Whose Hearts and Whose Minds? The Curious Case of Global Counter-Insurgency

Abstract

Traditionally regarded as a secondary activity in military thinking and practice, the notion of counter-insurgency (COIN) has undergone a remarkable renaissance. This analysis traces the origins of this renaissance to two distinctive schools: a neo-classical school and a global insurgency school. The global insurgency school critiques neo-classical thought and presents itself as a more sophisticated appreciation of current security problems. An examination of the evolution of these two schools of counter-insurgency reveals how the interplay between them ultimately leaves us with a confused and contradictory understanding of the phenomenon of insurgency and the policies and strategies necessary to combat it.

Key Words:

• Counter-insurgency
• Insurgency
• Strategy

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank the anonymous reviewers and the editors of the journal for their observations and constructive comments.

Notes

¹Quoted in Victor Purcell, Malaya: Communist or Free? (Stanford UP 1954), 93–4.

²Beatrice Heuser, ‘The Cultural Revolution in Counter-Insurgency’, Journal of Strategic Studies 30/1 (Feb. 2007), 153–71.

³For example Holsti's statistical assessment indicates that 75 per cent of the 164 cases of warfare identified since the end of World War II involved armed conflict within state boundaries, while only 18–20 per cent of cases could accurately be termed inter-state wars. See K.J. Holsti, The State, War and The State of War (Cambridge: CUP 1996), 22–4.

⁴Lt. Gen. Sir John Kiszely, ‘Learning About Counterinsurgency’, Military Review (March–April 2007), 10.

⁵Quoted in John A. Nagl, ‘Foreword to the University of Chicago Press Edition: The Evolution and Importance of Army/Marine Corps Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency’, in US Army and Marine Corps, Counterinsurgency Field Manual (Chicago UP 2007), xiv.

⁶David Ucko, ‘Innovation or Inertia: The US Military and the Learning of Counterinsurgency’, Orbis 52/2 (Feb. 2008), 291.

⁷David C. Hendrickson and Robert W. Tucker, ‘Revisions in Need of Revising: What Went Wrong in the Iraq War’, Survival 47/2 (Summer 2005), 7–32.

⁸See for example Ahmed S. Hashem, ‘The Insurgency in Iraq’, Small Wars and Insurgencies 14/3 (Autumn 2003), 1–22; Alastair Finlan, ‘Trapped in the Dead Ground: US Counter-Insurgency Strategy in Iraq’, Small Wars and Insurgencies 16/1 (March 2005), 1–21; Robert Tomes, ‘Schlock and Blah: Counter-Insurgency Realities in a Rapid Dominance Era’, Small Wars and Insurgencies 16/1 (March 2005), 37–56; Jeffrey Record, ‘Why the Strong Lose’, Parameters 35/4 (Winter 2005–06), 16–31.

⁹Nagl, ‘Foreword’, xv.

¹⁰See for example, Lt. Gen. David Petraeus, ‘Learning Counterinsurgency: Observations from Soldiering in Iraq’, Military Review (Jan.–Feb 2006), 2–11.

¹¹Ucko, ‘Innovation or Inertia?’, 294.

¹²In particular see Brig. Nigel Aylwin-Foster, ‘Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations’, Military Review (Nov.–Dec. 2005), 2–15.

¹³Frank G. Hoffman, ‘Neo-Classical Insurgency?’Parameters 37/2 (Summer 2007), 71–87.

¹⁴Examples of this set of literature would be Jonathan Stevenson, ‘We Wrecked the Place’: Contemplating an End to Northern Ireland's Troubles (New York: Free Press 1996); Malachi O'Doherty, The Trouble with Guns: Republican Strategy and the Provisional IRA (Belfast: Blackstaff 1998); Michael Page, Prisons, Peace and Terrorism: Penal Policy and the Reduction of Terrorism in Northern Ireland, Italy and the Basque Country, 1968–97 (Basingstoke: Macmillan 1998); Ed Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA (London: Allen Lane 2002); Peter Neumann, Britain's Long War: British Government Strategy in Northern Ireland, 1968–98 (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan 2003).

¹⁵Matthew B. Stannard, ‘Montgomery McFate's Mission’, San Francisco Chronicle, 29 April 2007.

¹⁶Montgomery McFate, ‘The Military Utility of Understanding Adversary Culture’, Joint Forces Quarterly 38/3^rd Quarter (2005), 42.

¹⁷Montgomery McFate, ‘Iraq: The Social Context of IEDs’, Military Review (May–June 2005), 37–40.

¹⁸Montgomery McFate and Andrea Jackson, ‘An Organizational Solution for DOD's Cultural Knowledge Needs’, Military Review (July–Aug 2005), 18.

¹⁹For a survey of this area see Col. Clinton J. Ancker, ‘Doctrine for Asymmetric Warfare’, Military Review (July–Aug. 2003), 18–25; Patrick Porter, ‘Shadow Wars: Asymmetric Warfare in the Past and Future’, Security Dialogue 37/4 (2006), 551–61.

²⁰There was, of course, always a residual academic interest in matters of insurgency even during the years of the Cold War as represented by the writings of those like Charles Townshend, Ian F.W. Beckett and others located ostensibly around the British Army's officer training academy and staff college at Camberley, Surrey. See for example, Ian F.W. Becket and John Pimlott (eds.), Armed Forces and Modern Counterinsurgency (New York: St Martin's Press 1985); Ian F.W. Beckett, The Roots of Counterinsurgency: Armies and Guerrilla warfare (London: Blanford 1988); Charles Townshend, Britain's Civil Wars: Counterinsurgency in the Twentieth century (London: Faber 1986). In the United States, the study of insurgency/counter-insurgency also retained a marginal following. On the one hand, a handful of scholars like the historian Thomas Mockaitis showed an interest in the British experience of counter-insurgency, while other analysts produced studies on the subject framed within the context of conducting inquests into the American performance in Vietnam. See for example Thomas Mockaitis, British Counter-Insurgency, 1919–1960 (London: Macmillan 1990); Andrew Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP 1986).

²¹Gen. Sir Rupert Smith's The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World (London: Allen Lane 2005) is the seminal work in this developing field although Mary Kaldor's New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era (Cambridge: Polity 1999) also foreshadowed much of this debate.

²²See for example, Andrew Dorman et al. (eds.), The Changing Face of Military Power: Joint Warfare in an Expeditionary Era (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave 2002).

²³John Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam (Chicago UP 2002), 51.

²⁴Montgomery McFate and Andrea V. Jackson, ‘The Object of War: Counterinsurgency and the Four Tools of Political Competition’, Military Review (Jan.–Feb. 2006), 13–16.

²⁵Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup, 216.

²⁶Stannard, ‘Montgomery McFate's Mission’.

²⁷Quoted in ibid.

²⁸See for example, Eliot Cohen, Conrad Crane, Jan Horvath and John Nagl, ‘Principles, Imperatives, and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency’, Military Review (March–April 2006), 49–53.

²⁹Nagl, ‘Foreword’, xiii–xx.

³⁰Montgomery McFate, ‘Anthropology and Counterinsurgency: The Strange Story of their Curious Relationship’, Military Review (March–April 2005), 24.

³¹Ibid., 27.

³²Heuser, ‘The Cultural Revolution in Counter-Insurgency’, 165.

³³Ucko, ‘Innovation or Inertia’, 308.

³⁴See for example, Lt. Col. Robert M. Cassidy, ‘Winning the War of the Flea’, Military Review (Sept. 2004), 41–6; Lt. Col. Wade M. Markel, ‘Winning Our Own Hearts and Minds: Promotion in Wartime’, Military Review (Nov.–Dec. 2004), 25–30; Lt. Col. Robert M. Cassidy, ‘The Savage Wars of Peace’, Military Review (Nov.–Dec. 2004), 76–7; Lt. Col. James D. Campbell, ‘French Algeria and British Northern Ireland: Legitimacy and the Rule of Law in Low-Intensity Conflict’, Military Review (March–April 2005), 2–5; Wade Markel, ‘Draining the Swamp: The British Strategy of Population Control’, Parameters 36/1 (Spring 2006), 35–48; Lou DiMarco, ‘Losing the Moral Compass: Torture and Guerre Revolutionnaire in the Algerian War’, Parameters 36/2 (Summer 2006), 63–76; Brian A. Jackson, ‘Counterinsurgency Intelligence in a “Long War:” The British Experience in Northern Ireland’, Military Review (Jan.–Feb. 2007), 74–85; Walter C. Ladwig, ‘Managing Counterinsurgency: Lessons from Malaya’, Military Review (May–June 2007), 56–66; Maj. Michael D. Sullivan, ‘Leadership in Counterinsurgency: A Tale of Two Leaders’, Military Review (Sept.–Oct. 2007), 119–23.

³⁵See David Galula, Pacification in Algeria, 1956–1958 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 2006) (orig. published in 1963); David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (Westport, CT: Praeger 2006) (orig. published 1964); Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency (Westport, CT: Praeger 2006) (orig. published 1964); Bernard Fall, Street Without Joy: The French Debacle in Indochina (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole 2005) (orig. published 1963); John J. McCuen, The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War: The Strategy of Counterinsurgency (St. Petersburg, FL: Hailer 2005) (orig. published 1966).

³⁶Colin Gray, ‘Thinking Asymmetrically in Times of Terror’, Parameters 32/1 (Spring 2002), 13.

³⁷There are too many examples to enumerate but for a selection see for instance: Kalev I. Sepp, ‘Best Practices in Counterinsurgency’, Military Review (May–June 2005), 8–12; Col. Thomas X. Hammes, ‘Countering Evolved Insurgent Networks’, Military Review (July–Aug. 2006); Jan S. Breemer, ‘Statistics, Real Estate, and the Principles of War: Why There is no Unified Theory of War’, Military Review (Sept.–Oct. 2006), 84–9.

³⁸Sarah Sewall, ‘Modernizing US Counterinsurgency Practice: Rethinking Risk and Developing a National Strategy’, Military Review (Sept.–Oct. 2006), 103.

³⁹Ibid.

⁴¹John A. Lynn, ‘Patterns of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency’, Military Review (July–Aug. 2005), 27.

⁴⁰Ibid., 104.

⁴²Ibid.

⁴³See Col. James K. Greer, ‘Operation Knockout: COIN in Iraq’, Military Review (Nov.–Dec. 2005), 16–19; Petraeus, ‘Learning from Counterinsurgency: Observations from Soldiering in Iraq’, 2–12. For example see also Frederick W. Kagan and Kimberly Kagan, ‘The Patton of Counterinsurgency’, The Weekly Standard, 3 Oct. 2008.

⁴⁴Lt. Col. Chris Gibson, ‘Battlefield Victories and Strategic Success: The Path Forward in Iraq’, Military Review (Sept.–Oct. 2006), 49.

⁴⁵Capt. Travis Patriquin, ‘Using Occam's Razor to Connect the Dots: The Ba'ath Party and the Insurgency in Tal Afar’, Military Review (Jan.–Feb. 2007), 16–25.

⁴⁶This is not to say that the efforts to make the US Army embrace COIN thinking do not continue to meet resistance. For the contending positions see the debate between John Nagl and Gian Gentile: John Nagl, ‘Let's Win the Wars We're In’, Joint Forces Quarterly, 52/1st Quarter (2009), 20–6; Gian Gentile, ‘Let's Build an Army to Win All Wars’, Joint Forces Quarterly, 52/1st Quarter (2009), 27–33.

⁴⁷See also Carter Malkasian, ‘The Role of Perceptions and Political Reform in Counterinsurgency: The Case of Western Iraq, 2004–05’, Small Wars and Insurgencies 17/3 (Dec. 2006), 367–94; Warren Chin, ‘Examining the Application of British Counterinsurgency Doctrine by the American Army in Iraq’, Small Wars and Insurgencies 18/1 (March 2007), 1–26; James Corum, ‘Rethinking US Army Counter-Insurgency Doctrine’, Contemporary Security Policy 28/1 (April 2007), 127–42.

⁴⁸Of the many possible contributions in this respect see Maj. Morgan Mann, ‘The Power Equation: Using Tribal Politics in Counterinsurgency’, Military Review (May–June 2007), 104–8; Col. Joseph D. Celeski, ‘Attacking Insurgent Space: Sanctuary Denial and Border Interdiction’, Military Review (Nov.–Dec. 2006), 51–7; Col. Gregory Wilson, ‘Anatomy of a Successful COIN Operation: OEF-Philippines and the Indirect Approach’, Military Review (Nov.–Dec. 2006), 2–12; Michael R. Melillo, ‘Outfitting a Big-War Military with Small-War Capabilities’, Parameters (Autumn 2006), 22–35; David M. Tressler, Negotiation in the New Strategic Environment: Lessons from Iraq (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute 2007); James Clancy and Chuck Crossett, ‘Measuring Effectiveness in Irregular Warfare’, Parameters 37/2 (Summer 2007), 88–100; Brian Reed, ‘A Social Network Approach to Understanding an Insurgency’, Parameters 37/2 (Summer 2007), 19–30; Jeffrey Record, ‘External Assistance: Enabler of Insurgent Success’, Parameters 36/3 (Autumn 2006), 36–49; Jim Baker, ‘Systems Thinking and Counterinsurgencies’, Parameters 36/4 (Winter 2006–07), 26–43; Raymond Millen, ‘The Hobbesian Notion of Self-Preservation Concerning Human Behavior During an Insurgency’, Parameters 36/4 (Winter 2006–07), 4–13.

⁴⁹See for example Christopher M. Ford, ‘Speak No Evil: Targeting a Population's Neutrality to Defeat an Insurgency’, Parameters 35/2 (Summer 2005), 51–66; Lt. Col. Douglas A. Ollivant and First Lt. Eric D. Chewing, ‘Producing Victory: Rethinking Conventional Forces in COIN Operations’, Military Review (July–Aug. 2006); David Betz, ‘Redesigning Land Forces for Wars Amongst the People’, Contemporary Security Policy 28/2 (Aug. 2007), 221–43; Major Mark P. Krieger, ‘We the People are Not the Center of Gravity’, Military Review (July–Aug. 2007), 96–100; Col. Peter R. Mansoor and Maj. Mark S. Ulrich, ‘Linking Doctrine to Action: A New Center-of-Gravity Analysis’, Military Review (Sept.–Oct. 2007), 45–51.

⁵⁰John Mackinlay, ‘Tackling bin Laden: Lessons From History’, Observer, 28 Oct. 2001.

⁵¹Ibid.

⁵²John Mackinlay, Globalisation and Insurgency, Adelphi Paper 352 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies/OUP 2002), 79.

⁵³See for example, Kaldor, New and Old Wars; David Held and Anthony McGrew, with David Goldblatt and Jonathan Perraton, Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture (Cambridge: Polity 1999); Mark Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars (London: Zed 2001).

⁵⁴See Benjamin Barber, Jihad versus McWorld: How Globalism and Tribalism are Reshaping the World Order (New York: Ballantine 1996); Olivier Roy, Bruce Hoffman, Reuven Paz, Steven Simon and Daniel Benjamin, ‘America and the New Terrorism’, Survival 42/2 (Summer 2000), 156–172; David Martin Jones and M.L.R. Smith, ‘The Changing Security Agenda in Southeast Asia: Globalization, New Terror and the Delusions of Regionalism’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 24/4 (2001), 271–88.

⁵⁵Mackinlay, Globalization and Insurgency, 79.

⁵⁶David Kilcullen, ‘Countering Global Insurgency’, Journal of Strategic Studies 28/4 (Aug. 2005), 597.

⁵⁷Ibid., 598.

⁵⁸Ibid., 601.

⁵⁹David Kilcullen, ‘Globalisation and the Development of Indonesian Counterinsurgency Tactics’, Small Wars and Insurgencies 17/1 (March 2006), 52.

⁶⁰Kilcullen claims in fact that Indonesian COIN methods were less harsh than other similar campaigns of the period such as those in Malaya, Palestine, Cyprus, Vietnam and Algeria. Without some clear statistical or documentary evidence it is difficult to compare and validate this contention. See ibid., 60.

⁶¹Ibid., 59.

⁶²Kilcullen, ‘Countering Global Insurgency’, 602.

⁶³Ibid., 602.

⁶⁴Ibid., 608.

⁶⁵Ibid., 609.

⁶⁶John Hillen, ‘Developing a National Counterinsurgency for the War on Terror’, Military Review (Jan.–Feb. 2007), 13.

⁶⁷Col. Joseph D. Celeski, ‘Strategic Aspects of Counterinsurgency’, Military Review (March–April 2006), 35–41.

⁶⁸Hillen, ‘Developing a National Counterinsurgency’, 13.

⁶⁹See for example Daniel Byman, ‘US Counter-Terrorism Options: A Taxonomy’, Survival 49/3 (Autumn 2007), 121–50.

⁷⁰In fact, David Kilcullen and Montgomery McFate shared a writing platform in Anthropology Today, defending themselves and the role of anthropologists in facilitating the writing of FM 3-24, who had been attacked by Roberto González for supposedly allowing themselves to become tools of ‘US imperial power’ (17). See Roberto J. González, ‘Towards Mercenary Anthropology? The New US Army Counterinsurgency Manual FM 3-24 and the Military Anthropology Complex’, 14–19; David Kilcullen, ‘Ethics, Politics and Non-State Warfare’, 20; Montgomery McFate, ‘Building Bridges or Burning Heretics’, Anthropology Today 23/3 (2007) 21.

⁷¹Lt. Col. David Kilcullen, ‘“Twenty-Eight Articles”: Fundamentals of Company-Level Counterinsurgency’, Military Review (May–June 2006), 103–8.

⁷²Mackinlay, ‘Tackling bin Laden’.

⁷³David Kilcullen, ‘Counter-insurgency Redux’, Survival 48/4 (Winter 2006–07), 111.

⁷⁴Ibid., 112.

⁷⁵Hoffman, ‘Neo-Classical Insurgency?’ 71.

⁷⁶Betz, ‘Redesigning land Forces’, 225.

⁷⁷Hoffman, ‘Neo-Classical Insurgency?’ 71.

⁷⁸McFate, ‘Iraq: The Social Context of IEDs’, 40.

⁷⁹See for example, US Army/Marine Corps, Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24, 11–15.

⁸⁰Hoffman, ‘Neo-Classical Insurgency?’, 71.

⁸¹Steven Metz, Rethinking Insurgency (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute 2007), 36.

⁸²As Cassidy, in contrast to Metz's assessment, notes with respect to British COIN operations from ‘the predominantly rural jungle of conditions Malaya, Kenya, Borneo, Guyana, and Dhofar to the desert conditions of Palestine: Muscat; and Oman; Radfan; and Kuwait’ that the ‘British Army helped bring about favorable political outcomes for Britain. In almost every case of devolution, newly independent states allowed the British Army to retain facilities in their countries.’ Surely, this is the proper criterion for gauging COIN success. Lt. Col. Robert M. Cassidy, ‘The British Army and Counterinsurgency: The Salience of Military Culture’, Military Review (May–June 2005), 56.

⁸³French COIN thinking manifested itself in an unyielding contest that perceived the Algerian nationalist campaign waged by the Front de Libération Nationale as a war against Western civilisation, resulting in immense brutality and loss of life on all sides, and which during certain parts of the campaign saw the creation of a clandestine bureaucracy that institutionalised policies of torture and atrocity. Many assessments have been written on the war, but for one of the most comprehensive treatments see Alistair Horne, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria, 1954–1962 (London: Macmillan 1977).

⁸⁴Kilcullen, ‘Countering Global Insurgency’, 609.

⁸⁵Ibid., 610.

⁸⁶Hoffman, ‘Neo-Classical Insurgency?’, 78. It would be more accurate to say the jihadist aspires to something founded in the seventh century.

⁸⁷David Kilcullen, ‘Subversion and Counter-subversion in the Campaign Against Terrorism in Europe’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 30/8 (Aug. 2006), 649.

⁸⁸Ibid., 652.

⁸⁹Quoted in George Packer, ‘Knowing the Enemy: Can Social Scientists Redefine the “War on Terror”?’The New Yorker, 18 Dec. 2006.

⁹⁰Ibid.

⁹¹See in this context Barry Cooper, New Political Religions, Or an Analysis of Modern Terrorism (Columbia: Missouri UP 2004).

⁹²Notes from ‘Reviewing UK Army Countering Insurgency Meeting’ (KCL Insurgency Group), King's College London, 20 June 2007, 1. John Mackinlay chaired the meeting.

⁹⁴McFate, ‘The Military Utility of Understanding Adversary Culture’, 43. See also Celeski, ‘Strategic Aspects of Counterinsurgency’, 35, for another example of critical remarks that question the relevance of Clausewitzian understandings.

⁹³Ibid., 2.

⁹⁵For a recent discussion see Colin M. Fleming, ‘New or Old? Debating a Clausewitzian Future’, Journal of Strategic Studies 32/2 (April 2009), 213–41.

⁹⁶Raymond Aron, On War: Atomic Weapons and Global Diplomacy, trans. Terence Kilmartin (London: Secker & Warburg 1958), 63.

⁹⁷Carl von Clausewitz, On War (trans. and ed., Michael Howard and Peter Paret) (Princeton UP 1984), 87–8.

⁹⁸Ibid., 87.

⁹⁹Which is something that John Mackinlay, for instance, believes Clausewitz embodies, when he suggested in 2001 of the ‘coalition of likeminded states to “wage the War on Terrorism” is an old-fashioned emergency structure that would address a Clausewitzian threat to security’. Again this is an erroneous interpretation. Clausewitz never wrote of what constituted ‘threats to security’ and to the extent that it is possible to discern a Clausewitzian understanding of threat, it is one that arises from the complex social and political conditions of individual societies, i.e. the source of all war. Therefore the statement is a tautology. Mackinlay, ‘Tackling bin Laden’.

¹⁰⁰Jan Willem Honig, ‘Strategy in a Post-Clausewitzian Setting’, in Gerd de Nooy (ed.), The Clausewitzian Dictum and the Future of Western Military Strategy (The Hague: Kluwer Law International 1997), 110.

¹⁰¹David Kilcullen, too, appears to subscribe to this conception when he writes that the ‘religious ideology of some modern insurgents’ meant that they often do have ‘real-world objectives’. ‘Particularly in al-Qaeda-linked insurgencies’, he contends, ‘the insurgent may not seek to do or achieve any practical objective, but rather to be a mujahid, earning God's favour (and hope of ultimate victory through his intervention) through the act itself.’ Kilcullen, ‘Counter-insurgency Redux’, 116.

¹⁰²Clausewitz, On War, 87.

¹⁰³Honig, ‘Strategy’, 118.

¹⁰⁴Col. Melanie R. Reeder, Editorial Statement, Military Review (Nov.–Dec. 2001), 1.

¹⁰⁵David J. Shaughnessy and Lt. Col. Thomas M. Cowan, ‘Attack on America: The First War of the 21st Century’, Military Review, supplement (Nov.–Dec. 2001), 2–9.

¹⁰⁶The authors could only find two such articles in Military Review after 9/11: Lt. Col. Peter J. Schifferle, ‘Terrorism and the Crabgrass’, Military Review (Nov.–Dec. 2001) and Col. John W. Jandora, ‘Osama bin Laden's Global Jihad: Myth and Movement’, Military Review (Nov.–Dec. 2006), 41–50.

¹⁰⁷Lawrence Freedman, ‘Globalization and the War against Terrorism’, in Christopher Ankerson (ed.), Understanding Global Terror (Cambridge: Polity 2007), 227.

¹⁰⁸Kilcullen, ‘Countering Global Insurgency’, 606.

¹⁰⁹Ibid., 605.

¹¹⁰Mackinlay, Globalisation and Insurgency, 33.

¹¹¹Kilcullen, ‘Countering Global Insurgency’, 611–12.

¹¹²Mackinlay, ‘Tackling bin Laden’.

¹¹³See for example, Cooper, New Political Religions, Or an Analysis of Modern Terrorism, 147 and Samuel L. Berger and Mona Sutphen, ‘Commandeering the Palestinian Cause: Bin Laden's Belated Concern’, in James F. Hoge and Gideon Rose, How Did this Happen? Terrorism and the New War (New York: Public Affairs 2001), 123.

¹¹⁴Mackinlay, ‘Tackling bin Laden’.

¹¹⁵Kilcullen, ‘Countering Global Insurgency’, 612.

¹¹⁶Paul Rogers, Global Security and the War on Terror: Elite Power and the Illusion of Control (Routledge: London 2008), 82 and 99.

¹¹⁷Joseba Zulaika and William A. Douglass, ‘The Terrorist Subject: Terrorism Studies and the Absent Subjectivity’, Critical Studies on Terrorism 1/1 (April 2008), 33.

¹¹⁸Ken Booth, ‘The Human Faces of Terror: Reflections in a Cracked Looking-Glass’, Critical Studies on Terrorism 1/1 (April 2008), 75.

¹¹⁹Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey, ‘The Post-Colonial Moment in Security Studies’, Review of International Studies 32/2 (2006), 329. See also Taraq Barkawi, ‘On the Pedagogy of “Small Wars”’, International Affairs 80/1 (2004), 28.

¹²⁰Rogers, Global Security and the War on Terror, 33.

¹²¹Mackinlay, ‘Tackling bin Laden’.

¹²²Freedman, ‘Globalization and the War Against Terrorism’, 227.

¹²⁴‘Full Text of MI5 Director-General's Speech’, Daily Telegraph, 5 Nov. 2007.

¹²³Kilcullen, ‘Countering Global Insurgency’, 609.

¹²⁵See for example Anthony Glees and Chris Pope, When Students Turn to Terror: Terrorist and Extremist Activity on British University Campuses (London: Social Affairs Unit 2005).

¹²⁶Peter Clarke, Learning from Experience: Counter-terrorism in the UK Since 9/11, Colin Cramphorn Memorial Lecture (London: Policy Exchange 2007), 18.

¹²⁷See Jonathan Sacks, The Home We Build Together: Recreating Society (London: Continuum 2008).

¹²⁸See Thomas Harding, ‘Public Support for Afghanistan is Vital’, Daily Telegraph, 13 Nov. 2008; Michael Evans, ‘Army Chief predicts a “Generation of Conflict”’, The Times, 28 Aug. 2007.

¹²⁹Clausewitz, On War, 88–9.