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ABSTRACT
Tolerance has an ambiguous role in anti-racism strategies. On the one hand, it is a clear antidote to racial intolerance. Yet on the other, not only is it not the only antidote to racial intolerance (respect for difference and indifference to difference are also possibilities), but the fact that it involves a negative attitude or belief and the power to act on it suggests it is far from ideal. These problems are compounded by the fact that racial tolerance can only deal with racial intolerance, which because of its intentionality seems to be only a small part of racism. In this paper, I defend racial tolerance by arguing that conceptually it does have a role in anti-racism strategies and normatively describes an important minimum for those at risk of committing acts of racial intolerance.
Acknowledgements
I am very grateful for comments and suggestions from Yin Paradies, Ned Dobos, Tim Soutphommasane, Geoffrey Brahm Levey, Stephen Coleman, Anne Pedersen, Maria Hynes, Scott Sharpe, Piero Moraro, Lina Eriksson and the journal's four anonymous referees, as well as to audiences at the ‘Reconfiguring Anti-Racism: Tolerance, Harmony, Inclusion or Justice? Conference’ (Deakin University), the ‘Australian Association of Philosophy Annual Conference’ (Australian National University), and the ‘RDA@40 Conference’ (Australian Human Rights Commission) where earlier versions of this paper were presented.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1. For a general defence of this view of tolerance in which these conditions are both necessary and sufficient, see Balint (Citation2014).
2. For an overview of the many issues involved in precisely defining racism, see for example Glasgow (Citation2009), esp. Part I.
3. I will not distinguish between ‘racial’ and ‘ethnoracial’ characteristics here, nor enter into discussion of how ‘real’ they are. These issues have no effect on my argument. It should also be clear that given this general understanding of the harm of racism, the question of ‘what is racism?’ can be answered a numbered of ways, and moreover, this answer has little bearing on my overall argument – readers can simply plug their own precise understanding into my conclusions.
4. Statistical and systemic discrimination are two other labels that are often used in this space. Both statistical discrimination (the use of data on past actions to target particular groups) and systemic discrimination can be either direct or indirect (Gynther Citation2007; Lippert-Rasmussen Citation2007). For my purposes, the direct/indirect distinction will be the most significant. Also, while it is true that racism is always wrong, this is not necessarily the case with racial discrimination (Singer Citation1978). Nevertheless, for ease of argument, I will assume among the cases I use that racial discrimination is wrong.
5. I elaborate on the meaning of ‘intentional’ shortly.
6. I mean ‘objection’ in the broad sense to include a negative attitude, a judgement of inferiority, a negative emotional reaction, etc.
7. I mean to keep respect for difference separate from respect for sameness (e.g., Kantian respect-for-persons). I do not contest the importance of the latter, the question is instead whether it implies respect for difference or merely tolerance of difference (for further discussion see Balint Citation2006, Citation2013). While racist attitudes seem hard to reconcile with respect-for-persons, one way of understanding the remainder of the paper is as addressing the question of which is the best way realising this value in a political rather than moral sense.
8. See, for example, the Dalai Lama's (Citation1996, 46–47) position on homosexuality, which is neither respectful nor actively intolerant.
9. See, for example, the discussion of special measures in Article 1.4 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965).
10. None of this is to say that having one's race valued positively is not important (see e.g., Jeffers Citation2013), but that there are problems when without issues of redress this becomes a general rather than local concern.
11. Darwall (Citation1977, 39–40) gives its general character as ‘the disposition to weigh appropriately some feature or fact in one's deliberations’, or more colloquially, to regard an object as something to be reckoned with and acting accordingly.
12. For the more general thesis, which is an orthodoxy in social psychology, see, for example, Myers (Citation2014, Citation120–Citation151).
13. This is commonly called ‘the paradox of the tolerant racist’ (Horton Citation1994). It involves calling someone more tolerant who holds racist views but does not act on them than someone who does not hold such views in the first place. There is a great deal of literature on this philosophical problem (for a recent example see Bessone Citation2013), but it only exists for those who insist on tolerance being a moral virtue. Once one takes a non-moral virtue understanding the problem immediately dissipates.
14. For a view of intolerance as prevention see Newey (Citation1999).