Overcoming Dilemmas Created by the 21st Century Mercenaries: conceptualising the use of private security companies in Iraq

Abstract

In the past private security companies have taken responsibility for protecting reconstruction and aid activities during and after conflict. In Mozambique, Angola and Afghanistan such companies have played various roles in providing security for the reconstruction effort and delivery of humanitarian aid. However, the extensive private sector involvement in the reconstruction of Iraq, in addition to expanding aid activities, means that the use of private security companies is at an unprecedented level. Consequently the boundaries between civilian and military activities are becoming blurred, which creates new dangers for humanitarian assistance. Despite the increased number of private security companies in operation, their role is poorly conceptualised, discussed only as part of the overall security response rather than as a vital component of the delivery of aid and of the extensive private sector-led reconstruction programme. To conceptualise the protection of private sector reconstruction and ngo activity, the article examines three interrelated perspectives—the confusion between military intervention and humanitarian aid, the advent of the armed humanitarian and the need to understand the perceptions of the local population. The article provides typologies of local perceptions as a starting point for organisational analysis. It examines the implication of these typologies for reconstruction using Slim's questions: how do we look? What is most visible? Who is looking? The article confirms the link between the use of private security companies for reconstruction and ngo activities and the exacerbation of conflict. Therefore ngos and organisations working in the private sector need to differentiate their efforts from the military campaigns which by doing so limits the violent consequences of negative perceptions.

Notes

Kjell Bjork and Richard Jones are both at the Post-war Reconstruction and Development Unit (prdu), University of York, Derwent College, York YO10 5DD, UK. Email: [email protected]

For a similar illustration from Afghanistan, see Barakat and Chard (2002).

Phrases translated from interviews conducted by Bjork in Baghdad and Central Iraq, November 2003 – February 2004.

Van Brabant (1998: 110) also confirms that the use of armed protection for reconstruction assistance has been escalating since the end of the Cold War.

The US military is heavily reliant upon the private sector for weapons design, procurement and supporting troops. Therefore to the USA the civil/military blurring is not as apparent as it is to Europeans, who are more reliant on in-house expertise.

Indeed, Barakat (2004: 23) states that reconstruction contracts can have a provision for security spending of around 40%. Therefore security companies are keen to exploit this highly profitable consequence of instability.

Company websites, www.sandline.co.uk; www.custerbattles.com; www.internationalriskcontrol.co.uk.

The bbc provides a good example. ‘A British contractor has been killed in a roadside bomb attack in Zubayr, south Iraq, an Army spokesman has said. The Foreign Office confirmed a Briton had died in an incident, but gave no further details. The Army spokesman in Basra said there were two civilian casualties from the bomb on Sunday morning. “I can confirm there was a car bomb this morning. I believe they were two civilians, they were definitely not military,” he said. The incident happened in Zubayr, just south of Basra. Danish television reported that the Briton was a civilian security employee, and the second casualty was a South African colleague.’ bbc, ‘British contractor killed in Iraq’, 7 November 2004. Available at www.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/3990857.

A few private security companies have been created specifically to support government operations and are primarily working as contractors of their respective governments. Most of the companies have a background as regular private mercenary organisations. An irregular band of redundant soldiers taking on contract killings or covert operations for governments has its roots in the Vietnam War and Africa during the evolution of independent states in the 1960s and 1970s. Since then, according to Abdel-Fatau and Kayode Fayemi (2000), regular mercenary companies have transformed into commercial companies with boards of directors, providing security services for transnational companies and governments.

Howe (2001) claims that this was the first time mercenary forces had been used in a way that, at least for the short term, provided stability in areas where other professional forces were lacking. Despite the title of chairman, Eden Barlow's role was analogous to that of a military commander. The difference between eo and earlier mercenary companies is its base of professional soldiers. As Isenberg (2001) quoted in Howe (2001) points out, instead of a being a ragtag band of adventurers or paramilitaries, eo offered an organised force that could not only fight but could also provide training and planning for national armies. When eo officially closed operations in 1999 this was partly the result of a changing South Africa that was starting to regulate the activities of private security operations and partly a consequence of its involvement in a failed coup in Papua New Guinea in 1997. Nevertheless Howe (2001) states that the company did not fully disappear. Part of the staff merged with the earlier sub-company, Sandline, that had been involved in the failed coup in Papua New Guinea.

Sandline has engaged in a number of quasi-mercenary activities over the years. In 1997 it was contracted by the Papua New Guinea government to retake control over the island of Bougainville. Landowners on the island had closed down a copper mine because of the environmental destruction caused by the mining company. Sandline was awarded a US$36 million contract to root out the local opposition to the mining in order to allow operations to continue. A member of the national armed forces in Papua New Guinea felt that the money would be better spent on its own troops and compromised the mission by making the deal public before operations commenced. The Sandline owner was arrested with $400 000 in cash but was later released. The following year Sandline was caught breaking a UN embargo on weapons to Sierra Leone. Sandline had sold 30 tons of weapons to the former leader of Sierra Leone, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah (Chatterjee, 2004). According to Sandline's own home page (www.sandline.com) the company was closed on 16 April 2004 because of the lack of government support for private military companies willing to help in armed conflicts.

For example, Somalia in 1992 – 93, Bosnia and Herzegovina with UN forces from 1992 and nato intervention in 1995, and Kosovo in 1999.

It is one thing to defeat Saddam Hussein but to ensure that every citizen obeys the law once the Saddam-era police had been disbanded was and remains much harder and must be complemented with ‘constabulary support’. Graham and Freeman (2002: 4) maintain that the use of a neutral police force staffed primarily by the surrounding Islamic nations and supplemented by staff from private security companies such as DynCorps was discussed as a possible alternative before the war. However, it is now known that the neighbouring countries had little intention of providing an international police force that would secure law and order in Iraq on behalf of a US-led coalition.

The Mogadishu line refers to the abortive attempt that US soldiers made to stabilise the Somalian capital beginning in May 1993. The armed resistance was much stronger than had been predicted and the rationale for the intervention—protecting food and distribution outlets—became less urgent as the USA was desperate to catch one of the warlords, Aideed. Pictures of a US marine being dragged through the streets in front of the world's press caused the political will for engagement to evaporate.

This can help to avoid embarrassing incidences such as the 1987 – 90 Indian Peace Keeping Forces mission to Sri Lanka, where intervening troops were accused of having an inherited bias towards one side.

The commercial sell-out of the country to foreign interests was a recurring theme in interviews conducted by Bjork in the central region and in Baghdad, October 2003 – February 2004.

Although prohibited under the Geneva Convention (Article 47), private security companies are operating in a grey area by exploiting loopholes (Whyte, 2003: 592 – 596).

ngos choosing to arm their staff, contract private security companies or train their own security force were identified by Bjork during the period October 2003 – February 2004. For security reasons these organisations prefer to be unnamed in order to avoid attracting further attention.

Furthermore, the high cost of having a security force protecting large areas has an overall impact on the total cost of providing the aid in question. The cost of contracting security staff can exceed $1000 per member of security staff per day (Harding, 2005).

Names of organisations have to remain confidential for security reasons, their feedback comes from interviews conducted by Bjork, November 2003 – February 2004.

In Baghdad a number of mine action organisations at times chose to conduct clearance operations on low or medium priority areas in order to be able to work outside the public eye, and thereby reduce the risk of becoming a target for attacks. On a few occasions where high priority tasks were in areas deemed highly hostile to a foreign presence, a different approach was chosen. The example refers to help-udt working at the south end of Al Rashid district on the border of UN Area 39/40.

In addition insurgents and combatants apprehended may be subjected to torture and abuse, the very human rights violations for which the occupying countries heavily criticised the former regime. Many Iraqis also view the US force as an inherited enemy after the last Gulf war, with Saddam-era state propaganda demonising the West in general and the USA in particular as enemies of the Iraqi people. In addition, public security and development progress, especially in terms of socioeconomic gains and infrastructure development, have deteriorated rather than improved in many areas.

Technological advances do not always ensure that people feel safer. For example, the situation among expatriate staff in Iraq has parallels with the perception held by many in the UK that more policemen on the street reduces crime and makes people feel safer.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Kjell Bjork

Kjell Bjork and Richard Jones are both at the Post-war Reconstruction and Development Unit (prdu), University of York, Derwent College, York YO10 5DD, UK. Email: [email protected]