Japan's shifting strategy toward the rise of China

Abstract

After examining different theoretical expectations of how Japan might respond strategically to the rise of China, this article analyzes the evolution of Japan's policy toward China from 1972 to 2006. It argues that Japan has shifted away from the ‘friendship diplomacy’ paradigm to a mixed strategy that involves both positive engagement and realistic balancing to hedge against the potential threats that China may pose in the future. Japan is engaged in a vigorous domestic debate about China policy that centers around four options: cooperative engagement with a soft hedge, competitive engagement with a hard hedge, balancing and containment, and strategic accommodation. The current mixed strategy of engagement and hedging is consistent with different theoretical traditions such as offensive realism, defensive realism, and liberalism. Future developments such as Japan–China interactive effects, shifts in the military power balance, and changes in US strategy, however, could steer Japan to make choices that point in a certain theoretical direction as opposed to others.

Key words:

• Engagement
• hedging
• mixed strategy
• offensive realism
• defensive realism
• liberalism
• Japan
• China

Acknowledgements

The author expresses his deep appreciation to the Smith Richardson Foundation for generously supporting the book project on ‘The US-Japan Alliance and the Rise of China’ on which this article is based.

Throughout this article, Japanese names are written in the Japanese order (family name—given name, except when they refer to authors writing in English).

Notes

¹John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton 2001), 45, 140–1, 402.

²Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 163–4.

³Glenn H. Snyder, ‘The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics’, World Politics 36 (July 1984), 461–96; and Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1997), 180–92.

⁴Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 157–9.

⁵Ibid., 267–72.

⁶Christopher P. Twomey, ‘The Dangers of Overreaching: International Relations Theory. The US-Japanese Alliance, and China’, in Benjamin L. Self and Jeffrey W. Thompson (eds.), An Alliance for Engagement: Building Cooperation in Security Relations with China (Washington DC: Henry L. Stimson Center 2002), 16–19.

Jennifer Lind makes a similar argument about Japan's robust air and naval capabilities in relation to China's. But rather than viewing these capabilities as a form of ‘internal balancing’, she frames Japan's conventional military modernization in terms of a general ‘buck-passing’ strategy. See Jennifer M. Lind, ‘Pacifism or Passing the Buck? Testing Theories of Japanese Security Policy’, International Security 29/1 (Summer 2004), 92–121.

⁷Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Powers, 390–2, 399.

⁸Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1987).

⁹David M. Edelstein, ‘Managing Uncertainty: Beliefs about Intentions and the Rise of Great Powers’, Security Studies 12/1 (Autumn 2002), 3–6, 12–17.

¹⁰Edelstein, ‘Managing Uncertainty’, 14.

¹¹John Mearsheimer (based on his two future scenarios for Northeast Asia), however, might argue that such a Japanese policy might be both ineffective and unnecessary. It would be ineffective because no matter what Japan might do, the United States would disengage militarily from Northeast Asia as soon as it realized that China does not have the potential to become a regional hegemon. And it would be unnecessary because as soon as China becomes capable of seeking regional hegemony and threatening Japan, the United States would balance effectively against China and thereby support Japan's security interests.

But there are two problems with this line of argument. First, the United States itself might want to hedge against a threatening China while pursuing essentially a cooperative strategy toward China by maintaining forward deployed forces in Japan and the alliance with Japan. Second, once the United States disengages militarily from the region, it may have difficulty balancing against a threatening, hegemony-seeking China in a timely manner. Therefore, both the United States and Japan may have strong incentives to maintain and strengthen their alliance precisely because they are pursuing a cooperative strategy vis-à- vis China and they want to hedge against a possible failure of that strategy to cultivate a benign China.

¹²For a theoretical discussion of the ‘security dilemma’, see Robert Jervis, ‘Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma’, World Politics 30/2 (Jan. 1978), 167–214.

¹³For a conceptual analysis of mixed strategies in response to rising powers, see Randall L. Schweller, ‘Managing the Rise of Great Powers: History and Theory’, in Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross (eds.), Engaging China: the Management of an Emerging Power (London: Routledge 1999), 7–18.

¹⁴Akira Iriye, ‘Chinese-Japanese Relations, 1945–1990’, in Christopher Howe (ed.), China and Japan: History, Trends, and Prospects (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1996), 51–5.

¹⁵Michael J. Green and Benjamin L. Self, ‘Japan's Changing China Policy: From Commerical Liberalism to Reluctant Realism’, Survival 38/2 (Summer 1996), 36.

¹⁶Tanaka Akihiko, Nit-chū Kankei 1945–1990 (Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai 1991), 112–15.

¹⁷The English version of the communiqué states the following: ‘The Japanese side is keenly conscious of the responsibility for the serious damage that Japan caused in the past to the Chinese people through war, and deeply reproaches itself.’ But in the original official Japanese version, the English clause ‘deeply reproaches itself” corresponds to ‘fukaku hansei suru’. Rather than conveying the notion of self-reproach or self-rebuke, however, the word ‘hansei’ refers to a milder notion of ‘self-examination’ or ‘self-reflection’. In fact, when rendered into Chinese, this expression does not constitute an unequivocal apology to China.

¹⁸Kamiya, ‘Japanese Foreign Policy toward Northeast Asia’, in Inoguchi Takashi and Purnendra Jain (eds.), Japanese Foreign Policy Today: A Reader (New York: Palgrave 2000), 232–3; and Takahashi, Shiro, Rekishi kyoiku wa kore de yoi no ka[Is History Education Good As It Is?] (Tokyo: Tōyō Keizai Shimpōsha, 1997), 163–7.

¹⁹Hidenori Ijiri, ‘Sino-Japanese Controversy Since the 1972 Diplomatic Normalization’, in Howe, China and Japan, 69–73.

²⁰Kamiya Fuji, Sengo-shi no naka no Nichi-Bei kankei[Japan-US Relations in Postwar History] (Tokyo: Shinchosha 1989), 136–7.

²¹Michael J. Green, Japan's Reluctant Realism (New York: Palgrave 2001), 88.

²²Kamiya Matake, ‘Japanese Foreign Policy toward Northeast Asia’, 231.

²³Michael J. Green and Benjamin L. Self, ‘Japan's Changing China Policy: From Commercial Liberalism to Reluctant Realism’, Survival 38/2 (Summer 1996), 38.

²⁴Tanaka, Nit-chū Kankei 1945–1990, 165–87.

²⁵Kakizawa Kōji, ‘Tennō hō-Chū go no Nit-Chū kankei’[Japan-China Relations after the Emperor's Visit to China], Chūō Kōron, Dec. 1992, 202–10.

²⁶Green, Japan's Reluctant Realism, 85–6.

²⁷Green, Japan's Reluctant Realism, 80–2.

²⁸Yoichi Funabashi, Alliance Adrift (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press 1999), 351–4.

²⁹Green and Self, ‘Japan's Changing China Policy’, 35–6.

³⁰Christopher B. Johnstone, ‘Japan's China Policy: Implications for US-Japan Relations’, Asian Survey 38/11 (Nov. 1998), 1071–8.

³¹Johnstone, ‘Japan's China Policy’, 1080.

³²Christopher W. Hughes, Japan's Security Agenda: Military, Economic, and Environmental Dimensions (Boulder: Lynne Rienner 2004), 177–81.

³³Christopher W. Hughes, ‘Japanese Military Modernization: In Search of a “Normal” Security Role’, in Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Wills (eds.), Strategic Asia 2005–06: Military Modernization in an Era of Uncertainty (Seattle, WA: National Bureau of Asian Research 2005), 120, 127–9.

³⁴Akiyama Masahiro, Nichi-Bei no Senryaku Taiwa ga Hajimatta[The Japan-US Strategic Dialogue Has Begun] (Tokyo: Aki Shobo 2002), 241–5.

³⁵Reinhard Drifte, Japan's Security Relations with China since 1989: From Balancing to Bandwagoning? (London: RoutledgeCurzon 2003), 97–9.

³⁶‘Joint Statement US-Japan Security Consultative Committee, Washington DC, February 19, 2005’, <www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/joint0502.html>.

³⁷Hughes, Japan's Security Agenda, 185–6; and Drifte, Japan's Security Relations with China since 1989, 99–101.

³⁸My thanks to Sugio Takahashi for making this point to me.

³⁹Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan 2006, Chapter 1 ‘Security Environment Surrounding Japan’, 29–30.

⁴⁰National Institute for Defense Studies Japan, East Asian Strategic Review 2001 (Tokyo: Japan Times, 2001), 199–203.

⁴¹National Institute for Defense Studies Japan, East Asian Strategic Review 2002 (Tokyo: Japan Times, 2002), 213–15.

⁴²National Institute for Defense Studies Japan, East Asian Strategic Review 2006 (Tokyo: Japan Times, 2005), 106.

⁴³Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan 2006, Chapter 1 ‘Security Environment Surrounding Japan’, 32.

⁴⁴‘Chūgoku no shinkō’ mo sōtei’[Hypothesizing Even a “Chinese Attack”], Asahi Shimbun, 26 Sept. 2006, 1.

⁴⁵‘‘Buryoku shōtotsu’ no kanōsei mo’[Even the Possibility of a Clash of Force], Sankei Shimbun, 1 Oct. 2006 (pm edition).

⁴⁶ Bō’ei Handobukku 2006[Defense Handbook 2006] (Tokyo: Asagumo Shimbunsha 2006), 324–5. Using a yen-dollar exchange rate of 110 yen per US dollar, Japanese defense spending in 1997 and 2006 was $44.9 billion and $43.5 billion respectively.

⁴⁷ East Asian Strategic Review 2005, 212–28.

⁴⁸The 2004 National Defense Program Guideline makes the following reference to China: ‘China, which has a major impact on regional security, continues to modernize its nuclear forces and missile capabilities as well as its naval and air forces. China is also expanding its area of operation at sea. We will have to remain attentive to its future actions.’ <www.jda.go.jp/e/policy/f_work/taikou05/fy200501.pdf>.

For a quasi-official denial that this reference to China constitutes Japan perceiving China as a threat, see East Asian Strategic Review 2005, 227–8.

⁴⁹ Bō'ei Handobukku 2006, 139, 144.

⁵⁰Hughes, ‘Japanese Military Modernization’, 123.

⁵¹Banning Garrett and Bonnie Glaser, ‘Chinese Apprehensions about Revitalization of the US-Japan Alliance’, Asian Survey 37/4 (April 1997), 387–92; Thomas J. Christensen, ‘China, the US-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia’, International Security 23/4 (Spring 1999), 49–80; and Wu Xinbo, ‘The End of the Silver Lining: A Chinese View of the US-Japanese Alliance’, Washington Quarterly 29/1 (Winter 2005–06), 119–30.

⁵²Morimoto Satoshi, ‘Nit-chū Bō-ei Kōryū no Genjō to Kadai’, [The Present Situation and Themes of Japan-China Defense Exchanges] in Morimoto Satoshi (ed.), Ajia Taiheiyō no Takoku-kan Anzen Hoshō (Tokyo: Nihon Kokusai Mondai Kenkyūjō, 2003), 273–89.

⁵³National Institute for Defense Studies Japan, East Asian Strategic Review 2006, 113–14.

⁵⁴Ming Wan, Sino-Japanese Relations: Interaction, Logic, and Transformation (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press 2006), 262–86.

⁵⁵Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), Japanese Trade and Investment Statistics <www.jetro.go.jp/en/stats/statistics/>.

⁵⁶Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), Japanese Trade in 2005, 200–1.

⁵⁷Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), 2005 JETRO White Paper on International Trade and Foreign Direct Investment (Summary), 11.

⁵⁸There were, however, criticisms that Japan's official development assistance to China could be aiding its military buildup. See for example, Komori Yoshihisa, Nit-chū Yūkō no Maboroshi[The Illusion of Japan–China Friendship] (Tokyo: Shogakkan 2001), 222–42.

⁵⁹Zhang Yunling and Tang Shiping, ‘China's Regional Strategy’, in David Shambaugh (ed.), Power Shift: China and Asia's New Dynamics (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press 2005), 48–68.

⁶⁰Naoko Munakata, ‘Has Politics Caught Up with Markets? In Search of East Asian Economic Regionalism’, in Peter J. Katzenstein and Takashi Shiraishi (eds.), Beyond Japan: the Dynamics of East Asian Regionalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 2006), 149–53; and Tsugami Toshiya, Chūgoku Taitō[Rise of China] (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha 2003), 210–16.

⁶¹‘Tokyo Declaration for the Dynamic and Enduring Japan-ASEAN Partnership in the New Millennium’ (12 Dec. 2003); and East Asian Strategic Review 2005, 49.

⁶²National Institute for Defense Studies Japan, East Asian Strategic Review 2006 (Tokyo: Japan Times 2006), 151–5.

⁶³‘Keisanshō – Chūgoku ni Taikō Shin Tsushō Senryaku’, [METI: New Trade Strategy to Counter China], Asahi Shimbun, 28 July 2006, 10; ‘Higashi Ajia Keizai Renkei Kōsō’, [East Asian Economic Cooperation Concept], Asahi Shimbun, 25 Aug. 2006, 3; and ‘Toward Further Economic Development and Integration in East Asia: Japan's Proposal’, Aug. 2006.

⁶⁴Mōri Kazuko, Nit-chū Kankei[Japan-China Relations] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten 2006), 177–84.

⁶⁵‘Joint Japan-China Press Statement’, 8 Oct. 2006 <www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/joint0610.html>.

⁶⁶This school of thought encompasses most of the prominent mainstream China scholars in Japan such as Amako Satoshi, Kojima Tomoyuki, Kokubun Ryosei, and Takahara Akio and those in Japan's diplomatic corps who have focused on relations with China (the so-called China school). It also includes Japanese diplomats who are not necessarily China specialists but who have focused on Asian affairs such as Ogura Kazuo and Tanaka Hitoshi and international relations scholars like Soeya Yoshihide and Tanaka Akihiko. Much of the business community support a “cooperative engagement” strategy with China.

⁶⁷Amako Satoshi, Chūgoku-Ajia-Nihon: Taikokuka Suru ‘Kyoryū’ wa Kyōi ka?[China-Asia-Japan: Is the ‘Giant Dragon's’ Emergence as a Great Power a Threat?] (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobo 2006), 106–34; Kojima Tomoyuki, Kukki Suru Chūgoku: Nihon wa dō Chūgoku to Mukiau no ka?[China Rising: How Should Japan Face China?] (Tokyo: Ashi Shobō 2005), 125–203; Kokubun Ryosei, ‘Globalizing China: The Challenges and Opportunities’, in Kokubun Ryosei and Wang Jisi (eds.), The Rise of China and a Changing East Asian Order (Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange 2004), 31–4; and Takahara Akio, ‘Japan's Response to the Rise of China’, in Kokubun and Wang, The Rise of China and a Changing East Asian Order, 167–70.

⁶⁸Sugimoto Nobuyuki, Daichi no Hōkō: Moto Shanghai Sōryōji ga Mita Chūgoku[The Roar of the Earth: The China Viewed by a Former Shanghai Consul General] (Tokyo: PHP Kenkyūjō 2006), 199–221, 259–81. Sugimoto, a career diplomat who specialized in China affairs, wrote this book while being treated for cancer; and the book was published just before he passed away in July 2006. Subsequently, the book has become a bestseller in Japan and is seen as a diplomat's testament on behalf of a realistic engagement policy toward China because Japan has such a stake in China's stability.

⁶⁹Hitoshi Tanaka, ‘Japan and China at a Crossroads’, East Asia Insights: Toward Community Building 1/2 (Japan Center for International Exchange) (March 2006), 2.

⁷⁰Hitoshi Tanaka, ‘Japan and China at a Crossroads’, 2–3; Kojima, Kukki Suru Chûgoku, 135–41; and Sugimoto, Daichi no Hōkō, 222–58.

⁷¹Amako, Chūgoku-Ajia-Nihon, 176.

⁷²Hitoshi Tanaka, ‘Japan and China at a Crossroads’, 4–5.

⁷³Lee Jong-won, Matsuda Yasuhiro, and Takahara Akio, ‘Chūgoku wa “kyōi” ka’[Is China a “Threat”?], Sekai, Sept. 2006, 106–7.

⁷⁴Soeya Yoshihide, Nihon no ‘Midoru Pawā’ Gaikō[Japan's ‘Middle Power’ Diplomacy] (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobo 2005), 222–6; Amako, Chūgoku-Ajia-Nihon, 207–9; and Taniguchi Makoto, Higashi Ajia Kyōdōtai: Keizai Tōgō no Yukue to Nihon[East Asian Community: Whither Economic Integration and Japan] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten 2004), 56–60.

⁷⁵Tanaka Hitoshi and Tahara Sōichirō, Kokka to Gaikō[State and Diplomacy] (Tokyo: Kodansha 2005), 220–2.

⁷⁶Amako, Chūgoku-Ajia-Nihon, 203.

⁷⁷Members of this school of thought include Japanese foreign policy and defense commentators such as Abe Junichi, Hiramatsu Shigeo, Morimoto Satoshi, Okazaki Hisahiko, Sakamoto Masahiro, and Shikata Toshiyuki. Many of the members of the Tokyo Foundation-sponsored study group on ‘Japan's Diplomacy for China’ subscribe to this perspective. In the business community, Kasai Yoshiyuki, chairman of the Central Railway Company, has been a vocal advocate of a tougher stance toward China.

⁷⁸Study Group on Japan's Diplomacy, ‘Policy Recommendations on Japan's Diplomacy for China’, July 2005 (sponsored by the Tokyo Foundation).

⁷⁹Hiramatsu Shigeo, Chūgoku no Anzen Hoshō Senryaku[China's Security Strategy] (Tokyo: Keisō Shobō, 2005), 69–105.

⁸⁰Hisahiko Okazaki, ‘Time to Change Our National Security Strategy’, Daily Yomiuri, 23 April 2006; Ishiba Shigeru, ‘Nit-chū Tatakawaba Katsu no wa Dotchi da?’[If Japan and China Fight, Which Side Would Win?], Bungei Shunjū, May 2006, 138–40.

⁸¹Hisahiko Okazaki, ‘The Strategic Value of Taiwan’ (paper prepared for the US-Japan-Taiwan Trilateral Strategic Dialogue in Tokyo, 2 March 2003); Hiramatsu Shigeo, Chūgoku wa Nihon o Heigō suru[China Will Annex Japan] (Tokyo: Kodansha 2006), 170–84; and Hiramatsu Shigeo, Chūgoku no Anzen Hoshō Senryaku[China's Security Strategy] (Tokyo: Keisō Shobō 2005), 222–7.

⁸²Morimoto Satoshi, Bei-gun Sai-hen to Zai-Nichi Bei-gun[Restructuring of US Forces and US Forces in Japan] (Tokyo: Bungei Shunjū 2006), 207.

⁸³Study Group on Japan's Diplomacy for China, 2–3, 7–8; Shikata Toshiyuki, Mu Bōbi Rettō[Defenseless Archipelago] (Tokyo: Kairyūsha 2006), 77–87.

⁸⁴Morimoto, Bei-gun Sai-hen to Zai-Nichi Bei-gun, 208–9.

⁸⁵Ishiba, ‘Nit-chū’, 140–2.

⁸⁶Hiramatsu Shigeo, Chūgoku, Kaku Misairu no Hyōteki[China, Target of Nuclear Missiles] (Tokyo: Kadokawa 2006), 219–20.

⁸⁷Hisahiko Okazaki, ‘Politics of Business in China’, Japan Times, 21 June 2004; and Yoshiyuki Kasai, ‘China-led Plans for Asia Threaten US Alliance’, Daily Yomiuri, 27 March 2005.

⁸⁸Abe Shinzō and Okazaki Hisahiko, Kono Kuni o Mamoru Ketsui[Determination to Defend This Country] (Tokyo: Fusōsha 2004), 172–4.

⁸⁹Members of this school of thought include Itō Kan, Komori Yoshihisa, Miyazaki Masahiro, Nakajima Mineo, and Nakanishi Terumasa.

⁹⁰Nakanishi Terumasa, Teikoku to shite no Chūgoku: Haken no Ronri to Jitsugen[China as an Empire: the Logic and Realization of Hegemony] (Tokyo: Tōyō Keizai Shimpôsha 2004); and Nakajima Mineo and Komori Yoshihisa, Chūgoku Bakuhatsu[China Explodes] (Tokyo: Bijinesu Sha 2005).

⁹¹Nakajima Mineo and Komori Yoshihisa, Chūgoku wa Kyōi ka?[Is China a Threat?] (Tokyo: PHP Kenkyûjô 2000), 180–2.

⁹²Hasegawa Keitarō, Chūgoku ‘Han-Nichi’ no Matsuro [The Fate of ‘Anti-Japan’ China's] (Tokyo: Tōyō Keizai Shimpōsha 2005).

⁹³Miyazaki Masahiro, Chūgoku kara Nihon Kigyō wa Tettai se yo[Japanese Companies Should Withdraw From China] (Hankyû Komyunikêshonzu 2006).

⁹⁴Itō Kan, Chūgoku no ‘Kaku’ ga Sekai o Seisu [The World Restrains China's Nuclear Forces] (Tokyo: PHP Kenkyûjô 2006), 223–33; Nakanishi Terumasa, Nihon no ‘Kakugo’[‘Resolution’ of Japan] (Tokyo: Bungei Shunjū 2005), 94–126; and Nakanishi Terumasa (ed.), ‘Nihon Kaku Busō’ no Ronten[Arguments for ‘Japan's Nuclear Forces'] (Tokyo: PHP Kenkyūjō 2006).

⁹⁵One example of this position is Ikeda Masaaki, Nit-chū Dōmei[Japan-China Alliance] (Tokyo: Bunrikaku, 2006).

⁹⁶Asai Motofumi, Chūgoku o dō Miru ka[How to View China] (Tokyo: Kōbunken 2000), 120–1.

⁹⁷Terashima Jitsurō, “‘Shin-Bei, Nyū-A” no Sōgō Senryaku o Motomete’[Seeking a Comprehensive Strategy for ‘Being Close to America, Entering Asia’], Chūō Kōron, March 1996, 20–38.

⁹⁸Asai, Chūgoku o dō Miru ka, 199–200.

⁹⁹Wan, Sino-Japanese Relations, 142–6, 149–50; Green and Self, ‘Japan's Changing China Policy’, 38–9, 45–7; Masahiko Sasajima, ‘Japan's Domestic Politics and China Policymaking’, in Self and Thompson, An Alliance for Engagement, 82–6; and Mike M. Mochizuki, ‘China-Japan Relations: Downward Spiral or a New Equilibrium?’ in David Shambaugh (ed.), Power Shift: China and Asia's New Dynamics (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press 2005), 136–7.

¹⁰⁰Abe Shinzō, Utsukushii Kuni e[Toward a Beautiful Country] (Tokyo: Bungei Shunjū 2006), 146–61.

¹⁰¹‘Nit-chū Kankei ni Kansuru Ishiki Chōsa – February 2006’[Opinion Survey Regarding Japan-China Relations – Feb. 2006] <www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/china/yoron05/index.html>.

¹⁰²One of the prominent advocates of a competitive strategy toward China, Okazaki Hisahiko, was quoted as expressing this view. See Norimitsu Onishi, ‘In First Month as Japan's Premier, Abe Veers to Center’, New York Times, 28 Oct. 2006, A7.

¹⁰³John J. Mearsheimer, ‘China's Unpeaceful Rise’, Current History 105/690 (April 2006), 160–2.

¹⁰⁴Thomas J. Christensen, ‘Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster?’International Security 31/1 (Summer 2006), 81–126; and Aaron L. Friedberg, ‘The Future of US-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?’International Security 30/2 (Fall 2005), 7–45.

¹⁰⁵For a discussion of US hedging strategy toward China, see Evan S. Medeiros, ‘Strategic Hedging and the Future of Asia-Pacific Stability’, Washington Quarterly 29/1 (Winter 2005–06), 145–67.