic Missiles’ (Cambridge, MA: PhD diss. MIT 1998).

³⁵Andrew J. Bacevich, The Pentomic Era: the US Army between Korea and Vietnam (Washington DC: National Defense UP 1986).

³⁶Bacevich, Pentomic Era, 103–28.

³⁷ Sixty Years of Reorganizing for Combat: A Historical Trend Analysis (Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute 2000), Ch. 4.

³⁸James W. Bradin, From Hot Air to Hellfire: The History of Army Attack Aviation (Novato, CA: Presidio Press 1994).

³⁹Frederic A. Bergerson, The Army Gets an Air Force (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins UP 1980).

⁴⁰Douglas N. Campbell, The Warthog and the Close Air Support Debate (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press 2004).

⁴¹Stephen P. Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1991).

⁴²Stephen P. Rosen, ‘New Ways of War: Understanding Military Innovation’, International Security 13/1 (Summer 1988), 134–68.

⁴³Rosen, Winning the Next War, 20.

⁴⁴Ibid., 20–21.

⁴⁵Ibid., 20.

⁴⁶Ibid., 22–23.

⁴⁷Rosen's theories have been revised and extended, to a degree, by Suzanne C. Nielson, ‘Preparing for War: The Dynamics of Peacetime Military Reform’ (Cambridge, MA: PhD diss. Harvard Univ. 2003).

⁴⁸Jon F. Giese, ‘Military Innovation: Sources of Change for United States Special Operations Forces’ (Monterey, CA: MA thesis US Naval Postgraduate School 1999); Susan L. Marquis, Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding US Special Operations Forces (Washington DC: Brookings 1997).

⁴⁹Marquis, Unconventional Warfare, 107–9; Giese, Military Innovation, 90–91.

⁵⁰Vincent Davis, The Politics of Innovation: Patterns in Navy Cases (Denver, CO: Univ. of Denver Press 1967).

⁵¹Davis, Politics of Innovation, 33–36.

⁵²Ibid., 11–12.

⁵³Gregory A. Engel, ‘Cruise Missiles and the Tomahawk’, in B. Hayes and D. Smith, (eds.), The Politics of Naval Innovation (Newport, RI: US Naval War College 1994), 18–22.

⁵⁴Engel, ‘Cruise Missiles and the Tomahawk’, 22.

⁵⁵Rod A. Coffey, ‘Doctrinal Orphan or Active Partner? A History of US Army Mechanized Infantry Doctrine’ (Ft Leavenworth, KS: MA thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College 2000).

⁵⁶Coffey, Doctrinal Orphan or Active Partner? 7–12.

⁵⁷W. Blair Haworth, The Bradley and How It Got That Way: Technology, Institutions, and the Problem of Mechanized Infantry in the United States Army (Westport, CT: Greenwood 1999).

⁵⁸For example, see Peter J. Katzenstein, (ed.), The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia UP 1996).

⁵⁹Theo G. Farrell and T. Terriff, The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 2002), 7–8. See also Theo G. Farrell, ‘Figuring Out Fighting Organizations: The New Organizational Analysis in Strategic Studies’, Journal of Strategic Studies 19/1 (Spring 1996), 122–35; Theo G. Farrell, ‘Culture and Military Power’, Review of International Studies 24/3 (Fall 1998), 407–16.

⁶⁰Emily O. Goldman, ‘The Spread of Western Military Models to Ottoman Turkey and Meiji Japan’, in Farrell and Terriff , Sources of Military Change; Terry Terriff, ‘US Ideas and Military Change in NATO, 1989–1994’, in ibid.

⁶¹Theo G. Farrell and Terry Terriff, ‘The Sources of Military Change’, in idem, Sources of Military Change, 8–10. See also specifically Theo G. Farrell, ‘World Culture and the Irish Army, 1922–1942’, in Farrell and Terriff, Sources of Military Change, 69–90.

⁶²Farrell's most recent study echoes these themes while extending the cultural/constructivist approach well beyond the topic of innovation. See Theo G. Farrell, The Norms of War: Cultural Beliefs and Modern Conflict (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 2005), 176–77.

⁶³In addition to those described here, Thomas McNaugher's The M16 Controversies: Military Organizations and Weapons Acquisition (New York: Praeger 1984) deserves mention. McNaugher contends that the US Army's ‘marksmanship tradition’ heavily influenced its approach to small arms acquisition from its earliest days through the 1960s. However, McNaugher rejects any association with a cultural school of innovation.

⁶⁴Carl H. Builder, The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins UP 1989). Builder did not use the term ‘stability operations’ but it is the mission set to which he referred.

⁶⁵Richard Lock-Pullan, US Intervention Policy and Army Innovation: From Vietnam to Iraq (London: Routledge 2005).

⁶⁶Ibid., 192–94.

⁶⁷Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine Between the Wars ( Princeton UP 1997); Elizabeth Kier, ‘Culture and Military Doctrine – France Between the Wars ’, International Security 19/4 (Spring 1995), 65–93.

⁶⁸Kier, Imagining War, 72–77.

⁶⁹Eric R. Giordano, ‘The US Army and Non-Traditional Missions: Explaining Divergence in Doctrine and Practice in the Post-Cold War Era’ (Medford, MA: PhD diss. Tufts Univ. 2003).

⁷⁰Robert E. Mullins, ‘Sharpening the Trident: The Decisions of 1889 and the Creation of Modern Seapower’ (PhD diss. King's College London 2000).

⁷¹Thomas G. Mahnken, Uncovering Ways of War: U.S. Intelligence and Foreign Military Innovation, 1918–1941 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 2002) 44–47.

⁷²Thomas G. Mahnken, ‘Uncovering Foreign Military Innovation’, Journal of Strategic Studies 22/4 (Winter 1999) 26–54. A similar point is made in George F. Hofmann, ‘The Tactical and Strategic Use of Attaché Intelligence: The Spanish Civil War and the U.S. Army's Misguided Quest for a Modern Tank Doctrine’, Journal of Military History, 62/2 (Jan. 1998), 101–33.

⁷³Mahnken, Uncovering Ways of War, 101–9. Mahnken and Emily O. Goldman also contribute to a growing sub-literature on the international diffusion of military innovation. Diffusion is a sufficiently different topic from innovation qua innovation that the diffusion literature is not reviewed here in detail. However, see Emily O. Goldman and Leslie C. Eliason, Diffusion of Military Technology and Ideas (Stanford UP 2003); Emily O. Goldman and Richard B. Andres, ‘Systemic Effects of Military Innovation and Diffusion’, Security Studies 8/4 (Summer 1999), 79–125.

⁷⁴Rosen, Winning the Next War, 2. Emphasis original.

⁷⁵Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, 226.

⁷⁶For an example that is more extreme than most, see Fred W. Gaudlip, ‘Vision to Victory – Space, Mahan, and Mitchell: The Role of the Visionary in Cross-Organizational Innovation’ (Montgomery, AL: MA thesis US Air Command and Staff College 2001).

⁷⁷See Avant, ‘The Institutional Sources of Military Doctrine’, 427.

⁷⁸See Rosen, Winning the Next War, 8–21.

⁷⁹See Chapter 2 in Kier, Imagining War.

⁸⁰Farrell and Terriff, ‘The Sources of Military Change’, 8.

⁸¹Farrell and Terriff term this ‘planned change’.

⁸²One of the earliest to recognize this was Eliot A. Cohen, see ‘Change and Transformation in Military Affairs’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 27/3 (Sept. 2004), 400–1.

⁸³This terminology is fully explained in Thomas L. Jentz, Dreaded Threat: The 8.8 cm Flak 18/36/37 in the Anti-Tank Role (Boyds, MD: Panzer Tracts 2001).

⁸⁴Jentz, Dreaded Threat, 8–12.

⁸⁵Ian V. Hogg describes of the emotional effect of the BT-5 attack. See Ian V. Hogg, Tank Killing: Anti-Tank Warfare by Men and Machines (New York: Sarpedon Press 1996) 79–80.

⁸⁶This engagement is described in Raymond L. Proctor, Hitler's Luftwaffe in the Spanish Civil War (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press 1983), 190–94. The tanks are identified as BT-4s in Hogg, Tank Killing, 9–10. However, according to Steven J. Zaloga, Soviet tank shipments to Spain were limited to T-26s and BT-5s. Hogg's nomenclature is likely a typographical error, and the tanks were probably BT-5s. See Steven J. Zaloga, ‘Soviet Tank Operations in the Spanish Civil War’, Journal of Slavic Military Studies 12/3 (Sept.1999) 134–62. An anonymous reviewer suggests that the Germans may also have used 88 mm anti-aircraft guns against tanks during World War I. This is certainly conceivable, given the way the Germans threw everything they had at the new threat presented by allied armor, but this author has seen no such accounts. The point here is that the Flak 18/36 was designed (beginning in 1928) as a specialist anti-aircraft weapon and later applied to the anti-tank role.

⁸⁷The quote is from the diary of a Condor Legion officer reproduced in Proctor, Hitler's Luftwaffe in the Spanish Civil War, 134. The German Army's 1937 review of anti-tank capabilities, which specifically dismissed the 88 mm Flak in this regard, is described in Jentz, Dreaded Threat, 8–9.

⁸⁸Ibid., 23–25.

⁸⁹Ibid., 25–30.

⁹⁰Hogg, Tank Killing, 85–86.

⁹¹Jentz, Dreaded Threat, 31–38.

⁹²Keith B. Bickel, ‘Mars Learning: The Marine Corps Development of Small Wars Doctrine, 1915–1940’ (Washington DC: PhD diss. Johns Hopkins Univ. 1999), 285–310. See also Keith B. Bickel, Mars Learning: The Marine Corps' Development of Small Wars Doctrine, 1915–1940 (Boulder, CO: Westview 2000).

⁹³Bickel, ‘Mars Learning’ (1999), iii.

⁹⁴Thomas A. Hughes, ‘The Other Air War: Elwood “Pete” Quesada and American Tactical Airpower in World War II Europe’ (Houston, TX: PhD diss. Univ. of Houston 1994). See also Thomas A. Hughes, Overlord: General Pete Quesada and the Triumph of Tactical Air Power in World War II (New York: Free Press 1995).

⁹⁵Hughes, The Other Air War, 257–62.

⁹⁶Ibid., 244–46.

⁹⁷Ibid., 28–29.

⁹⁸Robert G. Angevine, ‘Innovation and Experimentation in the US Navy: The UPTIDE Antisubmarine Warfare Experiments, 1969–1972’, Journal of Strategic Studies 28/1 (Feb. 2005). Another case of bottom-up development of ASW tactics is described in Marc Milner, ‘Convoy Escorts: Tactics, Technology, and Innovation in the Royal Canadian Navy, 1939–1943’, Military Affairs 48/1 (Jan. 1984), 19–25.

⁹⁹Angevine, ‘Innovation and Experimentation in the US Navy’, 90.

¹⁰⁰Ibid., 94.

¹⁰²Lupfer, The Dynamics of Doctrine, 28.

¹⁰¹Bruce I. Gundmundsson, Stormtroop Tactics: Innovation in the German Army, 1914–1918 (Westport, CT: Praeger 1995); Timothy T. Lupfer, The Dynamics of Doctrine: The Change in German Tactical Doctrine During the First World War (Leavenworth, KS: US Army Combat Studies Institute 1981).

¹⁰³Ibid., 49–54. Col. George Bruchmüller's artillery tactics also played an important role.

¹⁰⁴Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Univ. of Chicago Press 1962, repr. 1996).

¹⁰⁵Some may wonder why the Organizational Learning literature is not discussed here. Nagl and Downie argue that this literature presents a model of bottom-up military innovation. However, close examination reveals that the bottom-up characteristics of Organizational Learning are, as interpreted by Nagl and Downie, limited to information gathering. According to their accounts, the decision-making process remains centralized and deliberative. It originates among senior officers and is forced down on field units. See Richard D. Downie, Learning from Conflict: The U.S. Military in Vietnam, El Salvador, and the Drug War (Westport, CT: Praeger 1998); John A. Nagl, Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife (Westport, CT: Praeger 2002).

¹⁰⁶For an accessible overview see Donald A. MacKenzie and Judy Wajcman, (eds.), The Social Shaping of Technology (Milton Keynes, UK: Open UP 1999). The seminal source is Trevor J. Pinch and Weibe E. Bijker, ‘The Social Construction of Facts and Artifacts – or How the Sociology of Science and the Sociology of Technology Might Benefit Each Other’, Social Studies of Science 14/3 (Aug. 1984), 399–441.

¹⁰⁷See for example Weibe E. Bijker, Of Bicycles, Bakelites, and Bulbs (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1995).

¹⁰⁸The SST approach has been applied to a few military cases. See Donald A. MacKenzie, Inventing Accuracy: an Historical Sociology of Nuclear Missile Guidance (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1993); Timothy D. Moy, War Machines: Transforming Technologies in the U.S. Military: 1920–1940 (College Station: Texas A&M UP 2001).

¹⁰⁹See James Fleck, ‘Learning by Trying: the Implementation of Configurational Technology,’ in MacKenzie and Wajcman, Social Shaping of Technology, 244–57.

¹¹⁰See Nelly E. Oudshoorn and Trevor J. Pinch, How Users Matter: The Co-Construction of Users and Technology (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 2003).

¹¹²Gordon R. Sullivan, ‘Building the Force for the 21^st Century – Force XXI’, Chief of Staff Message, reprinted in Bolzak, (ed.), Collected Works, 318–19.

¹¹¹Gordon R. Sullivan, ‘Force XXI,’ Letter to the Army's General Officers, reprinted in Jerry R. Bolzak, (ed.), The Collected Works of the Thirty-second Chief of Staff United States Army (n.d.), 316–17.

¹¹³These systems were called, respectively, the Maneuver Control System (MCS), Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS), Combat Service Support Control System (CSSCS), Forward Area Air Defense Command Control and Intelligence (FAADC2I), and the All-Source Analysis System (ASAS).

¹¹⁴These included ‘Desert Hammer’ (April 1994), ‘Prairie Warrior’ (spring 1994, 1995, and 1996), ‘Focus Dispatch’ (Aug. 1995), ‘Task Force XXI’ (March 1997), ‘Division XXI’ (Nov. 1997), and a variety of smaller experiments.

¹¹⁵Gregory Fontenot et al., On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press 2005) 60–63.

¹¹⁶Fontenot et al., On Point, 394–95.

¹¹⁷Ibid., 1. According to OED, such work would be ‘trifling, negligible; of no intrinsic value or importance; worthless’. See ‘nugatory, a.1’The Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd edn 1989 (Oxford: OUP 2006) OED Online 25 May 2006 dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/00328264.

¹¹⁸Fontenot et al., On Point, 1.

¹¹⁹See ‘Statement by Lieutenant General William S. Wallace Command General, Combined Arms Center, US Army Training and Doctrine Command Before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities, Armed Services Committee, United States House of Representatives, October 21, 2003’, accessed 25 May 2006 at: <www.iwar.org.uk/rma/resources/c4i-interoperability/03-10-21-wallace.htm>.

¹²⁰Fontenot et al., On Point, 394–95.

¹²¹See Army Digitization Master Plan 1995, HQ Dept. of the Army, Ch. 2, Sect.2.4.2, accessed 19 April 2006 at <www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1995/admp95-adoch2.htm>.

¹²²See Cay Wilson, Network Centric Warfare: Background and Oversight Issues for Congress (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service 18 March 2005) 11, 26–27.

¹²³John W. Charlton, ‘Digital Battle Command: Baptism by Fire’, Armor Magazine (Dec. 2003), 26–29.

¹²⁴John J. Garstka, ‘An Introduction to Network Centric Operations’, briefing presented 13 July 2004 an accessed 24 May 2006 at <www.oft.osd.mil/initiatives/ncw/docs/NCO_to_NCO_Short_Course___Jul_04.pdf>. See also Jeffrey A. Charlston, ‘The Evolution of the Stryker Brigade – from Doctrine to Battlefield Operations in Iraq,’ in John J. McGrath, (ed.), An Army At War: Change in the Midst of Conflict (Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute 2005), 43–54.

¹²⁵John C. Tillson et al., Learning to Adapt to Asymmetric Threats (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses 2005) 129.