From Guerrillas to Government: post-conflict stability in Liberia, Uganda and Rwanda

Abstract

Post-conflict stability remains an elusive goal for many African countries. The political and socioeconomic preconditions of African civil wars have often persisted after the end of open hostilities and have frustrated regional and international efforts at peace building. The growing role of non-state armed groups in post-conflict governments raises further questions on the important role of guerilla groups in either exacerbating or ameliorating the ‘structural’ preconditions of protracted African wars. The cases of Liberia, Uganda and Rwanda offer important insights on the complex interplay between armed groups and governments that underlie these conflicts. All three countries have been marked by devastating civil wars and the subsequent formation of post-conflict governments led by respective insurgent groups, but only Rwanda and Uganda have made any effort to mitigate the conditions that ultimately led to intra-state violence and state collapse. While the conflict dynamic may heavily condition an insurgent group, these factors alone do not play a determining role in the success or failure of peace building efforts.

Notes

The author would like to thank Brent Wellsch, Jordan Guthrie and Kyle Clendinning for their insightful discussions on a number of African political and security issues, and Robert Finbow and David Black for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.

1 L Cliffe & R Luckham, ‘Complex political emergencies and the state: failure and the fate of the state’, Third World Quarterly, 20 (1), 1999, pp 27 – 50.

2 The trend towards regional interventionism in African civil wars was noted in the latter half of the Cold War, but appears to have been exacerbated in the post-cold war period. For further insight, see SN MacFarlane, ‘Africa's decaying security system and the rise of intervention’, International Security, 8 (4), 1984, pp 127 – 151.

3 The criteria for ‘complex political emergencies’ (cpes), which this paper has loosely borrowed in its description of African conflicts, can be found in J Goodhand & D Hulme, ‘From wars to complex political emergencies: understanding conflict and peace-building in the new world disorder’, Third World Quarterly, 20 (1), 1999, pp 16 – 17.

4 See J Busumtwi-Sam, ‘Sustainable peace and development in Africa’, Studies in Comparative International Development, 37 (3), 2002, pp 91 – 118.

5 Procedural legitimacy refers to the procedural characteristics of democracy, while substantive legitimacy is based on established normative rules, and performative legitimacy on socioeconomic progress. See ibid, p 94.

6 The contention for state power by communal groups in the context of state failure and/or collapse is associated with the most severe form of ethno-political violence. See T Gurr, ‘Peoples against states: ethnopolitical violence and the changing world system’, International Studies Quarterly, 38 (3), 1999, pp 347 – 377.

7 W Reno, ‘War, markets, and the reconfiguration of West Africa's weak states’, Comparative Politics, 29 (4), 1997, pp 493 – 509; and Reno, Warlord Politics and African States, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998, ch 2.

8 An argument for the prioritisation of economic causes can be found in P Collier, Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and their Implications for Policy, Washington, DC: World Bank Development Research Group, 2000.

9 Reno, Warlord Politics and African States, ch 3.

10 H Howe, ‘Lessons of Liberia: ecomog and regional peacekeeping’, International Security, 21 (3), 1996 – 97, pp 145 – 176.

11 D Dunn, ‘The civil war in Liberia’, in T Ali & R Matthews (eds), Civil Wars in Africa: Roots and Resolution, Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1999, p 101.

12 W Reno, ‘The politics of insurgency in collapsing states’, Development and Change, 35 (5), 2002, pp 837 – 858; and Reno, ‘The politics of violent opposition in collapsing states’, Government and Opposition, 40 (2), 2005, pp 127 – 151.

13 Doe's old Armed Forces of Liberia (afl) had 7000 troops, the Mandigo-dominated United Liberation Movement of Liberians for Democracy (ulimo-k) and the Krahn-dominated splinter group ulimo-j had 6800 and 3800 troops, respectively, while George Boley's alternative Krahn faction, the Liberian Peace Council (lpc) had 2500 troops. W Reno, ‘Reconstructing peace in Liberia’, in T Ali & R Matthews (eds), Durable Peace: Challenges for Peacebuilding in Africa, Toronto: Toronto University Press, 2004, p 121.

14 Reno, Warlord Politics and African States, p 93.

15 J Tindigarukayo, ‘Uganda, 1979 – 1985: leadership in transition’, Journal of Modern African Studies, 26 (4), 1988, p 609. See also G Glentworth & I Hancock, ‘Obote and Amin: change and continuity in modern Ugandan politics’, African Affairs, 72 (288), 1973, pp 237 – 255.

16 J Kiyaga-Nsubuga, ‘Managing political change: Uganda under Museveni’, in Ali & Matthews, Civil Wars in Africa, p 17.

17 The figure of estimated fatalities under Obote's second regime can be found in Tindigarukayo, ‘Uganda, 1979 – 1985’, p 617. For further information on the military engagements between 1983 and 1984, see N Kasfir, ‘Guerrillas and civilian participation: the National Resistance Army in Uganda, 1981 – 1986’, Journal of Modern African Studies, 43 (2), 2005, pp 271 – 296.

18 Kasfir, ‘Guerrillas and civilian participation’, pp 271 – 296. See also E Katumba-Wamala, ‘The National Resistance Army (nra) as a guerrilla force’, Small Wars and Insurgencies, 11 (3), 2000, pp 160 – 171.

19 For more on the relationship between a state's military capabilities and insurgencies, see J Herbst, ‘African militaries and rebellion: the political economy of threat and combat effectiveness’, Journal of Peace Research, 41 (3), 2004, pp 357 – 369.

20 W Cyrus Reed, ‘Exile, reform, and the rise of the Rwandan Patriotic Front’, Journal of Modern African Studies, 34 (3), 1996, pp 479 – 501. For more on the refugee warrior phenomenon, see H Adelman, ‘Why refugee warriors are threats’, Journal of Conflict Studies, 18 (1), 1998, pp 46 – 69.

21 P Uvin, ‘Ethnicity and power in Burundi and Rwanda: different paths to mass violence’, Comparative Politics, 31 (3), 1999, pp 257 – 258; and B Jones, ‘Civil war, the peace process, and genocide in Rwanda’, in Ali & Matthews, Civil Wars in Africa, pp 57 – 58.

22 Jones, ‘Civil war, the peace process and genocide in Rwanda’, pp 59 – 60.

23 See G Prunier, ‘The Rwandan Patriotic Front’, in C Clapham (ed), African Guerrillas, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1998, pp 119 – 133.

24 Reno, ‘Reconstructing peace in Liberia’, p 122.

25 D Newbury, ‘Irredentist Rwanda: ethnic and territorial frontiers in Central Africa’, Africa Today, 44 (2), 1997.

26 Cited in C David, ‘Does peacebuilding build peace? Liberal (mis)steps in the peace process’, Security Dialogue, 30 (1), 1999, p 26.

27 Ibid.

28 R Paris, ‘International peacebuilding and the “mission civilisatrice”’, Review of International Studies, 28 (4), 2002, pp 637 – 656.

29 Reno, ‘Reconstructing peace in Liberia’, p 125; and D Harris, ‘From “warlord” to “democratic” president: how Charles Taylor won the 1997 Liberian elections’, Journal of Modern African Studies, 37 (3), 1999, pp 431 – 455.

30 Reno, ‘Reconstructing peace in Liberia’, p 127. Other security agencies include the Anti-Terrorist Unit, under the command of his son, the Special Security Service, the Joint Security Forces, the National Bureau of Investigation, Counter Force and the Security Operations Division, with the total size of these forces reaching upwards of 60 000.

31 Ibid.

32 For more on the 2000 – 03 fighting that preceded Taylor's exile, see International Crisis Group, ‘Tackling Liberia: the eye of the regional storm’, icg Africa Report, 62, 2003, available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/report_archive/A400960_30042003.pdf.

33 For more on the role of insurgents in maintaining group cohesion, see J Herbst, ‘Economic incentives, natural resources and conflict in Africa’, Journal of African Economies, 9 (3), 2000, pp 270 – 294.

34 Kiyaga-Nsubuga, ‘Managing political change’, p 18.

35 Ibid, pp 13 – 34.

36 J Kiyaga-Nsubuga, ‘Uganda: the politics of consolidation under Museveni's regime, 1996 – 2003’, in Ali & Matthews, Durable Peace, pp 86 – 112.

37 Busumtwi-Sam, ‘Sustainable peace and development in Africa’, p 105; and S Dicklitch, ‘Uganda: a microcosm of crisis and hope in sub-Saharan Africa’, International Journal, 51, 1995 – 96, p 109.

38 See J Anthony Okuku, ‘Beyond “third term” politics in Uganda: the implications of proposed constitutional reforms for democratic governance’, Africa Insights, 36 (1), 2006, pp 13 – 23.

39 For a critical analysis of this conflict, see A Branch, ‘Neither peace nor justice: political violence and the peasantry in northern Uganda, 1986 – 1996’, African Studies Quarterly, 8 (2), 2005, at http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v8/v8i2a1.pdf.

40 S Sundstol Eriksen, ‘The Congo war and the prospects for state formation: Rwanda and Uganda compared’, Third World Quarterly, 26 (7), 2005, pp 1097 – 1113.

41 The military strength of the Former Government of Rwanda was estimated to be 50 000-strong and included elements of the ex-far, extremist Hutu militias and recruits from among the Hutu refugee population. For further information, see W Cyrus Reed, ‘Guerrillas in the midst: the former government of Rwanda and the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire in Eastern Zaire’, in Clapham, African Guerrillas, pp 134 – 154; and M McNulty, ‘The collapse of Zaire: implosion, revolution or internal sabotage?’, Journal of Modern African Studies, 37 (1), 1999, pp 53 – 82.

42 F Reyntjens, ‘Rwanda, ten years on: from genocide to dictatorship’, African Affairs, 103, 2004, pp 177 – 210.

43 According to European sources, the rpa is estimated to number between 49 000 and 64 000. E Sidiropoulos, ‘Democratisation and militarisation in Rwanda: eight years after the genocide’, African Security Review, 11 (3), 2002, p 84.

44 The centralised nature of natural resource extraction in the Congo raises questions on the efficacy of any new akazu-based network within the rpf. See Eriksen, ‘The Congo war and the prospects for state formation’, pp 1097 – 1113.

45 Reyntjens, ‘Rwanda, ten years on’, p 209.

46 See A Tiemessen, ‘After Arusha: gacaca justice in post-genocide Rwanda’, African Studies Quarterly, 8 (1), 2004, at http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v8/v8i1a4.pdf.

47 This Hutu insurgency has its origins in the dismantlement and forced return of the Hutu refugees in the DRC, which led to infiltration by Hutu genocidaires into Rwandan territory. See R Orth, ‘Rwanda's Hutu extremist genocidal insurgency: an eyewitness perspective’, Small Wars and Insurgencies, 12 (1), 2001, pp 76 – 109; and P Jackson, ‘Legacy of bitterness: insurgency in north west Rwanda’, Small Wars and Insurgencies, 15 (1), 2004, pp 19 – 37.

48 See S John Stedman, ‘Spoiler problems in peace processes’, International Security, 22 (2), 1997, pp 5 – 53; and K Greenhill & S Major, ‘The perils of profiling: civil war spoilers and the collapse of intrastate peace accords’, International Security, 31 (3), 2006/07, pp 7 – 40.

49 R Paris, ‘Peacebuilding and the limits of liberal internationalism’, International Security, 22 (2), 1997, pp 54 – 89.

50 See J Busumtwi-Sam, ‘Development and peacebuilding: conceptual and operational deficits in international assistance’, in Ali & Matthews, Durable Peace, pp 315 – 353.