ABSTRACT
This article aims to provide empirical evidence against the theory and practice of immigrant integration through the experience of EU citizens in the UK around Brexit. We demonstrate that, in the case of EU citizens, the outcomes of presumably successful “integration” have been achieved while – and, we argue, because of the fact that – EU citizens have been treated as citizens (not migrants) and have been freed from the requirement to “integrate”. On the basis of interviews, focus groups and a survey in the period 2016–18 we show meaningful incorporation of a variety of EU citizens of all backgrounds, including those from the so-called “low-skilled” presumably problematic to integrate subgroup. We claim that work, family, locality and time determine much of the intricacies of the incorporation journey. Integration governance which Brexit imposed on EU citizens can only threaten these outcomes.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 Of course, this applies to third-country nationals in the same degree, though it is beyond the scope of our empirical work here.
2 Using a Likert scale (1–5) the mean for applying for citizenship overall was 3.3, for Eastern Europeans it was around 4 (e.g. Polish 4.3, Bulgarian 3.7, and Hungarian 3.8). For comparison, it was lower for all others, for example, French 2.9, German 3.1 and Italian 3.2.
3 A total of 62.75 per cent in full-time employment, 15 per cent self-employed, 13 per cent in part-time employment and 3.75 per cent own their own business.
4 Perhaps the one notable exception to this finding has been the treatment of Roma EU citizens, which – due to a much longer term context of structural marginalization and discrimination – deserve a separate discussion (Fox, Morasanu, and Szilassy Citation2012). One thing our data suggest on this point is that discrimination is perceived not only from British citizens but from fellow EU citizens as well.