Strategy and Disproportionality in Contemporary Conflicts

Abstract

This article examines ‘disproportionality’. It begins by tabling some suggestions for how greater ‘proportionality’ can be attained and then maintained, particularly in international security operations. A process termed ‘proportionalisation’ is proposed. Lessons from ‘traditional’ strategic studies need to be re-asserted. This is so that some of the observed limitations with recent operations can be addressed. Losing sight of key objectives is unhelpful, not least when an essential clarity of focus and leadership is required. Today, a return to some classical notions is required to address the observed strategic vacuums, together with an improved intelligence methodology being needed. This article concludes by arguing that ‘disproportionality’ emerges when ‘high politics’ become increasingly disconnected and removed from their empirical bases and ‘low politics’. Greater connection needs to be engendered. Otherwise, in the absence of proportionality, strategies will increasingly fail, command and control will falter, and the desired goal of ‘operational success’ will elude us.

Key Words:

• Strategy Lessons, Proportionality, War, Intelligence

Notes

¹See also, for instance, the discussion contained in Amichai Cohen, ‘Proportionality in the Modern Law of War: An Unenforceable Norm, or the Answer to our Dilemma?’, Perspectives Paper No. 20 (Israel: The Begin–Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, 15 Aug. 2006).

²For the importance of proportionality, see also, for example, Peter Wilson, ‘The Contribution of Intelligence Services to Security Sector Reform’, Conflict, Security and Development 5/1 (April 2005), 102 – especially where he notes: ‘Honest adherence to the spirit of proportionality, in which the legitimate level of intrusiveness of security activity depends on the level of threat, is particularly important when the threat is still ill defined …’

⁴Martin L. Cook, ‘The Proper Role of Professional Military Advice in Contemporary Uses of Force’, Parameters 32/4 (Winter 2002–03), 21–33.

³Maj. Gary D. Brown, USAF, Proportionality for Military Leaders (Maxwell Air Force Base, ALA: US Air Command and Staff College/Air Univ., April 2000), iv.

⁵For more on the issue of ‘necessity’ in this context, see, for example, Judith G. Gardam, Necessity, Proportionality and the Use of Force by States (Cambridge: CUP 2004), 32–3. Elsewhere, ‘necessity’ is defined as: ‘1 the state or fact of being required or indispensable. 2 an indispensable thing. 3 a situation enforcing a particular course: created more by necessity than design.’ Quoted from the Compact Oxford English Dictionary, <www.askoxford.com/concise_oed/necessity?view=uk> (accessed 21 June 2008).

⁶The proposed model presented in this article can be summarised as consisting of the three steps of: (i) problem analysis; (ii) containment; (iii) rollback. This is identified in summary in this article as ‘P-C-R’ (see below).

⁷Joshua A. Geltzer, ‘Your Opinion: Shared Recognition of al-Qaeda's Strategy is Vital’, Atlantic Community Open Think Tank (1 Jan. 2008) <www.atlantic-community.org/index/articles/view/Shared_Recognition_of_al-Qaeda's_Strategy_is_ Vital> (accessed 2 March 2008); see also ‘Editorials: Facing al-Qaeda: With the terrorists growing stronger, their sanctuary in Pakistan must be eliminated’, Washington Post, 19 July 2007; Lt. Col. John M. Pollock, US Marine Corps, ‘A War Like No Other: Al Qaeda and the US Strategy for Combating Terrorism’, USAWC Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College 15 March 2006), 7, <www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/ksil466.pdf> (accessed 2 March 2008) - especially where he argues: ‘one can see reflected in [bin Laden's] strategic execution an appreciation of the indirect approach as espoused by Liddell Hart in Strategy (London: Faber and Faber Ltd 1965, 321):

Awaiting a change in the balance of force – a change often sought and achieved by draining the enemy's force, weakening him by pricks instead of risking blows. The essential condition of such a strategy is that the drain on him should be disproportionately greater than the drain on oneself. The object may be sought by raiding his supplies; by local attacks which annihilate or inflict disproportionate loss on parts of his force; by luring him into unprofitable attacks; by causing an excessively wide distribution of his force; and, not least, by exhausting his moral and physical energy.

The tactics used by Al-Qa'eda in Iraq and Afghanistan are very much the pricks vice blows that Liddell Hart describes. These attacks are usually executed against soft non-military targets in an effort to lower morale, depict the government as impotent and bleed off coalition casualties. In a strategic sense, the attacks against the Egyptian Red Sea resorts, the London subway, Madrid, and the World Trade Center are all examples of attacks that caused the disproportionate loss both physically and psychologically that Liddell Hart describes; see also ‘Afghanistan militants keep government under pressure’, Jane's Intelligence Digest, 3 March 2008; see also ‘Afghanistan's bloody Sunday’, Jane's Terrorism and Security Monitor, 4 March 2008.

⁸Martin Griffiths and Terry O'Callaghan, International Relations: The Key Concepts (London: Routledge 2002), 172–6.

⁹Thomas Hurka, ‘Proportionality in the Morality of War’, Philosophy & Public Affairs 33/1 (2005), 66.

¹⁰See, for instance, below.

¹¹Brown, Proportionality for Military Leaders, 5.

¹²Ibid.

¹³William J. Bayles, ‘The Ethics of Computer Network Attack’, Parameters 31/1 (Spring 2001), 44–58.

¹⁴Franklin E. Wester, ‘Preemption and Just War: Considering the Case of Iraq’, Parameters 34/4 (Winter 2004/5), 20–39.

¹⁵Alan M. Dershowitz, Preemption: A Knife That Cuts Both Ways (London: W.W. Norton 2006).

¹⁶Wester, ‘Preemption and Just War’.

¹⁸Griffiths and O'Callaghan, International Relations: The Key Concepts, 174–5.

¹⁷Dawn Rothe and Stephen L. Muzzatti, ‘Enemies Everywhere: Terrorism, Moral Panic, and US Civil Society’, Critical Criminology 12/3 (Nov. 2004), 330.

¹⁹Ronald Burns and Charles Crawford, ‘School Shootings, the Media, and Public Fear: Ingredients for a Moral Panic’, Crime, Law and Social Change 32/2 (Oct. 1999), 150.

²⁰Guidance provided in the OSCE/ODIHR manual –Countering Terrorism, Protecting Human Rights: A Manual (Warsaw: Organization for Security Cooperation Europe [OSCE]/Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights [ODIHR] 2007), 70–1 – is similarly useful. See, for instance, where it notes: ‘Is it proportionate? The principle of proportionality is not mentioned in the text of human rights treaties but it is a major theme in the application of human rights. Proportionality requires that there is a reasonable relationship between the means employed and the aims to be achieved. It would not be acceptable, for example, for a restriction on a right to destroy the essence of the right in question. Ultimately, disputes over proportionality may require a court to determine whether a measure aimed at promoting a legitimate public policy is either:

Unacceptably broad in its application; or

Has imposed an excessive or unreasonable burden on certain individuals.

Factors to consider when assessing whether an action is disproportionate are:

Have relevant and sufficient reasons been advanced in support of it?

Was a less restrictive measure possible?

Has there been some measure of procedural fairness in the decision-making process?

Do safeguards against abuse exist?

Does the restriction in question destroy the ‘very essence’ of the right in question?

A decision made taking into account proportionality principles should:

Impair as little as possible the right in question;

Be carefully designed to meet the objectives in question;

Not be arbitrary, unfair or based on irrational considerations.

To ensure that counter-terrorism measures are lawful, they not only have to be a proportionate response, but must also be applied proportionately on a case-by-case basis. Even in a counter-terrorism context, measures taken to limit qualified rights must be appropriate to achieve their protective function. The mere fact that the measure is sufficient to achieve the intended aim – for example protecting national security or public order – is not enough to satisfy proportionality. Proportionality requires that the way in which the right is being restricted is actually necessary to protect national security or public order, and that the approach adopted is the least restrictive method among those that might achieve the desired result of protecting national security or public order. Finally, proportionality always requires that a balance is struck between the burden placed on the individual whose rights are being limited and the interests of the general public in achieving the aim that is being protected.’

²¹See also Stephen Biddle, ‘Speed Kills? Reassessing the Role of Speed, Precision, and Situation Awareness in the Fall of Saddam’, Journal of Strategic Studies 30/1 (Feb. 2007), 3–46.

²²Brent Ellis, Back to the Future? The Lessons of Counterinsurgency for Contemporary Peace Operations (April 2002?), 9–10, <www.carleton.ca/e-merge/docs_vol5/articles/article_Ellis1.pdf> (accessed 29 Feb. 2008); see also where he further elaborates: ‘The British Pamphlet, Keeping the Peace (Duties in Support of the Civil Power), clearly laid out four conditions which govern the use of force under the principle of minimum force. First, there must be a necessity and justification for each separate act. Second, the use must be preventive and not punitive; there must be a reason for using military force. Third, no more force should be used than is necessary to achieve the minimum aim. Fourth, members of the military must act impartially and calmly at all time and their actions must comply strictly with the law. Under the minimum force criteria force is not an end in itself but must serve a wider purpose. The focus in determining whether or not to use force is upon how the use of force contributes to the achievement of the desired outcome; how it achieves its instrumental purpose.’

²³‘Military Operations Other Than War’, US Air Force Doctrine Document 2–3 (3 July 2000), 2.

²⁴Ibid., 36.

²⁵Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr, ‘The Rise of Asymmetric Threats: Priorities for Defense Planning’, Chapter 3 in The Quadrennial Defense Review of the United States of America (Washington DC: National Defense Univ. 2001), <www.ndu.edu/inss/press/QDR_2001/sdcasch03.html> (accessed 17 Aug. 2006) (emphasis in original).

²⁶See, for example, Tom Regan, ‘Israel's response in Lebanon called “disproportionate”: But others, including some Arab states, blame Hizbollah for conflict’, Christian Science Monitor, 14 July 2006.

²⁸‘EU Presidency Statement on the recent developments in Israel and Lebanon. CFSP (Common Foreign Security Policy) statement’, General Affairs and External Relations (Brussels 13 July 2006), <www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/lt/article_6110_lt.htm> (accessed 14 Aug. 2006), (emphasis added).

²⁷Quoted in ibid. (emphasis added).

²⁹For a briefing paper that attempts to help dispel some of the confusion that surrounded exact Hizballah objectives in this conflict, see, for example, Amal Saad-Ghorayeb, ‘Hizbollah's Outlook in the Current Conflict: Part One: Motives, Strategy and Objectives’, Policy Outlook No. 27 (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Aug. 2006) –‘As the international community scrambles to resolve the current crisis in Lebanon, the motives and objectives of Hizbollah and Israel remain unclear. How did the conflict escalate so quickly? What do both parties hope to gain? With diplomatic efforts to achieve a resolution of the fighting between Israel and Hizbollah in a critical phase, understanding Hizbollah's outlook and intentions is crucial. Some of the author's main findings are: Hizbollah's July 12 attack on an Israeli convoy was intended to provoke a prisoner exchange; it was not an Iranian-directed effort to trigger a wider conflict; Although prepared for it, Hizbollah did not expect a massive Israeli counter-strike; Hizbollah perceives Washington as the engineer of Israel's current offensive and now views itself as in direct confrontation with the overall US agenda for the region; Hizbollah aims to compromise the perception of Israeli military supremacy in the region, with the hope of undermining the stability of Israel itself.’

³⁰See, for example, Martin Asser, ‘Lebanon's devastation sightseers’, BBC News Online, 18 Aug. 2006.

³¹Hew Strachan, ‘Strategy and the Limitation of War’, Survival 50/1 (Feb.–March 2008), 33; see also Amos Malka, ‘Israel and Asymmetrical Deterrence’, Comparative Strategy 27/1 (2008), 1–19.

³²‘UN drive to agree Lebanon force’, BBC News Online, 16 Aug. 2006.

³³‘Lebanon: Protect Civilians From Unexploded Weapons: Civilians and Aid Work Endangered by Dud Ordnance’, Human Rights Watch (Beirut, 16 Aug. 2006), <http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/08/16/lebano14011.htm> (accessed 16 Aug. 2006).

³⁴See also Avi Kober, ‘The Israel Defense Forces in the Second Lebanon War: Why the Poor Performance?’, Journal of Strategic Studies 31/1 (Feb. 2008), 3–40.

³⁵Charles Krauthammer, ‘“Disproportionate” in What Moral Universe?’, Washington Post, 28 July 2006; see also ‘“The Israeli Response was Disproportionate”’ in Nahum Barnea, ‘Think Again: Israel vs. Hezbollah’, Foreign Policy (Nov./Dec. 2006), 24 – particularly where it is noted: ‘No.’

³⁶Quoted in ‘Bolton defends Israel's actions in Lebanon’, CNN.com (24 July 2006), <http://edition.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/07/23/mideast.bolton/index.html> (accessed 29 Feb. 2008).

³⁷Doug Struck and Tal Zipper, ‘War Stirs Worry in Israel Over State of Military: Many Say Failure to Silence Hezbollah Sends Bad Signal’, Washington Post, 19 Aug. 2006; for another evaluation of this conflict, see, for instance, Martin van Creveld, ‘Israel's Lebanese War: A Preliminary Assessment’, RUSI Journal 151/5 (Oct. 2006), 40–3.

⁴⁰Lionel Shriver, ‘Why Worry about Terrorist Attacks? You are Much More Likely to Die from Smoking or be Killed in a Car Crash’, The Guardian, 23 Aug. 2006.

³⁸See, for example, Francis T. Miko, ‘Removing Terrorist Sanctuaries: The 9/11 Commission Recommendations and US Policy’, CRS Report for Congress (Updated 11 Feb. 2005), 24.

³⁹See, for instance, Michael Head, ‘Critique and Comment: “Counter-Terrorism” Laws: A Threat to Political Freedom, Civil Liberties and Constitutional Rights’, Melbourne University Law Review, 34 (2002), <www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MULR/2002/34.html> (accessed 17 Aug. 2006).

⁴¹See also ibid. – where she argues: ‘I'm no psychologist, but school shooters and suicide bombers surely have much in common. They suffer from equal parts self-pity and grandiosity. They have chips on their shoulders. They feel underestimated and nourish a private sense of superiority. They glorify their own view of the world, which they fantasise about shoving down everyone else's throat. They covet celebrity, and even the posthumous kind will do. They're actually very imitative, and suggestible, but they think of themselves as exceptional, as special, as elect. It's a type. It's not just an Islamic type. You find it in every ethnicity, all over the world.’ (emphasis added); see also John L. Esposito, Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam (Oxford: OUP 2002); John L. Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?, 3^rd ed. (Oxford: OUP 1999). For a background history of Islam, see Karen Armstrong, Islam: A Short History (London: Phoenix 2001); see also Fred Halliday, ‘The Middle East in an Age of Globalization: States, Revolts and Cultures’, RUSI Journal 152/1 (Feb. 2007), 53–7, particularly where he highlights that: ‘We make the decisions, not the religion. Yet we have allowed religion to dominate the story far too much’ (54).

⁴²For more background on the ‘Bush Doctrine’, see Walter LaFeber, ‘The Bush Doctrine’, Diplomatic History 26/4 (Fall 2002), 543; see also Michael Hirsh, ‘Bush and the World’, Foreign Affairs 81/5 (Sept./Oct. 2002), 18–42.

⁴³For example, the phrase ‘Islamo-fascism’, used by US President Bush, arguably creates too strong a linkage between the religion Islam and the terrorism/extremism currently being confronted. This is regarded as being deeply unhelpful for successfully fulfilling the stated aims of the wider overall so-called War on Terror strategy in a sustainable manner over the long-term - see ‘Transcript: Bush Discusses War on Terrorism’, FDCH E-Media (6 Oct. 2006), <www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/administration/bushtext_100605.html> (accessed 20 Nov. 2006); see also IISS, Strategic Survey 2006 (London: Routledge for IISS 2006), 49 , where it notes: ‘Some people have been tempted to frame the counter-terrorism problem in exclusively competitive terms, as a stand-off between “Islam and the West”. But indulging this temptation is likely to lose Muslim “hearts and minds” and should be resisted, insofar as it caters to the vision of a “clash of civilisations” that bin Laden so fervently desires.’; see also Karen Armstrong, ‘Our Truth is Just a Bit-player in the Tragic, Conflicted Whole: Religion Recognises that There can be Coherence in Apparently Contradictory Narratives. The Same Applies to Global Politics’, The Guardian, 26 Aug. 2006. The UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) arguably tries to offset such a ‘clash’, through its ‘Engaging with the Islamic World’ initiative, see for details, <www.fco.gov.uk/> (accessed 9 Nov. 2006). Furthermore, ‘We need to get away from stereotypes, generalisations and preconceptions, and take care not to let crimes committed by individuals or small groups dictate our image of an entire people, an entire region, or an entire religion.’ UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, quoted in ‘Quote of the day’, UN Wire: E-mail news covering the UN and the world (UN Foundation, 14 Nov. 2006); see also ‘Perspectives: Bridging the Western-Muslim Divide’, ISN Security Watch, 15 Nov. 2006; for his view on the phrase ‘Islamist fascists’, see Michael Howard, ‘A Long War?’, Survival 48/4 (Winter 2006–07), 9–11.

⁴⁴Shriver, ‘Why Worry about Terrorist Attacks?’

⁴⁵Strachan, ‘Strategy and the Limitation of War’, 48.

⁴⁶Jens O. Zinn, ‘Introduction: The Contribution of Sociology to the Discourse in Risk and Uncertainty’, Chapter 1 in idem (ed.), Social Theories of Risk and Uncertainty: An Introduction (Oxford: Blackwell 2008), 12.

⁴⁷See also, for example, Jeremy Waldron, ‘Reality Check’, London Review of Books, 10 April 2008, particularly where he notes: ‘The One Per Cent Doctrine: it's a striking methodology and a liberating one, and many people think it's the only way to respond to the threat of low-probability, high-impact events. With it, the endless evidence-gathering and analysis that characterises traditional intelligence policy gives way to clarity. Nothing any longer needs to be conditional. We no longer say, “If X has happened, then we need to do Y,” with all our effort being devoted to finding out whether X has in fact happened or (in an uncertain world) what its probability is. Instead we say, “If there is the smallest significant chance that X has happened, then we have no choice but to do Y.” If X may lead to a catastrophe that must be avoided at all costs (like a nuclear attack on an American city), then we need to swing into action immediately and do Y. No further questions.’

⁴⁸John Parachini, ‘Putting WMD Terrorism into Perspective’, Washington Quarterly 26/4 (Autumn 2003), 38.

⁴⁹See, for instance, Richard Kohn, ‘A War Like No Other’, Organization of American Historians (OAH) Newsletter (Nov. 2001), <www.oah.org/pubs/nl/2001nov/kohn.html> (accessed 2 March 2008).

⁵⁰See, for example, Charles Chao Rong Phua, ‘From The Gulf War to Global War on Terror – a Distorted Sun Tzu in US Strategic Thinking?’, RUSI Journal 152/6 (Dec. 2007), 46–52, see particularly where he notes: ‘US military leadership style is thus more “managerial than strategic”’; see also Derek M.C. Yuen, ‘Deciphering Sun Tzu’, Comparative Strategy 27/2 (2008), 183–200.

⁵¹See, for instance, as quoted in Paddy Ashdown, ‘A Strategy to Save Afghanistan’, Financial Times, 12 Feb. 2008.

⁵²Sun Tzu (translated by Lionel Giles 1910), The Art of War (US: Filiquarian Publishing 2006), 18; for an argument that chimes with the lack of ‘method and discipline’, see, for instance, Adam Roberts, ‘Review Essay: Torture and Incompetence in the “War on Terror”', Survival 49/1 (Spring 2007), 199–212.

⁵³Tzu, Art of War, 5.

⁵⁴Indeed more recently, during 2007, arguably the US military is increasingly distancing itself from the label the ‘Long War’, see, for example, Michael R. Gordon, ‘US Command Shortens Life of “Long War” as a Reference’, New York Times, 24 April 2007.

⁵⁵Tzu, Art of War, 9.

⁵⁶Ibid., 13.

⁵⁷Ibid.

⁵⁸See, for example, Charles E. Lindblom, ‘The Science of “Muddling Through”’, Public Administration Review 19 (Spring 1959), 79–88; see also Charles E. Lindblom, ‘Still Muddling, Not Yet Through’, Public Administration Review 39 (1979), 517–26.

⁵⁹Quoted in Robert Cooper, ‘The Utility of Force by General Sir Rupert Smith’, Sunday Times (18 Sept. 2005).

⁶⁰On the economic cost of the Iraq War, see, for instance, Aida Edemariam, ‘The true cost of war: In 2005, a Nobel prize-winning economist began the painstaking process of calculating the true cost of the Iraq War. In his new book, he reveals how short-sighted budget decisions, cover-ups and a war fought in bad faith will affect us all for decades to come'. ‘Aida Edemariam meets Joseph Stiglitz’, The Guardian, 28 Feb. 2008.

⁶¹See Michael I. Handel, Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought, 3rd rev. and expanded ed. (London: Routledge 2001); see also Jason D. Wood, ‘Clausewitz in the Caliphate: Center of Gravity in the Post-9/11 Security Environment’, Comparative Strategy 27/1 (2008), 44–56.

⁶²For more on ‘complex interdependence’ see Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye Jr, ‘Power and Interdependence in the Information Age’, Foreign Affairs 77/5 (Sept./Oct. 1998).

⁶³See also, for example, British Army Col. Alexander Alderson, ‘Learning, Adapting, Applying: US Counter-Insurgency Doctrine and Practice’, RUSI Journal 152/6 (Dec. 2007), 12–19.

⁶⁴Julian Lewis MP, ‘Double-I, Double-N: A Framework for Counter-Insurgency’, RUSI Journal 153/1 (Feb. 2008), 37.

⁶⁵For ‘intelligence power’, see former UK intelligence practitioner Michael Herman's book, Intelligence Power in Peace and War (Cambridge: Chatham House/CUP 1996).

⁶⁶See, for example, Handel, ‘Deception, Surprise, and Intelligence’, Chapter 15 in his Masters of War, from 215.

⁶⁷Tzu, Art of War, 68.

⁶⁸See, for instance, those outlined above in OSCE, Countering Terrorism, Protecting Human Rights.

⁶⁹For the ‘bludgeon’ and ‘rapier’ reference, see David Omand, ‘Reflections on Secret Intelligence’, Gresham College Transcript, London, 20 Oct. 2005.

⁷⁰See also, for instance, Robert M. Perito, ‘Police in Peace and Stability Operations: Evolving US Policy and Practice’, International Peacekeeping 15/1 (2008), 51–66.

⁷¹Quoted in Cooper, ‘The Utility of Force by General Sir Rupert Smith’; see also Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World (London: Penguin 2005).

⁷²Here, good peacekeeping intelligence (PKI) is essential. For more background on PKI, see, for example, David Carment and Martin Rudner (eds), Peacekeeping Intelligence: New Players, Extended Boundaries (London: Routledge 2006).

⁷³For an example of this detrimental scenario of ‘regrouping/reforming’ occurring, see, for instance, Bruce Riedel, ‘The Return of the Knights: al-Qaeda and the Fruits of Middle East Disorder’, Survival 49/3 (Autumn 2007), 107–20.

⁷⁴For the US military's current policy towards handling detainees, see, for example, US Joint Chiefs of Staff, ‘Detainee Operations’, Joint Publication 3–63 (6 Feb. 2008); see also Steven R. Ratner, ‘Why the Old Rules of War are Still the Best Rules’, Foreign Policy (March/April 2008), 26–32, he writes ‘The Geneva Conventions help protect civilians and soldiers from the atrocities of war. But these hard-won rules of battle are falling by the wayside: Terrorists ignore them, and governments increasingly find them quaint and outdated. With every violation, war only gets deadlier for everyone.’

⁷⁶James Fallows, ‘Foreword’, in John Robb, Brave New War: The Next Stage of Terrorism and the End of Globalization (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley 2007), vi; see also the comments of former US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) analyst Alex Rossmiller, ‘Excerpts: “Still Broken”’, The Huffington Post, 13 Feb. 2008; see also Alex J. Rossmiller, Still Broken: A Recruit's Inside Account of Intelligence Failures, From Baghdad to The Pentagon (New York: Presidio Press 2008); see also Lara J. Jordan and Pamela Hess, ‘Cheney, Others OK'd Harsh Interrogations’, The Huffington Post, 10 April 2008.

⁷⁵For the importance of maintaining ‘values’ and continuing to adhere to international law, see, for example, Philippe Sands, Lawless World: The Whistle-Blowing Account of How Bush and Blair are taking the Law into Their Own Hands, updated ed. (London: Penguin 2006); Helena Kennedy, Just Law: The Changing Face of Justice – and Why It Matters to Us All – Equality, Fairness, Respect, Dignity, Civil Liberties (London: Vintage 2004).

⁷⁷The US military also recognises this – see, for example, US Joint Chiefs of Staff, ‘Information Operations,’Joint Publication 3–13 (13 Feb. 2006); Steven Aftergood, ‘DoD Issues New Doctrine on Information Operations’, FAS Secrecy News, 2006/42 (3 April 2006); see also Raphael F. Perl, ‘Terrorism and National Security: Issues and Trends’, CRS Issue Brief for Congress, 9 March 2006, 1; Tony Skinner, ‘Information Operations – Shaping Influence’, Jane's Defence Weekly, 23 Aug. 2006; Clay Wilson, ‘Information Operations and Cyberwar: Capabilities and Related Policy Issues’, CRS Report for Congress (updated 14 Sept. 2006). For these types of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, see, for instance, Robin Moore et al., TASKFORCE DAGGER: The Hunt for Bin Laden: On the Ground with Special Operations Forces in the War on Terror (Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan 2003), 366; see also PDF by Major Joseph L. Cox, US Army, ‘Information Operations in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom – What Went Wrong?’, School of Advanced Military Studies, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 25 May 2006.

⁷⁸Zinn, ‘Introduction: The Contribution of Sociology to the Discourse in Risk and Uncertainty’, 13.

⁷⁹Andrew Imbrie, ‘AFGHANISTAN UPDATE’, British American Security Information Council (BASIC), 29 (25 Jan.–7 Feb. 2008), <www.basicint.org/update/afg.htm> (accessed 9 Feb. 2008).

⁸⁰Indeed, an initiative working on this sort of basis is apparent in Canada, where the ‘Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security … was created to engage Canadians and the Government of Canada in a long-term dialogue on matters related to national security as they impact a diverse and pluralistic society.’– A. Anne McLellan, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness in ‘Message from Deputy Prime Minister’, Canadian Government, Securing an Open Society – One Year Later: Progress Report on the Implementation of Canada's National Security Policy (April 2005); see also Adam Roberts, ‘International Relations after the Cold War’, International Affairs 84/2 (2008), 335–50, especially where he argues: ‘If there is a single theme that unites what follows, it is recognition, even celebration, of a pluralist approach both to the actual conduct of international relations and to the academic subject.’

⁸¹See also John L. Esposito and Dalia Mogahed, ‘Battle for Muslims’ Hearts and Minds: The Road Not (Yet) Taken’, Middle East Policy 14/1 (2007), 27–41.

⁸²See also, for example, the strategy proposed by Lord Paddy Ashdown for Afghanistan as detailed in Ashdown, ‘A Strategy to Save Afghanistan’; see also, for example, the arguments presented in Colin S. Gray, ‘Out of the Wilderness: Prime Time for Strategic Culture’, Comparative Strategy 26/1 (Jan. 2007), 1–20.

⁸³Colin S. Gray, ‘Weapons for Strategic Effect: How Important is Technology?’, Occasional Paper No. 21 (Maxwell Air Force Base, Montgomery, ALA: Center for Strategy and Technology Air War College/ Air Univ. Jan. 2001), 26–7.

⁸⁴Ibid. The 17 dimensions Gray suggests are: ‘1. People; 2. Society; 3. Culture; 4. Politics; 5. Ethics; 6. Economics and logistics; 7. Organization (defense planning); 8. Military administration; 9. Information and intelligence; 10. Theory and doctrine; 11. Technology; 12. Military operations (fighting performance); 13. Command (political and military); 14. Geography; 15. Friction and chance; 16. Adversary; 17. Time …Each dimension is always in play and influences other dimensions as a contributor to strategic behavior.’

⁸⁵Will Hutton, The World We're In (London: Abacus 2003), 464.

⁸⁶See also Colin Gray, ‘Clausewitz Rules, OK? The Future is the Past – With GPS’, Review of International Studies 25/special issue (Dec. 1999), 163, particularly where he notes: ‘I agree with Ken Booth's helpful light adaptation of the familiar definition of politics by Harold Lasswell: world politics is about “‘who gets what, when, [and] how’ across the globe”.’

⁸⁷As a general example of this, see ‘Barriers to Conflict: A Concrete Solution to Shifting Concerns?’Jane's Intelligence Review, 1 July 2006; see also ‘Plans for Tougher [UK] Border Controls’, BBC News Online, 26 Jan. 2007; Jonathan Weisman, ‘With Senate Vote, Congress Passes [US-Mexico] Border Fence Bill: Barrier Trumps Immigration Overhaul’, Washington Post, 30 Sept. 2006.