Exploring the Paradoxical Consequences of State Collapse: the cases of Somalia 1991–2006 and Lebanon 1975–82

Abstract

Relative social and economic well-being in the aftermath of a state's collapse is usually explained on the basis of a single case, Somalia, and with reference to the impact of endogenous factors such as the repressive and predatory nature of the state which collapsed and the ability of civil society actors and institutions to fulfil those functions that are normally performed by a state. This article challenges this theoretical view. As can be seen from a study of Lebanon, relative well-being after state collapse is more common than it appears to be at first glance. Moreover, given the limited role that the Lebanese state played in the economic and political spheres before the breakdown of state authority in 1975, the repressive and predatory nature of the collapsed state cannot be the explanatory variable in this case. Exogenous factors, such as remittances from abroad, international loans bestowed upon residual state institutions and ‘political money’ from foreign powers, are the decisive factors generating such paradoxical developments. Study of Somalia and Lebanon also shows the limitations of the conceptualisations of state collapse prevalent in the literature.

Notes

1 P Leeson, ‘Better off stateless: Somalia before and after government collapse’, Journal of Comparative Economics, 35(4), 2007, p 699. See also B Powell, R Ford & A Nowratesh, ‘Somalia after state collapse: chaos or improvement?’, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 67, 2008, pp 662–665.

2 J Mubarak, ‘The “hidden hand” behind the resilience of the stateless economy of Somalia’, World Development, 25(12), 1997, pp 2027–2028.

3 Leeson, ‘Better off stateless’, p 692.

4 K Menkhaus, ‘Governance without government in Somalia—spoilers, state building, and the politics of coping’, International Security, 32(3), 2006–07, p 74.

5 Powell et al, ‘Somalia after state collapse’, p 657.

6 Mubarak, ‘The “hidden hand” behind the resilience of the stateless economy of Somalia’, p 2031.

7 Leeson, ‘Better off stateless’, p 703.

8 Mubarak, ‘The “hidden hand” behind the resilience of the stateless economy of Somalia’, p 2031; and P Little, Somalia: Economy without State, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2003, p 144.

9 The central bank of Somalia was plundered and destroyed as early as in 1991. See Little, Somalia, p 144.

10 Mubarak, p 2032.

11 Ibid, p 2033; Leeson, ‘Better off stateless’, p 703; and B Powell et al, ‘Somalia after state collapse’, pp 661, 663.

12 Ibid, p 701; and Mubarak, ‘The “hidden hand” behind the resilience of the stateless economy of Somalia’, p 2032.

13 Little, Somalia, p 37.

14 Leeson, ‘Better off stateless’, pp 696–698.

15 Powell et al, ‘Somalia after state collapse’, pp 664–6665. See also p 657.

16 Mubarak, ‘The “hidden hand” behind the resilience of the stateless economy of Somalia’, pp 2034–2035.

17 Powell et al, ‘Somalia after state collapse’, pp 667, 669.

18 Leeson, ‘Better off stateless’, p 698.

19 Ibid.

20 T Hobbes, Leviathan, London: Penguin Books, 1968, p 186.

21 Powell et al, ‘Somalia after state collapse’, pp 658, 659.

22 Ibid, p 661, emphasis added.

23 Mubarak, ‘The “hidden hand” behind the resilience of the stateless economy of Somalia’, pp 2028, 2038.

24 Menkhaus, ‘Governance without government in Somalia’, pp 75–76.

25 Leeson, ‘Better off stateless’, p 690.

26 Ibid, p 706.

27 Ibid, p 707.

28 Ibid, p 699.

29 Cf ibid, p 698.

30 It has to be noted that this view is not universally accepted. In the available literature two works tend to emphasise the negative economic consequences of the civil war. See A Kubursi, ‘Reconstructing the economy of Lebanon’, Arab Studies Quarterly, 21(1), 1999, pp 72–75; and N Saidi, Economic Consequences of the War in Lebanon, Oxford: Centre for Lebanese Studies, 1986, pp 1–2.

31 TK Gaspard, A Political Economy of Lebanon 1948–2002—The Limits of Laissez-faire, Leiden: Brill, 2004, pp xx, 189.

32 NG Khalaf & GV Rimlinger, ‘The response of the Lebanese labour force to economic disclocation’, Middle Eastern Studies, 18, 1982, p 300.

33 N Salim, ‘Lebanon's war: is the end in sight?’, Middle East Report, January–February 1990, p 5.

34 Gaspard, A Political Economy of Lebanon, pp 192, 90. See also Saidi, Economic Consequences of the War in Lebanon, p 18.

35 CH Moore, ‘Prisoner's financial dilemmas: a consociational future for Lebanon?’, American Political Science Review, 81(1), 1987, p 201.

36 Nasr, ‘Lebanon's war’, p 6.

37 Cf Saidi, Economic Consequences of the War in Lebanon, p 10.

38 Ibid, pp 306–307.

39 Khalaf & Rimlinger, ‘The response of the Lebanese labour force to economic disclocation’, p 303.

40 Gaspard, A Political Economy of Lebanon, p 191.

41 Nasr, ‘Lebanon's war’, p 5. According to Harik, ‘looting on a massive scale’ was ‘the most visible and active “economic activity” among both the Christian militias and the Muslim ones’. I Harik, ‘The economic and social factors in the Lebanese crisis’, in SE Ibrahim & NS Hopkins (eds), Arab Society Social Science Perspective, Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 1985, p 414.

42 Nasr, ‘Lebanon's war’, p 6.

43 Saidi, Economic Consequences of the War in Lebanon, p 10.

44 Ibid.

45 See ibid; AM Baylouny, Privatizing Welfare in the Middle East—Kin Mutual Aid Associations in Jordan and Lebanon, Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 2010, pp 60–62; and S Makdisi, ‘An appraisal of Lebanon's postwar economic development and a look to the future’, Middle East Journal, 31(3), 1977, p 276.

46 C Nahas, ‘Finance and political economy of higher education’, in A Galal & T Kanaan (eds), Financing Higher Education in Arab Countries, Cairo: Economic Research Form (erf) Policy Research Report No 34, 2010, pp 52–53.

47 A Lijpart, Democracy in Plural Societies—A Comparative Exploration, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1977, pp 147–150.

48 O Barak, ‘Lebanon: failure, collapse, and resuscitation’, in RI Rotberg (ed), State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003, p 314.

49 Ibid.

50 Ibid, p 315.

51 Michael C Hudson, quoted in S Goglio, ‘Lebanon: from development to civil war’, Mediterranean Quarterly, Summer 1997, p 79.

52 Farid al-Khazen, quoted in ibid, p 86. See also RH Dekmejian, ‘The consociational democracy in crisis—the case of Lebanon’, Comparative Politics, 10(2), 1978, p 261.

53 According to one study, predation in Lebanon started after the eruption of the civil war. See E Picard, “The political economy of civil war in Lebanon’, in S Heydemann (ed), War, Institutions, and Social Change in the Middle East, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000, pp 301–302.

54 A Kubursi & JJ Siam, ‘The economy of Lebanon, 1950–2002: what happened to the Lebanese economic miracle?’, Journal of Social Affairs, 23(89), 2006, pp 15–16.

55 Ibid, p 16.

56 Baylouny, Privatizing Welfare in the Middle East, p 48.

57 Makdisi, ‘An appraisal of Lebanon's postwar economic development and a look to the future’, pp 267–268.

58 Gaspard, A Political Economy of Lebanon, p xix.

59 It should be noted that there were also a couple of endogenous factors in operation in Lebanon between 1975 and 1982. As mentioned above, trade union activism in the mid-1970s may explain improvements in the living standards of the less privileged social classes. Moreover, at the start of the civil war, ‘Lebanon possessed a considerable economic reserve’ in terms of ‘surplus in its balance of payments of more than $4 billion and very strong coverage of the Lebanese pound in gold and hard currencies’, in addition to private savings of the middle and upper classes. Nasr, ‘Lebanon's war’, p 5. However, these factors, though important, appear to be less significant compared with the huge amount of money that poured into the Lebanese economy from abroad.

60 See Saidi, Economic Consequences of the War in Lebanon, p 6; and Nahas, ‘Finance and political economy of higher education’, p 52.

61 Nasr, ‘Lebanon's war’, p 5.

62 Ibid.

63 N Choucri, ‘The hidden economy: a new view of remittances in the Arab world’, World Development, 14(6), 1986, p 704.

64 Ibid, p 697.

65 Nasr, ‘Lebanon's war’, p 5.

66 S Nasr, ‘Backdrop to civil war—the crisis of Lebanese capitalism’, merip Reports, 73, December 1978, p 10.

67 Ibid.

68 Khalaf & Rimlinger, ‘The response of the Lebanese labour force to economic disclocation’, pp 307–308. However, the authors also note that it is particularly difficult to estimate the figures because of ‘the importance of family as well as seasonal labour’ in the agricultural sector.

69 Harik, ‘The economic and social factors in the Lebanese crisis’, p 414.

70 H Khashan & M Palmer, ‘The economic basis of civil conflict in Lebanon: a survey analysis of Sunnite Muslims’, in TE Farah (ed), Political Behaviour in the Arab States, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983, p 78.

71 See, for instance, Nahas, ‘Finance and political economy of higher education’, p 52.

72 See, for instance, Nasr, ‘Lebanon's war’, p 5.

73 Ibid, pp 5–6.

74 Ibid, p 5.

75 Baylouny, Privatizing Welfare in the Middle East, p 64.

76 Ibid, p 62.

77 Ibid.

78 See Ibid, pp 62–63.

79 S Joseph, ‘Local-level politics and development in Lebanon: the view from Borj Hammoud’, in LJ Cantori & Iliya Harik (eds), Local Politics and Development in the Middle East, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984, p 147.

80 Ibid, pp 149–150.

81 Ibid, p 150.

82 Baylouny, Privatizing Welfare in the Middle East, p 47.

83 Ibid, p 68.

84 See ibid, pp 71–72.

85 W Zartman, ‘Introduction: posing the problem of state collapse’, in Zartman (ed), Collapsed States—The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995, pp 9, 5.

86 R Rotberg, ‘The failure and collapse of nation-states—breakdown, prevention, and repair’, in Rotberg (ed), When States Fail—Causes and Consequences, Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2004, p 3.

87 Ibid, pp 2–10.