The strategic limitations of a Middle East client state by the mid-1950s: Britain, Libya and the Suez Crisis

Abstract

This article looks at how Libya – a British client state under the Anglo-Libyan treaty – refused to allow Britain the use of forces and bases in that country for operations against Egypt during the summer and autumn of 1956. The subsequent restrictions over the use of Libya was shown over the movement of the 10th Armoured Division for ‘training exercises’ on the Cyrenaican–Egyptian border during early August and later manifested in a written request that the bases would not be used in connection with the operations in Egypt. What emerges is that the decision of the British government to acquiesce to this Libyan demand on 1 November 1956 was taken against the prospect of a ‘second front’ being opened up in Libya in which urban fighting there would take place there alongside the main operation against Egypt.

Key Words:

• Libya
• Suez crisis
• military bases
• Nasser
• Anglo-Libyan treaty

Acknowledgements

An earlier-version of this article was given to the Suez Conference, July 2006, at the University of Hull. I am grateful to Mr Nigel James, Bodleian Library Oxford, for his assistance in the creation of the two maps in this article. I must also thank the University of Oxford's Beit Fund for financial assistance and also the anonymous referee for his/her comments on the original draft.

Notes

¹PREM 11/1430, Lloyd to Macmillan, 18 April 1956.

²S. Morewood, The British Defence of Egypt 1935–1940: Conflict and Crisis in the Eastern Mediterranean (London/New York: Frank Cass 2005), 113, 121.

³ADM 1/116219, DC (44) 19 (Revised), Future Policy in Cyrenaica, Note by CCAO for the Defence Committee, 13 Nov. 1944.

⁴AIR 20/2463, COS (48) 21st Meeting, Middle East, 11 Feb. 1948.

⁵WO 216/381, ‘A Chain of Gibraltars’, Note on British Policy in the Middle East, Letter by Gen. Glubb, 23 May 1951.

⁶R. Harkavy, Bases Abroad: The Global Foreign Military Presence (Oxford: OUP 1989), 110–11.

⁷FO 371/90332, S. Perowne, Ministry of Interior, Government of Cyrenaica, to Ravensdale, 16 April 1951.

¹⁰CAB 129/50, C (52) 73, Libya: Evacuation of Towns by H.M. Forces, Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 11 March 1952.

⁸CAB 129/46, CP (51) 222, Treaty With Libya, Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 26 July 1951.

⁹AIR 20/8203, Ministry of Defence Principal Administrative Officers' Committee, PAO/P (51) 51, Accommodation in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, Note to the Chiefs of Staff, 15 Aug. 1951.

¹¹CAB 128.24, CC (52) 30th Conclusions, Libya, 13 March 1952.

¹²WO 216/415, Strang to Sir G. Turner, 6 Sept. 1951.

¹³DEFE 4/59, COS (53) 8th Meeting, 19 Jan. 1953.

¹⁴CAB 129/39, C (53) 65, Egypt: The Alternatives, Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 16 Feb. 1953.

¹⁵CAB 129/59, C (53) 67, Treaty with Libya, Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 17 Feb. 1953.

¹⁶WO 32/17579, Garnett to A. J. Hall, War Office, 11 April 1953.

¹⁷CAB 128/26, CC (53) 40th Conclusions, Treaty with Libya, 8 July 1953.

¹⁸CAB 128/26, CC (53) 43rd Conclusions, Treaty with Libya, 16 July 1953.

¹⁹AIR 20/8203, Minute by H. O'Grady, Libya, 17 July 1953.

²⁰CAB 129/64, C (53) 364, Treaty and Agreements with Libya, Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 30 Dec. 1953.

²¹S. Kelly, Cold War in the Desert: Britain, the United States and the Italian Colonies, 1945–1952 (Basingstoke: Macmillan 2000), 145.

²²DEFE 5/69, COS (56) 232, United Kingdom Requirements in the Middle East, Note by the Secretary [COS Committee], 15 June 1956. See also M. Cohen, Strategy and Politics in the Middle East, 1954–1960: Defending the Northern Tier (London/New York : Frank Cass 2005), 120–1.

²³FO 371/102721, Hankey to Marquess of Salisbury, 17 Aug. 1953.

²⁴CAB 128/26, CC (54) 6th Conclusions, Egypt, Defence Negotiations, 28 Jan. 1954.

²⁵FO 371/119731, COS (56) 16th Meeting, Strategic Importance of Libya, 1 Feb. 1956.

²⁶CAB 131/17, DC (56) 17, UK. Requirements in the Middle East, Note by the Minister of Defence, 3 July 1956.

²⁷E. Shuckburgh, Descent to Suez, Foreign Office Diaries 1951–1956 (London: Norton 1986), 269.

²⁸D. Vandervalle, A Modern History of Libya, (Cambridge: CUP 2006), 45.

²⁹H. Trevelyan, The Middle East in Revolution, (London: Macmillan 1970), 58.

³⁰FO 540/3, Biographical Notes No. 8, Leading Personalities in Libya, Kirkbride to Lord Salisbury, 24 July 1953.

³¹M. Khadduri, Modern Libya (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press 1963), 268–9. In his memoirs, Ben-Halim records as meeting with Nasser to discuss Algeria on the very day (1 Nov. 1954) that the Algerian rebellion broke out. He was asked by the Egyptian leader for his agreement that arms could be transferred through Libya to Algeria, and he was later introduced to Ahmed Ben-Bella. See M. Ben-Halim, Libya: The Years of Hope (Croydon: Media Publishers 1998), 202–4.

³²PREM 11/1430, Visit of the Libyan Prime Minister, Brief No. 1, 16 June 1956.

³³PREM 11/1430, Graham to G.E. Millard, 23 June 1955. Educated at Oxford, Sir Walter Graham had succeeded Alec Kirkbride as ambassador to Libya in Jan. 1955. He had previously spent much of his career in China and the Far East, and had been the British Minister to the Republic of Korea (1952–54). See Who's Who, 1958, 1200.

³⁴PREM 11/1430, Memorandum for the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gift of Arms to Libya, 12 Nov. 1955.

³⁵FO 371/119730, W. Graham , British Embassy in Tripoli, to J.H.A. Watson, African Department, FO, 17 Jan. 1956.

³⁶PREM 11/1430, FO to Tripoli, 12 March 1956.

³⁷PREM 11/1430, FO to Washington, 12 March 1956.

³⁸FO 371/119709, Monthly Political Report for Libya, March 1956. Ben-Halim records how he had ‘made sure that this stand was proclaimed in the strongest language, leaving no doubt about Libya's worthy pan-Arab stance’. See Ben-Halim, Years, 239.

³⁹FO 371/119728. Handwritten minute by Ramsden, 28 July 1956.

⁴⁰FO 540/6, Egyptian Influence in Libya, And Proposals for Countering It, Halford to Lloyd, 24 April 1956.

⁴¹PREM 11/1746, Rome to Foreign Office, 14 Mar. 1956.

⁴²PREM 11/1430, Visit of Libyan Prime Minister [to London], Brief No. 2, Economic and Financial Questions [June 1956]. One later telegram from Cairo which discussed the possibility of Ben-Halim's turn to Egypt for arms saw a terse handwritten note by Eden which stated ‘Then they won't get our money’. See PREM 11/1430, Cairo to FO, 23 June 1956.

⁴³PREM 11/1430, Visit of Libyan Prime Minister, Record of meeting held in the Secretary of State's room in the Foreign Office on 18 June 1956. For a brief overview of the Libyan visit see R. Ovendale, Britain, the United States and the Transfer of Power in the Middle East, 1945–62 (London: Leicester U P 1996), 152–4.

⁴⁴FO 371/119726, Visit of the Libyan Prime Minister, Record of a meeting held in the Secretary of State's room at the Foreign Office on 19 June.

⁴⁵CAB 128/30, CM (56) 44th Conclusions, Libya, 19 June 1956.

⁴⁶CAB 128/30, CM (56) 46th Conclusions, Libya 21 June 1956. A further Cabinet meeting which discussed Libya was held on 28 June 1956. See CAB 128/30.

⁴⁷FO 371/119726, Visit of the Libyan Prime Minister, Record of meeting held in the Secretary of State's room, 22 June 1956.

⁴⁸FO 371/119727, Visit of the Libyan Prime Minister, Record of sixth meeting held in the Secretary of State's room in the Foreign Office on 26 June 1956.

⁴⁹FO 371/119726, Watson to Halford, 27 June 1956.

⁵⁰Ben-Halim, Years, 117.

⁵¹D. R. Thorpe, Eden: the Life and Times of Anthony Eden (London: Chatto & Windus 2003), 481.

⁵²WO 32/16709, Ministry of Defence to GHQ MELF, C-in-C Med., 31 July 1956. See PREM 11/1148, FO to Tripoli, 11 Aug. 1956.

⁵³CAB 134/1217, EC (56) 5, Action against Egypt – Outline Plan, Memorandum by the Chiefs of Staff, 2 Aug. 1956.

⁵⁴PREM 11/1148, Tripoli to FO, 2 Aug. 1956.

⁵⁶PREM 11/1148, Tripoli to FO, 3 Aug. 1956.

⁵⁵CAB 134/1216, EC (56) 10th Meeting, 3 Aug. 1956.

⁵⁷CAB 134/1217, EC (56) 8, Action against Egypt, Note by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 7 Aug. 1956.

⁵⁸CAB 134/1216, EC (56) 11th Meeting, Confidential Annex, Military Operations: General, 7 Aug. 1956.

⁵⁹CAB 134/1217, EC (56) 7, Libya, Note by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 7 Aug. 1956. Article 2 reads as follows: ‘Each of the High Contracting Parties undertakes not to adopt in regard to foreign countries an attitude which is inconsistent with the alliance or which might create difficulties for the other party thereto’.

⁶⁰PREM 11/1148, EC (56) 11th Meeting, Libya – Reinforcements, 7 Aug. 1956.

⁶¹PREM 11/1148, Tripoli to FO, 8 Aug. 1956.

⁶²CAB 134/1216, EC (56) 12th Meeting, 9 Aug. 1956.

⁶³WO 32/16709, Tripoli to FO, 9 Aug. 1956.

⁶⁴FO 371/119711, P.D. Stobart to Graham, 10 Aug. 1956.

⁶⁵FO 371/119728, G. Fitzmaurice to H. Beeley, 10 Aug. 1956.

⁶⁶CAB 134/1216, EC (56) 14th Meeting, 10 Aug. 1956.

⁶⁷CAB 134/1217, EC (56) 15, Military Operations: Force Commanders' Outline Plan, Memorandum by the Chiefs of Staff, 10 Aug. 1956.

⁶⁸DEFE 32/5, COS (56) 78th Meeting, Confidential Annex, Operation Musketeer – Force Commanders Outline, 9 Aug. 1956.

⁶⁹PREM 11/1148, Egypt Committee, EC (56) 14th Meeting, 19 Aug. 1956.

⁷⁰FO 371/119718, Tripoli to FO, 10 Sept. 1956.

⁷¹FO 371/119718, Graham to Watson, 10 Sept. 1956. Eventually a ceremony would be held at Sebha on 1 Dec. 1956 to mark the French withdrawal in which they removed from the fort such articles as baths and washbasins because they were French government property.

⁷²Ben-Halim, Years, 243–5.

⁷³S. Dorril, MI6:Fifty Years of Special Operations (London: Fourth Estate 2000), 635.

⁷⁴FO 371/119728, Tripoli to FO, 11 Sept. 1956. Graham wrote that ‘political considerations should override practical advantages of using Libya as an arms dump’. See FO 371/119728, Tripoli to FO, 22 Sept. 1956.

⁷⁵FO 371/119728, Graham to Watson, 18 Sept. 1956. See also FO371/119728, Graham to Watson, 25 Sept. 1956.

⁷⁶FO 371/119728, Air Cmdre D. J. P. Lee, Secretary Chiefs of Staff Committee, to Watson, 5 Oct. 1956.

⁷⁸ FRUS, 1955–1957, Volume XVI, Suez Crisis July 26 – December 31 1956, Memorandum of a Conversation, Secretary Dulles' Suite, Waldorf Astora, New York, 5 Oct. 1956, 641.

⁷⁷C. Andrew, For the President's Eyes Only (London: HarperCollins 1996), 224–5.

⁷⁹S. Lucas, Divided We Stand: Britain, the US and the Suez Crisis (London: Hodder & Stoughton 1996), 183.

⁸⁰WO 32/16709, Moore to MIDEAST MAIN INFO TROOPERS, 3 Oct. 1956.

⁸¹CAB 158/25, JIC (56) 97 (Final), Probable Actions by Nasser in Certain Circumstances, Report by the Joint Intelligence Committee, 11 Oct. 1956.

⁸²DEFE 32/5, COS (56) 100th Meeting, Confidential Annex, 12 Oct. 1956.

⁸³CAB 134/1217, EC (56) 62, Propaganda and Political Warfare in the Middle East, Memorandum by Foreign Secretary, 24 Oct. 1956.

⁸⁴ADM 205/139, Musketeer – Use of Libya, Minute by the Director of Naval Intelligence, 26 Oct. 1956.

⁸⁵Ben-Halim, Years, 256–61.

⁸⁶FO 371/119729, Tripoli to FO, 31 Oct. 1956.

⁸⁷AIR 8/2087, AHQ Malta to Air Ministry, 31 Oct. 1956.

⁸⁸FO 371/119752, Brief Account of events in Libya from 26th October to 16th Nov. 1956. This account shows how Moore later received intelligence that the Egyptian embassy had given out orders ‘to carry out the plan’ and he therefore placed all British units on alert.

⁸⁹FO 371/119729, Tripoli to FO, 1 Nov. 1956.

⁹⁰FO 371/119729, Tripoli to FO, 1 Nov. 1956.

⁹¹FO 371/119711, Benghazi to FO, 1 Nov. 1956.

⁹²AIR 8/2087, Air Ministry to AHQ Malta, 2 Nov. 1956.

⁹³FO 371/119729, Tripoli to FO, 2 Nov. 1956.

⁹⁴AIR 8/2087, Anglo-Libyan Treaty – Reply to Foreign Office Minute.

⁹⁵FO 371/119729, Allied Forces Headquarters to Ministry of Defence, 3 Nov. 1956.

⁹⁶FO 371/119729, Tripoli to FO, 3 Nov. 1956.

⁹⁷FO 371/119729, Tripoli to FO, 3 Nov. 1956.

⁹⁸CAB 134/1217, EC (56) 63, Military Implications of Mounting Operation Musketeer, Memorandum by the Chiefs of Staff, 25 Oct. 1956.

⁹⁹FO 371/119791, Tripoli to FO, 7 Nov. 1956. In a later report on the activities of the Egyptian military attaché in Libya, it was pointed out that at the Egyptian embassies in Libya and Ethiopia ‘the important figure was not so much the ambassador or minister as the military attaché who should be regarded as the representative in direct contact with the officers' clique now ruling Egypt under Nasser’. See FO 371/119791, FO to Certain of Her Majesty's Representatives, Egyptian Subversive Activities in Iraq, Libya and Ethiopia, 28 Nov. 1956.

¹⁰⁰FO 371/119729, FO to Tripoli, 26 Nov. 1956.

¹⁰¹FO 371/119729, Libya, Minute by Ramsden, undated.

¹⁰²FO 371/119729, Graham to Lloyd, 27 Nov. 1956.

¹⁰³P. Darby, British Defence Policy East of Suez, 1947–1968 (London: OUP 1973), 95, 122–3.

¹⁰⁴CAB 21/3934, A. Nutting to A. Head, 26 Dec. 1956. Two days later, Eden wrote that ‘In the strategic sphere we have to do some re-thinking about our areas of influence and the military bases on which they must rest. Some of the latter seem of doubtful value in the light of our Suez experience. What return for instance do we get for our armoured division in Tripoli and Libya? If the purpose is to prevent this part of North Africa falling under Egyptian dominion could that not be ensured more cheaply? … [Do] we need armour in Tripoli itself?’ See PREM 11/1138, Minute by Eden, Thoughts on the general position after Suez, 28 Dec. 1956. See also A. Gorst and L. Johnman, The Suez Crisis, (Abingdon: Routledge 1997), 151–2.

¹⁰⁵Quoted from D. Little, American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East Since 1945 (London: I.B. Tauris 2002), 208.

¹⁰⁶N.J. Ashton, Eisenhower, Macmillan and the Problem of Nasser: Anglo-American Relations and Arab Nationalism, 1955–59 (Basingstoke: Macmillan 1996), 110.

¹⁰⁷ FRUS, 1955–1957, Vol. XVIII, Telegram from the Embassy in Libya to the Dept. of State, 22 March 1957, 477–9.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid, Memorandum of Discussion at the 321st Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington DC, 2 May 1957, 481–5.

¹⁰⁹DEFE 7/1013, COS (57) 256, Appendix – The Possible Consequences of the Reduction in the British Subsidy and Withdrawal of the British Army Garrison from Libya, Memorandum by the British Defence Co-ordination Committee Middle East, 12 Nov. 1957.

¹¹⁰WO 216/16223, Sandys to D. Heathcoat-Amory, 11 March 1959.

¹¹¹WO 216/16223, Minute by Vice-Chief of the Imperial General Staff, 13 April 1959.