Pandemic impact as worldview and paradigm clashes between science and society and between science and politics. Is there a role for pedagogy of science and worldview education?

ABSTRACT

The worldwide impact of the COVID-19 pandemic has been enormous. It has affected the justification of the contributions from academia, and resulted in rapid spreading of misinformation and conspiracy theories. The use of the social media has during the pandemic intermixed the space between the private and the public domain, and has interfered with an adequate functioning public sphere. In this article I will sketch some remarkable aspects of the pandemic impact on the sciences and on society at large. Then, I will argue that conceptualisations of ‘worldview’ and ‘paradigm’ could be of use to shed light on clashes between science and society and between science and politics. In the discussion section, I will deal with the impact of the new social media on the public sphere, present what a pedagogy of science perspective might contribute in dealing with such clashes, and how theories and practices of inter-worldview education might be interpreted as stimulating examples for dealing with other differing worldviews and paradigms and how to practice translation work, in order to learn to live democratically together with consensus and dissensus. I finish with a short epilogue.

KEYWORDS:

• Pandemic impact
• worldview clashes
• Kuhn, pedagogy of science
• inter-worldview education

Introduction

The Dutch Minister of Education Culture and Science since 10 January 2022, Robbert Dijkgraaf, who was from 2012 till that date the Director of the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, USA, presented on 11 March 2022 at Leiden University a lecture titled ‘When knowledge becomes critical’ (Dijkgraaf 2022).

He pointed to the fact that the COVID-19 pandemic has exposed very clearly the distance between science and society, the vulnerability of knowledge, and the growing tensions between science and politics. We need, according to him, pay more attention to the relationship of academia and society and the grown distance between the two as well as to the relationship of science and politics with a specific focus on political decision-making.

The pandemic has had a special impact on the debates in respect to the truth status of academic research results, and whether academic truth claims should have of shouldn’t have a preferential position or can and may attribute special weight in the public arena. Regarding the relationship of science and politics, Dijkgraaf criticised, what I would coin in Habermasian terms a technocratic view on this relationship. In such a view the technical-scientific means determine the final political goals. Dijkgraaf is in favour of a decisionistic view in which science is providing alternative scenarios with its consequences, and the politicians are in the end responsible for the choice or choices to be made (see for the notions of technocratic and decisionistic view Habermas 1971, 62–80).

In this essay, I will first sketch in the next section remarkable aspects of the pandemic impact on the sciences and on society at large. In the following section, I will argue that using the concept of ‘worldview’ and of ‘paradigm’ can shed some light on the clashes between science and society and science and politics. In respect to the notion of ‘worldview’, I will use the conceptualisations which has been provided the last decades with regard to this concept. I further address the question whether next to the concept of ‘worldview’, the Kuhnian notion of ‘paradigm’ with its four constitutive layers of the disciplinary matrix might also be helpful for such an analysis. In the discussion section, I will deal with the impact of the new social media on the public sphere, present what a pedagogy of science perspective might contribute in dealing with such clashes, and how theories and practices of inter-worldview education might be interpreted as stimulating examples for dealing with differing worldviews and paradigms and how to practice translation work, and to live democratically together with consensus and dissensus.

Pandemic impact on the sciences and on society at large

The impact of COVID-19 outbreak that started in China in early 2020 and was spreading in Europe first in Italy has been enormous and was worldwide. On 11 March 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) characterised this outbreak as a pandemic.

At first there was huge confusion because there was no proven medication available to be used in what could be expected adequate treatments. Due to these circumstances more people died than normally during this period of the year. At hindsight it became clear that health complaints haven’t been estimated adequately, sometimes with long lasting (side) effects. Especially people working in health institutions and in educational settings have for a long period of time been exposed to health threatening situations and relations. Those who were caught by lung covid have often long-term and possibly permanent health problems and are quite often unable to work any longer.

The pandemic has also impacted the research communities worldwide (see in extenso RNAAS 2022). Before the pandemic and the spreading of the concept of Open Science (see for an example of Open Life Sciences Miedema 2022) academic research was mostly individually focused or at best were researchers working in closed and internally oriented research groups, however, in both cases in extremely competitive cultures. Seen the urgent problems COVID-19 had caused the importance of national and international collaboration was highlighted leading to mutual support, solidarity and altruism. The rapid acceleration of digitalisation during the pandemic also stimulated changes in academic practices in terms of internationalisation, collaboration, conferencing and publishing (RNAAS 2022, 9–10). Within a year after the outbreak vaccinations were available, at least in the Western world, and that was really a medical novelty.

Next to politicians, academic researchers representing different disciplines were prominently present and communicating in the public media, that is TV (especially talk shows), radio, and newspapers as well as on social media via posts. These experiences exemplify at hindsight ‘the need to invest in transparency and good communication with the public. Not every academic researcher needs to be an expert in public engagement, but to build trustworthiness, researchers must be aware of their own position and epistemic expertise, open about their values, open to information reaching from outside their “bubble”, and willing to change their views in light of new evidence. Importantly, science must not only get the space to show vulnerability, but it must also be resilient’ (RNAAS 2022, 9).

Being resilient is indeed very important because academics were confronted with the effects of the so-called ‘infodemic’ (RNAAS 2022, 19), the rapid spreading of misinformation and conspiracy theories circulating in the mainstream and social media and on the internet (Dyrendal and Jolley 2020). This happened especially when scholarly insights could have implications for how governments might deal with this information.

During the pandemic one of the big issues was for instance vaccine hesitancy. This has resulted in the politicisation of scholarly knowledge, that is due to the development of different bubbles and rabbit holes the notions of academic ‘knowledge’, ‘truth’, ‘experience’ and ‘feeling’ were seriously doubted. This was sometimes fuelled by self-proclaimed health experts and adherents – including politicians – of conspiracy theories who claimed to provide alternative information from sources consistent with their own system of belief and in contrast to evidence-based scientific information. However, also within the community of researchers there were from the very start of the pandemic clashes between scientists themselves what would be the most adequate health care practices to follow in the given circumstances and the way the communication with citizens should be handled. The pandemic has even created rifts and mistrust between family members as well as good friend.

This has also led to public hostility towards academics in general and was shown in several media and in some cases has resulted in serious threats of physical or sexual violence. Even to death threats, for instance for the Dutch virologist Marion Koopmans who as an expert and also as a member of the WHO was nearly every week present in talk shows dealing with the state-of-the-art of the pandemic and the knowledge and advices that were available at that moment (Huijsmans 2022).

Another aspect of the pandemic impact that strongly came to light, but was already active, is the low trust in institutions and not at least in governmental institutions. Only family and friends as well as persons with whom people have a personal or communal relationship are trusted. Researchers use the term ‘low-trust society’ for this wide-spread phenomenon (Engbertsen, Van Bochove, De Boom et al. 2021). This low-trust has immediate impact on the way the practices and outcomes of science as well as of politics are evaluated by the general public, and are quite often getting a negative treatment.

On worldviews and paradigms

In this section, I will argue that we will be able to better understand the clashes between science and society and between science and politics when we use the concept of ‘worldview’ and will focus on particular, clearly definable and constitutive areas, and on the existential questions related to these areas. In this respect, also the Kuhnian notion of ‘paradigm’ in philosophy of science terms, that could be seen as a particular equivalent of the concept of ‘worldview’, might be enlightening as well.

Discussions on the meaning of worldviews as a concept as well as its use in education, in religious and worldview education, are extensive and growing (see e.g. Valk 2007; Valk, Albayrak, and Selçuk 2017; Valk, Selçuk, and Miedema 2020; Van der Kooij, de Ruyter, and Miedema 2013, 2015; Miedema 2014; Jackson 2014; Cooling 2020; Bråten 2022).

For our purpose here, I argue that with combining and using the areas mentioned by Valk (Valk 2021) and the list of existential questions distinguished by Van der Kooij et al. (Van der Kooij, de Ruyter, and Miedema 2015). we have an adequate conceptual tool to analyse clashes between science and society and between science and politics.

In his 2021 magnum opus on worldviews, John Valk is defining worldviews as ‘frameworks by which we understand ourselves, others, and the world in which we live. They are the integrative and interpretive frameworks by which order and disorder are judged, and the standard by which reality is managed and pursued’ (Valk 2021, 13). He also rightly points to the fact that while the term might lend itself to give more priority to a focus on ‘views’, it implies at the same time our being in the world. Thus, a worldview has to do with behaviours and actions and is fuelled by the beliefs and values that people embrace. With his comprehensive worldview approach Valk is distinguishing five important areas: personal and group identity; cultural dimensions; ultimate/existential questions, ontological (the nature of being) and epistemological (the nature of knowing) beliefs; and universal/particular beliefs, values and principles. Those areas are featured as main topics in a comprehensive worldviews approach (Valk 2021, 26–29).

This is fully in line with our definition of worldview as a view on life, the world, and humanity and also emphasise the influence it has on the thinking and acting of people (Van der Kooij, de Ruyter, and Miedema 2013). With Valk we also make a distinction between personal worldviews providing meaning in life of a person, and organised worldviews that aim to provide meaning of life of human beings in general.

We use the concept of ‘worldview’ for a more specific outlook on the world, namely one that focusses on meaning giving and specially on existential themes. Sometimes, these meaning giving and existential views are part of a more or less coherent and established system that has developed over time with certain (written and unwritten) sources, traditions, values, rituals, ideals or dogmas. The concept ‘worldview’ can also be used to describe someone’s personal meaning giving outlook on the world, life and humanity. A personal worldview can be, but is not necessarily, based on or inspired by an organised worldview.

Existential questions have, in our view, a special status in respect to worldviews, and we distinguish between the following existential questions: ontological -, cosmological -, theological -, teleological -, eschatological – and ethical questions (Van der Kooij, de Ruyter, and Miedema 2015, 82).

From the concept of ‘worldview’ I now turn to the concept of ‘paradigm’ in the way this concept is introduced from a philosophy of science perspective by Thomas Kuhn (Kuhn 1970; Kuhn 2022). Interestingly, he has also coined ‘paradigm’ as a ‘worldview’ (Kuhn 1970, 204). Inspired by his approach on the paradigmatical basis of sciences, the question may arise whether we need to speak of (in)compatibility and/or (in)commensurability when dealing with clashes between science and society and between science and politics in terms of different worldviews. For Kuhn science in whatever stage of development it might be is always a community-based activity, and to understand it we must unravel its community structure as well as the way paradigms as the constellation of group commitments govern a group of scientific practitioners (Kuhn 1970, 179–180).

In his most sophisticated conceptualisation of the concept of ‘paradigm’ in the Postscript of the 1970-edition of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions he characterises a paradigm as a ‘disciplinary matrix’ with four constitutive elements: symbolic generalisations, metaphysical elements, values, and exemplars (Kuhn 1970, 181–187). Although focusing on developments and clashes in science, Kuhn interestingly underscored ‘the need for similar and, above all, for comparative study of the corresponding communities in other fields’ (Kuhn 1970, 209). In my view, the elaborated conceptualisations of ‘worldview’ presented above could be seen as adequate candidates for such comparisons. Also combined with the four elements of the ‘disciplinary matrix’.

What interest me now most in respect to these comparisons is Kuhn’s view in respect to the questions of (in)compatibility and (in)commensurability in scientific settings and what this might mean when we are dealing with worldview clashes. Re-reading the Postscript and also his Last Writings, it strikes me that his approach is highly compatible with the critical-hermeneutical tradition outlined by Gadamer (Gadamer 1975) and Habermas (Habermas 1984/1987). Kuhn’s keywords are translation and translating.

Taking the differences between their own intra- and inter-group discourse as itself a subject for study, they (that is the scientists, SM) can first attempt to discover the terms and locations that, used unproblematically within each community, are nevertheless foci of trouble for inter-group discussions. (…) Having isolated such areas of difficulty in scientific communication, they can next resort to their shared everyday vocabularies in an effort further to elucidate their troubles. Each may, that is, try to discover what the other would see and say when presented with a stimulus to which his own verbal response would be different. If they can sufficiently refrain from explaining anomalous behaviour as the consequence of mere error or madness, they may in time become very good predictors of each other’s behaviour. (Kuhn 1970, 202)

Kuhn is convinced that even when there is strong dissensus on certain elements of each other’s paradigms or worldviews, recourse to good reasons is always possible. From Habermas we can learn, however, that for this some basic prerequisites must be fulfilled. There need to be the willingness of all actors to follow the rules of communicative action, that is to negotiate interpretations of their situations. Elements of the objective, the social, and the subjective worlds are under discussion here. The aim is to achieve consensus with regard to claims, norms and expressive utterances, but also with regard to claims made to validity, whether truth, rightness, or sincerity. Language plays a decisive part by way of its representative, appellative and expressive modes, or in claims to validity by means of affirmation or denial (taking a yes/no position (Miedema 1994, 198). Thus, on a deliberative basis the exchange of views, facts and norms (just to mention a few areas) should be possible, and the outcome could lead to consensus as well dissensus on particular elements.

The conceptual tools along worldview lines could make us attentive to particular areas of worldviews (Valk) that are at stake in clashes between science and society and science and science and politics. But also, to the particular existential questions (Van der Kooij et.al.) that consciously are addressed or unconsciously play a role behind the back of the participants (Marx). With the help of these tools analysis and reconstruction would be possible. Of course, with the aim that discussion, debate, exchanges of fact, norms and experiences take place in deliberative-democratic practices. The practices and actions of scientists/academics can also be analysed with these tools and can make attentive to the relationships of the personal and the professional, and to the personal/professional and the collective/group. The Kuhnian notions of ‘symbolic generalization’, ‘metaphysical elements’, ‘values’, and ‘exemplars’ may be helpful in these clashes too (Kuhn 1970, 182-187). Scientists, politicians and citizens may use these four elements in their own way. So, putting weight on their own positions and to try and strengthen the bonding between group members. They may use general statements as having a lawlike stance. Particular commitments might be put in to strengthen the bond of a group of participants. Values can provide a sense of community different from other communities. Shared practices might be used to socialise the members of a community in a particular way and in a certain direction.

Discussion

One of the big issues in these clashes is how to strengthen the basis for open communication, for dialogue, encounter and exchange of arguments on facts, norms and experiences. In line with his view on communicative action in deliberative-democratic societies, Habermas (born in 1929) has recently pointed to some particular socio-political aspects of the pandemic in his latest book (Habermas 2023). Crucial in his analysis of the current state of democracy is the dramatic and devastating impact the new social media have on the public sphere. These media are in the hands of multinationals only driven by earning as much income as possible, that is following a neoliberal market model. In exchange of free access to these media these multinationals get all the data in respect to the users. This, what Habermas has coined the platform character of the social media, implies that every user has become also author of her/his unedited, publicly accessible utterances, that is statements and words. The algorithms these media use is not treating users as citizens who exchange arguments within a deliberative democratic setting with a focus on the common good, but as consumers with personal preferences. Users have broadly adopted this consumer view on using the new media and appropriate the platforms as publication channel for their personal opinions and lifestyle choices. In short, the new social media are stimulating the self-expression of the users who only depart from their own experiences, interests and perspectives, while these media are driven by a neoliberal marketing approach. The effect is that on the social media the space between private and public is intermixed.

It might be clear that fake news and expressions of conspiracy theories can flourish, because the responsible media are not regulating the content, thus not taking any responsibility for the published content. They just follow the logic of the capitalist free market ideology. However, if we want to defend the democratic rights and participation of all citizens, and when these citizens follow the norms and rules of an adequate functioning public sphere, then this public sphere where the new media operate should, according to Habermas, be regulated by the constitution. Only such an arrangement could lead to inclusive participation of and deliberative exchange of arguments among citizens, and might yield rational acceptable outcomes.

I want to argue that the philosophy of science might also contribute here in terms of reasoning with an eye on choice and decision-making. In an earlier essay, we introduced what we coined a ‘pedagogy of science point of view’ as part of philosophy of science, and such next to sociology of science, psychology of science, and history of science. We noticed that in contemporary philosophy of science there is increased attention to pedagogical questions, also due to an increased attention to the relationship between science and society (Biesta and Miedema 1990).

One of the core notions of such a pedagogy of science is the concept of ‘phronesis’ in a Bernsteinian connotation as ‘a form of reasoning that is concerned with choice and deliberation. It deals with that which is variable and about which there can be differing opinions (doxai). It is a type of reasoning in which there is a mediation between general principles and a concrete particular situation that requires choice and decision. Informing such a judgement there are no determinate technical rules’ (Bernstein 1983, 54). Bernstein points to a structural relationship between scientific and other communities, so from a pedagogical perspective on phronesis this should imply that pedagogical activities are needed to establish the relationship between science and society or, more precisely, between scientific and other communities.

Bernstein’s view on choice and deliberation is fully compatible with Habermas’ view on deliberative politics and deliberative democracy. The relation of science/academia, politics and practice is then guided by a pragmatistic model (Habermas 1971, 67), instead of a technocratic or decisionistic view on that relationship that I dealt with in the introduction of this essay. The relationship of these should be one of critical reciprocity. This is compatible with the plea for strengthening the link between academia, lifeworld and politics, in which the practice of science should be interpreted as ‘part of the democratic society and focusing on it together with politicians, practitioners (and citizens) in terms of public debate, communication, responsibility, value-ladenness (…) and this includes the public debate on values, control, re-direction of research topics and problems’ (Miedema 2021, 235–236). Already in 1971, Habermas was well aware that the empirical and practical possibilities for public debates in his pragmatistic model of the complex relationship between academia, politics and practices, are of crucial importance. These possibilities are, however, not always easy to realise due what he characterised as the structural change in the bourgeois public realm and the internal development of the sciences. Above we have seen, with Habermas, that due to the new structural transformation of the public sphere under the influence of the new social media and their impact on the public sphere, the possibilities are even more seriously challenged.

The translating process Kuhn propagated as a means to tackle incommensurable positions, is well-known for religious and worldview educators under the name of interreligious or inter-worldview education for children and young people in the school setting. In these approaches the dialogue and encounter are addressed and stimulated by the teachers and practised by the students (see for example Lȁhnemann 2015; Wielzen and Ter Avest 2017; Valk, Selçuk, and Miedema 2020; Lipiȁinen and Poulter 2022). Quite interesting, and inspired by the work of Ann Taves and colleagues, is Bråten’s approach to develop a kind of worldview education that might enable teachers and students to understand how worldviews are formed. She emphasises the need to deal from a worldview perspective with religious, secular, and non-binary views in an intertwined way (Bråten 2022).

Such approaches will help the students to really understand self and others and their own religious or worldview stance via the didactical means of dialogue and encounter. It provides them with the opportunity to experience, to be confronted by and become acquainted with the religious or worldview background, ideas, experiences, and practices of these other children and young people. Through such pedagogical processes they deliberately learn to see where there is consensus with their own worldview or religion, but also at which points there is dissensus. Such practices might bring about mutual respect and understanding.

It is my hope, that similar practices should also be constitutive for improving relationships between science, society and politics in order to avoid worldview or paradigmatic clashes at different levels in society. Insights from theories and practices of inter-worldview education may be interpreted as stimulating heuristical examples for dealing with differing worldviews and paradigms, how to practice translation work, and to live democratically together with consensus and dissensus. In that way doing justice to differences on the basis of an attitude of inclusivity. Such practices of intersubjectivity might avoid absolutistic and relativistic stances on truth and normativity.

Epilogue

The pandemic has made us aware of several developments or reinforcements of already existing trends that really are a threat for every social-democratic society. Just to mention the rabbit holes, the social bubbles where scientific knowledge is discredited as ‘just an opinion among others’, the growth and spread of conspiracy theories, low trust societies, and the platform character of social media in the hands of multinationals not putting any restrictions on the users while following the logic of the neoliberal market model. The relationship between science and society, between science and politics, and between scientists themselves and citizens themselves are seriously under pressure.

It may be crystal clear that there is no easy way out here. However, with the conceptual tools of worldview and paradigm theory thorough reconstructions may as a hermeneutics of understanding make visible what is at stake. The theories and especially the practices of interreligious education and worldview education may be a source of heuristic inspiration for other practices in society at large.

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Siebren Miedema

Siebren Miedema (1949) is Professor Emeritus in Religious Education in the Faculty of Religion and Theology & Professor Emeritus in Educational Foundations in the Faculty of Behavioural and Movement Sciences at the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, the Netherlands. He has published numerous books, chapters, and articles both in academic and professional journals and in newspapers, and gave numerous lectures all over the globe.