Islamic Militancy in East Africa

Abstract

This paper examines the relative political significance of domestic and transnational Islamic militancy in three East African countries: Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. It seeks to identify, describe and account for the sources and significance of such militancy, with a focus upon the significance of al-Qaeda and regional affiliates. The paper argues that, encouraged by the post-9/11 international fall out, regional Islamic networks work towards improving the perceived low political and economic status of Muslims in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. At present, however, the political significance of Islamic militancy in the three countries is low.

Notes

1 I refer to various sources of information in the first section of the article—both governmental and academic. While the individual reliability of sources may be called into question, their overall import is to affirm the growing significance of transnational Islamic militancy that may or may not have an al-Qaeda dimension. I suggest, however, that this does not necessarily lead to the growing significance of Islamic militancy in relation to the politics of the individual countries in focus in the article.

2 It is possible, although at the time of writing (early August 2005) not verified, that there were links between Islamist groups in East Africa, notably Somalia, and the bomb attacks on London in July 2005. Several of the alleged perpetrators of the failed 21 July attacks were of Somali or Eritrean origin.

3 The infiltration of al-Qaeda into Somalia was facilitated by the fact that the country had become a collapsed or ‘failed’ state by this time; that is, a polity without an effective central government and with a generalised breakdown of law and order.

4 Kenya and Tanzania are a focus of this paper because of the destructive terrorist attacks in those countries in the late 1990s and early 2000s with which Islamic militan ts were implicated. Uganda is also a focal point as that country has also been identified as a likely source of Islamic militancy in East Africa.

5 The bombings were claimed by a previously unknown organisation, The Secret Organization of al-Qaeda in Europe (http://news.com.com/E-mail+traffic+doubles+after+London+bomb+blasts/2100-1038_3-5778088.html?tag=nl).

6 McGrory et al. (2005).

7 The US Foundation for the Defense of Democracies claims that Islamic ‘terrorists can easily blend into the Muslim populations of the coast’. See http://www.defenddemocracy.org/research_topics/research_topics_show.htm?doc_id=157584&attrib_id=7451.

8 McGrory et al (2005).

9 A US Department of Defense official, Vincent Kern, told more than 120 senior African military officers and civilian defence officials gathered at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (acss) seminar on 10 February 2004 that, in June 2003, ‘President Bush announced a $100 million, 15-month Eastern Africa counter-terrorism initiative under which the United States is expanding and accelerating [US] counter-terrorism efforts with Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Uganda, Tanzania and Eritrea’. The programme, Kern said, was designed to counter terrorism by focusing on coastal and border security; police and law enforcement training; immigration and customs; airport/seaport security; establishment of a terrorist tracking database; disruption of terrorist financing; and ‘community outreach through education, assistance projects and public information’. Kenya, for example, was to receive training and equipment for a counter-terrorism police unit aimed at ‘building an elite Kenyan law enforcement unit designed to investigate and react to terrorist incidents’. See http://japan.usembassy.gov/e/p/tp-20040212-24.html.

10 For accounts of the relationship between Islam and politics in Kenya, see Cruise O'Brien (1995) and Oded (2000).

11 Al-Ittihad is on the US list of terror groups, and has been watched closely since 9/11. In 1993 members of al-Ittihad killed 18 American soldiers in Somalia, speeding up the withdrawal of the USA from that country. According to Marchesin (2003), al-Itahaad provided logistical support to those who committed the 1998 attack in Nairobi. The organisation is also suspected of having co-operated with al-Qaeda during the dual attack in Mombasa in 2002.

12 Concerned with the influence of Somali Islamic radicals in Kenya, the then president, Daniel arap Moi, actively engaged in peace efforts in Somalia from the early 1990s. During the 1990s Kenya organised numerous peace conferences as the Kenyan government was concerned that continuing instability in Somalia could lead to region-wide instability. In July 2001 Kenyan officials closed the border with Somalia because of illegal arms smuggling into Kenya (Dagne, 2002: 18; Kelley, 2001).

13 For accounts of Islam and politics in Tanzania, see Heilman and Kaiser (2002); and Lodhi and Westerland (1997).

14 For accounts of Islam and politics in Uganda, see Constantin (1995); and Oded (1995).

15 The Kakwa people amount to less than 1% of the total population of Uganda.

16 According to Chande (2000: 355), ‘The Salafi reputation rests on their scholarly activities and the challenge they pose (given their skills in the Arabic language) to the monopoly on religious education held by traditional scholars. Their efforts have made Islamic education more accessible’.

17 I duly note the continued conflict between the government and the Lord's Resistance Army that has seriously affected parts of the Acholi-dominated north.