Reflexivity for what? A response to Gewirtz and Cribb on the role of values in the sociology of education

Abstract

This article is a reply to Gewirtz and Cribb's argument for ethical reflexivity, presented in a previous issue of this journal. These authors compared their views with mine, suggesting a way in which the differences between our positions could be overcome. I argue that, while there is certainly substantial agreement, there are also some fundamental differences between us, notably about the goal of research. Indeed, in my view, what they recommend involves a greatly increased danger of bias and a version of scientism. At issue here is, in large part, the kind of ethical reflexivity that is appropriate in sociological work.

Keywords:

• reflexivity
• fact and value
• research and practice
• bias
• scientism

Notes

1. For some classic discussions of these issues that show that critics of the Weberian position come from diverse directions, see Strauss (1953), Habermas (1976), and Midgely (1983). See also Myrdal (1969).

2. Gewirtz and Cribb seem to use ‘ethical’ in a broad sense, to refer to all values relevant to research, and I will follow them in this here.

3. It is worth noting that Gillborn has argued in favour of differential treatment on ethnic/’racial’ grounds, as against ‘colour‐blind’ treatment (Gillborn 1995).

4. Any such evaluations or recommendations should be made in an explicitly conditional form (see Foster, Hammersley, and Gomm 2000).

5. For an outline of this sense of the term, see Kolb (1964).

6. And in my view it is a characteristic feature of academic research that such knowledge should be provided in the form of literature reviews, not on the basis of the findings of a single study. This is a further barrier to what Gewirtz and Cribb propose.

7. Flyvbjerg (2001) is an example of the latter; for a brief assessment, see Hammersley (2002).

8. One of the arguments here is that there must be something that is of intrinsic rather than instrumental value for instrumentalism even to get off the ground (Hammersley 1995, 140–142). This is a line of argument that has also been used against extreme forms of consequentialism in ethics (see, for example, Williams 1973, 82).