Inflexible Response: Diplomacy, Airpower and the Kosovo Crisis, 1998–1999

Abstract

This article examines the key lessons of combining diplomacy and airpower in the Kosovo Crisis (1998–99). Drawing on a comprehensive list of primary sources involved in the military leadership of NATO at the time, this article goes beyond existing literature in revealing just how surprisingly unprepared NATO was when it went to war against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). This article argues that on the eve of war, NATO neither had a political nor a military strategy for handling the war it itself had started – and that at the time, the air power community in general failed to appreciate the need for producing more precise and innovative solutions to complex conflicts and crises in the lower band of the intensity spectrum.

Key Words:

• Kosovo
• Airpower
• NATO

Notes

¹First war in the history of NATO: Gen. Wesley K. Clark, Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo and the Future of Combat (New York: PublicAffairs/Perseus Books Group 2001), Ch. Introduction, xxiii. Benjamin S. Lambeth, NATO's Air War for Kosovo. A Strategic and Operational Assessment (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 2001), Ch. Summary, xx.

²Lambeth, NATO's Air War for Kosovo, xx. Roberto Bellini, ‘Kosovo and Beyond: Is Humanitarian Intervention Transforming International Society?’Human Rights & Human Welfare 2/1 (Winter 2002) <www.du.edu/gsis/hrhw/volumes/2002/2-1/belloni2-1.pdf> (accessed 10 Feb. 2008).

³Robert A. Pape defines the term ‘coercion’ as ‘efforts to change the behavior of a state by manipulating costs and benefits … coercion seeks to force the opponent to alter its behavior’. Robert A. Pape, Bombing To Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (New York: Cornell University Press 1996), Ch.1, 4. Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman provide a similar definition of the term ‘coercion’: ‘the use of threatened force, and at times the limited use of actual force to back up the threat, to induce an adversary to change its behavior’. Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman, The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might (RAND: Cambridge UP 2002), Ch.1, 1. Robert J. Art describes ‘coercive diplomacy’ as ‘the attempt to get a target – a state, a group (or groups) within a state, or a non-state actor – to change its objectionable behaviour through either the threat to use force or the actual use of limited force … Coercive diplomacy can include, but need not include, positive inducements …’. Robert J. Art and Patrick M. Cronin (ed.), The United States and Coercive Diplomacy (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press 2003), Ch.1, 6–7.

⁴This includes operations in Bosnia 1995 (Op. ‘Deliberate Force’), Afghanistan/Sudan 1998 (Op. ‘Infinite Reach’), Iraq 1998 (Op. ‘Desert Fox’) and Kosovo 1999 (Op. ‘Allied Force’).

⁵For instance military historian John Keegan, who in June 1999 called OAF a historic turning point: ‘There are certain dates in the history of warfare that mark real turning points. November 20, 1917 is one, when at Cambrai the tank showed that the traditional dominance of infantry, cavalry and artillery on the battlefield had been overthrown. November 11, 1940 is another when the sinking of the Italian fleet at Taranto demonstrated that the aircraft carrier and its aircraft had abolished the age-old supremacy of the battleship. Now there is a new date to fix on the calendar: June 3, 1999, when the capitulation of President Milosevic proved that a war can be won by airpower alone …’. John Keegan, Daily Telegraph (London), Issue 1472, 6 June 1999.

⁶For instance Dr Jonathan Eyal, who one year after OAF wrote: ‘one powerful myth about the outcome of the operation still needs to be addressed: the idea that Kosovo was one modern example of the victory of airpower. It was nothing of the kind … Much more important from Milošević's perspective was the realisation that, sooner or later, NATO was gearing up for a ground offensive … The final ingredient in his decision to cave in was Russia's changed policy … In essence, therefore, Milošević was persuaded he had to accept Western terms by a mixture of diplomatic moves which isolated his regime, coupled with the threat of ground forces'. Jonathan Eyal, ‘Kosovo: Killing the Myths After the Killing Has Subsided’, Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies (RUSI Journal) 145/1 (Feb. 2000), 26–7.

⁹Clark, Waging Modern War, 271.

⁷NATO, ‘Press Statement by Dr Javier Solana, Secretary General of NATO’, 23 March 1999 (Press Release (1999) 040) <www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-040e.htm> (accessed 10 Feb. 2008). NATO, ‘Political and Military Objectives of NATO Action with Regard to the Crisis in Kosovo’, 23 March 1999 (Press Release (1999)043) <www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-043e.htm> (accessed 10 Feb. 2008). NATO, ‘Statement by the North Atlantic Council on Kosovo’, 30 Jan. 1999 (Press Release (99)12) <www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-012e.htm> (accessed 10 Feb. 2008). US Dept. of Defense, Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report (Washington DC: Report to Congress 31 Jan. 2000), Ch.1, 3–4. Washington Post [Editorial], ‘Excerpts From Clinton's Address on NATO Attacks on Yugoslav Military Forces’, Washington Post, 24 March 1999. William J. Clinton, My Life (New York: Random House (large print) 2004), Ch.52, 1368. The United Kingdom Parliament, Examination of Witnesses [George Robertson] (London: UK Defence Committee 24 March 1999), Questions 356–379 <www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm199899/cmselect/cmdfence/39/9032402.htm> (accessed 10. Feb. 2008).

⁸Madeleine Albright, Madam Secretary: A Memoir (London: Macmillan 2003), Ch.25, 410.

¹⁰Gen. (ret.) Joseph Ralston, telephone interview with the author, 6 Sept. 2004.

¹¹Gen. (ret.) Dieter Stöckmann, interview with the author, (outside) Bonn, Germany, 7 Dec. 2004.

¹²Gen. (ret.) Sir Rupert Smith, telephone interview with the author, 15 March 2005.

¹³Gen. (ret.) Jean-Pierre Kelche, interview with the author, Paris, France, 11 April 2005.

¹⁴TV documentary, ‘The Mind of Milošević’, Panorama (Producer Kevin Sutcliffe, Editor Peter Horrocks, Reporter Gavin Hewitt), BBC1 (29 March 1999).

¹⁵Klaus Naumann, ‘Interview with General Klaus Naumann’, PBS FRONTLINE2000 <www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/naumann.html> (accessed 10 Feb. 2008).

¹⁶Clark, Waging Modern War, 439–40.

¹⁷Lt. Gen. (ret.) Michael C. Short, email correspondence with the author, 31 Aug. 2004.

¹⁸Paul C. Strickland, ‘USAF Aerospace-Power Doctrine. Decisive or Coercive?’Aerospace Power Journal 14/3 (2000), p.23.

¹⁹Brig. Gen. (ret.) Gunnar Lundberg, interview with the author, Stockholm, Sweden, 25 May 2004.

²⁰The United Kingdom Parliament, The Defence Committee's Fourteenth Report (London: 2000), Ch.3, point no 71 <www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199900/cmselect/cmdfence/347/34702.htm> (accessed 10 Feb. 2008).

²¹Wing Cdr Sean Corbett, RAF, email correspondence, spring 2004. Wing Cdr Corbett did not want to reveal who ordered him to find ‘three days worth of good targets’.

²²Ibid. It should be mentioned that the air leadership at CAOC Vicenza also believed that a deal had already been struck with Milošević, and that the somewhat ‘token’ bombing had taken place in order to enable Milošević to restore his domestic power base while conceding to NATO's demands. In other words, publicly saying it would be a waste of lives to continue resisting the mighty NATO alliance, and it would be wiser to opt for a peaceful solution. Col. Tom Johansen, Battle Staff Director in CAOC Vicenza, interview with the author, Oslo, Norway, 17 Oct. 2003.

²³Strickland, ‘USAF Aerospace-Power Doctrine. Decisive or Coercive?’, 23.

²⁴David Halberstam, War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton and the Generals (New York: Scribner 2001), Ch.41, 451.

²⁵The UK Parliament, Fourteenth Report, point ‘Strategy' in Annex A: ‘Summary'.

²⁶William Drozdiak, ‘War Effort Restrained By Politics’, Washington Post, 20 July 1999.

²⁷Gen. Joseph Ralston, telephone interview with the author, 6 Sept. 2004.

²⁸Ibid. The following is a summary of Gen. Ralston's main terms, not a direct quotation from the document: ‘(1) Don't bomb anything in Montenegro. Because this is a political decision, we are trying to keep Montenegro out of the fight, so don't bomb in Montenegro. Even then there was a caveat that said: if an airplane is threatened by a system in Montenegro, you are automatically cleared to take that out. If they put a SA-3 in Montenegro or if they put a MiG in Montenegro you can bomb that if you needed to, but as a general policy, don't bomb in Montenegro because we are trying to keep them out of the war. (2) Don't bomb inside 5 nautical miles of downtown Belgrade without coming back to the capitals. Now, you can argue about whether that was too much political interference or not, but nevertheless that was necessary to get agreement from everyone. It didn't say that one couldn't bomb within 5 nautical miles – and we did bomb within 5 nautical miles – but if you were going to do that, the Heads of State wanted to know what it was they were bombing. (3) For every target we had, we had ‘what were the predicted casualties and what about unintended casualties – civilian casualties?’ If there was a number greater than X – and I am not going to talk about X here – but if it were greater than X, then you needed to get political approval. And it was a pretty significant number. (4) The electrical grid. Don't bomb the electrical grid without political agreement. This turned out to be a legal question more than a strategic one. There were people who said ‘take out the electrical grid, because the people in Serbia will get all upset. They will put pressure on Milošević and that will be one of the things that will force him to withdraw. If you do that, that is a war crime. If you bomb the electrical grid because it is supplying the electricity to the surface-to-air missile-sites, then that is a legal target, but it is not legal to take out the electrical grid to put pressure on the people to change their leaders. So that was put on there for legal reasons.’ What should be noted by the reader is that Gen. Ralston provides guidance on what not to do – not what to do in order to generate the desired effect, to coerce Milošević to accept NATO's demands.

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰Gen. (ret.) Wesley K. Clark, email correspondence, 5 May 2005.

³¹Gen. Dieter Stöckmann, interview with the author, (outside) Bonn, Germany, 7 Dec. 2004.

³²Wing Commander Sean Corbett, email correspondence, Spring 2004.

³³Based to a very large degree on the planning done by Gen. John Jumper's staff at US European Command at Ramstein Air Base, Germany. While NATO was precluded from doing detailed planning, the US chain of command was not, and as the senior US airman in Europe, Gen. Jumper had a very close relationship with Gen. Clark, who besides being SACEUR, was also the Commander-in-Chief of the US European Command. Two separate air operation plans were introduced by NATO in late Summer/Fall 1998; (1) a Limited Air Operations Plan and (2) a Phased Air Operations Plan. The Limited Air Operations Plan‘[Relied] predominantly on (a limited number of) cruise missiles to strike selected targets throughout the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, (and) was developed as a stand-alone option. As originally planned, it was intended to be a short-notice, limited air response, to a serious, but limited incident in Kosovo, with the aim of preventing a further deterioration of the situation.’ The Phased Air Operations Plan was generally what most people came to regard as NATO's air campaign plan, and consisted of three executing (excluding the deployment and redeployment phases) phases of gradual escalation: (1) Phase One aimed at establishing air superiority over Kosovo (creating a no-fly zone south of a latitude of 44 degrees North) and degrading the command and control (C2) and integrated air defence system (IADS) of the FRY – plus deployed forces in Kosovo. (2) Phase Two authorised military targets in Kosovo and FRY forces south of a latitude of 44 degrees North, and (3) Phase Three expanded the air operations ‘against a wide range of high-value military and security force targets throughout the FRY’. These two air campaign plans formed the basis for NATO issuing the formal Activation Order on 13 Oct. 1998 – to maintain pressure on Milošević. Still, shortly before OAF commenced, SACEUR ordered that a new option separate from previous plans be developed. ‘This option was envisioned to be a two-day strike, hitting targets throughout the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in an attempt to convince Milošević to withdraw his forces and cease hostilities.’ It was probably this plan the targeting cell in CAOC Vicenza was asked to support less than 48 hours before OAF started. None of the plans revealed which effect the campaigns were supposed to have on whom, and none of the options were supported by the air leadership at CAOC Vicenza. US Dept. of Defense, Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report, 8–23; Anthony H. Cordesman, The Lessons and Non-Lessons of the Air and Missile Campaign in Kosovo (Westport, CT: Praeger 2001), Ch.2, 23–4; Clark, Waging Modern War, 176; Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O'Hanlon, Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press 2000), Ch.4, 117–18. For further reading on the various air campaigns and the development process – see the author's book, NATO's Gamble: Combining Diplomacy and Airpower in the Kosovo Crisis, 1998–99 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press 2007).

³⁴Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT/ London: Yale UP 1966), Ch. Preface and 1, vi and 1–3.

³⁵Byman and Waxman, Dynamics of Coercion, 18 and 240.

³⁶Pape, Bombing To Win, 17.

³⁷Gen. Wesley K. Clark, Gen. Sir Rupert Smith and US President's Representative for the Dayton Implementation in Bosnia, Robert Gelbard, all perceived the US State Dept. and NSC to be the dominant political force behind the handling of the Kosovo Crisis. Gen. Wesley K. Clark, email correspondence with the author, 5 May 2005. Gen. Sir Rupert Smith, telephone interview with the author, 15 March 2005. Robert Gelbard, telephone interview with the author, 17 May 2005.

³⁸Gen. Klaus Naumann, interview with the author, Berlin, Germany, 30 Sept. 2004.

³⁹Ibid.

⁴⁰Klaus Naumann, Statement to Senate Armed Services Committee[Kosovo After-Action Review] (Washington DC: 3 Nov. 1999) <http://armed-services.senate.gov/statement/1999/991103kn.pdf> (accessed Jan. 2007).

⁴¹Clark, Waging Modern War, 213.

⁴²UN Resolution 1199 called for a ceasefire, called for the improvement of the humanitarian situation, urged the parties to enter a dialogue for a political solution to the issue of Kosovo, and demanded that the FRY immediately implement the following measures: a ceasefire and the withdrawal of FRY security forces, enabling effective and continuous international monitoring in Kosovo, the returning home of refugees and the internally displaced, access for non-governmental and humanitarian organisations and the making of rapid progress to clear a timetable and enter a dialogue with the Kosovar Albanians in order to find a political solution to the problems of Kosovo. The day after the UN resolution, the defence ministers of NATO met in Portugal (Villa Mora) to discuss how they could put force behind the Resolution, and the defence ministers agreed on limiting a statement to ACTWARN (Activation Warning), and on 24 Sept., Sec. Gen. Solana issued a statement which started ‘Just a few moments ago, the North Atlantic Council approved the issuing of an ACT WARN for both a limited air option and a phased air campaign in Kosovo’. NATO, ‘Statement by the Secretary General following the ACTWARN decision’, 24 Sept. 1998, (Vilamoura) <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1998/p980924e.htm> (accessed Jan. 2007). UN, ‘Resolution 1199’, 23 Sept. 1998, (S/RES/1199) <http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/98sc1199.htm> (accessed 10 Feb. 2008). Cordesman, The Lessons and Non-Lessons, 11. Albright, Madam Secretary, 388.

⁴³TV documentary, ‘The Fall of Milošević’, Series producer Dai Richards and Executive producers Brian Lapping and Norma Percy, BBC2 (5 and 12 Jan. 2003).

⁴⁴Gen. Klaus Naumann, interview with the author, Berlin, Germany, 30 Sept. 2004.

⁴⁵US News & World Report [Editorial], ‘A French spy inside NATO’, US News & World Report, 16 November 1998, <http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1218/is_1998_Nov_16/ai_n12440819> (accessed 10 Feb. 2008).

⁴⁶BBC News [Editorial], ‘French major jailed as Serb spy’, BBC News, 12 Dec. 2001, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/1706341.stm> (accessed 10 Feb. 2008).

⁴⁷Congressional Research Service, Iraq: Former and Recent Military Confrontations With the United States, (Washington DC: Report to Congress 16 Oct. 2002), 2 <www.fas.org/man/crs/IB94049.pdf> (accessed 10 Feb. 2008).

⁴⁸Daalder and O'Hanlon, Winning Ugly, 2.

⁴⁹Ibid.

⁵⁰John Diamond, ‘Yugoslavia, Iraq Talked Air-Defense Strategy’, Philadelphia Inquirer [AP], 30 March 1999. Associated Press (unknown author), ‘Is Iraq Helping Serbs?’, Seattle Times, 29 March 1999.

⁵¹Maj. Gen. Bjørn Nygård, telephone interview with the author, 7 July 2004.

⁵²Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge, 2nd ed. (Newhaven, CT: Yale Nota Bene 2002), Ch.8, 228.

⁵³TV documentary, ‘The Fall of Milošević’.

⁵⁴The UK Parliament, Fourteenth Report, point ‘Planning and Preparation’ in Annex A: ‘Summary’.

⁵⁵By the end of the negotiations, Secretary Albright was telling the Kosovars that they had to sign, because otherwise NATO could not carry out its threat of a bombing campaign, saying: ‘You'll get NATO to protect your people. Don't mind the small print because you will be running the show and many of the problems in the text will be irrelevant.’ Judah, Kosovo, 212–13. By now, according to one US official, ‘the price of saving Rambouillet was to tie ourselves more and more closely to the Albanians’. Michael Hirsh and John Barry, ‘How We Stumbled Into War’, Newsweek, no. 133, 12 April 1999, 38–40. The chief US negotiator at Rambouillet, Christopher Hill, says the Serbs did not think the Albanians would agree to the accords and that they were ‘quite shocked when the Albanians did agree’, adding, ‘I must say that the Albanians agreed because we helped them a lot, which I suppose was not fair, but our mediation proved very significant in terms of changing the position of the Albanians.’ Christopher Hill, telephone interview with the author, 8 Nov. 2004.

⁵⁶Albright, Madam Secretary, 184.

⁵⁷The Contact Group was established in 1994 as an international body in response to increased Russian diplomatic influence in Bosnia by spring 1994. It was formed by the key players involved in the situation in Bosnia (or even the Balkans), and by the time the Kosovo Crisis erupted it consisted of the USA, Russia, France, the UK, Germany and Italy.

⁵⁸Daalder and O'Hanlon, Winning Ugly, 24.

⁵⁹Ibid.

⁶⁰Ibid.

⁶¹Ivo Daalder, ‘Interview with Ivo Daalder’, PBS FRONTLINE2000, <www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo> (accessed 10 Feb. 2008).

⁶²Madeleine Albright, ‘Interview with Madeleine Albright’, PBS FRONTLINE 2000, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo> (accessed 10 Feb. 2008).

⁶³Richard Holbrooke, ‘Interview with Richard Holbrooke’, PBS FRONTLINE 2000, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo> (accessed 10 Feb. 2008).

⁶⁴It should be noted that in Nov. 1997, the European Union had offered Milošević the opportunity to improve FRY's diplomatic and trade relations, and support Belgrade's re-entry into international institutions in return for accepting a negotiating process on the Kosovo issue. Just before the Jashari situation in March 1998, the Americans had lifted some sanctions as a reward for Milošević's assistance in moderating the Bosnian Serb leadership. Still, the efforts appear half-hearted and too limited. For the previously mentioned key individuals, the conclusions on what would coerce Milošević had been drawn years earlier – and when the Kosovo Crisis surfaced, the focus on force to alter his behaviour was by far the dominant one.

⁶⁵Thorvald Stoltenberg, interview with the author, Oslo, Norway, 8 June 2004.

⁶⁶Col. Morten Klever, interview with the author, Oslo, Norway, 14 April 2004.

⁶⁷Juan O. Tamayo, ‘Cold War Habits Explain NATO's Cautious Attack On Serbs’, Miami Herald, 5 May 1999.

⁶⁸Svein Efjestad, interview with the author, Oslo, Norway, 14 April 2004.

⁶⁹Thorvald Stoltenberg, interview with the author, Oslo, Norway, 8 June 2004.

⁷⁰For a thorough analysis of John A. Warden and his influence on the 1991 Gulf War see Dr John A. Olsen's John Warden and the Renaissance of American Air Power (Washington DC: Potomac Books 2007).

⁷¹For instance airpower historian Col. (ret.) Phillip S. Meilinger, who in 1995 wrote: ‘An unfortunate characteristic of air theorists is that they long promised more than their chosen instrument could deliver. Theory outran technology, and airmen too often were in the untenable position of trying to schedule inventions to fulfil their predictions. It appears that those days are now past. Airpower has passed through its childhood and adolescence, and the wars of the past decade – especially in the Persian Gulf – have shown it has now reached maturity.’ Phillip S. Meilinger, 10 Propositions Regarding Air Power (Washington DC: Air Force History and Museums Program 1995), 67–8.

⁷²Olsen, John Warden, 267.

⁷³Dennis M. Drew, ‘Air Theory, Air Force, and Low Intensity Conflict: A Short Journey to Confusion’ in Phillip S. Meilinger (ed.), The Paths of Heaven: The Evolution of Airpower Theory (Maxwell AFB: Air University Press 1997), Ch.9, 344.

⁷⁴See John A. Warden, The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat (San Jose, CA: toExcel Press 2000); John A. Warden, ‘The Enemy As A System’, Airpower Journal 9/1 (Spring 1995), 40–55; John A. Warden, ‘Success in Modern War: A Response to Robert Pape's Bombing to Win’, Security Studies 7/2 (1997–98), 172–90.

⁷⁵Michael C. Short, ‘An Airman's Lessons from Kosovo’, in John A. Olsen (ed.), From Manoeuvre Warfare to Kosovo? (Trondheim, Norway: Luftkrigsskolen 2001), Ch.12, 257–8.

⁷⁶Michael R. Gordon, ‘Allies' War By Consensus Limiting Military Strategy’, New York Times, 4 April 1999.

⁷⁷Earl H. Tilford, ‘Operation Allied Force and the Role of Airpower’, Parameters 29/4 (Winter 1999/2000), 24–5 <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/99winter/tilford.htm> (accessed Jan. 2007). The article refers to Michael E. Ryan, ‘Airpower is Working in Kosovo’, Washington Post, 4 June 1999, 35.

⁷⁸Olsen, From Manoeuvre Warfare to Kosovo?, 260.

⁷⁹Michael C. Short, ‘Interview with Gen. Michael C. Short’, PBS FRONTLINE2000, <www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo> (accessed 10 Feb. 2008).

⁸⁰Warden, ‘The Enemy As A System’, 45.

⁸¹John A. Tirpak, ‘Short's View of the Air Campaign’, AIR FORCE Magazine 82 (1999), 43.

⁸²Ibid., 45 and 47.

⁸³Col. Tom Johansen, interview with the author, Oslo, Norway, 17 Oct. 2003.

⁸⁴‘Dual-use targets’ are targets that have both a military and a civilian function – for instance like a power plant that produces electricity for houses and hospitals, but also for the war industry and various military defence systems.

⁸⁵How best to utilise airpower and which targets to hit to create effect has been debated for the better part of the twentieth century. In April 1998 the US President Clinton's representative for the Dayton implementation, Robert Gelbard, suggested to (1) warning Milošević– using the context of the Christmas Warning. (2) If Milošević did not withdraw his troops within a specified number of days, one should warn him that the threat was not a bluff, and that one was prepared to act against him. (3) If Milošević still did not withdraw, Gelbard argued one should deploy some Tomahawk missiles, and attack the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of the Interior in Belgrade in the middle of the night and destroy them, and (4) then go back to Milošević the next morning and say: ‘Look, we were serious. We warned you. You now have X amount of days – very short – to withdraw your troops, or we will dramatically escalate against you.’ Robert Gelbard, telephone interview with the author, 17 May 2005.

As an indication of how one wanted to use airpower in Kosovo and what were perceived as important [strategic] targets within CAOC Vicenza, it should be noted that Lt. Gen. Michael C. Short believed that the reason for Milošević's surrender after 78 days was: ‘(he) hadn't had [electric] power in his capital for a number of days and wasn't going to have it for a number of days more … there was no fuel for his automobiles and his military … and communications infrastructure was being systematically destroyed’. Tirpak, ‘Short's View of the Air Campaign’, 43. For greater insight in this perspective on airpower and the debate it has generated, see Warden, Air Campaign; Warden, ‘The Enemy as a System’, 40–55; Warden, ‘Employing Airpower in the Twenty-first Century’, 57–82; Robert A. Pape, ‘The Limits of Precision-Guided Airpower’, Security Studies 7/2 (Winter 1997/98), 93–114; Warden, ‘Success in Modern War: A Response to Robert Pape's Bombing to Win’, 172–90; Robert A. Pape, ‘The Air Force Strikes Back’, Security Studies 7/2 (Winter 1997/98), 191–214; Barry D. Watts, ‘Ignoring Reality: Problems of Theory and Evidence in Security Studies’, Security Studies 7/2 (Winter 1997/98), 115–171; Karl Mueller, ‘Strategies of Coercion: Denial, Punishment and the Future of Airpower’, Security Studies 7/3 (Spring 1998), 182–228; Short, ‘An Airman's Lessons from Kosovo’, 257–88; Tirpak, ‘Short's View of the Air Campaign’, 43–7; Brig. Gen. David A. Deptula, Effects-Based Operations: Change in the Nature of Warfare (Arlington, VA: Air Force Assoc./Aerospace Education Fdn 2001), <www.aef.org/pub/psbook.pdf> (accessed 10 Feb. 2008); Harlan K. Ullman and James P. Wade, Shock and Awe: Achieving Rapid Dominance (Washington DC: Defence Group Inc. for National Defense Univ. 1996), <www.dodccrp.org/files/Ullman_Shock.pdf> (accessed 10 Feb. 2008); Harlan K. Ullman and James P. Wade, Rapid Dominance – A Force For All Seasons (London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies [RUSI Whitehall Paper Series]1998).

⁸⁶John A. Olsen, Strategic Airpower in Desert Storm (London/ Portland, OR: Frank Cass 2003), Ch.2, 86–95.

⁸⁷Gen. Dieter Stöckmann, interview with the author, (outside) Bonn, Germany, 7 Dec. 2004.

⁸⁸Olsen, From Manoeuvre Warfare to Kosovo?, 260.

⁸⁹Halberstam, War in a Time of Peace, 446.

⁹⁰Gian P. Gentile, How Effective Is Strategic Bombing? Lessons Learned From World War II to Kosovo (New York UP 2001), Ch. Afterword, 191.

⁹¹Halberstam, War in a Time of Peace, 446.

⁹²Klaus Naumann, ‘Interview with Gen. Klaus Naumann’.

⁹³Gen. Sir Rupert Smith, telephone interview with the author, 15 March 2005.

⁹⁴Gen. Jean-Pierre Kelche, interview with the author, Paris, France, 11 April 2005.

⁹⁵Schelling, Arms and Influence, vi.

⁹⁷United States Department of Defence, Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report, 15–16.

⁹⁶Byman and Waxman, The Dynamics of Coercion, 10–11. Colin McInnes, Spectator-Sport War: The West and Contemporary Conflict (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 2002), Ch.5, 95.

⁹⁸The UK Parliament, Fourteenth Report, point ‘The Future’ in the Report's ‘Conclusions’.

⁹⁹Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World (London: Allen Lane/Penguin Group 2005), Ch.9, 333.

¹⁰⁰Gen. Jean Pierre Kelche, interview with the author, 11 April 2005.

¹⁰¹Drew, ‘Air Theory, Air Force, and Low Intensity Conflict’, 321.

¹⁰²Martin Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York: The Free Press 1991), Ch. Postscript, 224–7.

¹⁰³Smith, The Utility of Force, 1 and 17–18.

¹⁰⁴Gen. Klaus Naumann, interview with the author, Berlin, Germany, 30 Sept. 2004.

¹⁰⁵Gen. Sir Rupert Smith, telephone interview with the author, 15 March 2005.

¹⁰⁶For a more comprehensive analysis of the coercive diplomacy in the Kosovo Crisis, see the author's book NATO's Gamble: Combining Diplomacy and Airpower in the Kosovo Crisis, 1998–99 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press 2007).