Lost Chance or Lost Horizon? Strategic Opportunity and Escalation Risk in the Korean War, April–July 1951

Abstract

This article examines three questions surrounding American attempts at war termination in 1951. Was there a militarily feasible ‘lost chance’ for UN forces to advance to the narrow neck of the Korean peninsula? If so, why did American decisionmakers decline to pursue it? What effect might such operations have had on the course of the war and subsequent American thinking on limited war? It concludes that the US missed a critical opportunity to conclude the war on more favorable terms; that the American decision to forgo amphibious operations in June 1951 had less to do with military calculations than with the domestic political firestorm that followed MacArthur's relief; and that the ‘lost chance’ not only increased the cost and duration of the Korean War, but encouraged subsequent decision makers to overstate the risks of intra-war escalation and understate the risks of premature, de-escalation.

Key Words:

• Escalation
• Limited War
• Korean War

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank colleagues who reviewed this article and provided invaluable feedback. They include Thomas Christensen, Owen Cote, Brendan Green, Llewelyn Hughes, Karl Jackson, Bradford Lee, Jon Lindsay, Austin Long, William Norris, Barry Posen, and Josh Rovner.

Notes

¹Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965 (Princeton UP 1992), 99–102.

²Morton H. Halperin, Limited War in the Nuclear Age (New York: John Wiley 1963), 3.

³Ibid., 9, 32.

⁴Bernard Brodie, War and Politics (New York: Macmillan 1973), 92–7.

⁵Gen. Van Fleet's views were largely shared at the time by Adm. Forrest P. Sherman, the Chief of Naval Operations, Maj. Gen. Edward M. Almond, Commander of US X Corps, Maj. Gen. Gerald C. Thomas, Commander of US 1st Marine Division, and Vice Adm. Turner Joy, the lead US negotiator at Panmunjom. The arguments first proposed by these military leaders were subsequently expanded upon by Bernard Brodie and Henry Kissinger, among others.

⁶Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War (Garden City, NY: Doubleday 1967); Matthew B. Ridgway, Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway (New York: Harper & Brothers 1956); J. Lawton Collins, War in Peacetime: The History and Lessons of Korea (New York: Houghton Mifflin 1969); Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: W.W. Norton 1969); Dean Acheson, The Korean War (New York: W.W. Norton 1969).

⁷Allan R. Millett, The War for Korea, 1945–1950: A House Burning (Lawrence: Univ. of Kansas Press 2005); Sergei Goncharov, John Lewis, Xue Litai, Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War (Stanford, CA: Stanford UP 1993); Chen Jian, ‘The Sino-Soviet Alliance and China's Entry into the Korean War’, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper, 31 Oct. 1991; Kathryn Weathersby, ‘Soviet Aims in Korea and the Origins of the Korean War, 1945–1950: New Evidence from Russian Archives’, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper No. 8, Nov. 1993; Thomas J. Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947–1958 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP 1996).

⁸Allan R. Millett, The Korean War (Washington, DC: Potomac Books 2007), 160–1.

⁹Ridgway, The Korean War, 143.

¹⁰ F[oreign] R[elations of the] U[nited] S[tates], 1951, Vol.7, Part I, 166.

¹¹George F. Kennan, Memoirs: 1950–1963 (Boston: Little, Brown 1972), 28–9.

¹²US Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings, 83rd Congress, 1st Session, General James A. Van Fleet, Testimony, 5, 6, 10 March 1953.

¹³Gen. James A. Van Fleet, ‘The Truth About Korea: Part I: From a Man Now Free to Speak’, Life Magazine, 11 May 1953, 127–42; Gen. James A. Van Fleet, ‘The Truth About Korea: Part II: How We Can Win with What We Have’, Life Magazine, 18 May 1953, 157–72.

¹⁴Collins, War in Peacetime, 306–8.

¹⁵Ridgway, Korean War, 181–2.

¹⁶Acheson, Korean War, 116.

¹⁷United States Senate, Military Situation in the Far East (Washington DC: GPO 1951).

¹⁸Billy C. Mossman, Ebb and Flow (November 1950–July 1951): The United States Army in the Korean War (Washington DC: Center of Military History/US Government Printing Office 2000), 158.

¹⁹Clay Blair, The Forgotten War: America in Korea 1950–1953 (New York: Doubleday Books 1987), 570.

²⁰Shu Guang Zhang, Mao's Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War 1950–1953 (Lawrence: UP of Kansas 1995), 123.

²¹Ibid., 136–7, 138, 142.

²²Col. John F. Antal, ‘Busting Through’, Military Review, Jan.–Feb. 2000, 4; Blair, Forgotten War, 697–8.

²³Shu Guang Zhang, Mao's Military Romanticism, 142.

²⁴Ibid., 130.

²⁵Gen. (Ret.) Hong Xuezhi, ‘The CPVF's Combat and Logistics’, in Xiaobing Li, Allan R. Millett, and Bin Yu, Mao's Generals Remember Korea (Lawrence: UP of Kansas 2001), 131–2.

²⁶These figures are drawn from Blair, Forgotten War. One Chinese source, Gen. Hong Xuezhi, puts the CVF total strength in Korea in mid-April 1951 much higher – close to 950,000; see Hong Xuezhi, ‘The CPVF's Combat and Logistics’, 131–2. The discrepancy may be the difference between the number of troops engaged and the number available in theater.

²⁷Blair, Forgotten War, 819–20.

²⁸Ibid., 841.

²⁹W.L. Archer, ‘Observations of Close Air Support in Korea’, Technical Memorandum, Operations Research Office, ORO-S-18 (FEC), 1 June 1951.

³⁰Blair, Forgotten War, 854–5; Mossman, Ebb and Flow, 437.

³¹Korea Institute of Military History, The Korean War (Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska Press 1998), 2: 733.

³⁴Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Edward M. Almond, Conversations between Lieutenant General (Ret.) Edward M. Almond and Captain Thomas Fergusson: Senior Officers' Debriefing Program (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army Military History Institute 1979), 51–3.

³²Ibid., 2: 717–18.

³³Shu Guang Zhang, Mao's Military Romanticism, 152.

³⁵Archer, ‘Observations of Close Air Support in Korea’.

³⁷Van Fleet, ‘Truth about Korea: Part I’, 137. Chinese generals largely agreed that Chinese élan was insufficient to overcome the massive UNC advantages in firepower, logistics and air support; see Hong Xuezhi, ‘The CPVF's Combat and Logistics’, 132–3.

³⁶Hong Xuezhi, ‘The CPVF's Combat and Logistics’, 132.

³⁸Blair, Forgotten War, 884–6.

³⁹Ibid., 898.

⁴⁰Radio message, GX-5-5099 KGOP, CG 8th Army to CINCFE, 28 May 1951.

⁴¹Ridgway recorded his objections in a memorandum on 31 May 1951. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, ‘Memorandum for record: conference between General Ridgway and General Van Fleet, 31 May 1951', The Matthew B. Ridgway Papers, US Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA, Box 21.

⁴⁴Ibid., 470–1.

⁴² FRUS, 1951, 7: 470–2.

⁴³Ibid., 470.

⁴⁵Ibid., 471.

⁴⁷Van Fleet, ‘The Truth About Korea: Part 1’, 132.

⁴⁶US Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings, Van Fleet, Testimony.

⁴⁸Ridgway, Korean War, 181–2.

⁴⁹ FRUS, 1951, 7: 295, cited in Collins, War in Peacetime, 304.

⁵⁰C. Turner Joy, How Communists Negotiate (New York: Macmillan 1955), 166.

⁵¹Brodie, War and Politics, 91–112.

⁵²Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster 1994), 488–9.

⁵³Mossman, Ebb and Flow, 497.

⁵⁵Kathryn Weathersby, ‘New Russian Documents on the Korean War’, Cold War International History Project, Bulletins 6–7, (Winter 1995/1996), Doc. 70, 13 June 1951 ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin) via Roschin, 52–3.

⁵⁴Shu Guang Zhang, Mao's Military Romanticism, 152.

⁵⁷Ibid., Doc. 71, 54.

⁵⁶Ibid., Doc. 71, 14 June 1951, handwritten letter from Gao Gang and Kim Il Sung, with 13 June 1951, handwritten letter from Mao Zedong to Gao Gang and Kim Il Sung, 53–54.

⁵⁸Shu Guang Zhang, Mao's Military Romanticism, 146.

⁵⁹Gen. Paik Sun Yup, From Pusan to Panmunjom (McLean, VA: Brassey's 1992), 155–6.

⁶⁰Van Fleet, ‘Truth about Korea: Part II’, 164.

⁶¹ FRUS, 1951, 7: 295; Military Situation in the Far East, 2: 731–2.

⁶²William Stueck, Rethinking the Korean War: A New Diplomatic and Strategic History (Princeton UP 2002), 124–5; FRUS, 1951, 7: 36.

⁶³Christensen, Useful Adversaries, 186.

⁶⁴John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (Oxford: OUP 1982), 115.

⁶⁵ Military Situation in the Far East, 3: 1720.

⁶⁶ FRUS, 1951, 7: 41–3, 165–6.

⁶⁷Kennan, Memoirs, 28–9.

⁶⁸ Military Situation in the Far East, 1: 42–3.

⁶⁹MacArthur's requests came in the form of a 30 Dec. 1950 message to the JCS; see Blair, Forgotten War, 590. It is well worth noting that MacArthur's recommendations were largely adopted by the JCS as a whole in their 12 Jan. 1951 memorandum to MacArthur; see FRUS 1951, 7: 71–2. While the JCS position soon shifted against broad expansion of the war, the 12 Jan. 1951 memorandum is evidence of the frequent and significant changes in military opinion among the JCS.

⁷⁰ Military Situation in the Far East, 1: 43.

⁷¹Ibid., 2: 1541–2.

⁷²Ibid., 2: 1379.

⁷³Ibid., 2: 732.

⁷⁴Ibid., 1: 324–5, 621; 3: 1719.

⁷⁵ FRUS, 1951, 7: 71–2.

⁷⁶Rosemary Foot, The Wrong War: American Policy and the Dimensions of the Korean Conflict, 1950–1953 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1985), 124–6; Military Situation in the Far East, 1: 9.

⁷⁷ FRUS, 1951, 7: 177.

⁷⁸Ibid., 7: 192–3.

⁷⁹Ibid., 7: 205.

⁸⁰Ibid., 7: 471.

⁸¹Since the record of this critical meeting is in the form of loosely compiled minutes, Matthews' and Harriman's views on the escalation risks of an advance on Wonsan are not explicitly stated. The record does state that both emphasized the danger of moving north of that line; the author infers from this statement that they did not object to Admiral Sherman's statements earlier in the meeting advocating a Wonsan limit of advance.

⁸²Weathersby, ‘New Russian Documents’, Doc. 68, 13 June 1951, ciphered telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Soviet military advisor in Beijing, Krasovsky, 51.

⁸³ FRUS, 1951, 7: 439–42.

⁸⁴Stueck, Rethinking, 310.

⁸⁵This point looms particularly large in the post-Cold War era as North Korea's nuclear extortion rests in large part on its credible threat to use its artillery arrayed along the DMZ to inflict great damage on Seoul. Had the armistice line been drawn north of Pyongyang, the South Korean capital would be well outside the range of anything save ballistic or cruise missiles.

⁸⁷Ibid., Doc. 73, 21 June 1951, ciphered telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong, 55.

⁸⁶Weathersby, ‘New Russian Documents’, Doc. 72, 21 June 1951, ciphered telegram, Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin), 54.

⁸⁸Mossman, Ebb and Flow, 504.

⁸⁹Shu Guang Zhang cites a chilling discussion between Mao and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in Aug. 1958 in which Mao stated that, ‘if the USA attacks China with nuclear weapons, the Chinese armies must retreat from the border regions into the depths of the country. They must draw the enemy deep in deep so as to grip US forces in a pincer inside China … Only when the Americans are right in the central provinces should you give them everything you've got.’ Shu Guang Zhang, Mao's Military Romanticism, 258.

⁹⁰Weathersby, ‘Soviet Aims in Korea’, 24.

⁹¹Ibid., 28.

⁹²Kissinger, Diplomacy, 487.