Turkish nationalism and the Kurdish question

Abstract

This article addresses the ways in which Turkish nationalism has perceived the Kurdish question. It is shown that both Turkish nationalism and the Kurdish question have passed through some paradigmatic moments in the twentieth century. This, I argue, has shaped the way that the Kurdish question has been perceived by Turkish nationalism. While the Kurdish question had been seen by Turkish nationalism mostly in terms of a fatal rivalry between the backward, pre-modern and tribal past and the prosperous present in the first half of the century, it was perceived in terms of a tension between the peripheral economy and national market in the fifties and sixties. In the 1970s, the Kurdish unrest was believed to be a product of communist incitement. Despite this impurity in perception, one thing has remained nearly unchanged for Turkish nationalism: Kurds could become Turkish. In other words, Turkish nationalism of the republican era has principally perceived Kurds as future-Turks. However, the signs in circulation at present indicate that the confidence of Turkish nationalism as to Kurds’ potential of becoming Turkish is not as firm as it used to be. At present, Turkish nationalism seems to be getting prepared to abandon its contention that Kurds are future-Turks.

Keywords:

• Turkish nationalism
• Kurdish question
• Republican period of Turkey

I would like to thank the two readers of this essay for their helpful comments and suggestions.

Notes

1. In this study, Turkish nationalism is taken to be a discourse, i.e. ‘a meaningful practice that forms the identities of subjects and objects.’ (Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000, pp. 3–4). This particular conception of the term discourse has been introduced in the works of Laclau and Mouffe (1985) and Foucault (1972).

2. The term the Kurdish question is used to refer to a set of unalike events which have indicated that a considerable part of Kurds in Turkey have been discontented with this or that facet of the Turkish nation-state. Kurds have expressed their discontent in various forms since the foundation of Turkish Republic as a nation-state. Armed resistance, unarmed resistance to the consolidation of the modern state apparatus and national-market economy, and legal political opposition have been some of these forms through which Kurds expressed their discontent. During the republican period, Kurds revolted many times. Likewise, many Kurds refused to give up the economic transactions they had with the other sides of the new national borders. Kurds’ occasional popular support of radical political programmes, such as those of Turkish Workers Party in the sixties and People's Labour Party (or its successors) in the nineties, also testifies to the same discontent. To be brief, the term the Kurdish question is used in this study to refer to a set of disparate issues, which, in the last instance, suggest that there was a lack of integration of some sort between Kurds and the Turkish politics/economy.

3. The crisis of the Ottoman Empire, which had already begun in the eighteenth century, was most evident towards the end of the nineteenth century. The political and territorial integrity of the Empire was being challenged by several events and processes, the most important of which was undoubtedly the rise of nationalist aspirations among Ottoman peoples. In this context of possible disintegration, the rulers of the state intended to save the territorial and political integrity by means of first Ottomanism and later Turkism. The first assumed to render all subjects of the Ottoman state with different religious and ethnic origins 'Ottoman citizens' tied to the Ottoman dynasty. Yet, Ottomanism could not overcome the problem of ethnic and nationalist revival. As Bernard Lewis (1961, p. 214) states, ‘the spread of nationalism among the subject peoples of the Empire […] ended forever the ‘Ottomanist’ dream of the free, equal, and the peaceful association of peoples in a common loyalty to the dynastic sovereign of a multi-national, multi-denominational empire.’

4. For an examination of this version of nationalism see Bora and Can (1991).

5. For left-wing nationalism see Ari (1994) and Aydin (2002).

6. For an examination of the nationalism of Islamist movement in Turkey see Bora (1998).

7. For a study on popular Turkish nationalism of the last decade see Kozanoglu (1995).

8. For a recent study involving the assessments of all these versions of Turkish nationalism see Bora (2002).

9. There are of course numerous works on this mainstream Turkish nationalism, which is marked by an undecidability between a civic and ethnicist understanding of nation. Kushner's (1977) and Heyd's (1950) works are the two well-known studies available in English.

10. For a brief but a very helpful examination of the history of Kurdish nationalism see Bozarslan (2002). For some comprehensive works on the history of Kurdish question and Kurdish nationalism see Jwaideh (1960), Olson (1989), Bruinessen (1992), Entessar (1992) and McDowall (1996).

11. As it appears, the paradigmatic periods found in the history of the Kurdish question mostly overlap with those in the adventure of Turkish nationalism. This, I believe, is because both have been conditioned by a more encompassing process, which may vaguely be termed as Turkish modernisation.

12. According to one calculation (Ahmad 1969, p. 153), the Ottoman Empire lost 1/3 of its territories during between 1908 and 1913. As ‘Rumelia had been the heart of the Empire’ since its provinces were ‘by far the most advanced and productive’ ones, the loss of Rumelia was all the more important (Ahmad 1969, pp. 152–153). Eventually, the separation of the Balkan Nations was considered as confirmation of the failure of the strategy of Ottomanism to preserve the integrity of the state.

13. The Ottoman Palace and palace bureaucracy embarked upon reforms in the army, administration, and finance starting from the late eighteenth century. However, the reforms in the nineteenth century were far from being incessant and all-inclusive. Reforms were resisted on many occasions. It is only after the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 when a comprehensive and a resolute reform programme was followed. For a scholarly examination of the nineteenth century Ottoman politics see Lewis (1961), Ortayli (1983) and Zürcher (1993).

14. It seems that the reign of Abdulhamid II (1876–1908) was successful in maintaining the loyalty of Kurds by means of building in 1891 the Hamidiye Regiments (Kurdish tribal militia). However, following the 1908 Revolution Kurds revolted a few times. Soon after the Young Turk government came to power several Kurdish sheikhs submitted a petition asking for the adoption of a Kurdish administration and adopting Kurdish as the language of instruction in Kurdish districts (Olson 1989, p. 17). This was followed by the two revolts which took place in the very first few years of the Revolution and which were led by Sheikh Said Berzenci and Ibrahim Pasha, the leader of a tribal confederation (Jwaideh 1960, pp. 309–312).

15. For an examination of the Young Turk Revolution in 1908 see Kansu (1997)

16. Since the Ottoman Empire had experienced a short constitutional period between 1876 and 1878, the (re)introduction of the constitution in 1908 represented the commencing of the second constitutional period.

17. The expansion of political representation was not limited to the election of some Kurdish deputies to the parliament. In 1908, there were 60 Arab, 27 Albanian, 26 Greek, 14 Armenian, 4 Jewish and 10 Slavic deputies in the parliament (Ahmad 1969, p. 155).

18. For this shift from the notion of unsur-i asli to millet-i hakime see Hanioglu (1989, pp. 626–644).

19. This was also pointed out by Tarik Zafer Tunaya (1988). In Tunaya's view (1988, p. 407), there was an essential difference between the way the CUP approached the Kurdish question and the way it approached the Armenian or Arab questions. The Kurdish question was taken to be a question of the amelioration of the socio-economic conditions of the Eastern region. If we translate this remark into the language of this paper, the Kurdish question was basically a question of Islahat for the CUP nationalists.

20. However, this does not mean that the resistance of Kurds to Islahat had no ethnic content whatsoever. Instead, since the tribal organizations and the peripheral economy the programme of Islahat aimed to dissolve were the two privileged social spaces wherein Kurds would experience their collective identity, any pressure on these spaces and any resistance to protect them had necessarily an ethnic content. As the attack of Islahat on these spaces intensified, Kurds fought harder to save these spaces. As such, Islahat would help crystallize Kurdish ethnic identity. It is therefore possible to argue that Islahat and the resistance it prompted made some contribution to the development of a proto-Kurdish nationalism. For a broader discussion on the ethnic content of Islahat and the resistance it prompted see Yegen (1996). For an examination of the centrality of tribes, peripheral economy, and religion in the collective identity of Kurds see Olson (1989), Yalçin-Heckmann (1991) and Bruinessen (1992).

21. The Muslimification of the Ottoman territory had started previously. The Ottoman Empire had already lost some of its territories inhabited by the non-Muslim and the non-Turkic peoples before World War I. Likewise, the escape of Muslim masses from the Balkans and Caucasia to Anatolia during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries also contributed to the same process. For the Muslimification process of Anatolia towards the end of the Ottoman State see (Karpat 1985, pp. 60–77). To give some figures, the percentage of non-Muslim population decreased from 55.96 % at the end of the 19^th century to 35. 2 % in 1927 in Istanbul, from 61.5 % to 13.8 in Izmir, from 43.6 % to 18.4 % in Edirne, and from 42.8 % to 1.2 % in Trabzon (Behar 1996, p. 64). Overall, while non-Muslims would constitute approximately 27 % of the total Ottoman population in 1885 (Behar 1996, p. 46) in 1927 only 3 % of the population in Turkey were non-Muslims (Dündar 1999, p. 159). It is also estimated that almost a million people migrated from the Balkans to Turkey in the years between 1923 and 1939 (Kirisçi 2000, p. 8). For an overall assessment of this process see Karpat (1985), Akgündüz (1998) and Kirisçi (2000).

22. This new spirit, which is composed of a marriage between Turkishness and Muslimhood, was most evident in the population exchanges held between the Turkish Republic and Greece after the Independence War. During this exchange the Turkish-speaking Orthodox Christians were asked to leave Turkey while non-Turkish speaking Muslims living in the Balkans were admitted into Turkey. According to the Lausanne Treaty signed in 1923 (Meray 1993, pp. 82–87), Orthodox Greeks of Turkish citizens were to be exchanged with the Muslims of Greek citizens. As this striking example suggests, some non-Turkish people living outside of Turkey were admitted into the country whereas some non-Muslim people living in Turkey were asked to leave. This testifies that Turkishness was open to non-Turks, but not to all of them. As it appears, while Muslimhood was considered by the Turkish authorities to be the key to achieving Turkishness, non-Muslimhood was seen as a ‘natural’ obstacle. Having identified Turkishness with the Muslimhood of Anatolia, the new regime embarked upon the Turkification of the Muslims of Anatolia. For the role of Muslimhood in the constitution of Turkishness see Nisanyan (1995), Somel (1997) and Yildiz (2001).

23. For an examination of why ‘the ethno-history of the Turkish nation put together by the Republican cadres refuted the polyethnic and multireligious Ottoman heritage’ see Canefe (2002, pp.145–149)

24. For the text of Amasya Protokolu see Unat (1961).

25. A notorious example of the programme of assimilation was the Settlement Law of 1934. The aim of this law was as follows: ‘The Republic of Turkey could not condone those who would enjoy Turkish citizenship and all the rights law provided without having a devotion to the Turkish flag. It is for this reason this law has specified the ways of assimilating such people in the Turkish culture. In the Republic of Turkey, Turkishness of anyone who says s/he is Turkish must be evident and clear for the Turkish state.’ (TBMM, Zabit Ceridesi [Minutes of the Parliament], 4^th Period, v. 23–24: 8). For an examination of the Settlement Law of 1934 see Besikçi (1978).

26. The text below shows that a post prominent figure of the Turkish nationalism of the period, Yusuf Akçura, would perceive the Kurdish question in terms of the same conflict. In his assessment of the Kurdish rebellion of 1925, Akçura (1984 [1925]:18) states: ‘while the Turkish Republic is endeavouring to become a contemporary state, legal, social, economic, traditional and diplomatic obstacles have been encountered. These obstacles are either because the Ottoman state belonged to the civilization of the Orient or because of the degeneration of the Ottoman state organization. Now those individuals, institutions and groups representing these obstacles have constituted a sort of front in opposition to the efforts of the Republic. […]. As it was observed in the last Kurdish reaction, the Turkish Republic is bound to eliminate this reactionary front in a very short time.’

27. This conviction is most obvious in the results of a recent poll which shows that the discontent from the recent policies of the USA is the highest among the Turkish citizens. See http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2005/01/19/.

28. Note that the perception of Kurdish question as an issue of regional underdevelopment did not disappear from the discourse of Turkish nationalism of the following years. Instead, it became a constant of Turkish nationalism since then. As Ömer Faruk Gençkaya's work (1996, p.101) shows, Kurdish question continued to be perceived as a question of economic integration in the 1980s and 1990s. Many deputies in the parliament perceived the issue as a ‘socio-economic problem of underdevelopment enhanced by the feudal structure.’

29. For an examination of this nationalism see Bora and Can (1991). However, it has to be noted that although it became a political movement only in the sixties, the intellectual roots of this extreme nationalism can be traced back to the thirties and forties. For an examination of extreme nationalism in this period see Özdogan (2001).

30. For an examination of this undecidability in extreme nationalism see Bora and Can (2000).

31. In fact, until the 1960s, the pre-eminent other of both extreme and mainstream Turkish nationalism was non-Muslimhood. As Özdogan maintains (2001, p. 223), until the 1960s, the burning issue for Turkish nationalism remained the conquest of Beyoglu (Pera), a place in Istanbul identified with non-Muslims.

32. For a comprehensive examination of the Kurdish question in Turkey in 1990s see Olson (1996).

33. ‘We recognize Kurdish reality’ was a crucial phrase used by the then Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel in Diyarbakir in 1992. The statement has a massive symbolic meaning in that it indicated the end of the policy of the denial of the physical existence of Kurds.

34. The constitutional amendments made in 2002 signalled that the Turkish nationalism was ready to adjust this bizarre logic. Together with these amendments, a state run TV station is ‘allowed’ to broadcast in Kurdish and Kurdish language is allowed to being taught in private institutions. In other words, Turkish nationalism at the turn of the century seemed prepared to recognize Kurds together with (some of) their rights.

35. Although non-Muslims of the country are defined as the citizens of the Republic, they have not been allowed to exercise all the rights assigned to Turkish citizens. Many non-Muslims were fired from their jobs in bureaucracy (Bali 1999, pp. 206–227) in accordance with the law enacted in 1926, which specified Turkishness, instead of Turkish citizenship, as a requirement to become a state employee. The fourth item of article 788 stated that being Turkish is a precondition to become a state employee (Aktar 1996, p. 11). Specifying ethnic Turkishness as a precondition for becoming a state employee, this law was in use until 1965. Likewise, the gates of some institutions such as the army were closed for non-Muslims. For instance, an announcement published in Cumhuriyet newspaper on 2 July 1938 specified being of Turkish race as a necessary condition to be admitted to the Military Veterinary School (Yildiz 2001, p. 283). Also, non-Muslim citizens’ right to estate has been violated occasionally. The Wealth Tax (Aktar 2000) and the prevention of foundations built by non-Muslim citizens for holding estates are two examples for the violation of this right. For a very helpful study examining the discriminatory citizenship practices that non-Muslim citizens have experienced see Oran (2004, pp. 81–104). Non-Muslim citizens of the Republic are still subject to such practices, at least occasionally. Note, however, that not all non-Muslim citizens of the Republic have had the same trajectories in experiencing citizenship rights. Some non-Muslim communities such as Assyrians, Keldanis and Nasturis have not even been recognized. As such, these communities were not allowed to exercise the linguistic and religious rights used by the recognized religious communities, i.e. Greeks, Armenians and the Jews. Besides, even these three communities have not experienced their recognized rights in the same manner. The relations that the citizens of Jewish origin have had with the state have not been as harsh as the ones between the state and the citizens of Greek and Armenian origin. For these disparities in citizenship practices see Oran (2004, pp. 66–70). For a discussion on the bonds between citizenship and ethnicity in Turkey see Yegen (2004).

36. Kurds’ exemption from discriminatory citizenship practices has not been a categorical one. Many Kurds did encounter such practices when they revolted against the central power. In some cases the estates of those who joined the revolt were confiscated and many Kurds faced compulsory settlement. For the legal background of such practices see ‘the Law About the Individuals to be Deported From East to West’ of 1927 and the Settlement Law of 1934. In both cases, many Kurds were deported from their native places and the estates of some were confiscated. For an examination of these laws and their consequences see Tezel (1982, pp. 346–347). Yet, it is essential to note that these discriminatory practices mostly took place in let us say extraordinary cases. In principle, Kurds were allowed to experience citizenship rights without discrimination provided that they assimilated into Turkishness.

37. The undecidability in question has usually been studied in terms of the oscillation of Turkish nationalism between an ethnic and civic definition of Turkishness. Many studies acknowledged that Turkish nationalism has characteristically oscillated between these two opposing positions. For a few examples see Bora (1996) and Kadioglu (1996). Arguing that the examination of Turkish nationalism in terms of such an oscillation fails to consume the complexity of the construction of Turkish nationalism, Nergis Canefe (2002) suggests to use an ethno-symbolic approach instead. To this approach (p. 134), what makes nationalisms powerful is myths, memories, symbols and traditions of ethnic heritage.

38. Here it has to be noted that the openness of Turkishness to Muslimhood has not been a categorical one. Instead it appears that Turkishness has been open to those Muslim peoples who once had been the subjects of the Ottoman State and who were not strong enough to build their own nation-states after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.

39. However, it has to be noted that the openness between Turkishness and Muslimhood was not discovered or spelled out only after the foundation of the Turkish Republic. It was registered long before by Namik Kemal, a champion of the strategy of Ottomanism, which may be considered as a proto-nationalism preceding Turkish nationalism. As early as 1878, Namik Kemal put forward very boldly that while it is difficult to provide for the assimilation of such non-Muslim peoples of the Ottoman Empire as Bulgarians and Greeks into Turkishness, the assimilation of Muslim peoples of the empire is achievable. See Arai (1994). For an assessment of the Ottoman roots of Turkish nationalism see Deringil (1993) and Canefe (2002).

40. For the logic of this population exchange held in 1924 see Aydin (1995, p. 59). For an examination of the social and economic consequences of this population exchange in Turkey see Ari (1995).

41. As it is suggested above, the traces of what has arisen today may be found in the past of Turkish nationalism. A closer look at the issue manifests that Turkish nationalism has had some doubts as to the Turkishness of Kurds from the very beginning. Turkish nationalism (state) lost its confidence in Kurds especially when the latter threatened the central authority. The language of Turkish nationalism and the policies pursued at the times of Kurdish revolts show that assimilation was far from being the only instrument of Turkish nationalism in tackling the Kurdish question. The report written in 1930 by the then chief of staff, Fevzi Çakmak, gives an idea about the other possible instruments that Turkish nationalism was ready to use: ‘During my visits to Erzincan I became convinced that villages named Askirik, Gürk, Dagbey, and Haryi […] have to be punished and repressed. […] To make the state authority sovereign and to give a warning to all the Kurdish villages in the region, I am in the view that it is proper to destroy these villages by means of air force’ (Halli 1972, p. 351). Another striking example in this regard is the symbolization invoked during the military operations held in the 1930s. In the military maps used during the upheavals of the 1930s, while Kurdish resisters were symbolized as red forces, the Turkish army units were symbolized as blue forces. As these two examples suggest, Kurds, who in principle were reckoned as the Turks of the future, were on certain occasions perceived as enemies to be destroyed. When Kurds revolted, not only did their image change from ‘future Turks’ to the enemies to be destroyed, but also the citizenship status accorded to them by Turkish nationalism changed. On certain occasions, Kurds encountered discriminatory practices of citizenship. Confiscation of their property and compulsory settlement were two of such practices. Nevertheless, my conviction is that these instances remained marginal and they did not change the main route followed by Turkish nationalism. Despite these instances, it still looks possible to suggest that Turkish nationalism/state has in principle perceived Kurds as those who may become Turkish until very recently.

42. The representation of the Kurdish leaders, Mesud Barzani and Celal Talabani, as tribal chieftains lacking the ability to rule a modern administrative apparatus is now ordinary. Not only are Kurds despised, they are sometimes plainly insulted. When the governorship election at Kerkuk in May 2003 was won by the Kurdish candidate, Abdurrahman Mustafa, this was reported by the Turkish newspaper Star on 29 May 2003 with the title ‘Kerkürt’, which in Kurdish means “donkey-Kurd”.

43. See www.bozkurt.net; www.otuken.org.

44. http://www.yenisafak.com.tr/arsiv/2003/aralik/03/g05.html

45. http://www.milliyet.com/2004/01/19/yazar/bila.html

46. The figures given in the report prepared by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (GNAT) in 1998 indicate that more than three thousand villages were evacuated. For the report see (GNAT,1998)

47. For these conflicting views see (GNAT 1998, pp. 13–26).

48. For the law enacted on 17 July 2004 see http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/kanunlar/k5233.html

49. http://www.milliyet.com/2004/01/19/yazar/bila.html.

50. Signs to this effect are not confined to the usage of the terms Jewish-Kurds and native-Loizidus. Doubts as to the dictum that Kurds are future-Turks may often be encountered especially in the readers’ responses to the news regarding Kurds in the Internet. For a few examples of these reader responses see the following: http://www.hurriyetim.com.tr/haber/0,,sid∼1@w∼2@tarih∼2005-01-27-m@nvid∼529242,00.asp http://www.hurriyetim.com.tr/haber/0,,sid∼1@w∼3@tarih∼2005-01-31-m@nvid∼530884,00.asp http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2005/01/27/