Political mobilization of layered ethnic identities

ABSTRACT

The ethnic identities of many communities in Central Asia, the Middle East, and Sub-Saharan Africa are layered: larger-scale superordinate ethnic groups consist of smaller-scale subordinate ethnic (sub)groups. This underappreciated feature of ethnicity has far-reaching political ramifications. In settings where ethnic identities are layered, politicians can access the considerable benefits of coethnic voting by mobilizing the electoral support of fellow members of any ethnic layer. Presented with such choices, election candidates adapt their identity mobilization strategies to the ethnic composition of electorates in order to target and coordinate with suitable coethnic electorate segments, form winning coalitions, and fragment the voting blocs assembled by their electoral rivals. The multiplicity and malleability of available layered identities facilitates both the construction and fragmentation of cross-segment alliances as well as individual segments. Evidence from fifty-four electoral contests in Marsabit in Northern Kenya provides support for this argument.

KEYWORDS:

• Ethnicity
• ethnic politics
• elections
• coalitions
• Kenya
• Sub-Saharan Africa

Acknowledgements

The author is grateful to Dalle Abraham, Catherine Boone, Antoinette Handley, Anne Pitcher, Caress Schenk, Woche Guyo Woche, conference participants at APSA and the University of Toronto, and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful feedback and to the research participants for their insights into Marsabit politics.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 In some settings, cross-cutting cleavages offer comparable electoral advantages (Dunning and Harrison 2010).

2 Posner compares the mobilization of ethnic and non-ethnic (linguistic) identities. I extend his seminal work by discussing the electoral strategies of politicians who can choose between multiple distinct ethnic allegiances.

3 In Sub-Saharan Africa, twenty-one countries use district systems, thirteen PR, and six hybrid. India, where ethnic politics has also been extensively studied, has a first-past-the-post system.

4 The availability of numerous coalitions that all offer access to the benefits of coethnicity disincentivizes mobilization of non-ethnic identities, which is more attractive in settings where ethnicity is less malleable (Posner 2005).

5 Such as 2+3+4(+5) in district III or A2+A3+A4+A5 in IV.

6 Such as 2+3+4+5 in district I, 1+3+4 in II, A1+A2 in III, or A2+A3+A4+A5 in IV.

7 Such as A1+A2, rather than A2+B1+B2+C, in district III, or A2+A3+A4+A5, rather than A3+A4+A5+B+C, in IV in Figure 1.

8 Due to cross-district variation in electorate ethnic composition, members of such coalitions may mobilize different ethnic layers in concurrent electoral contests.

9 The Marsabit electoral districts roughly correspond to the district types from Figure 1. See Figure 2.

10 University of Toronto Social Sciences, Humanities, and Education Research Ethics Board Protocol #32509.

11 Several candidates ran in multiple elections.

12 I classify winning coalitions as large if their margin of victory is greater than ten per cent.

13 In contrast, cross-cutting cleavages, such as class or religion, have no political salience in Marsabit.

14 Usually national, but sometimes local. In particular, in 2013 Ukur Yatani joined the countrywide Orange Democratic Movement, which he left to create his own Frontier Alliance Party four years later.

15 Because of the variation in the ethnic composition of Marsabit electorates, coethnic allies have mobilized different ethnic layers in individual contests. For instance, while Abshiro and Hargura emphasized the superordinate Borana and Rendille identities in their countywide contests, their Team Kayo coethnics Qalicha and Marselino relied on subordinate Warrajiddaa and Rongumo clan identities in the concurrent Moyale and Laisamis campaigns.

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by University of Toronto.