Caudillos and the crisis of the Colombian state: fragmented sovereignty, the war system and the privatisation of counterinsurgency in Colombia

Abstract

This article examines the rise of private militias within the historical context of the crisis of the Colombian nation-state. Taking a political economy approach, the paper attempts to assess the consequences of the emergence of the United Auto Defenses of Colombia (auc) for the country's political trajectory. It argues that the auc and the narco-bourgeoisie have created a new ‘reactionary class configuration’ that has regenerated a ‘labour-repressive’ mode of capital accumulation best characterised as a rentier-based political economy. Hence the counterinsurgency in Colombia is not the typical military instrument of the state, but rather an instrument for class articulation and socioeconomic and political transformation beyond the state. Although these transformations were consistent with the neoliberal economic path that the Colombian government had adopted in earnest by the late 1980s, they also deepened the political crisis of the state and accentuated ‘fragmented sovereignty’ and the ‘war system’. Finally, this article sheds light on the social class composition of the auc and on the insurgency led by the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (farc), revealing the social class differences between the two main warring actors.

Notes

This paper is, at least in part, a product of field research conducted in Colombia during the summer of 2006. I interviewed two auc leaders and six informants from the Middle Magdalena region (Baracabermeja, Puerto Wilches and San Pablo), as well as consulting specialists and academics working in this area. I am grateful to the Ministry of Interior for providing me with data on the demobilisation process and to the Organization of American States (auc) for facilitating the interviews.

1 N Richani, Systems of Violence: The Political Economy of War and Peace in Colombia, New York: suny Press, 2002.

2 See Antonio Gramsci, Prison Notebook, Vol 2, New York: Columbia University Press, 1996; and D Forgacs (ed), The Antonio Gramsci Reader: Selected Writings, 1916 – 1935, New York: New York University Press, 2000, pp 204 – 209.

3 F Safford & M Palacios, Colombia: Fragmented Land, Divided Society, New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.

4 F Lopez-Alves, State Formation and Democracy in Latin America 1810 – 1900, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2000, ch 3.

5 Vision Colombia II Centerario: 2019 Propuesta para una Discusion, Bogota: Presidencia de La Republica, Planeta and dnp, 2005, pp 109 – 110. According to one study cited in Vision Colombia, the country has the third most complex terrain out of 155 countries and it has a score of 0.42 in terms of population density, the lowest in Latin America.

6 C Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990 – 1992, New York: Blackwell, 1992, p 30.

7 C LeGrand, Frontier Expansion and Peasant Protest in Colombia: 1850 – 1936, Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico, 1986; and Richani, Systems of Violence, ch 2.

8 Richani, Systems of Violence, ch 1.

9 Ibid, pp 31 – 32.

10 C Medina, Autodedensas, Paramilitares y Narcotrafico en Colombia, Bogota: Editorial Documentos Periodicos, 1990.

11 Richani, Systems of Violence, ch 5; and M Romero, Paramilitares y Autodefensas 1982 – 2003, Bogota: iepri & Planeta, 2003.

12 F Sanchez & M Chacon, ‘Conflicto, estado y decentralizacion’, in F Gutierrez, ME Willis & G Sanchez (eds) Nuestra Guerra Sin Nombre, Bogota: iepri & Norma, 2006, pp 349 – 399. This study applying regression analysis confirmed the strong correlation between the political decentralisation and the increase in regional violence.

13 Richani, Systems of Violence; and Richani, ‘The political economy of protracted conflicts: the crisis of the war system in Colombia’, Journal of Conflict Studies, 21 (2), 2001, pp 50 – 77.

14 ‘Deuda con la humanidad: paramilitarism de estado 1988 – 2003’, Noche Niebla, Bogota: cinep, 2005, p 492.

15 R Steiner & A Corchuelo, Repercusiones Económicas e Institucionales del Narcotráfico en Colombia, cede Uniandes, 1999, p 32. Consultoría para los Derechos Humanos y el Desplazamiento Forzado (Codhes) provides a much higher estimate, claiming that between 1997 and 2004 the paramilitaries acquired five million hectares by pressuring owners to sell or face death. See El Tiempo, 21 December 2004.

16 Ernesto Baez, ex-paramilitary commander, interview with author, Medellin, 11 August 2006. See also G Duncan, ‘Historia de una subordinacion: como los guerreros sometieron a los narcotraficantes’, Revista Foro, 57, March 2006, pp 42 – 57.

17 Baez, interview with author.

18 Julian Bolivar, ex-commander of the auc, interview with author, Medellin, 11August 2006.

19 The 1985, 1995 and 2000 figures are according to the estimate of the defence department. See Richani, Systems of Violence, ch 5. The 2006 figures are according to a Ministry of Interior list of former combatants obtained by the author. Ernesto Baez, interview with author.

20 Baez, interview with author.

21 See William Wood, US Ambassador to Colombia, cited in El Tiempo, 8 February 2004.

22 El Nuevo Heraldo, 19 October 2004.

23 See El Tiempo, 6 November 2005, pp 1 – 4.

24 These figures were obtained by the author from the Ministry of Interior and are based on the total number of demobilised fighters.

25 See ‘Los archivos de Don Berna’, Cambio, 15 – 22 August 2005, pp 22 – 26. Don Berna was appointed by the auc as its Inspector. Don Berna formed part of the defunct Medellin Cartel of Pablo Escobar.

26 Carlos Castano and his ally, Rodrigo Franco ‘Doble Zero’, both accepted narco-bourgeoisie money, but opposed its outright command of the auc. Their death sealed the fate of control over the auc. The deaths of Carlos Castano and Rodrigo Franco parallel that of ex-congressmen Pablo Guarín and Gonzalo de Jesús Pérez (and his son Henry), three of the main architects of the paramilitary in Puerto Boyaca who accepted money from narco-traffickers such as Pablo Escobar and Rodrigo Gacha, but wanted to maintain some political autonomy. This led to their killings in 1987 and 1991, respectively. As a consequence Puerto Boyaca's paramilitaries, then the most important group, came under the full control of the narco-bourgeoisie represented by Escobar and Gacha. This analysis differs from the one presented by Gustavo Duncan, in which he claims that the paramilitaries subjugated the narco-traffickers. See G Duncan, ‘Historia de una subordinacion’.

27 As quoted in El Tiempo, 23 May 2005. See also El Espectador, 22 – 28 January 2006, p 5A.

28 See El Tiempo, 16 March 2006. In the House of Representative the number could be much higher. In the 2002 elections the paramilitaries claim that 35 percent of the Congress members were their allies. In the 2006, at least 11 members are being investigated for their links.

29 pnud-dne, Drogas ilícitas en Colombia, Bogota, 1997. See also R Ricardo, La Economía Colombiana después de 25 años de Narcotráfico, Siglo del Hombre Editores, undcp, Bogota 2000, p 11. Rocha calculated that the value of the lands acquired by the narco-bourgeoisie by 2000 was US$2.4 billion.

30 Ernesto Baez, interview with author.

31 Fundacion Seguridad y Domocracia, ‘Colombia: balance de seguridad 2003’, p 2.

32 Julian Bolivar, interview with author.

33 Informants from Barancabermeja, Puerto Wilches and San Pablo, Middle Magdalena, interview with author, 26 August 2006.

34 Desmovilizar a los Paramilitares en Colombia: Una Meta Vialble?, Bogota: International Crisis Group, 5 August 2004, p 9.

35 Baez, interview with author. See also J Monatanez, J Bolivar, P Sevillano & E Basz de la Serna, Pensameineto Social y Politico del Bloque Central Bolivar de las Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, Santafe de Realito, Cordoba: bcb, 2005.

36 El Salvador and Guatemala witnessed similar processes of rentier-led violent transformation of their rural economies. See N Richani, ‘Multinational corporations, rentier capitalism and the war system in Colombia’, Latin American Politics and Society, 47 (3), 2005, pp 113 – 144.

37 Ibid.

38 This analysis builds on the one presented by Lopez-Alves, State Formation and Democracy in Latin America, p 116.

39 Richani, Systems of Violence, ch 4.

40 This social class characteristic can be better understood if we factor in the information that about 40% of the auc fighters were recruited in Uraba, an area where the peasant economy was largely displaced by agribusiness such as banana plantations, African palms, extensive cattle ranching and mining. This created a host of menial jobs that are not related to the traditional rural economy, but rather to the process of urbanisation associated with the capitalist transformation. See El Tiempo, 22 January 2005. From the total number of demobilised auc members about 9000 may have originated from Antioquia, followed by Cordoba and Cesar, with 3856 and 3038 fighters, respectively. The source of these data is the Ministry of Interior, Programa para la Incorporacion a la Vida Civil, 2006.

41 Stathis Kalivas & Ana Maria Arjona, ‘Resultados preliminares de una encuesta a combatientes desmovilizados en Colombia’, mimeo, 2005; and ‘Cuidadanos excombatientes: un desafio de reconciliacion para Bogota’, mimeo, Programa de Atencion Complementaria a la Poblacion Reincoporada Con Presencia en Bogota, Bogota, 2006.

42 Kalivas & Arjona, ‘Resultados preliminares’, p 12; Cuidadanos excombatientes, pp 11 – 12; and Richani, Systems of Violence, chs 4, 5.

43 Kalivas & Arjona, p 20.

44 These findings are also supported by a recently published report by the Organization of American States (mapp – oas), which confirms the formation of new armed groups in various guises in the departments of North Santander, Narino, Cordoba, Guajira and Bolivar. The report counted 43 armed structures. One of the new forms of paramilitary reorganisation is manifested in establishing private security companies in Barranquilla, Barancabermeja and other places. See ‘Septimo informe trimestral del Secretario General al Consejo Permanente Sobre la Mision de Apoyo Al Proceso de Paz en Colombia’, mimeo, oas, Bogota, September 2006.

45 This time around, however, the state is compromising with a mafiosi structure reminiscent of the Italian state in the early decades of the 20th century, when it had to negotiate with the Mafia to fight the leftist opposition between 1943 and 1950 in Sicily, and consequently established a modus vivendi between the Christian Democratic Party and organised crime which helped the former extend its rule for over 40 years (1948 – 92). See Richani, Systems of Violence, ch 7.