Christian religious education and the development of moral virtues: a neo-Thomistic approach

ABSTRACT

This article explores the implications for Christian religious education of the theory of moral virtues formulated by Thomas Aquinas and developed by the contemporary Neo-Thomists. The analysis is divided into two parts. The first part introduces Thomistic virtue theory and presents cardinal virtues crucial for Thomistic ethics: prudence, justice, temperance and fortitude, as the reference points for moral education. This part also includes analysis of the relationship between cardinal and theological virtues, leading to the conclusion that Christian religious education also requires the development of theological virtues. The second part explores, through Thomistic theory, what factors condition the development of a person’s moral character (i.e. his/her moral virtues) and what those factors mean for supporting moral education within Christian religious education, initially within the context of Polish schooling. Particular attention is given to three issues: introducing the concept of responsibility for community members, introducing knowledge of moral virtues, and building a relationship with God.

KEYWORDS:

• Moral virtues
• cardinal virtues
• Christian religious education
• neo-Thomistic theory
• Poland

Introduction

The analysis undertaken in the present article aims at answering the question of the potential of Christian religious education within the scope of supporting young people’s moral virtue development. This relates to significant issues concerning – firstly – the process of supporting young people’s moral character development and – secondly – the role played by (Christian) religious education in that process. Education includes students gaining knowledge of the surrounding world, moral aspects of their actions and their religious conditions. Religious education generally provides knowledge regarding different religions, paying particular attention to the dominant denominations in a given society, and shows the relationship between religion and morality. Secularisation and the principle of tolerance for people of different religions, denominations and non-believers participating in religious classes (Franken and Loobuyck 2017) mean that there is a reluctance for religious education to induct children into a particular religion. In Poland, despite the fact that religious education is taught by representatives of a given religious community, it does not in practice include initiation into religious life, for example into prayer or liturgy, but typically involves a transmission of information alone (Tomasik 1998; Chałupniak 2012). The specificity of the Polish context includes the tendency of many parents to leave religious development of their children to the school, rather than the home or church. Considering the significant connections between religion and morals, namely between persons’ faith and their moral choices, the question arises as to how well Christian religious education that is implemented in such a way can support the moral development of the individuals. On the one hand, it is easy to maintain that a privileged place for supporting the development of moral character is the family or religious community, for example a parish, rather than the school, so in school there is no need for moral education based on the faith of the individuals. On the other hand, school is where maturing people first encounter persons not belonging to their families or the local communities who are befriended by the families. In school, children have to cooperate with people from different cultural and religious backgrounds. The period of school education consequently becomes the time in which moral virtues, crucial for further functioning in public space and occupational roles, are developed in maturing persons. The relationships with schoolmates are often where the germ of moral virtues and vices begins to take shape. May (Christian) religious education support an individual in this area of development, and to what extent? Does the school, caring about maintaining worldview neutrality, lose the chance to support the moral development of individuals by preferring a particular form of Christian religious education that ignores the connection between the moral development and individual’s faith?

For this analysis, the key category is ‘virtue’ and its associated theory, as formulated within neo-Thomistic philosophy. The practice of using the category of virtue to conduct an ethical reflection, examine moral development from the perspective of theory, and formulate concepts of moral education has a rich history, since its roots can be traced back to ancient philosophy and to the works of Plato and Aristotle (Wren 2014). Unlike other ethical traditions, such as deontology and utilitarianism, in which attention is given to the target of particular individuals’ decision, in virtue ethics an account is made from the target to agents (Hursthouse and Pettigrove 2018) and to character traits which, in a moral dimension, adjust themselves in relation to other people – positive traits being diligence, charity, understanding and patience, and negative ones being laziness, selfishness, arrogance or cowardice. Consequently, virtue theory offers a great opportunity to analyse specific dispositions and moral decisions, as well as to observe moral development and its socialisation and educational conditions. It also facilitates an understanding of the dissonance between individuals’ theoretical recognition of what is morally good or bad, and the decisions made by them, which indicates that moral decisions are influenced not only by the ability to assess what is good or bad, what should be done and what should be avoided, but also by the ability to refrain from small or big indulgences for the sake of the greater good, as well as patience in confronting hardships that individuals may encounter in the pursuit of good.

In philosophical reflection in the 17th and 18th centuries, the category of virtue was somewhat marginalised, but since the end of the 19th century, it has experienced a renaissance in philosophical thought. This is associated with the intensive development of empirical sciences, psychology and sociology, in which it is frequently asked what stable feature do the attitudes of individuals towards other people and the external world have. In this context, the theory of virtues as moral traits gradually became a bridge between the fields of ethics and empirical sciences (Carr 1991; Steutel and Carr 1999; Curren 2015; Szutta 2015a; Snow 2016). The representatives of neo-Thomistic philosophy were the first to refer to the category of virtue. This school in the field of philosophy has been developed intensively since the end of the 19th century in Catholic circles, not least because it was seen within it as a channel for dialogue between natural science and matters of faith (Gilson 1971). As an integral part of philosophy, the category of virtue became fundamental not only to ethics but also to pedagogy (Kunowski 1966). Through the perspective of virtue, efforts were made to build a Catholic theory of moral education. One can trace the level of progress of these efforts in the works of Joseph Mausbach (1920, 1925), a professor at the University of Münster in Germany, or of Jacek Woroniecki, one of the founders of the Catholic University of Lublin in Poland (Woroniecki 1922; Horowski 2015, 78–82). In the Anglo-Saxon philosophical tradition, the revival of reflection on virtue is associated with Elizabeth Anscombe and her 1958 text entitled Modern Moral Philosophy, in which she criticised the prevailing ethical theories of the 20th century and explored their weaknesses and deficiencies; what is more, she made a plea for a return to Aristotelian ethical thought (Anscombe 1958; Szutta 2015b, 14). One of the best-known projects concerning virtue ethics, which is based on Aristotle’s own reflections, was proposed by Alasdair MacIntyre in his book After Virtue. A Study in Moral Theory (2007). Also within this trend, virtue theory finds application in pedagogical thought (Arthur et al. 2016; Carr 1991, 1996, 2017; Eaude 2016; Kristjánsson 2015; Kaźmierczak 2019).

The reference to neo-Thomistic philosophy is related to the emphasis that it places on the real conditions of humans actions (Krąpiec 1999). It draws attention to how real people ― amongst whom individuals live and whom the individuals try to care for ― condition the decisions made by them and, consequently, the development of their character traits. Neo-Thomistic thought also examines the reality of the subjects who, when making decisions about dealing with another person, take into account their abilities and the impact of various decisions on themselves. The use of other philosophical positions for analyses, such as phenomenology or hermeneutics, means shifting the point of interest from actual reality to the subjects’ consciousness, i.e. a subjective image of reality. By transferring this specificity to the pedagogical field, one can argue that Thomistic thought refers to and tries to analyse the significance of real conditionings of individuals’ experiences for their moral development, while the domain of other philosophical concepts within the philosophy of education is the reflection on subjective aspects of experience and building the image of the world (including knowledge of what is morally right or wrong) of individuals. The specificity of Thomism is reflected in its potential but also in its weaknesses in analysing and explaining educational reality. On the one hand, within its scope it is possible to show the importance of external reality, as perceived by the senses, to the process of development of individuals; on the other hand, since Thomism does not penetrate into consciousness conditionings, this school does not analyse or explain all the development conditions of the individuals. Bernard Lonergan attempted to overcome this weakness of Thomistic thought in the field of pedagogy by developing a philosophy of education that was built on the Thomistic theory of knowledge and included processes of judging that are strongly connected with sensory experience and reasoning ― a specifically intellectual activity. The specificity of his approach in relation to Jacques Maritain’s philosophy was highlighted by Mario D’Souza (2016). However, it does not change the fact that the specificity of Thomistic thought in the field of pedagogy is based on referring mainly to the real conditionings of human development and building an education concept that uses those conditionings as a basis.

The approach to the research problem outlined above means that in this case Thomism is treated as an interpretative key and an analytical philosophy that builds the basis for understanding reality of Christian religious education, but does not claim the right to build comprehensive visions of the world (Bocheński 1962), and even less so to justify or support any model of social relations (i.e. to act in favour of a specific civilisation ― Christian, liberal or dialogical) (Luby 2019). These analyses are only an attempt to use neo-Thomistic philosophy, and especially the theory of moral virtues formulated within it, to ascertain what conditionings the moral development of an individual and what that means for moral education provided within religious, especially Christian, education. An attempt to answer these questions will be made in the second part of the text. The first part will present a brief description of the Thomistic theory of moral virtues, which also incorporates the issue of special challenges that are faced by Christians.

Christian morality from the perspective of the Thomistic theory of virtues

The selection of character traits which, from the moral dimension, improve people and thereby improve their relationships with other persons, after a deeper reflection always raises some doubts. Diligence – so appreciated in working life – might be accompanied by neglecting duties which should be fulfilled by individuals towards their close relatives: spouse, children, parents. Repeatedly, the public sphere raises the subject of courage shown by mountain climbers who strive to reach the highest peaks on Earth. At the same time, regarding the fact that they ignore the risk of losing their lives and that they might leave their children with a single parent, it is difficult to perceive their courage as a virtue. Alasdair MacIntyre noticed this ambivalence and consequently acknowledged that one could speak of a particular trait as a virtue or vice only with regard to the contexts of one’s life: social and individual (MacIntyre 2007). The first context is created by culture which prevails in a given moment. The second one, depends on the aims and ways of life chosen by a person. Doctors need certain virtues, while teachers need different ones and fire-fighters different ones again. His theory might be regarded as the one which relativises virtues (Carr 2017).

The point of reference for these analyses is the standpoint taken by Thomas Aquinas and the 20th-century neo-Thomists. Thomas Aquinas built his virtue theory on the foundation of four virtues, outlined in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (1990) as the essential ones: prudence, justice, temperance and fortitude (Aquinas Thomas, 1485 [1947]; Pieper 1966; Mróz 2001; Keenan 2016). Therefore, Thomas Aquinas initially formulated the theory of basic, cardinal virtues, whereas MacIntyre’s reflection moved the analyses immediately to the level of detailed virtues. Essential, cardinal virtues are related to four powers distinguished in Thomistic anthropology and the theory of human activity. It would be a good idea to take a closer look at this theory so as to understand the concept of virtues as capabilities which improve human activity. Thomas Aquinas regards man as an intelligent being. He therefore considers that each action starts with a decision taken by spiritual powers: the intellect and the will. The intellect recognises the truth, while the will desires the good. According to him, it is impossible that a good action is the result of merely one of the powers (STh I–II, q. 14, a. 1, ad 1). In order to do good, it is not enough to learn the truth about it. There are people who know what is good and what should be done in a particular situation and yet, they do not do so, since it is of no importance for them or they are not able to resist the temptation of some pleasures. On the other hand, the desire for good which is not navigated by the intellect is blind. An action of a person who seeks good but has recognised the way to its achievement improperly, will end in failure. In order to do good, a perfection of the intellect recognising the truth (prudence – STh I–II, q. 57, a. 4; II–II, q. 47) and a perfection of the will seeking good (justice – STh II, q. 58) are needed simultaneously. Likewise, Thomistic belief does not depreciate emotions, being the agitations of sensual powers, which are generated either by pleasant goods or by things that might cause unpleasant feeling (STh I–II, q. 59). A necessary condition for doing good is the capacity for reasonable management of emotions so that, on the one hand, a person (in particular situations) does not succumb to the desire of sensual pleasures (temperance – STh II, q. 141) and on the other hand, does not refrain from difficult challenges, especially when the journey towards the good involves suffering (fortitude – STh II–II, q. 123). Cardinal virtues are, in other words, the perfections of the intellect, the will and the sensual powers, thanks to which a specific person discovers the path of good in the complicated circumstances of daily life more efficiently, quickly, easily and finally, follows this path.

In Thomistic theory, any other ability might be called a virtue as long as it is built on the foundation of four cardinal virtues. Referring to an example of diligence, this affair will be discussed more deeply. This virtue may be regarded as an excellence of an activity oscillating between the extremities of indolence and workaholism. In any event, the boundary between these very extremities will run somewhere else. Persons who do not have their own family might devote considerably more time to work than persons responsible for a spouse, bringing up children or taking care of sick parents. The virtue of diligence could take a different form when people are able to easily earn their own keep and that of their families, and another form, when food acquisition for themselves and their children would be feasible merely as a result of hard and time-consuming work. In order to define properly the amount of time and strength that should be devoted to work, the virtue of prudence is needed. In turn, the virtue of justice is a condition for proper division of time and strength, which means that agents do not scorn anyone’s good: their own, their families’, their employers’ and those who make use of the effects of their work. This virtue does not consist so much in the ability of the assessment of whom to devote time and strength and how much (it is a virtue of prudence), but in the desire for giving everyone as much as they should get. Temperance is a condition for diligence as well; nevertheless, it might take a different form. It might involve the renunciation of goods which would be achievable provided that individuals worked a lot (forgoing the time devoted to the families) or it may involve renouncing pleasures that might be enjoyed if they did not go to work. The last cardinal virtue is fortitude. It is not solely a matter of accepting tough challenges. The manifestation of fortitude is also a daily struggle against hardships, oppression, fatigue, and the awareness of the effects a particular work exerts on specific organisms.

The example provided above leads to two conclusions. First of all, it shows that in Thomistic theory, the virtue is not a kind of trait that sets a regular tone for one’s action (it is not an automatic habit), but an ability that makes a reasonable management of one’s own action easier (Austin 2017). The second conclusion is associated with the unity of cardinal virtues. Despite the fact that they are distinguished, they essentially form a single unit (Szutta 2010). In other words, either they develop evenly or a given agent does not have anyone. For example, persons cannot be assessed as prudent when, instead of aiming at doing good for themselves and their families, they indulges themselves due to lack of temperance (Horowski 2019a).

When speaking of Christian morality, it should be noted that it is inspired by specific challenges, like the call to love thine enemy (Mt 5:44) or a call to forgive up to seventy-seven times (Mt 18:22). At first glance, accepting these challenges is acting in defiance of cardinal virtues and is not feasible. Referring to the Parable of the Prodigal Son (Lk 15:11–32), one could either notice that being virtuous means taking into account not only the well-being of themselves, but considering third party’s well-being as well. The forgiveness by the older brother is prudent and just because of the good of the father who could receive what belongs to him by right, that is, the son. Furthermore the Parable shows that major challenges, like forgiving someone (in particular a stranger) for injustice or giving enemies help, need a particular point of reference since morality is of purposeful character (Maritain 1990). If the older son is to forgive his brother, only love for the father who loves the prodigal son might persuade him to do so. Therefore, forgiving harm or concern for an enemy is possible if an agent sees those people from God’s perspective (Horowski 2017). As a consequence, moral virtues could reach a level that make it possible to accept specific challenges for a Christian only when a man, facing moral dilemmas, has a relationship with God. The relationship is, in turn, reinforced with theological virtues: faith as a perfection of the intellect knowing God as well as hope and charity as perfections of the will desiring God (Mróz 2001; Conrad 2017). At this point, one arrives at the significant change that was introduced to Aristotle’s virtue theory by Thomas Aquinas. Not only did he make God the point of reference for virtues, but he also considered theological virtues – faith, hope and charity – as pivotal ones for morality (Pinsent 2015; Roberts 2017).

In summary, it might be stated that, following the suggestions of Thomas Aquinas and contemporary neo-Thomists, both cardinal and theological virtues are the key virtues for Christian morality. The achievement of excellence in prudence, justice, temperance and fortitude is the condition for a deliberate action with the purpose of the well-being of the people who will see the effects of this action. On the other hand, theological virtues of faith, hope and charity are, in a certain sense, given as a condition for regarding God as a person who constitutes a point of reference for accepting specifically Christian challenges and that may, thereby, prompt such difficult decisions (STh I–II, q. 63; Maritain 1967, 131; Keenan 2016, 198–199; Conrad 2017) as forgiveness or concern for enemies.

Christian religious education and development of moral virtues in school

The introduction to the neo-Thomistic theory of virtue makes it possible to ask the question about potential, and limitations, of school (Christian) religious education to support the development of moral virtues. The answer to the question raised above will be divided into three stages. In the first, the issue of the development of moral virtues will be presented, as well as the school as a space for building moral character. In the second stage, the problem of introducing to understanding of virtues will be addressed. The third stage directly concerns the tasks of Christian religious education in the process of supporting the development of moral virtues. This argument is initially made as appropriate for Christian religious education, and it could be applied to the religious education found in Polish schools – where all religious education is denominational and provided by religious communities. It could be extended to other contexts internationally where religious education is denominational in this way. The theories of virtue development are of relevance to all considering moral education as an element of religious education, as religious education of all kinds should consider the moral development of young people learning about religion.

Supporting virtue development as an introduction to being responsible for community members

This brief introduction to virtue theory creates an awareness that moral education is more than just following standards or preparing people so that they can analyse and solve moral dilemmas. It is also about supporting human development in such a way that maturing persons consistently follows solutions regarded by them as good ones, keeps being moderate in relation to pleasures or even gives them up when the situation so requires, and bravely endures adversity when good is hard to achieve. Is it possible ― in the context of school education ― to support moral development that is understood more broadly than merely developing moral reasoning? Before attempting to answer this question, let us try to examine briefly the problem of developing virtues.

Thomas Aquinas, talking about virtues’ development, stated that they are improved by an exercise, a practice (STh I–II, q. 51, a. 2; q. 52; Keenan 2016, 198–201). Jacek Woroniecki also suggested that respective powers improve and achieve harmony in pursing one’s good only if an agent attempts to act morally. Each subsequent minor act in pursuit of well-being makes the act of doing good easier. The same applies to the vices. Each subsequent act of succumbing to the temptation of pleasure and devotion to greater good in exchange for the achievement of this pleasure makes it increasingly easier for an agent to abdicate from difficult and demanding challenges (Woroniecki 2000, 359–360; Horowski 2015, 175–180). Therefore, the privileged place for moral virtues’ development is a community in which an agent is able to interact with others in achieving a common good, and where a particular person is entrusted with responsibility for the realisation of specific tasks.

Speaking about community as a place of moral virtues’ development, it is worth noting that maturing persons are encountered with specific real problems that have to be solved. What does it mean for moral development? Konstanty Michalski, one of the rectors of the Jagellonian University in Cracow in the inter-war period, distinguished two phenomena: ‘perfectionism’ and “perfectiorism”. He stated that perfectionism is striving for perfection and is self-centred in character (perfection becomes the objective of the action); perfectiorism, on the other hand, is achieving perfection by the way of an action that heads towards the good of another person (Michalski 1937). If moral perfection becomes a purpose in itself, it will actually never be realised since it is not another’s well-being at the centre of attention, but the agents themselves (egocentrism). In order for agents to develop in the moral dimension, they have to secure the well-being of another people. In this case, moral development (moral virtues’ development) will be gradually accomplished almost incidentally (Wojtyła 1993).

School is a place where young people not only ponder how to treat other people, but also meet defined, real individuals who do not belong to their family circle. Each person encountered in this community experiences a variety of issues and difficulties, and in many situations needs support from people who, on an everyday basis, are close to him/her. These issues can be due to learning difficulties, financial problems of the family, or difficulties in building relationships with peers. When meeting schoolmates, maturing persons must decide whether to be caring towards them, to ignore their problems, or even to humiliate them by taking advantage of their weakness. When deciding to help schoolmates learn, they must demonstrate the cardinal virtues of prudence in managing their time; justice, i.e. readiness to fulfil their obligations towards that person and other people (e.g. family members), or towards the school; and temperance, when helping the schoolmates requires, for example, giving up the pleasure of playing with friends. A school is also a place where young people brought up in different cultures and religions meet, especially nowadays, in the age of migration. Consequently, a school becomes a space where people with stereotypical views and fears of the unknown meet. Maturing persons in this situation are forced to deal with the dilemma of whether to establish relationships with cultural/religious strangers, invite them to play, or alternatively ignore them and deepen their isolation/rejection. The decision to overcome stereotypes is always accompanied by the danger of being misunderstood by friends, and consequently experiencing isolation. Therefore, the virtue of courage is needed to establish a relationship with someone who is marginalised. Repeating similar decisions on a daily basis leads to the formation of specific character traits: justice, temperance and courage, or alternatively injustice, the pursuit of pleasure without heeding the welfare of others, and fearful conformism. Therefore, not only is a learning community created at school, but also a community that constitutes the context of moral development. A school creates a space for the germination and development of traits that in the future will determine the individual’s adoption of specific attitudes in public life. One might say that the time of school education always leads a person to the development of some character traits. However, it does not mean that each trait can always be called a virtue. At times, this functioning leads to the development of vice in the moral character of a student.

It can be concluded from the above reflection that school education in its moral aspect should be understood more broadly than information transfer. Teachers must also look at their roles more broadly and deeply. If school education is to lead to virtue development, form teachers’ challenge at school is a deliberate incorporation of maturing people into a school community life (Horowski 2019b, 106) in such a way as to face moral dilemmas, seek solutions which would be – in their opinion – just, and learn to forgo simple pleasures, by taking actions with the objective aimed at the goodness of other community members. One may say, following Aristotle, that education is a kind of certain policy whose art should be seized by teachers (Vogler 2017).

Teachers may also ― sometimes unconsciously ― not take advantage of opportunities to support moral virtue development, or may contribute through their actions to the development of moral vices. If school become an exemplification of contemporary individualistic and consumer societies, where everyone cares about their own good, and relationships are established primarily in order to attain goods that are impossible to acquire otherwise, students strive to acquire knowledge and competences that increase the chances of success in later life, and often collaborate with their schoolmates because it suits their own interests. Teachers can take advantage of these mechanisms and motivate students to learn by allowing competition between them. Students thus achieve better results, but at the expense of them ― developing moral vices, such as egoism, craftiness or selfishness. This mechanism could be used in many schools, regardless of whether they declare a Christian or secular character. Can a teacher direct school community life in such a way that it promotes a sense of responsibility for a classmate, the importance of supporting a classmate in his/her weakness, and the ability to give up certain pleasures to help another person? Students should learn prudence, justice, temperance and courage in relation to their schoolmates every day (van der Zee 2012; Kozubek 2015). Special opportunities to support moral development are critical moments in the lives of individual students, particularly if, for instance, one of the students falls seriously ill, undergoes a crisis in his/her family or his/her family experiences a traumatic event (e.g. the death of a family member).

Supporting virtue development by introducing an understanding of virtue

The reflection on moral virtues and their development conditions leads to the conclusion that the very didactic classes implemented at school contribute to virtues development to a small extent. Jacques Maritain, speaking of school education, ascertained that it conducts ‘premoral’ education: ‘a point which deals not with morality strictly speaking, but with the preparation and first tilling of the soil thereof’ (Maritain 1943, 27). In other words, within didactics students might be provided with knowledge about the moral rightness and wrongness, they may acquire skills of analysing moral problems from various perspectives and of identifying the consequences of particular acts and finally, they might understand what moral virtues are for. Notwithstanding, didactic activities themselves are not able to motivate students in such a sufficient way that, when finding themselves in a situation requiring decision, they are able to take a morally difficult decision. Following the reflection of Thomas Aquinas on the virtues, it may be stated that students, within didactic classes, may develop the virtues of deliberation well and judiciousness (good sense), which are related to a situation analysis and have a characteristically intellectual nature, but within these classes, they will not be able to obtain the virtue of prudence which is expressed in firm decision making.

The above statements do not depreciate the value of knowledge transferred within school education. Thomas Aquinas himself is the author of a well-known statement: ‘God’s greatest gift to human beings is reason’. Through the life, human beings are not only guided by reason, but they can be changed only when their way of understanding reality is changed. Maritain in his famous work Education at the Crossroads (1943) ascertained that education of man is always an appeal for his reason. Intellectual development is important and constitutes a condition for moral development, including virtues development. If maturing persons, at some point of their life, are to seize control of their moral development, starting thereby the process of self-education, it is vital for them to be previously introduced to the understanding of moral virtue.

As regards the area that we are interested in, the key lies not only in supporting positive attitudes towards moral virtue and encouraging students to take actions that develop such virtues (Smith and Smith 2013), but also in explaining what concrete virtues are about. Unfortunately, virtue ― as a moral proficiency ― is not distinguished from habit in contemporary culture. Virtue is proficiency in adapting activities to goals and circumstances, so it is reason-based. Habits are revealed in automatic, thoughtless actions. In modern cultures, these two phenomena are not distinguished from each other, since the term ‘habitus’ ― used by Thomas Aquinas to mean such a formation of man that manifests itself in reason-based actions ― has been utilised in psychological and sociological theories to define an automatic, mechanical action (an example of this is the theory of Pierre Bourdieu, Austin 2017). Consequently, students do not perceive that the same virtue can manifest itself in different decisions when those decisions are taken in different contexts, or the action can be a manifestation of either virtue or vice, depending on the context. They do not perceive, for example, that taking actions that threaten health and life can, in certain circumstances, be a manifestation of the virtue of courage, and in other circumstances a manifestation of thoughtless bravado (which is in fact a vice), or that transferring money to a stranger may in some circumstances be an expression of the virtue of generosity, while in other circumstances it may indicate the vice of prodigality. School education should therefore introduce an understanding of virtue that can help to properly identify examples of it and distinguish those examples from similar but non-virtuous features.

In this context, introducing an understanding of virtue is connected with showing its relationship with the cardinal virtues. This of course assumes a prior understanding of the cardinal virtues by the students. Defining a given feature as a virtue or vice implies indicating whether that feature leads to prudent and just actions in specific situations, or alternatively to hasty and unreasonable actions that are unjust to the people who directly or indirectly experience the effects of specific decisions brought about by that features. Consequently, a virtue or vice can be identified when, in an individual’s given action, the role that moderation/immoderation and courage/cowardice played when the decision was made is indicated.

Finally, it is important for students to learn the understanding of virtue through examples that are close to their life, and consequently to analyse the decisions they have made, in which they have dealt with moral dilemmas, while identifying their own virtues or vices. The narration about virtues, as well as the examples cited to characterise specific virtues, often do not relate to students’ daily decisions. Students learn virtues through the example of heroic deeds, in which individuals risk their health or life for the good of others. Consequently, knowledge of virtue is not directly related to their own lives. If it is true that in order to make heroic decisions one has to mature for years by making good decisions on seemingly unimportant matters on a daily basis, then students must discover virtues and vices in their own relationships with family, schoolmates and neighbours, so that this knowledge can accentuate their diligence, kindness, punctuality, exactitude, modesty, patience and forbearance.

Supporting the development of moral virtues by development of theological virtues

The last issue raised in these analyses directly concerns the potential of Christian religious education in supporting the moral development of students. It aims at answering the question of what Christian religious education can bring to moral education in school. It is not the question about the involvement of a religious teacher in activities that can be taken by other teachers, but about the specific factor of moral development that could be provided by religious education.

As outlined in the introduction, Neo-Thomistic thought claims that students’ moral choices are conditioned by their moral beliefs, but are not a simple consequence of those outlooks. According to representatives of neo-Thomism, who pay attention to the external, objective conditions of the human act, the will plays a key role in making moral decisions, and specifically the good that is desired by the will. Referring to this thesis, it can be said that for moral choices the most important is whether students want their personal good, do they care about the good of their friends, do they want a friendly atmosphere in the classroom, etc. Religious education can support moral education by adding a motivation that could be significant if the student is a believer. Religious education can show concern for another person (stranger or even hostile) as concern for someone loved by God.

If Christian religious education is to contribute to moral education, understood as supporting the development of moral virtues, the religion teacher should observe the relationships between students belonging to different peer, social, sometimes religious groups, and encourage them to cooperate and sometimes solve conflicts, drawing strength from religious faith. To integrate moral development and religious development in maturing persons, students should treat schoolmates, whether they profess the same faith, whether they are unbelievers or belonging to another religious community, as the subject of their calling. For young Christians, the differences, difficulties, or weaknesses of peers may be seen as opportunities for virtuous action. Christian religious education, if it is to support moral development, cannot be limited to information, but should also lead to initiation in undertaking moral challenges adequate to the students’ faith. It is necessary to learn moral virtues in everyday situations by performing minor morally good deeds.

The understanding of virtues is evidently also important. Just as in moral education, it is possible to analyse actions in terms of the moral virtues manifesting in them; thus, in religious education, it is possible to search for the causes of specific attitudes in the strength of theological virtues. The purpose of this analysis should not be to value someone’s faith, hope or love, but to see how theological virtues could change moral attitudes. This reflection may be particularly important in the specific challenges that maturing persons face such as the love of their enemies or the forgiveness of the perpetrator of evil. Difficulties in meeting these challenges can sometimes lead young people to faith and moral crises and to blame themselves for an inability to meet specific and very difficult norms (Grün 2015). Reflecting on the relationship between morality and faith can help people understand that faith, hope and love of God are a source of additional strength to meet difficult standards.

Reflection on the potential of religious education to support moral development also leads to a question about the nature of religious education, or, more specifically, to the issue of confessional religious education, and to the problem of initiation in religious education (Bagrowicz 2006; Valk 2007; Court 2013). If religious education is to contribute to supporting the moral development of maturing people, and the thesis that the potential of religious education is primarily associated with the integration of faith and morality is correct, then the greatest contribution to moral development can be made by religious education by supporting the development of theological virtues in which strength to face the moral dilemmas can be obtained. However, fulfiling the function of supporting the development of theological virtues is currently difficult. On the one hand, as was mentioned in the introduction, due to social, cultural, legal and political conditions, religious school education is limited to the transfer of knowledge, and religious education broadly understood is limited to religious school education – it means that maturing persons do not receive other religious education, as part of which they would be introduced to prayer, liturgy, and meditation. Consequently, it must be stated that the potential of Christian religious education in relation to supporting moral development which is understood as the development of moral virtues is limited. Referring to Maritain’s thesis, it can be said that Christian religious education conducted within its contemporary socio-cultural and legal conditions is rather a ‘premoral’ than moral education; it more creates the foundation for Christian moral development than supports the development of Christian moral character.

Conclusion

The analysis conducted in the article was made on the basis of the theory of moral virtue formulated by Thomas Aquinas, and developed in works of contemporary neo-Thomists. Their purpose was to determine the extent of the potential of Christian religious education to support students’ moral development. The analysis was accompanied by an assumption that each school is not only provided with certain content, including an introduction to the understanding of moral problems and possible ways to solve them, but it also develops specific character traits among students. Depending on how students’ community life is, their cooperation and care for each other is organised by teachers who, by means of their ideas, can either support the development of students’ moral virtues or support the development of students’ moral vices. In extreme cases, a student might be taught about moral good and at the same time, the mode of school functioning could stimulate the development of moral vices.

Reflection on the theory of moral virtues leads to the conclusion that virtue education should be accompanied by such an organisation of school life that students could build communities in which they take responsibility for one another and work together towards the achievement of morally acceptable goals. The only condition for virtues’ development, including cardinal virtues – prudence, justice, temperance and fortitude, is the pursuit of the realisation of a common good. Transferring knowledge about virtues and caring for their proper understanding by students are crucial, but as such they cannot make students be more patient, understanding or inclined to forgo simple pleasures.

Reflection on school education from the perspective of the Thomistic theory of moral virtues also allowed us to ascertain what the specificity of moral education implemented within religious education is. This is related to the development of theological virtues that can support students’ motivation to care for the good of their classmates, even if they have suffered harm from them or perceive a hostile attitude from the individual in concern. The reflection taken in the article also leads to the conclusion that religious education can play an important role in moral education understood as supporting the development of moral virtues, when it is not limited only to the implementation of informational functions.

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Jarosław Horowski

Dr Jarosław Horowski is an associate professor in Faculty of Philosophy and Social Sciences of Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń, Institute of Education Sciences, Chair of History and Theory of Education, editor-in-chief of the scientific journal “Paedagogia Christiana”. Author of Moral Education According to neo-Thomistic Pedagogy (WN UMK, 2015). Intrested in Philosophy of education, moral and religious education, neo-Thomistic notion in pedagogy, education for moral virtues, and education for forgiveness.