Inter- and Intra-Service Rivalries in the Battle of the Atlantic

Abstract

This article considers disputes the Royal Navy and Coastal Command had with Bomber Command, the Air Staff and supporters of strategic bombing over what was the ‘proper’ use of air power. The disputes centred on the provision of air support for the anti-submarine campaign in the Battle of the Atlantic. This article will argue that the balance was too much in favour of strategic bombing at the expense of the security of the Atlantic convoys, but that when corporate culture and grand strategy are considered, the reasoning behind such an imbalance becomes easier to comprehend.

Key Words:

• Atlantic
• Aircraft
• ASW

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Paul Readman, Joe Maiolo and Kate Polden for reading early drafts of this article. I would also like to pay particular thanks to the anonymous referee whose comments and very constructive criticism helped focus my thinking.

Notes

¹R. Goette, ‘Britain and the Delay in Closing the Mid-Atlantic “Air Gap” During the Battle of the Atlantic’, The Northern Mariner 15 (2005), 19.

²W.J.R. Gardner, Decoding History: The Battle of the Atlantic and Ultra (London: Macmillan Press 1999), 218.

³Gardner, Decoding History, 218.

⁴Goette, ‘Britain and the Delay in Closing the Mid-Atlantic “Air Gap” During the Battle of the Atlantic’, 21.

⁵J. Buckley, The RAF and Trade Defence 1919–1945: Constant Endeavour (Keele, UK: Ryburn 1995), 115–70.

⁶W. Douglas, The Creation of a National Air Force. The Official History of the Royal Canadian Air Force, Vol. 2 (Univ. of Toronto Press 1986), 537–9, 545–51.

⁷[Kew, United Kingdom, The National Archives], ADM[iralty papers] 234/578, CB3304 (1A), Naval Staff History: Defeat of the Enemy Attack on Shipping 1939–1945: A Study of Policy and Operations, 171.

⁸[Kew, United Kingdom, The National Archives], AIR [Ministry and Royal Air Force papers] 41/47, The RAF in the Maritime War, 346.

⁹AIR 14/481, Joubert to Pierce, 22 June 1941.

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹AIR 14/481 Joubert to Pierce, 22 June 1941.

¹²AIR 14/481, Pierce to Joubert, 28 June 1941.

¹³AIR 41/47, The RAF in the Maritime War, 30.

¹⁴ADM 205/23, Battle of the Atlantic Committee 18th Meeting, 2 Sept. 1941.

¹⁵Sir C. Webster and N. Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany 1939–1945, Vol. 4 (London: HMSO 1961), 133.

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷[Kew, United Kingdom, The National Archives], CAB[inet Office papers] 86/1, BA (42)7, The Part Played by the Royal Air Force in the Battle of the Atlantic During 1941, 23 Feb. 1942.

¹⁸CAB 86/1, BA (42) 7, Attacks on Submarine Bases 1941.

¹⁹Webster and Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany, Vol. 4, 137.

²⁰AIR 41/47, The RAF in the Maritime War, 30.

²¹AIR 41/47, The RAF in the Maritime War, 355.

²²M. Middlebrook, Convoy (London: Penguin Books 1976), 64.

²³AIR 41/47, The RAF in the Maritime War, 355.

²⁴ADM 205/17, Minutes AU (42), 1st meeting, 4 Nov. 1942.

²⁵ADM 199/240, Minutes of a Meeting held at 10 Downing Street, 23 Dec. 1942.

²⁶ADM 205/30 Bombing of U-Boat Bases in the Bay of Biscay.

²⁷A. Harris, Bomber Command[1947] (London: Greenhill Books 1990), 137.

²⁸ADM 205/30 Bombing of U-Boat Bases in the Bay of Biscay.

²⁹ADM 205/30, 2nd Meeting of the Anti-U-Boat Committee, 13 Nov. 1942; ADM 199/240, Minutes of a Meeting held at 10 Downing Street, 23 Dec. 1942.

³⁰TNA, ADM 205/30, 2nd Meeting of the Anti-U-boat Committee, 13 Nov. 1942

³¹TNA, ADM 199/240, Minutes of a Meeting held at 10 Downing Street, 23 Dec. 1942.

³²Harris, Bomber Command, 137.

³³AIR 14/1232, The Contribution of Bomber Command to the Anti Submarine Campaign, 5.

³⁴CAB 66 (33), WP (43) 11.

³⁵AIR 15/362, Report by P.B. Joubert on the Review of the U-Boat War 1940–43, May 1943.

³⁶ADM 205/14, Speech by Prime Minister to COS (42) 297th Meeting, 22 Oct. 1942.

³⁷ADM 205/56, Letter from AOC Coastal Command to 1SL [First Sea Lord], 17 Nov. 1941; CAB 66 (20), WP (41) 308, 29 Dec. 1941.

³⁸CAB 66 (20), WP (41) 308, 29 Dec. 1941.

³⁹ADM 205/56, Letter from AOC Coastal Command to 1SL, 17 Nov. 1941.

⁴⁰G.C. Peden, Arms, Economics and British Strategy (Cambridge: CUP 2007), 177.

⁴¹CAB 86/2, 24th Meeting of the Battle of the Atlantic Committee, 11 Nov. 1942.

⁴²[Portsmouth, Naval Historical Branch], D/NHB 2-2-15, R.H.R. MacKay, An Account of Seventeen Convoys Conducted by Capt R.H.R. MacKay, 10.

⁴³C. Barnett, Engage The Enemy More Closely (London: Hodder & Stoughton 1991), 380.

⁴⁴Ibid., 583–4.

⁴⁵Ibid., 600–1; N. Friedman, British Carrier Aviation (London: Conway Maritime Press 1988), 186.

⁴⁶HMS Avenger was commissioned in the USA on 2 March 1942. She arrived in the UK in May 1942. Following modifications including lengthening the flight deck and fitting HF/DF she sailed with PQ 18 for Russia in early Sept. 1942; ADM 234/578, CB3304 (1A), 293–4; Barnett, Engage The Enemy More Closely, 583, 600–1; Friedman, British Carrier Aviation, 188; J. Terraine, Business in Great Waters: The U-Boat Wars 1916–1945 (London: Leo Cooper 1989), 552.

⁴⁷ADM 234/578, CB3304 (1A), 294; Terraine, Business in Great Waters, 552.

⁴⁸ADM 205/56, CC/PBJ/709/41, Letter from AOC Coastal Command to 1SL, 2 Nov. 1941.

⁴⁹ADM 205/56, CC/PBJ/709/41, AOC Coastal Command to 1SL, 2 Nov. 1941.

⁵⁰ADM 205/15, Minute on the Operational Data of Coastal Command Aircraft. Figures based on radius of action including 1/3 endurance for convoy escort.

⁵¹ADM 205/15, Minute on the Operational Data of Coastal Command Aircraft.

⁵²ADM 205/10, Undated Admiralty Reply to Churchill's Minute of 8 Oct. 1941.

⁵³ADM 205/10, Churchill to 1SL and First Lord, 8 Oct. 1941.

⁵⁴CAB 120/295, Portal to Churchill, 20 Jan. 1942.

⁵⁵AIR 8/1397, A/S Warfare – Aircraft Requirements.

⁵⁶ADM 234/578, CB3304 (1A), 25.

⁵⁷ADM 205/23, 30th Meeting of the Battle of the Atlantic Committee, 10 Feb. 1942.

⁵⁸ADM 205/30, AU (42) 5, 2nd Meeting of the AU Committee, 13 Nov. 1942.

⁵⁹ADM 205/15, Undated Memo to 1SL; AIR 41/47, The RAF in the Maritime War, 357.

⁶⁰ADM 205/14, Churchill to 1SL, 21 Oct. 1942.

⁶¹C. Ashworth, RAF Coastal Command 1936–1969 (Yeovil, UK: Patrick Stephens 1992), 236.

⁶²ADM 205/23, AU (42) 3rd Meeting.

⁶³Ashworth, RAF Coastal Command 1936–1969, 236.

⁶⁴J. Buckley, ‘Contradictions in British Defence Policy 1927–1939: The RAF and the Defence of Trade’, Twentieth Century British History 5 (1994), 101; Terrain, Business in Great Waters, 176–8; see also Capt. S.W. Roskill, Naval Policy between the Wars, Vol. 2 (London: Collins 1968).

⁶⁵Compare G. Franklin, Britain's Anti-Submarine Capability 1919–1939 (London: Frank Cass 2003).

⁶⁶Buckley, ‘Contradictions in British Defence Policy 1927–1939’, 102.

⁶⁷AIR 41/47, The RAF in the Maritime War, 350. Although the fact that this history was never published means that it can be argued that it was not representative of the Air Staff view, it should also be considered that the official history of the strategic bombing offensive, The Strategic Bombing Offensive Against Germany 1939–1945 also received opposition from the Air Staff. See N. Frankland, History at War: The Campaign of an Historian (London: Giles de la Mare Publishers 1998), 102–12, 117 for details on how the Air Staff attempted to suppress or distort this official history.

⁶⁸D. Richards, The Hardest Victory (London: Hodder & Stoughton 1994), 81.

⁶⁹CAB 66/13 WP (40) 421, The Mediterranean, 15 Oct. 1940.

⁷⁰Ibid.

⁷¹ADM 234/578, CB3304 (1A), 218; Capt. S.W. Roskill, The War at Sea, Vol. 1 (London: HMSO 1954), 370, 371, 374, 376, 379–40.

⁷²ADM 234/578, CB3304 (1A), 215–16.

⁷³Barnett, Engage the Enemy More Closely, 381.

⁷⁴CAB 80/17, COS (40) 683.

⁷⁵B.P. Farrell, The Basis and Making of British Grand Strategy: Was There a Plan? (Lampeter, Wales: Edwin Mellen Press 1998), 43–4, 62–5; R.J. Overy, ‘Strategic Bombardment Before 1939: Doctrine, Planning and Operations’, in R. Cargill (ed.), Case Studies in Strategic Bombardment (Washington DC: Office of Air Force History 1998), 73.

⁷⁶Farrell, The Basis and Making of British Grand Strategy, 31–2, 50–2; D. Reynolds, ‘Churchill and the British “Decision” to fight on in 1940: Right Policy, Wrong Reasons’, in R. Langhorne (ed.), Diplomacy and Intelligence during the Second World War (Cambridge: CUP 2003), 157–60.

⁷⁷A. Chandler, ‘The Church of England and the Obliteration Bombing of Germany in the Second World War’, English Historical Review 108/429 (Oct. 1993), 926, 931.

⁷⁸Chandler, ‘The Church of England and the Obliteration Bombing of Germany in the Second World War’, 943; J.R.M. Butler, Grand Strategy, Vol. 3, Part 2 (London: HMSO 1964), 523; see also cartoons in the popular press such as Daily Mail, 10 Sept. 1940.

⁷⁹CAB 66/27, WP (42) 311.

⁸⁰AIR 8/405, Harris to Churchill, 17 June 1942.

⁸¹Ibid.

⁸²Ibid.

⁸³Ibid.

⁸⁴Lord Alanbrooke, A. Danchev and D. Todman (eds.), War Diaries 1939–1945 (Berkley and Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press 2001), 238, 258, 278, 325, 331, 332, 349.

⁸⁵D. Wood, ‘Digest of the Group Discussions’, in D. Wood (ed.), Seek and Sink: A Symposium on the Battle of the Atlantic (Bracknell, UK: Royal Air Force Historical Society 1992), 75.

⁸⁶CAB 120/95, Portal to Churchill, 29 March 1942.

⁸⁷Sir J. Slessor, The Central Blue: Recollections and Reflections (London: Cassell 1956), 499.

⁸⁸Buckley, The RAF and Trade Defence 1919–1945, 98–114.

⁸⁹Buckley, ‘Contradictions in British Defence Policy 1927–1939’, 110; Butler, Grand Strategy, Vol. 3, Part 2, 524, 556–7. An agreement on aircraft allocation between the USAAF, USN and RAF respectively signed in Washington DC on 21 June 1942.

⁹⁰W.J.R. Gardner, ‘Prelude to Victory: The Battle of the Atlantic 1942–1943’, Mariner's Mirror 79/3 (Aug. 1993), 309.

⁹¹Butler, Grand Strategy, Vol. 3, Part II, 626; M. Howard, Grand Strategy, Vol. 4 (London: HMSO 1972), 18–17, 112, 121; K. Smith, Conflict Over Convoys: Anglo-American Logistics Diplomacy in the Second World War (Cambridge: CUP 1996), 75–80.

⁹²ADM 205/15, Memo by Director of Plans, 27 Feb. 1942.

⁹³ADM 205/15, Churchill to 1SL, 19 Oct. 1942.

⁹⁴CAB, 80/65 COS (42) 345 (O) (Final); CAB 80/65, COS (42) 379 (O) An Estimate of the Effects of an Anglo-American Bomber Offensive Against Germany; CAB 80/65, Minute by Pound, 15 Nov. 1942.

⁹⁵CAB 86/2 3rd Meeting, Anti-U-boat Warfare Committee; ADM 205/27, Notes for the Prime Minister's Meeting, 13 Nov. 1942.

⁹⁶D. Reynolds, Britannia Overruled. British Policy and World Power in the 20th Century, 2nd edn (London: Longman 2000), 49–50.

⁹⁷U. Bialer, The Shadow of the Bomber (London: Royal Historical Society 1980), 156; M. Smith, British Air Strategy Between the Wars (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1981), 94–105.

⁹⁸AIR 19/23, The Navy and its Relation to the Fleet Air Arm and Shore-based Aircraft: Inskip Inquiry.

⁹⁹AIR 19/23 Minute by Group Captain Harris, 15 March 1937.

¹⁰⁰ADM 234/578, CB3304 (1A), 34.

¹⁰¹AIR 20/3045, Minutes by Peck, 13 Nov. 1942, 12 Feb. 1943.

¹⁰²AIR 20/3045, Minute by Peck, 12 Feb. 1943.

¹⁰³ADM 205/15, Minute from the Naval Staff to 1SL, 6 April 1942.

¹⁰⁴P.S. Meilinger, ‘Trenchard and “Morale Bombing”: The Evolution of Royal Air Force Doctrine Before World War II’, Journal of Military History 60 (1996), 268; R. J. Overy, ‘Air Power and the Origins of Deterrence Theory before 1939’, Journal of Strategic Studies 15/1 (March 1992), 89; see also N. Jones, The Beginnings of Strategic Air Power: A History of the British Bombing Force (London: Frank Cass 1987).

¹⁰⁵Chandler, ‘The Church of England and the Obliteration Bombing of Germany in the Second World War’, 920–46; Webster and Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany, Vol. 1, 329–31.

¹⁰⁶Webster and Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany, Vol. 1, 178–80.

¹⁰⁷AP 1300, RAF War Manual, Part I Operations (London: Air Ministry 1935), 57; Buckley, ‘Contradictions in British Defence Policy 1927–1939’, 103, 107; Peden, Arms, Economics and British Strategy, 112–13.

¹⁰⁸P.R.C. Groves, Our Future in the Air: A Survey of the Vital Questions of British Air Power (London: Hutchinson 1922), and Behind the Smoke Screen (London: Faber 1934); J. Griffin, Glass Houses and Modern War (London: Chatto & Windus 1938); L.E.O. Charlton, War From the Air (London: T. Nelson 1935), and War Over England (London: Longmans Green 1937); W. Murray, ‘Strategic Bombing. The British, American, and German experiences’, in W. Murray and A.R. Millett (eds.), Military Innovation in the Interwar Period (Cambridge: CUP 1996), 102; I.F. Clarke, Voices Prophesying War 1763–1984 (London: OUP 1966), 170; A. Conan Doyle, ‘Danger!’, Strand Magazine Vol. 48 (1914), 12, 16, 17, 18.

¹⁰⁹P. Williamson, Stanley Baldwin (Cambridge: CUP 1999), 47, 305–6.

¹¹⁰T. D. Biddle, Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare: The Evolution of British and American Ideas about Strategic Bombing, 1914–1945 (Princeton UP 2002), 102, 103.

¹¹¹Bialer, Shadow of the Bomber, 155.

¹¹²J.M.A. Gwyer, Grand Strategy (London: HMSO 1964), 32.

¹¹³CAB 66/28, WP (42) 374.

¹¹⁴Farrell, The Basis and Making of British Grand Strategy, 79; D. Reynolds, In Command of History (London: Penguin Books 2004), 118–19.

¹¹⁵Air, 8/1397, A/S Warfare – Aircraft Requirements, undated Nov. 1942; Ashworth, RAF Coastal Command 1936–1969, Appendix 7; Buckley, The RAF and Trade Defence 1919–1945, 146–7.

¹¹⁶N. Dixon, On the Psychology of Military Incompetence (London: Jonathan Cape 1976), 164–6.

¹¹⁷R. Darnton, The Great Cat Massacre and Other Episodes in French Cultural History (London: Penguin Books 2001), 5.

¹¹⁸J. Lynn, Battle: A History of Combat and Culture (Boulder, CO: Westview Press 2003), 121.

¹¹⁹AIR 41/47, The RAF in the Maritime War, 351.