Emotions and resistance in diaspora: the case of Australia’s Kurds from Turkey

ABSTRACT

This paper examines the emotional motives behind the reproduction and maintenance of Kurdishness as a transnational social identity among Kurds from Turkey residing in Melbourne, Australia. Drawing from 15 face-to-face, in-depth interviews with members of the Kurdish diaspora, we argue that the collective victimhood experienced by Kurds in response to repressive assimilationist state policies and crackdowns on political rights and activities in Turkey has played a significant role in shaping diasporic Kurdish identity. Our findings, however, reveal that resistance and resilience have also emerged among the members of the Kurdish diaspora in Australia, and are now equally integral to the construction and preservation of Kurdishness. By exploring the complex interplay between emotions, victimhood, resistance and resilience, this paper sheds light on the ongoing struggles and shifting diaspora identities.

KEYWORDS:

• Transnationalism
• diasporas
• resistance
• victimhood
• emotions
• Kurds

Introduction

The scholarship on diasporic political communities highlights the role of emotions in the formation, maintenance and mobilization of ethno-political diasporic identities.¹ Scholars exploring the nexus of victimhood and social identities highlight the politicization of victimhood to construct social categories as political players (Grigoriadis and Dilek 2018; Horwitz 2018; Lerner 2020; Armaly and Enders 2021). Some others narrow their focus to look at the impactor role of collective victimhood in the formation of a shared identity in the construction of nations (Baumann 2013; Mijić 2020). Some others deal with alternative accounts and interpretations of events that result in victimhood within the same group as challenges to group formation and maintenance of projected social identities (Yildiz and Verkuyten 2011). Others still narrow their focus further to the intractable conflict settings and politics of victimhood by the conflicting parts (Lim 2010; Noor et al. 2012; Adelman et al. 2016). Aras (2014) shed lights on role of emotions, fear and pain, in formation of Kurdishness, however, she keeps her scope limited to the Kurds in Turkey. In this paper, we aim to broaden the scope of our discussion beyond Turkey to encompass diasporic/transnational dimension. Additionally, we seek to provide a fresh perspective by focusing specifically on the aftermath of the collapse of the peace process, which was also known as the Kurdish Opening, between the years 2009 and 2015. We do this by exploring how the developments in this “new” era have been interpreted by diasporic Kurdish communities in relation to their Kurdishness, with a specific focus on the Australian Kurds from Turkey.

Alongside emotions, the scholarship highlights resilience, resistance and push back as important determinants of ethnic minority identities, including Kurdish identity (Kuumba and Ajanaku 1998; Yashar 2007; Aljunied 2010; Luz 2013; Gourlay 2018; Gruber and Pospisil 2015; Lobbedez and Buchter 2023). The existing literature on Kurdish identity has primarily focused on the Kemalist nation-building process and the victimhood experienced by Kurds, as well as the associated emotions in identity formation. There has been also a lack of research on the impact of the failure of “the Kurdish peace process” (Yilmaz, Demir, and Shipoli 2022) and the subsequent developments during the Erdoğanist era (Yilmaz 2021) on the formation and maintenance of Kurdish identity in diaspora. There is also an emerging literature on the impact of the successful Rojava-Kobani defence of the Kurds against the ISIS invasion on the Kurdish identity. These works recognize the emergence of a nationalist myth of heroism and liberation that has resonated with Kurds (Gunes and Lowe 2015, 14; Yegen 2021, 8). However, there are few studies looking at the Kobani/Rojava’s impact and the senses of resistance and resilience in maintaining of Kurdish identity in diasporic spaces (Toivanen 2021; Schøtt 2021). Therefore, this article addresses these gaps in the literature and provide new insights into the complex interplay between emotions, victimhood, push back and resilience and Kurdish identity in the context of the Kurdish diaspora in Australia.

The paper proceeds as follows: first, we provide a brief review of the relevant scholarship on diaspora and then victimhood and build a frame to capture how victimhood functions in the deformation and reformation of a diaspora group around an identity and how it helps to maintain this diasporic identity. We then summarize our methodology. Then, we focus on the data collected via semi-structured interviews and analyse them. The first part of this paper examines how and why victimhood becomes a powerful theme that shapes the political and cultural life of Kurds in diaspora, triggering emotions of anger and resistance. We then test these insights in the case of the Australian Kurdish diaspora. Our argument is that the experienced victimhood of a collective can stir emotions of anger and resistance, which facilitate the deconstruction, reproduction and transnationalization of a social identity in the diaspora. We specifically focus on (i) how the victimization recently experienced in Turkey is interpreted by Kurds in Melbourne and how it has been facilitating the deconstruction and reconstruction of a social identity, which is centred around resistance and (ii) its impact on their daily life and approach to the settled country, Australia.

Diasporas

The literature on diasporas is vast. Theory of state–diaspora relations in general (Délano and Gamlen 2014); emigrant nations and policies shaping their engagements with citizens living in foreign countries (Ragazzi 2014; Koinova and Tsourapas 2018; Adamson and Tsourapas 2019; Adamson 2019); the electoral rights of the citizens abroad (Barry 2006; Rubio-Marin 2006; Spiro 2006) the legitimacy of external voting (Collyer and Vathi 2007; Escobar 2007; Itzigsohn and Villacres 2008); dynamics and agents in the politicization of dispersed people in diaspora (Syrett and Keles 2019); and coalition between diasporic collectives (Koinova 2019) have been well-covered by this literature. Political campaigning and voter mobilization of sending/home countries beyond the national borders have also drawn attention from scholars (Yener-Roderburg 2020). Most recently, another phenomenon drawing the attention of scholars has been the transnational practices of authoritarian states and their engagements with their nationals/citizens living beyond their borders (Gamlen 2008; Tsourapas 2015; Adamson 2019; Yilmaz and Demir 2023; Yilmaz, Shipoli, and Dogru 2023). However, there are still few works on this topic and applied to limited cases and geographies.

Regarding the Kurdish diaspora (from Turkey), while the European Kurdish diaspora has been thoroughly researched, there remains a need for further exploration of the factors that influence identity formation and maintenance in diaspora during the AKP era, particularly in the aftermath of the Kurdish peace process breakdown.

Transnationalization refers to the process in which a collective move beyond national boundaries and becomes an actor in a global system. This process generally takes place based on the victimization experienced by their members due to their belonging to the collective in their place of origin. Persecuted minority groups, such as the Ismaili and Ahmedi communities, Uyghur Muslims, Yazidis, Gulenists, Kurds and other similar groups, can be regarded as collectives forming diasporas based on experienced victimization.

Victimhood(s) in diaspora formation

Feelings of victimization, fear, anxiety, anger, trust and nostalgia are some of the emotions that inform identity maintenance of minority groups. However, among these emotions a sense of victimhood is prominent in keeping social and collective identity intact (Yildiz and Verkuyten 2011; Baumann 2013; Yilmaz and Demir 2022). It is also deeply related with the collective anxiety and anger that both feelings are deeply related, triggered and justified by. Therefore, in unravelling collective “anger”, informing identity formation of a collective, it would be beneficial to first reveal the victimhood experienced by the collective, the Kurdish diaspora. First, we must understand who the victim is to be able to analyse the impact of a sense of victimhood on behaviours of individuals and collectives. A victim, in Aquino and Byron’s words “is anyone who experiences injury, loss, or misfortune as a result of some events or series of events” (Aquino and Byron 2002, 71). However, a sense of victimhood, like other emotions, is a “psychological state of mind that involves beliefs, attitudes, emotions and behavioural tendencies” (Bar-Tal et al. 2009, 231). If harm or injury is inflicted on an individual because they are a member of a certain collective, then not only is the individual victimized but also other members of the collective indirectly hold a sense of victimhood (Bar-Tal et al. 2009, 234). That might trigger anxiety and anger among the members of the collective and might instil a resistance character to the identity which is in re-formation [we might also argue in the beginning that we take the phenomenon of identity as something which is in constant formation] (Erikson 1994).

Victimhood, especially the perception of victimhood, has a transnational feature and can be hereditary, thus victimhood can pass from one generation to another (Lim 2010), it is intergenerationally transmitted, but might be in different formats (Bauman 1998). For example, victimhood experienced by a collective can manifest itself in the form of anger and can become the emerge base for a resistance cultural identity or nationalism. For Bauman (1998) “victimization breeds more victimization” and becomes a form of empowerment (Starman 2006, 325). Thus, victimhood can be a part of long-distance nationalism that defines the feeling of belonging of diaspora members who have the “shared memories of victimhood and trauma” (Ziemer 2010, 300). However, it is worth mentioning that “long-distance nationalism”² centred around victimhood in some cases, if not most, is emerging as a non-territorial, transnational phenomenon. For example, transnational character of Turkish nationalism, which is anti-Europe/West, is blended with Islamism and mainly constructed against victimhood(s) (perceived or real) experienced by the Muslims in general Ottoman in particular.

Recent picture of Kurdish Victimhood in Turkish politics

Scholarship focusing on Turkey-originated diaspora groups in general, and Kurds in particular, mainly reflects upon the historical development (Van Bruinessen 1998; Wahlbeck 2012) and political performance of Kurds in Europe (Eccarius-Kelly 2002; Lyon and Uçarer 2001; Kavak 2017); diaspora Kurds’ relations with their country of origin and their economic and social integration into receiving countries (Wahlbeck 2004; 2007; Demir 2012; Sheffer 2013; Baser 2019); how Kurdish cultural identity has reproduced and organized as a community in diaspora (Ugurlu 2014; Wahlbeck 2019); transnational carriers of cultural identity (Koçer 2014); the comparative experiences of Kurds in different Western countries (Wahlbeck 1999); and some very rare studies examine the representation and organization of the Kurdish diaspora in comparison with other diasporas occupying the same diaspora (Griffiths 2002; Bengio and Maddy-Weitzman 2013).

Anatolia, the peninsula that constitutes more than 90 percent of modern Turkey, has historically been multi-ethnic and multi-religious. However, following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and War of Independence (1919-1922), the new Republic of Turkey was projected as a modern, homogenous and staunchly secular (although Sunni Muslim) nation (Turkish) state (Zurcher 1993). This led to a forceful nation-building process and caused many tragic social breakdowns and victimization of ethnic and religious minorities outside of Turkey’s desired citizens (Yilmaz 2021). Some could not bear this top-down nation- and citizen-building project, and fled (Aktar 2010; Içduygu, Toktas, and Ali Soner 2008; Filippidou 2020), whereas others sought salvation by assimilating into the desired citizens (Kaya 2009; Ülker 2007). However, others still, particularly Kurds, preferred to resist the state’s desire for them to assimilate into Turkishness (Yegen 2007). This rebellion against state has led to state suppression and victimization of the Kurds. The Kurdish people, their language and culture, were marginalized by the Kemalist hegemony for most of the twentieth century, and Kurdish identity was the most problematic identity for the Kemalist hegemonic project, a homogeneous (one nation, one language, one religion) nation state. The Kemalist hegemony principally perceived Kurds as a national identity threat to Turks and Turkey and as potential future Turks (Poulton 1999, 27; Yegen 2007, 119). Kurds were presented not as a separate ethnic group but as an oppressive and feudal socio-class whose main aim was to destroy Turkish ethnic identity (Bozarslan 2008, 342). However, for the Kurds, this worked paradoxically and strengthened their ethnic and cultural consciousness, and the state has failed to suppress their cultural and political claims.

During its first two and a half terms in power, the AKP, with the support of the West, was operating as a democratizing force, challenging the Kemalist hegemony. The AKP initiated the “the Kurdish Opening” and held negotiations with the outlawed PKK to disarm the group and resolve the Kurdish question (Pusane 2014; 81, Gourlay 2020). During this period, the political atmosphere was friendlier to the pro-Kurdish opposition and some issues [political claims/rights] that had once been taboo were discussed in a relatively non-securitized context. The government took a number of historic steps, initiating reforms to address the problems faced by Kurdish people in Turkey. The project envisioned that democratization would solve the Kurdish problem. The AKP leader, Prime Minister and then President Erdoğan accepted and convinced his supporters that the rights of the Kurds had been violated by the state. After a period of silence, there were some low-level developments in March 2013, when a new initiative, known as the Reconciliation Process, began (Demir 2019). However, during the June 2015 general elections, when it became clear that Kurds would not support the consolidation of power in Erdogan’s hands, the process of desecuritization was reversed and Kurdish demands resecuritized; and Kurds have been treated accordingly ever since (Geri 2017; Özpek 2019; Gürses 2020; Yilmaz, Demir, and Shipoli 2022).

Compared to the Kemalist era, the AKP lifted bans on the cultural practices of Kurds. Particularly during the Kurdish Opening the ban on speaking the Kurdish language was lifted. However, recent developments demonstrate that this is the case only if you speak in favour of the AKP and its leader Erdogan. This might have strengthened loyalty of religious Kurds to Erdogan regime. For example, currently Turkish authorities would allow billboards in Kurdish reading Em ji ERDOGAN Hez dikin (We love Erdogan) (Duvar English 2021). However, writing Jiyan bi Kurdi xwes e (life is beautiful with Kurdish) on social media may attract the attention of authorities and even lead to arrest for spreading terrorist propaganda (Ozgurmanset 2018). However, this context has not motivated Kurds towards reformation of a religious Kurdish identity. The results of elections show that new generation is more inclined to a liberal, secular Kurdish identity. In this the regional developments and Rojava movement might have played a role. Invasion of Kurdish dominated north of Syria by the ISIS and the Turkish state’s ignorance of this, led criticism of even pro-AKP Kurds. This might have negative impact on the Kurds’ level of “trust” in the Erdogan regime.

Linking this above depicted victimhood to our case, the Australian Kurds [originated from Turkey], we hypothese/presume that, like other Kurdish diasporas in Western/European countries, this victimhood has been intact and guiding in the case of Australian Kurdish diaspora and it has been key in their understanding/interpretation of politics in Turkey.

Methodology

We have used qualitative data obtained from face-to-face, semi-structured interviews conducted as part of a broader study of ethnic and religious minorities from Turkey living in Australia. The broader study included Armenians, Alevis and Kurds, all originally from Turkey, conducted from June 2018 to June 2019. For the Kurdish segment of this project, we interviewed 15 participants in and around Melbourne. Alongside these interviews, we also analysed relevant primary data obtained from credible sources, including media and news reports. Before starting the interviews, an ethics approval has been received from the Deakin University Human Research Ethics Committee (2018-088).

For the interviews, participants were selected to proportionately represent adults at various ages over 18. Participants were all born and brought up either in Turkey or Australia. Most of the participants were Australian citizens. Nine (four female and five male) of the participants were born and brought up in Turkey; the remaining six (three male three female) were born and brought up in Australia by Kurdish families from Turkey. Participants completed a 25-question survey and participated in a semi-structured interview answering around 40 questions, during which they had the opportunity to express their views on a variety of topics, from Australian politics to religion and identity. These interviews took between half-an-hour and two hours.

English was the primary language of participants who were born and brought up in Australia, Turkish was the primary language for the participants born and brought up in Turkey. Most of them preferred to speak in English and a few of them spoke in Turkish. Sometimes, a few first-generation Kurds who spoke in English reverted back to Turkish to express better themselves. This helped these participants to better express their feelings and emotions. These were translated into English before the NVivo analysis.

To ensure confidentiality and anonymity, we have not used participants’ names. Both authors read the interview transcripts and carefully annotated relevant sections, listened to these sections of the interviews carefully to identify subtle reactions when interviewees spoke about contact, including emotions, pauses and emphases. Then the authors highlighted dominant emotional themes to structure and analyse the data accordingly. In other words, instead of structuring collected data in line with the themes highlighted in our interview questions, we preferred to identify and highlight the emotional themes emerging from participants’ answers in a grounded fashion. We then combined our findings that overlapped to a great extent. Differences were resolved after re-visiting the transcriptions together.

Since our sample is not a representative probabilistic sample, our findings cannot be generalized to the whole Kurds (from Turkey) community in Australia. However, they shed a light on the prevalent ideas and emotions within the community. We are hoping that our findings can travel to other contexts and can be tested in different socio-political milieus.

Analysing diaspora Kurds in Melbourne through the lens of emotions

The population of Kurds in Australia is estimated to be around 10,500 according to the 2016 census by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (Germian 2019). However, many Kurds do not identify themselves as Kurdish (not revealing their ethnic background) when being registered in the Australian documents/offices.

The first arrivals of Kurds in Australia were in the 1960s, overwhelmingly from Turkey. There are also Kurds from Iran, Iraq, Syria. The 1980s and 1990s also witnessed Kurdish migration to Australia, not exclusively but mainly from Turkey (Ekurd 2010). The waves of Kurdish migration to Australia coincide with tragic political breakdowns and crises in the Kurdish-dominated parts of the Middle East and many of the Kurds in Australia were accepted under the United Nations’ Humanitarian Programme (for further details about Kurds in Australia see Babacan 2009). Kurds in Australia are often connected to Kurdish associations, for example, the Kurdish Women’s League of Australia, which have organized cultural and political gatherings, political campaigns and outreach activities to vocalize the oppression of Kurds since early 1980s. These activities are very similar to the activities of Kurdish associations in European countries (Demir 2017; Kavak 2018), and comparative research focusing on transnational connections between Kurdish organizations and associations would be a novel contribution to relevant literature(s).

Against this backdrop, assuming that Kurdish identity in Australia is centred on anger and resistance stemming from Kurdish victimization at the hands of political authorities not only in their countries of origin but in of any political authorities in the Kurdish populated geographies would not be wrong. Through analysing the transcriptions of the interviews we conducted, we explore how the events that inflicted harm and led to anxiety for Kurds and marked the recent history of Kurdish-dominated geographies, are construed by the individual members of the Kurdish community in the diaspora and stirred/instilled effects/sentiments of anger and resistance in/among the Kurdish diasporic collective in Melbourne, Australia. In this paper, as mentioned above, we focus on and argue that it is the emotions these incidents evoke in individuals rather than the experience of victimization itself that shape the behaviours of diasporic collectives. Thus, in the following pages, we structure collected data around the emergent emotional themes.

Fear and anxiety: acting under Turkish state surveillance

Fear is a strong emotion that informs behaviours of victimized individuals, even in settled and trusted countries that provide them refuge. For example, knowing that the political activities of the Kurdish diaspora are monitored by Turkish consulates stirs a strong sense of fear among Kurds outside Turkey. Some members of the collective may thus fear visiting Turkey, which allows victimization beyond the borders, that is a transnational repression. For example, one study participant (KRD-09) said the following:

This is a painful thing actually. Something happens that you are afraid to go to your own country [Turkey] … because you sympathize with any party [designated as outlaw by Turkey’s AKP]. There are “Fetoists” [Gulenists], Erdoganists, there are many different people who we have talked about … We go to our country [Turkey], but with fear … you feel anxious.

Another participant (KRD-01), in relation to the fear the Turkish state inflicts upon Turkey-originated people in Australia, notes that:

Some of the (pro-Turkish government) associations they have here and they’re trying to oppress minorities here as well. And we have special, very bad experience with member of our community, Kurdish community, visiting Turkish consulate and they are telling them “Why you attend this protest, and we know you attend this and why you come here, and we know what you do.”

Participant KRD-02, an active member of the Kurdish community, also highlighted the activities of Turkish regime, saying:

So, we experience certain pressure by Turkish government. So last few months, few members, they were questioned and interrogated when they visited Turkish embassy. And so, they couldn’t issue whatever they went for. So, what they were shown, their photos, they say “we know you and you are attending protests” so now we start to feel more now, I think … That’s concerning … now people don’t feel safe with Turkey. For example, I really would like to go to Turkey, but I feel big concern. I don’t want to go to Turkey. I have concerns, a lot.

Fear is not only directly experienced by the individual members of the Kurdish community, but also, indirectly, there is fear of possible victimization inflicted upon family members and fellow Kurds back in the region of Kurdistan which affects the behaviours of Kurds in Australia (Doherty 2019).

Anger: politicization of Kurdishness

The designated victimizer of the Kurdish collective is the authoritarian nationalist Turkish state. When asked about the Kurdish language, for example, nearly all those participants born and brought up in Turkey revisited painful childhood memories of being beaten by their teachers because of speaking Kurdish, not only in school but also in their daily life. Later they were exposed to discrimination in different phases of their lives and felt obliged to become more Turkish to be equal, “desired” (Yilmaz 2021) citizens.

For example, one participant (KRD-01), answering the question of whether they ever felt racial or religious discrimination in Turkey or by the Turkish state while living in Australia, said:

Ethnic because I’m Kurdish background. Definitely. When I was a child, I remember I was beaten by teacher for speaking in Kurdish. Not only in school, at the village because they had a special person to come and listen who is speaking Kurdish or not, to report things (KRD-01).

Continuing victimization of the Kurds in Turkey has also evoked anger among diaspora Kurds. Anger manifests itself in protests and political outreach activities to inform the settled polity about the ongoing victimization in Turkey. In other words, anger allows victimized individuals to express this emotion via politics to fuse the cultural with the political. In analysing interviews, we observe that all the Kurds, except the pro-AKP Kurds, developed a social identity based on the continuing suffering of victimized Kurds in Turkey at the hands of the state. In response to this victimization, Kurdishness emerges as a political identity nurtured through protests and political struggle. Supporting this argument, KRD-15 highlighted that:

We have protests or any other events that the Kurdish community has, we’re always there together to support one another as a community. All our family and friends, we get together. (KRD-15)

This context has informed the Kurdish collective that the political sphere is crucial to the existence of cultural collective Kurdish identity. Asked if the arrest of Öcalan in 1999 and the arrest of Selahattin Demirtaş in 2016 changed things, KRD-10 answered:

Personally, it affected me in a bad way. He was our voice, they both were our voices and again, it brought our community way closer than ever, since the last one in 1999. It brought us together and him being here, he was once here, Selahattin Demirtaş, and he was almost like family, and then he got locked up.

Another participant, KRD-15, said:

… Well, what I would like is for it to improve and Kurds to be free, to get their freedom as well and be able to … this stuff [the arrest of Demirtas and attacks on Kurds, especially Kurdish politicians] that’s been going on, the killings and torture you hear that’s happening, just all to be united as one. 

This response, direct and indirect, or hereditary (“the killings and torture you hear that’s happening”), victimhood motivates Kurds to unite around their Kurdishness. Another participant (KRD-13) said:

Selahattin Demirtaş, Turkey just shows him that how much of a shit political system you have when you’re putting away a party’s leader for no reason.

This well shows that the continuing victimization of Kurds and political arrests and crackdowns on Kurds in Turkey are stirring anger in diaspora Kurds, mobilizing and rallying them around their Kurdishness.

Anger led de-Turkification: transformation from Kurds from Turkey to Australian Kurds,

Through interviews with members of the Kurdish diaspora, we found that diaspora has enabled Kurds to overcome the restrictions imposed by the dominant nation-states in their countries of origin. Additionally, being in diaspora has allowed Kurds to construct an identity that is not subordinate to any other national identity and transcends the borders of the nation-states in which they are situated.

Participant KRD-01, answering a question about their identity, said: “ … . Probably multiple. Multiple, but I can describe myself now Australian Kurdish.” Then when asked, “So, you don’t include the fact that you come from Turkey as part of your identity?” they answered:

…  Definitely, we’re Kurdish people. We have many … interaction between Kurdish community and Turkish community … But because of my view of Turkish government, the way they forcibly try to assimilate us or discriminate against us, I don’t feel any Turkishness at all. (KRD-01)

This shows that de-Turkification of Kurds from Turkey is a political reaction to discriminatory, assimilationist state policies towards the Kurds. It also underpins that being diaspora has provided an opportunity for the members of the Kurdish diaspora to eliminate these restrictions and manifest an identity that is not subordinate to any other identities. When asked “is that the AKP government or all throughout?” the very participant (KRD-01) answered:

All throughout. In respect of Turkish, definitely, Turkish culture and Turkish people. I respect them. But then because of what I witnessed while I was there as Kurds, I don’t, I mean, I don’t consider any feeling of part of me being there. (KRD-01)

For some, if not many, Kurds, these experiences of victimhood are self-suppressed. In Turkey, they tend to forget about “the past” to carve out a better life as Turkish citizens. When Kurds in Turkey denounce their Kurdishness, and speak and write well in Turkish, they enjoy being equal citizens. For such people, Kurdishness is confined to their homes, in some cases even hidden from their children. Answering the question “who was actually telling you that you can’t speak in Kurdish on the streets?”, KRD-10 said:

Well, it was my family, back in the day when we went in 2007. We can’t say this, we can’t say that we can’t do this. (KRD-10)

The second generation of Kurds in Australia reads Turkey through the experiences of their families and the victimization they experience also comes from families in Turkey. It is also quite interesting to note here the relationship between the socio-political conditions of the Kurds and the Kurdish language.

It is also important to note that in the de-Turkification process, the approach of nationalist Turks to the Kurds in diaspora also plays a significant role, especially Kurdish suspicion of the Turkish identity. For example, when asked about their relations with Turkish people, KRD-06, a second-generation Kurd:

Oh mine? My relations? I have the good and the bad. So, I have really close Turkish friends, really, really close. Like closer than Kurdish friends … But yeah, if it comes to that, I always say I’m Kurdish, but I do feel different. I do feel a lot of Turkish communities make you feel like you’re second-best or you’re different or you’re not alike. (KRD-06)

This seems to be recreating a sort of victimhood experience like their parents but at a lower scale. In developing ethnic and cultural consciousness of Kurdishness and de-Turkification among the second-generation migrants, victimization of nationalist Turkish people in Australia appears to be critical. We also observe that there are mixed feelings in relation to the Turks in diaspora. There is an intellectual effort to separate the Turkish state as their victimizer from the Turkish people.

Resistance and resilience: Rojava/Kobani-Moment

Empirical data suggests that a sense of resistance and resilience has emerged among the members of the Kurdish diaspora in Australia and is now equally integral to the construction and preservation of Kurdishness.

The policies pursued by the Turkish government during and after the invasion of Kobani by ISIS fanatics (Guardian 2014) have particularly heightened the senses of resistance and resilience among members of the Kurdish diaspora. This sentiment was echoed by one interviewee, who emphasized:

(KRD-02): Look, Kurdish people, the struggle of Kurdish people started, as I said, beginning of 80s. And the Turkish government, the only means of Turkish government was violence and persecution. Despite of that now, HDP, we know how many, there are 6 or 7 million voters of HDP. And thousands of people support Kurdish struggle. So, this will continue. I don’t think so Turkish government, the approach of Turkish government will easily change towards Kurds as now when we look at Syria, because of what’s happening in Northern Syria, Rojava, because Kurds are becoming a voice there. They are becoming power so that’s why they’re involving that much into Syria.

R: You mean that’s why Turkey is involved in Syria?

KRD-02: Yeah, because they don’t want Kurds to become power. So, they do whatever they can to stop that. We know what happened in Idlip and how they are supporting armed groups, including ISIS and other extremist groups. Mainly this is because they don’t want to see Kurds to be stronger in power in Northern Syria.

Another participant explained that Rojava has provided a very good argument to the Kurds living in democratic politics to appeal to the local and international politics and explain what the Kurds [not only in Syria but in the region in all four countries] have been fighting for.

…  obviously, what happened in Rojava has made quite a lot of difference. And it has opened the eyes of worldwide or international or politicians as well to see what we’ve been fighting for and that especially when Kurdish rebels saved the lives of thousands of Yazidis. Not just considering, they could have just, if older people turned it back, but Kurds didn’t do that. Kurds just stood up for them and took them and saved their lives. So, they saw that we’re in it for humanity and not just for other countries’ powers like trying to have a Kurdish power. No, that’s not what we’re after. We just want peace in Middle Eastern countries. (KRD-07)

Another participant answering the question “how successful do you feel Kurdish groups have been in their efforts to win international diplomatic support?” said that:

…  There’s only so much you can do. But after Rojava and YPG movement struggle, it made everyone notice that because you’re trying to prove a point to them. (KRD-13)

The participant does not clarify what he/she refers as the “point” to be proved. However, it is clear from the context that the point is about the reason/rationale behind the Kurdish struggle and resistance which has emerged as the backbone of the Kurdish identity.

Discussion and conclusion

Diaspora theories inform us that time will show “whether a minority community forms a diaspora, or whether the community follows another integration or assimilation trajectory” (Wahlbeck 2019, 2). Uniting culture and politics can facilitate transformation of a minority community into a diaspora, but it happens over a long period. Oppression of a cultural collective encourages its members to develop a sense of collective victimhood that facilitates the transformation of cultural elements into political identities. Thus, cultural identities, for persecuted communities, are re-produced as a diasporic identity with reference to the experienced victimization. This seems to be case for many forcefully migrated/dispersed peoples such as Armenians, Tamils, Uyghurs, Kurds and other oppressed people.

Stuart Hall underlines that identity is grounded not in anthropology, but in re-telling of stories, (Hall 1994, 224). We suggest a humble addition to this observation of the late Hall to further narrow the issue of identity for diasporic communities formed by political refugees fleeing oppression, tyranny and state-inflicted victimization in their countries of origin.

We argue that identity for such groups in diaspora is not merely about “re-telling of the past”, but also “the recent”, specifically re-telling of the ongoing oppression/repression of these groups in their geographies of origin. This strengthens and revitalizes the collective identity for the generation born and brought up in settled countries. Therefore, we observe a relationship between maintenance and political strength of these diasporic ethno-political identities and state repression in their countries of origin.

The diasporic space allows Kurds to be exposed to a process of de-Turkification, that is, the undoing the intense Turkification to which Kurds have been subjected in Turkey (Demir 2017, 2). This can be seen as a form of resistance in diasporic spaces. As a contribution to this discussion, we argue that the awareness of the victimhood they experienced (directly/indirectly) in their origin country inflicted by the state has served not only as the main dynamic of de-Turkification, but also as the dynamic that has trans-nationalized the Kurdish identity. Historically, Kurds are divided across various states and transnational in nature. However, living in different but all authoritarian and antagonistic nationalist political settings have restricted them/Kurdish identity within the borders of these nation states. Thus, they [had to] re-formulate a sub-identity, which has placed them under the dominant national identity of these nation states such as Iranian Kurds, Turkish Kurds, Iraqi and Syrian Kurds and is tolerable to these nation states. Against this backdrop, the diasporic space has helped them eliminate the restrictions imposed by these states and manifest/re-construct an identity, which is not sub to any other identity and beyond the borders of the nation states Kurds are trapped in.

Our findings suggest that the experience of victimhood of a collective can trigger emotions of anger and resistance, which contribute to the deconstruction, reproduction and transnationalization of their social identity in the diaspora.

We found that alongside the emotions of fear, anxiety and anger, a sense of resistance and resilience has emerged among the members of the Kurdish diaspora in Australia and is now equally integral to the construction and preservation of Kurdishness. We discussed how these emotions and senses have shaped collective behaviours of the Turkey-originated Australian Kurds. We also discussed how these emotions prompted politicization, reproduction and maintenance of Kurdishness. This victimization is not only inflicted by the Turkish state in Turkey and abroad, but also by nationalist Turks abroad in casual social interactions.

Rather than culture (Kurdishness), it is largely these emotions stemming from Turkey’s victimization of Kurds and resistance and resilience against oppression have shaped self and inter group perceptions among Kurdish people, especially between Turkey-originated groups in diaspora. In line with this, although the Kurdish language was seen as the base of Kurdishness by the majority of participants, paradoxically, it is usually their second language after Turkish, which is used predominantly in their daily life. In another words, Kurdishness emerges as their political expression while Turkish language is part of their daily routine. This is likely the result of the forceful suppression by the Turkish state of their mother tongue.

The lack of the knowledge of Kurdish language is blamed on the Turkish state but paradoxically, it created cultural awareness among Kurds, helping them to construct Kurdishness as a political identity. The political aspect of the Kurdish identity is constructed in a way that carries culture and language, and this aspect developed as a reaction to the assimilationist policy of the Turkish state. This is highly salient among the Kurdish diaspora in Australia.

When asked about the Kurdish language, for example, nearly all those participants brought up in Turkey revisited their painful childhood memories of being beaten by their teachers because of speaking Kurdish during their early years in education. This emotional and mental injury they experienced during their childhood created a deep-down victimhood. Later they were exposed to discrimination in different phases of their lives, and they feel obliged to adopt Turkishness in the public sphere to become “desired” (Yilmaz 2021) citizens. Against this backdrop, especially for the generation brought up in Turkey, keeping Kurdishness alive emerges as a mission, and in practice involves combining cultural practices and political activities. The line between culture and politics has become blurred for our participants and Kurdish cultural elements come to life in protests. For many Kurdish parents in Australia, the experience of victimhood related to the suppression of their Kurdishness by Turkey has motivated them to raise their children conscious of their Kurdishness, to the extent that Kurdishness has been imposed in top-down fashion on the younger generations in some cases, with boundaries around social interactions among individuals, especially with the constitutive other of the Kurdish identity, the Turkish.

Kurds living in Australia, both those that moved to Australia later in their lives and Australian-born and -raised Kurds, made meaning of cultural, ethnic and racial difference through the first-hand experiences and also stories (reported by critical pro-Kurdish or international media) of repressive state politics towards the Kurds in Turkey and abroad. Attempts to suppress and undo Kurdish progress in any parts of the Kurdish geography [demographically and historically dominated by the Kurds] has stirred emotions such as anger or resistance among the individual members of the Kurdish diasporic collective (Gunes and Lowe 2015, 14).

The empirical data/interviews demonstrated that the policies pursued by the Turkish government during and after the invasion of Kobani by ISIS fanatics have particularly heightened the senses of resistance and resilience among members of the Kurdish diaspora. These feelings have transformed Kurdish identity and kept Kurdishness alive and transnational.

The empirical data has also shown that political relations and tensions between the incumbent regime and ethno-religious groups and their securitization in Turkey (Yilmaz and Shipoli 2021; Yilmaz, Shipoli, and Demir 2023) also shapes intergroup relations between Turkey-originated groups in diaspora. We observed that political repression in the sending state, Turkey, paradoxically shapes participants’ approach and conception of their settled country as home. In embracing the settled country as home, a sense of freedom and security in contrast to the experienced victimization in Turkey play a key role. In other words, it seems that it is the absence of insecurities, physical or emotional, from which participants fled that creates the connection to Australia more than the positive emotional attachment to it as home. In other words, rather than positive emotions towards Australia, negative emotions towards Turkey work more towards making Australia home for these Kurds from Turkey.

Ethics

An ethics approval for this project has been received from the Deakin University Human Research Ethics Committee (2018-088).

Acknowledgements

We are grateful to William Gourlay, James Batty, Zuhal Caliskan and Kainat Shakil for their help in different phases of the field research, from getting the ethics approval for this project to conducting the interviews and transcription. We are also immensely grateful to the anonymous reviewers who provided substantive constructive criticism that significantly shaped this paper by getting us to revisit our empirical material. If we knew their names, we would gladly invite them to be the co-authors of this paper.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

1 Diaspora is “a transnational community whose members (or their ancestors) emigrated or were dispersed from their original homeland but remain oriented to it and preserve a group identity” (Grossman 2019, 1267).

2 The concept of long-distance nationalism was coined by late Benedict Anderson to capture the prominent role of migrant people in nationalism (Anderson 1998, 58). Glick-Schiller and Fouron (2001, 20) highlight that it “binds together immigrants, their descendants and those who have remained in their homeland” (cited in Sobral 2018).