ABSTRACT
The public discourse over Israel’s unprecedented political crisis in 2019–2021 (four general elections in only two years) has focused on the personality and actions of one person: Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Relying on a series of public opinion polls during Netanyahu’s second term (2009–2021), we examine the triadic relationship between the following components: (1) sentiments toward Netanyahu, (2) affiliation with ethno-class Jewish status groups, and (3) political attitudes along the liberal-conservative continuum. We show that while there are real socio-political divisions behind the controversy over Netanyahu, the conflict around his public image reflects and shapes the boundaries between various Jewish ethno-class status groups and enables alignments along these boundaries. The centrality of Netanyahu’s image in Israeli politics, we argue, substitutes substantive political discussions and has stemmed from the failure of some political actors, and especially the Secular Ashkenazi group, to articulate a coherent political vision.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 See an interview of Lev Grinberg by Tom Mehager, 19 March 2019. https://www.haokets.org/2019/03/29/גנאלוגיה-של-הצבעה-שבטית-בישראל. A more vulgar version of this theme has been promoted by the TV reporter and commentator, Avishai Ben Haim, who argued that Netanyahu, even if himself a Secular Jew of European origin, has become a symbol of the “Second Israel”: a code word for Jews of African or Asian origin (Mizrahi Jews) who live disproportionally in the periphery, populate disproportionally the lower socio-economic ranks among Jewish Israelis, and tend to follow Jewish religious traditions. Ben Haim further contended that the aspiration to put Netanyahu behind bars aims at preserving the privileges of Ashkenazi Jews.
2 See Gideon Levy, “'Hope'? Anti-Netanyahu Protest Movement Never Cared About the Day After,” Haaretz, July 24, 2021.
3 In 2009, the scale was from 1 to 10 and the values were calibrated accordingly.
4 For more details about the method see Smooha (Citation2018)
6 Dataset provided by the Viterbi Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research of the Israel Democracy Institute (N = 701).
7 Peace Index Survey, August 2003, dataset provided by the Viterbi Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research of the Israel Democracy Institute.
8 The Israeli Voice Index, August 2020, conducted by the Viterbi Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research of the Israel Democracy Institute, from 31 August to 2 September 2020. The above-mentioned analysis is based on 605 men and women who were interviewed in Hebrew, constituting a representative national, 9% of them reported on participating on the protest.
9 https://www.mekomit.co.il/המחאה-היא-הזדמנות-להחזיר-את-הכיבוש-לסד/
10 See for example, Bar-Lev filmed report from the demonstration on August 29, 2020 at https://www.facebook.com/orly.barlev1/videos/4916263551732996/. From minute 19:27 a demonstrator repeated three times a slogan against the occupation. Bar-Lev left the scene and from another location at the demonstration clarified that she is against any “political” issue and “when I hear calls of this kind I give up on them”.