Operational Research, Military Judgement and the Politics of Technical Change in the British Infantry, 1943–1953

Abstract

The central claim underpinning the Revolution in Military Affairs is that battlefield imperatives drive technical and more widely social change: that technology evolves according to a logic that starts with the relationship between the offence and defence in battle. Thus the ambition of the military organisation is to develop weaponry that can beat the adversary. A failure to grasp this essential truth leads to defeat in battle. This paper demonstrates how technology change happens in practice. By looking inside the ‘black box’ of the military organisation, what emerges is a more complicated picture that takes into account the way arguments for technical change are constructed and deployed within the bureaucracy based on a variety of battlefield interpretations. This shows that technology development is not necessarily driven by either frontline demands or scientific understanding but in reference to who has organisational power and how they use it.

Key Words:

• Revolution in Military Affairs
• Technology
• Change
• Infantry

Notes

¹Millet and Murray are the most widely quoted authorities on the subject of military effectiveness. See for example A.R. Millett, W. Murray and K.H. Watman, ‘The Effectiveness of Military Organizations’, International Security 11/1 (Summer 1986), 37–71 and A.R. Millett and W. Murray (eds.), Military Effectiveness, Vol. 1 The First World War (Boston: Allen & Unwin 1988). For a review of the literature on military effectiveness see, R.A. Brooks, ‘Introduction: The Impact of Culture, Society, Institutions and International Forces on Military Effectiveness’, in R.A. Brooks and E.A. Stanley (eds.), Creating Military Power: The Sources of Military Effectiveness (Stanford UP 2007), 4–9.

²The views of some historians who address this subject can be found in, J. Buckley (ed.), The Normandy Campaign 1944: Sixty Years On (London: Routledge 2006). In addition several political scientists have also investigated the problem but have taken an approach based on statistical analysis. For some recent examples of this kind of investigation see, S. Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton UP 2004) and J. Lyall and I. Wilson III, ‘Rage Against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes in Counterinsurgency Wars’, International Organization 63 (Winter 2009), 67–106. While extremely interesting these examinations take a different theoretical stance to that proposed here.

³For a critique of this line of reasoning see J. Stone, ‘Technology and War: A Trinitarian Analysis’, Defense and Security Analysis 23/1 (2007), 27–40.

⁴Because the RMA literature is so vast it is impossible to discuss it in all its nuanced forms. However, an excellent introduction to the field can be found in M. Knox and W. Murray (eds.), The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300–2050 (Cambridge: CUP 2001). Examples of work undertaken by the main historians of the RMA include, G. Parker, The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500–800 (Cambridge: CUP 1988); J. Black, A Military Revolution? Military Change and European Society, 1550–800 (London: Macmillan 1991); C.J. Rogers (ed.), The Military Revolution Debate: Readings on the Military Transformation of Early Modern Europe (Princeton UP 1992). For an indication as to how the historical RMA literature can be applied to contemporary socio-technical problems see, C.J. Rogers, ‘“Military Revolutions” and “Revolutions in Military Affairs”: A Historian's Perspective’, in T. Gongora and H. Riekhoff (eds.), Towards a Revolution in Military Affairs? Defense and Security at the Dawn of the Twenty-First Century (London: Greenwood Press 2000). For a review of the RMA debate in the 1990s see, C.S. Gray, Strategy for Chaos: Revolutions in Military Affairs and The Evidence of History (London: Frank Cass 2002), 1–20. The importance of the RMA logic is demonstrated by the way in which it has shaped discussions in US military circles. In this respect Col. Andrew Krepinevich's article on the RMA is particularly important, especially given his affiliations with the Pentagon's Office of Net Assessment. See A. Krepinevich, ‘Cavalry to Computer: The Pattern of Military Revolutions’, The National Interest 37 (1994), 30–42.

⁵WO 216/324, National Archive (NA), Minutes of Meeting Held by the Vice Chief of the Imperial General Staff (VCIGS) in Hotel Metropole, London, at 1500 hours, 20 July 1949 to discuss ‘The steps to be taken to improve small arms shooting in the Army and further support for the Army Rifle Association’, 20 July 1949, p.2.

⁶D. French, Raising Churchill's Army: the British Army and the War Against Germany, 1919–1945 (Oxford: OUP 2000), 98–9.

⁷French, Raising Churchill's Army, 71.

⁸R. Weeks, Organisation & Equipment for War (Cambridge: CUP 1950), 31–2.

⁹There were a number of Major-General Wilsons during the war. The Wilson referenced here is Thomas Needham Furnival Wilson CB, DSO, MC.

¹⁰PP/MCR/182 Imperial War Museum (IWM), Wimberley Papers.

¹¹T.H. Place, ‘Lionel Wigram, Battle Drill and the British Army in the Second World War’, War in History 7/4 (2000), 442.

¹²Place, ‘Lionel Wigram, Battle Drill and the British Army in the Second World War’, 446.

¹³Ibid. 444.

¹⁴For more information about the techniques and tactics being taught at the schools see L. Wigram, (Infantry) Battle School (1941): A Detailed Description of the Evolution of Battle Drill Training in its Early Stages (Cambridge: John Bodsworth 2005).

¹⁵Wigram, (Infantry) Battle School (1941), 160.

¹⁶I.V. Hogg, Jane's Guns Recognition Guide (Glasgow: HarperCollins 2002).

¹⁷T.H. Place, Military Training in the British Army, 1940–1944: From Dunkirk to D-Day (London: Frank Cass 2000), 60–1.

¹⁸French, Raising Churchill's Army, 22.

¹⁹120 Meetings – Conferences (Future Design of Weapons) – Box 2, MOD Pattern Room Archive, Memo Circulated by DInf on the Objectives of the Standing Committee, 30 May 1943.

²⁰120 Meetings Conferences (Future Design of Weapons) Box 2, MOD Pattern Room Archive, Meeting of the Standing Committee on Infantry Weapon Development, 1 September 1943.

²¹Unfortunately for the Army re-armament was a slow process. Two examples demonstrate this point: (1) 1938 production of Bren LMGs amounted to 300 per week rising to 400 per week in Sept. 1942. Before Dunkirk, the British Army had around 30,000 Bren guns. At Dunkirk the British Army lost 8,000 Bren guns. After the fall of France the total number of Brens in Britain amounted to only 2,300 weapons. By 1943 production reached 1,000 weapons per week. At the beginning of the war, however, production was centred at the Royal Small Arms Factory (RSAF) at Enfield Lock, north-east London. This was subject to regular air raids which could severely disrupt output. By Sept. 1939 production standards it would take around two years to replace all the lost Bren guns following the Dunkirk debacle. See A.J.R. Cormack, Famous Rifles and Machine Guns (London: Barrie & Jenkins 1977) 27; and W. Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. II: Their Finest Hour (London: Cassell & Co. 1949), 125. (2) At a time when the number of men in uniform had risen from 224,000 in 1939 to 2,453,000 in 1942, the number of No.1 Short Magazine Lee-Enfield (SMLE) rifles that had been manufactured totalled only 177,491. For No.1 SMLE production figures see, PREM 11/854, NA. Data on the size of the wartime British Army can be found in J. Crang, The British Army and the People's War, 1939–1945 (Manchester UP 2000), 144–5.

²²For example 237,732 Sten Mk I and Mk II sub-machine guns (or 16 per cent of entire Sten output) were recalled because of quality assurance problems. This fundamentally affected the confidence of troops in their equipment despite revisions that significantly improved the weapon's reliability, see P. Laidler, The Sten Machine Carbine (Cobourg, Ont.: Collector Grade Publications 2000), 299–302. For the views of the service men issued with early production versions of the No. 4 Rifle see 200 Small Arms General Box 1, ‘Summary and Consolidated Report by WTSFF on Infantry Questionnaire and Answers from Units in First and Eighth Armies on Conclusion of N. African Campaign May 1943’. For evidence of early quality assurance failures see 200 (200) Small Arms General Box 2, all found in the MOD Pattern Room Archive, Memorandum from DOS to DDOS, Rifles No.4 MkI* - British Manufacture, 8 Dec. 1942.

²³See 120 Meetings Conferences (Future Design of Weapons) Box 2, MOD Pattern Room Archive, Meeting of the Standing Committee on Infantry Weapon Development, 1 Sept. 1943.

²⁴M.W. Kirby, Operational Research in War and Peace: The British Experience from the 1930s to 1970 (London: Imperial College Press 2003), 3. For a good introduction to the operational research undertaken in Britain during World War II, see J. McCloskey, ‘British Operational Research in World War II’, Operations Research 35/3 (1987), 453–70.

²⁵This data came from ‘Current Reports from Overseas’ (CRO) and ‘Notes from Theatres of War’ (NTW). Both the NTW and the CRO documented combat experience and lessons learnt. NTW was officially sanctioned, had been edited by the War Office and endorsed by the relevant HQ. CRO provided a vehicle for transmitting combat lessons where War Office and Army level approval had not yet been achieved. A detailed description of both types of document can be found in Place, Military Training in the British Army, 1940–1944, 12–15. For an excellent introduction to the work of the Army Operational Research Group see T. Copp, Montgomery's Scientists: Operational Research in Northwest Europe: The Work of No.2 Operational Research Section with 21 Army Group June 1944 to July 1945 (Waterloo, Ont.: Wilfrid Laurier Univ. 2000).

²⁶See, Shephard Papers Box 2 - File 00028, Laurier Centre for Military, Strategic and Disarmament Studies (LCMSDS), AORG memoranda ‘Infantry Battle’, and Shephard Papers Box 2 - File 00028, LCMSDS, ‘The Fire-Power of the Infantry Section’.

²⁷By 1944, the section had increased in size to ten men. Typically the officer and NCO were armed with Sten guns, seven others had rifles and one man had a Bren gun. For an organisation chart of the 1944 infantry battalion see, George Forty, British Army Handbook, 1939–1945 (London: Chancellor 2000), 165.

²⁸French, Raising Churchill's Army, 84.

²⁹The magazine could contain 30 rounds. However, troops often only loaded 28 rounds into the magazine in order to prevent feeding problems.

³⁰The figure 450 to 550 rpm quoted from J. Barlow, Small Arms Manual (London: J. Murray 1942). It was stated at a meeting of the Infantry Weapons Development Committee that fire on average was 74 rounds per minute. See Conferences (Future Design of Weapons) Box 2, MOD Pattern Room Archive, Meeting of the Infantry Weapons Development Committee, 24 Feb. 1944.

³¹See WO 204/1895, NA, ‘Points Raised by Delegates, Infantry Training Conference’, 23 April 1944.

³²Indeed as much as anything this attachment led some in the small arms community to spuriously compare it with the German general purpose machine guns (GPMG), the MG34/MG42. See WO 205/998, NA, ‘Infantry Notes No. 6 – Appendix A, “Spandau versus the Bren”’, 17 Sept. 1944. For a more balanced comparison of the respective qualities of the Bren versus the belt-fed German GPMGs, see also WO 291/474, NA, ‘Rate of Fire of LMG’

³³By contrast the typical German infantry section contained 13 men armed with a combination of bolt-action rifles, machine carbines and MG34. The MG34 was an air cooled, belt-fed weapon which had a theoretical rate of fire of between 800 and 950 rounds per minute (rpm). Its successor, the MG42 had an even higher theoretical rate of fire at between 1,100 and 1,150 rpm. In actual operations these weapons would produce significantly less firepower, from 150 to 300 rpm for the MG34 and from 150 to 450 rpm for the MG42, reflecting the difficulty of getting sufficient ammunition and replacement barrels in the same place at the same time. However, what was clear was that the MG34 and its successor, without the contribution of any other weapon, produced rates of fire that made the German infantry section considerably more potent than its British equivalent. See French, Raising Churchill's Army, 39 and 120 Meetings – Conferences (Future Weapons Design) Box 2, MOD Pattern Room Archive, ‘Notes prepared by M.I.10 on German LMGs and MMGs and their Tactical Use’, 22 July 1943.

³⁴Nearly all of the drills taught by the Battle Schools were underpinned by this technique, see Wigram, (Infantry) Battle School (1941).

³⁵T.N.F. Wilson, ‘The Role of the Infantry’, JRUSI, 89 (1944), 2.

³⁶For an account of how men behaved in battle read Lionel Wigram's own analysis in the appendix of Denis Forman, To Reason Why (London: Abacus 1993), 199–201.

³⁷Forman, To Reason Why, 200–1.

³⁸This is implicitly stated by Wilson when he wrote that the infantry, ‘must at all times be able to fight their way forward and to close with the enemy with the support of their own weapons. It is to this end that the modern organisation and fire power of the infantry is designed. In this organisation the balance must be held between fire power, assault power and manoeuvrability’. See Wilson, ‘The Role of the Infantry’, 2.

³⁹By 1945 it was being stated explicitly by Weapons Technical Staff attached to 21st Army Group that, ‘The reduction in weight that could be affected in the re-design of Infantry weapons, together with the simplification of ammunition carriage and supply, would over-ride the advantage of being able to engage the enemy at longer ranges on the relatively few occasions when such opportunities arise’. See, 121 Design of Weapons - Box 3, ‘Final Report of Small Arms Effectiveness for Western Campaign WW2 from D-Day to VE Day - Small Arms Section from Weapons Technical Staff at 21^stArmy Group’, 15 July 1945.

⁴⁰The Sten has been wrongly singled out for being unreliable. These problems were at least initially down to poor manufacture rather than an inherent weakness in the design. Despite significant later improvements in its manufacture and design, the initial problems with the Sten left the infantry cautious about the weapon's reliability for the remainder of the war, for an example of this see S.E. Ambrose, Pegasus Bridge D-Day: The Daring British Airborne Raid (London: Pocket 2003), 169 and 181. See also note 24 above.

⁴¹At an infantry training conference in April 1944, one delegate observed, ‘It is considered that present teaching lays too much stress on the use of infantry weapons in the attack, especially the Bren. Experience shows that the ammunition problem is acute in the counter-attack phase. Ammunition fired in the attack is seldom aimed and therefore wasted.’ See WO 204/1895, NA, ‘Points Raised by Delegates, Infantry Training Conference’, 23 April 1944. The AORG also demonstrated that the Sten would be very effective when fighting in built-up areas or at night. See Shephard Papers Box 2 - File 00028, LCMSDS, AORG memoranda ‘The Fire-Power of the Infantry Section’. The question of rate of fire had been considered before. Major McMahon, a Chief Instructor at the School of Musketry in the years before World War I, had shown by practical experiment that 150 second-rate shots firing the SMLE rapidly could inflict more damage on an enemy moving in groups and by bounds than 100 elite marksmen. However, for a variety of reasons the General Staff had decided not to accept McMahon's conclusions and the issue was buried. Consequently, the notion that more lead in the air might improve the probability of achieving a kill had languished and it was only after World War II that this ‘chance to kill’ phenomenon systematically entered the ordnance communities' lexicon. According to the US Operations Research Office (ORO) attached to Johns Hopkins University, and whose membership included the esteemed combat historian Brig. Gen. S.L.A. Marshall, the chance to kill was expressed as an equation. This stated that the probability of killing a target involved multiplying the probability of achieving a hit by the probability that the round might strike a part of the victim's body that contained a vital organ. For information on Major McMahon see S. Bidwell and D. Graham, Fire-Power: British Army Weapons and Theories of War 1904–1945 (London: George Allen & Unwin 1982), 29–30. For the original material, see also 77/189/93, IWM, Bruce Williams Papers. For references to the ORO, see E. Prokosch, The Technology of Killing: A Military and Political History of Anti-Personnel Weapons (London: Zed Books 1995), 42.

⁴²See Shephard Papers Box 2 - File 00028, LCMSDS, ‘The Fire-Power of the Infantry Section’, see also WO 291/473, NA, AORG Memo 125, Interim Report on Performance of Bullet Weapons.

⁴³See Shephard Papers Box 2 - File 00028, LCMSDS, ‘The Fire-Power of the Infantry Section’.

⁴⁴See Shephard Papers Box 2 - File 00028, LCMSDS, ‘Infantry Battle’.

⁴⁵See Shephard Papers Box 2 - File 00028, LCMSDS, ‘The Fire-Power of the Infantry Section’.

⁴⁶120 Meetings – Conferences (Future Design of Weapons) – Box 2, MOD Pattern Room Archive, Meeting of the Committee of Infantry Weapon Development, 8 July 1943.

⁴⁷A similar request had been made during the Great War, see P. Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Western Front: The British Army's Art of Attack, 1916–1918 (London: Yale UP 1996), 131.

⁴⁸WO 32/10515, NA, Meeting of the Organisation and Weapons Policy Committee, 7 October 1943.

⁴⁹120 Meetings – Conferences (Future Design of Weapons) Box 2, MOD Pattern Room Archive, ‘Summary of Replies Received from Middle East, North Africa and Combined Operations Headquarters to Questions asked in Progress Bulletin (infantry) Relevant to Small Arms Development’, 1 Sept. 1943.

⁵⁰See 200 Small Arms General Box 1, MOD Pattern Room Archive, ‘Summary and Consolidated Report by WTSFF on Infantry Questionnaire and Answers from Units in First and Eighth Armies on Conclusion of N. African Campaign May 1943’.

⁵¹Ibid.

⁵²120 Meetings – Conferences (Future Design of Weapons) Box 2, MOD Pattern Room Archive, Minutes of Various Meetings of the Standing Committee on Infantry Weapon Development Dated 24 June 1943, 2 July 1943, 8 July 1943.

⁵³See 200 Small Arms General Box 1, ‘Summary of Replies Received from Middle East, North Africa and Combined Operations Headquarters to Questions asked in Progress Bulletin (Infantry) Relevant to Small Arms Development’, 1 Sept. 1943.

⁵⁴WO 32/105, NA, Meeting of the Organisation and Weapons Policy Committee, 4 Jan. 1944.

⁵⁵WO32/105, NA, Memo from the Secretary of the Organisation and Weapons Policy Committee, 31 Jan. 1944.

⁵⁶No doubt this was partly driven by the recognition that the Ordnance Factories had had some trouble delivering sufficient .303in ammunition during the first two years of the war and that there were a vast number of .30in 06 weapons in Britain, see PREM 3/46/3, NA. The staff policy on adopting US ammunition can be found in WO 32/10515, NA, General Staff Policy Statement on Rimless Small Arms Ammunition, 20 March 1943.

⁵⁹200(200) Small Arms General Box 2, MOD Pattern Room Archive, ‘Report on the possibilities of adopting American Weapons for use in the British Service’, 25 March 1946.

⁵⁷By 1945 Wilson had been replaced by Major-General Douglas Wimberley, the former commander of the 51st Highland Division. This infantry division had fought its way across North Africa as part of Eighth Army and then been involved in the Sicily landings. During this operation Wimberley was injured forcing his return to England. In the time of to the period considered by this paper there were five other DInfs. None of them are directly considered here because broadly speaking they adopted the same views as Wimberley and Wilson with regards to future small arms for the infantry. The officers concerned were: 1947–48 Major-General A.B. Dowler; 1948–49 Major-General Fairbanks; 1949–52 Lieutenant-General C.M. Barber, who was both DInf and Director of Military Training; 1952 Major-General J.H.O. Wilsey; 1952–55 Major-General F.R.G. Matthews.

⁵⁸WO 32/10515, NA, Meeting of the OWPC, 24 April 1947; WO 216/324, NA, Minutes of Meeting held by VCIGS in Hotel Metropole at 1500 hours, 20 July 1949 to discuss ‘The steps to be taken to improve small arms shooting in the Army and further support for the Army Rifle Association’, 20 July 1949, p.2.

⁶⁰The efforts of Brigadier Barlow, the Director of Artillery (Small Arms), and Lieutenant-Colonel Noel Kent-Lemon, the Assistant Chief Engineer Armament Design at the Armament Design Establishment were central to this endeavour.

⁶¹In a conventionally configured rifle the stock accounts for the majority of the weight. By removing the stock it is possible to reduce the weight but the trigger housing mechanism has to move forward to enable the shooter to use the weapon. When thinking of the EM2's configuration keep in mind the shape of the current British service rifle, the SA80.

⁶²WO 32/10515, NA, Meeting of the OWPC, 19 Dec. 1946.

⁶³WO 32/10515, NA, Letter from DCIGS to CIGS, 31 May 1946.

⁶⁴WO 32/10515, NA, Meeting of the Organisation and Weapons Policy Committee, 18 April 1946.

⁶⁵WO 32/10515, NA, Letter from BJSM to DWD, ‘Future Small Arms Ammunition Policy’, 31 July 1946.

⁶⁶US War Dept., War Dept. Equipment Board Report, 22 May 1946, quoted from Thomas McNaugher, The M-16 Controversies – Military Organisations and Weapons Acquisition (New York: Praeger 1984), 35.

⁶⁷See Prokosch, The Technology of Killing, 34; and WO 291/1040, NA, ‘An Examination of the Zuckerman Criteria of Wounding, Based on a Review of the Available Literature’, Military Operational Research Report, Report No. 112, Aug. 1946.

⁶⁸WO 291/1040, NA, ‘An Examination of the Zuckerman Criteria of Wounding, Based on a Review of the Available Literature’, Military Operational Research Report, Report No. 112, Aug. 1946.

⁶⁹See SZ/OEMU/44/17/79, Zuckerman Papers, University of East Anglia (UEA), ‘Memorandum for Dr J. F. Fulton on the use of 58ft/lbs as a Criterion of Incapacitation’, 16 March 1945.

⁷⁰The case Zuckerman and his colleagues made is most clearly laid out in HO 195/13/350, NA, ‘The Wounding Power of Small Bomb and Shell Fragments’ by B. Delisle Burns and S. Zuckerman, RC350, Oct. 1942, p.4. Zuckerman also made reference to his wartime research work in S. Zuckerman, From Apes to Warlords: The Autobiography (1904–1946) of Solly Zuckerman (London: Collins 1988), 113–30.

⁷¹See SZ/OEMU/47/19/31, Zuckerman Papers, UEA, ‘A review of the criteria of wounding power in common use’ by Dr B. Delisle Burns and Dr P.L. Krohn, Ministry of Aircraft Production, Oxford Research Unit, Scientific and Technical Memoranda No. C.3/45, 11 Oct. 1945.

⁷²World War II research into wound ballistics was first published by Zuckerman, Black and Burns who outlined the results of their research using 3/32in steel balls fired into anesthetised animals giving insight into wound cavities. See S. Zuckerman, A.N. Black and D.D. Burns, ‘An Experimental Study of the Wounding Mechanism of High Velocity Missiles’, British Medical Journal, ii (Dec. 1941), 872–3; and, HO 195/13/350, NA, ‘The Wounding Power of Small Bomb and Shell Fragments’ by B. Delisle Burns and S. Zuckerman, RC350, Oct. 1942.

⁷³WO 185/244, NA, Extracts from Correspondence Between Brigadier Barlow and Professor Zuckerman, 3 April 1951.

⁷⁴The t25 was a prototype weapon that fired the t65 .30in round. Correspondence between the BJSM and DGofA, 9, 11 and 17 Nov. 1948, WO 185/242, NA.

⁷⁵There are many examples of the American efforts to undermine the British ammunition but the British attitude towards this is best summed up in, Draft letter from DofA (SA) to DGofA titled, ‘Report of US Army Equipment Board, 8 March 1950, WO 185/242, NA.

⁷⁶Aberdeen Proving Ground (in Maryland) test results concluded that .280in achieved an average velocity of 2,211fps at the beginning of the test and 2,172fps at its end. The t65 by contrast achieved 2,737fps and 2,754fps respectively, see T. Dugelby, EM2 Concept and Design: A Rifle Ahead of Its Time (Toronto: Collector Grade Publications 1980), 119.

⁷⁷Specifically it had to be a .30in 06 155 grain bullet. See Ammo .280in – 3 .280in (7mm) Ammunition, MOD Pattern Room Archive, DofA (SA) Directive on SA Weapon and Ammunition Development Programme for the Future, 18 Sept. 1947, Letter from DofA (SA) to ADE, DGofA, and DOF.

⁷⁸CHUR 2/34, Churchill College Archives, Letter from unknown (possibly Brigadier Barlow) to Winston Churchill, July 1951.

⁷⁹WO 185/244, NA, The Adoption of the New Small Arms Ammunition and Weapon into the British Armed Forces, Note by the Chiefs of Staff to the Cabinet Defence Committee, 16 March 1951.

⁸⁰Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), House of Commons, Oral Answers, 25 April 1951, col. 378.

⁸¹PREM 11/854, NA, Note by the Prime Minister, 12 Nov. 1951.

⁸²Ibid.

⁸³CAB 21/3465, NA, Letter from Secretary of State for War to CIGS, 25 July 1951.

⁸⁴PREM 11/854, NA, Note of the Meeting of the 20 Nov. with the Secretary of State for War and CIGS, 21 Nov. 1951.

⁸⁵R. Lewin, Slim: The Standardbearer – A Biography of Field-Marshal The Viscount Slim[1976] (London: Pan Books 1978), 272–3.

⁸⁶PREM 11/854, NA, Note by the Prime Minister, 12 Nov. 1951.

⁸⁷See for example, K. Lieber, War and the Engineers: The Primacy of Politics over Technology (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 2005), 79–98 and S. Biddle, ‘Rebuilding the Foundations of Offense-Defense Theory’, Journal of Politics 63/3 (2001), 741–74.

⁸⁸Place, ‘Lionel Wigram, Battle Drill and the British Army in the Second World War’, 460–1.

⁸⁹S. Hart, Montgomery and ‘Colossal Cracks’: The 21st Army Group in Northwest Europe, 1944–45 (Westport, CT: London: Praeger 2000).

⁹⁰Similar points are made by Steve Woolgar and Keith Grint. See K. Grint, and S. Woolgar, The Machine at Work: Technology, Work, and Organization (Cambridge: Polity Press 1997).