Romanticism, representations of religion and critical religious education

Abstract

Geoff Teece has recently (in BJRE, 27, 2005, pp. 29–40) come to the defence of modern religious education and contended that many of the criticisms brought against it are based on mistaken interpretations. More particularly, Teece accuses Andrew Wright of misinterpreting the position of Professor John Hick and of failing to appreciate the intellectual resources that Hick provides for the construction of a critical form of religious education. He attempts to correct Wright’s interpretation of Hick, and by extension to undermine Wright’s indictment of the influence of modernity on religious education; and he attempts to illustrate how Hick’s religious pluralism can make a contribution to discussions about critical religious education. The aim of this paper is to advance the case for critical religious education and to outline something of the form and nature it should take. It begins with a short discussion of the nature and commitments of modern religious education, indicating the sense in which they are deficient. It then moves on to consider Teece’s appeal to the thought of John Hick, which is judged to be misinterpreted and inappropriate. The paper concludes with the articulation of a set of four heuristic principles that give substance to the vision of critical religious education.

Keywords:

• Religious Education
• confessionalism
• John Hick
• pluralist theology

Notes

1. All page references incorporated into the text are from Teece (2005).

2. At one point Teece cites Alston in support of Hick’s appeal to experience (p. 34). This unfortunately may give the impression that Alston agrees with Hick’s positive account of religious pluralism. Alston, however, unlike Hick, does not believe that the appeal to religious experience justifies the truth of each and every religion. Alston holds to a robust form of realism in religion (he professes to be a Trinitarian, charismatic Christian by the way: Alston, 1994, pp. 19–30) that he expressly distinguishes from ‘Hick’s [theological] Kantianism’ (Alston, 1991, p. 266).

3. The nature of ‘agreement’ between sense experiences receives fuller treatment in Forgie, 1985.

4. See Barnes (2002a) for criticism.