The Hidden Effect of Diaspora Return to Post-conflict Countries: the case of policy and temporary return to Rwanda

Abstract

In response to the paucity of human resources in post-conflict societies, various agencies have implemented programmes to facilitate returns of qualified diasporas to their countries of origin. This paper examines the context in which diaspora return programmes have emerged and developed, and implications of the return programmes for post-conflict societies. It specifically looks at Migration for Development in Africa (mida) using the example of Rwanda. The paper demonstrates that the prime purpose of diaspora return programmes is to mitigate the effect of brain drain caused by migration from the South to the North. Furthermore, the paper argues that a secondary purpose of the programmes can be to secure a chance of return for diasporas who would like to return to their countries of origin but would like to stay away from the politics of these countries. In conclusion, the author suggests that diaspora return may increase the multiplicity of voices available in countries that tightly control dissident voices.

Notes

The author would like to thank iom staff and other interviewees whose information and advice was crucial to the completion of this paper. The author is especially indebted to Carl Death, Mitsugi Endo and Shin'ichi Takeuchi for their insightful comments on an earlier version of this paper. The paper was initially prepared while the author was working at the pko Secretariat, Cabinet Office, Government of Japan in 2011. The author appreciates the support offered by colleagues at the pko office.

1 K Nilaus Tarp & F Ferdinand Rosen, ‘Coaching and mentoring for capacity development: operational lessons learned from the case of South Sudan’, unpublished manuscript, 2011. Permission for the quotation obtained from the authors.

2 In this paper I use the word ‘diaspora’ in accordance with the definition adopted by the organisations and governments I examine. As mida targets diasporas living in Europe and North America, the paper primarily focuses on diasporas living in the North, the so-called developed countries. On diasporas in the South, see J Crush, ‘Diasporas of the South: situating the African diaspora in Africa’, in S Plaza & D Ratha (eds), Diaspora for Development in Africa, Washington, DC: World Bank, 2011. For other definitions of diasporas, see W Safran, ‘Diaspora in modern societies: myths of homeland and return’, Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies, 1(1), 1991, pp 83–99.

3 On tokten, see www.unv.org/en/what-we-do/countries/viet-nam/doc/tokten-channels-global-expertise.html, accessed 26 November 2011.

4 International Organization for Migration (iom), The mida Experience and Beyond, Geneva: iom, 2011, p 26.

5 I use the term ‘country of origin’ to describe the place to which diasporas return through diaspora return programmes. In contrast, the term ‘country of settlement’ indicates the place where diasporas currently reside.

6 iom, The mida Experience and Beyond, p 28.

7 Ibid, p 31. For an evaluation of the rqn programme, see S Plaza & D Ratha, ‘Harnessing diaspora resources for Africa’, in Plaza & Ratha, Diaspora for Development in Africa, p 28. For other iom-led diaspora return programmes, see http://www.iom-nederland.nl/english/Programmes/Migration_Development/Projects_Migration_Development/Temporary_Return_of_Qualified_Nationals_TRQN_II, accessed 8 June 2011.

8 iom, The mida Experience and Beyond, p 32.

9 Other mida programmes are in Ghana, Somalia, Mauritania, North Rhine Westphalia, Mali, Ethiopia, Cape Verde, Burkina Faso and Benin.

10 Diasporas from any one of these countries can go back to any of the three countries. In the majority of cases, people make a temporary return to their countries of origin. Information obtained from mida iom staff, 20 October 2011.

11 This does not mean that the host countries bear no financial responsibilities. Information obtained from mida iom staff, 13 July 2011.

12 N Ndiaye, S Melde & R Ndiaye-Coic, ‘The migration for development in Africa experience and beyond’, in Plaza & Ratha, Diaspora for Development in Africa, p 235.

13 P Pirkkalainen & M Abdile, The Diaspora–Conflict–Peace Nexus: A Literature Review, diaspeace Working Paper No 1, 2009, esp pp 5–7. For the perspective that diasporas are ‘peace-breakers’, see A A Mohamoud, Mobilizing African Diaspora for the Promotion of Peace in Africa, Amsterdam: African Diaspora Policy Centre, 2005; and M Berdal, ‘Beyond greed and grievances—and not too soon …’, Review of International Studies, 31(4), 2005, esp pp 694–695.

14 Mohamoud, Mobilizing African Diaspora for the Promotion of Peace in Africa, p 5.

15 A A Mohamoud, ‘African diaspora and post-conflict reconstruction in Africa’, diis Brief, Danish Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen, 2006, p 8.

16 An overview of migration development nexus debates can be found in N Nyberg-Sørensen, N Van Hear & P Engberg-Pedersen, ‘The migration–development nexus: evidence and policy options state-of-the-art overview’, International Migration, 40(5), 2002, pp 3–48.

17 On the contribution of diasporas to their countries of origin, see R Cheran, Diaspora Circulation and Transnationalism as Agents for Change in the Post Conflict Zones of Sri Lanka, Policy Paper, Berlin: Berghof Foundation for Conflict Management, 2003. For a critical reading of the migration and development nexus, see O Bakewell, ‘Keeping them in their place: the ambivalent relationship between development and migration in Africa’, Third World Quarterly, 29(7), 2008, pp 1341–1358.

18 On the brain drain view, see J Heraud, Migration and Development: An Insight into the Experiences and Perceptions of Skilled Migrants involved in the mida Great Lakes Programme, Sussex Centre for Migration Research Working Paper no 59, Brighton: University of Sussex, 2010, pp 17–18.

19 See I Spagnul, ‘Migration and development policies and practices emphasizing diasporas and their potential’, International Organizations for Migration Mission to Georgia, at Diasporas_Research_en.pdf, pp 12–19.

20 See Peace Research Institute Oslo (prio), Participation of Diasporas in Peacebuilding and Development, Oslo: prio, 2010; and oecd, The Contribution of Diaspora Return to Post-conflict and Fragile Countries, Paris: oecd, 2010, at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/31/1/46663447.pdf, p 13.

21 Before mida gl, Rwanda had another iom-led programme called ‘Return of Qualified Rwandan Nationals’ (rqr) started in 1996. Since the first phase of mida gl about 100 diaspora members have come back to Rwanda: 15 in Phase I, 25 in Phase II and 60 in Phase III. Information obtained from a Rwandan official working at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, 27 September 2011.

22 The exact number of people killed during the 1994 genocide remains contested. See, for example, HM Hintjens, ‘Explaining the 1994 genocide in Rwanda’, Journal of Modern African Studies, 37(2), 1999, pp 241–286.

23 Republic of Rwanda, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, ‘The Rwanda Diaspora Policy’, Kigali, June 2009, esp p 2.

24 Plaza & Ratha ‘Harnessing diaspora resources for Africa’, p 32.

25 E Kadozi, ‘Harnessing diaspora for development in Rwanda’, unpublished thesis, 2010, p 5.

26 Plaza & Ratha, ‘Harnessing diaspora resources for Africa’, p 27.

27 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, ‘The Rwanda Diaspora Policy’, p 14.

28 Ibid, p 6, emphasis added.

29 Ibid, p 5, emphasis added.

30 Ibid, p 15, emphasis added.

31 Ibid, p 22, emphasis added.

32 Republic of Rwanda, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, Diaspora General Directorate, ‘Rwandan Diaspora Guide’, Kigali, 2010, p 8, emphasis added.

33 Ibid, emphasis added.

34 Ibid, p 9.

35 Ibid, pp 29–30, emphasis added.

36 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, ‘The Rwanda Diaspora Policy’, pp 8, 9.

37 Ibid, p 9.

38 Ibid.

39 Ibid.

40 Ibid, emphasis added.

41 Ibid, p 5.

42 N Eltringham & S Van Hoyweghen, ‘Power and identity in post-genocide Rwanda’, in R Doom & J Gorus (eds), Politics of Identity and Economics of Conflict in the Great Lake Region, Brussels: VUB University Press, 2000, pp 215–242. By looking at the genocide framework, I merely focus on one—distinctive—feature of Rwanda.

43 Eltringham & Van Hoyweghen, ‘Power and identity in post-genocide Rwanda’, p 222.

44 D Beswick, ‘Managing dissent in a post-genocide environment: the challenge of political space in Rwanda’, Development and Change, 41(2), 2010, p 238.

45 Ibid, p 238.

46 Eltringham & Van Hoyweghen, ‘Power and identity in post-genocide Rwanda’, p 221.

47 Ibid, pp 215–242.

48 See Amnesty International, Safer to Stay Silent: The Chilling Effect of Rwanda's Laws on ‘Genocide Ideology’ and ‘Sectarianism’, London: Amnesty International, 2010.

49 Ibid. The comments are from the third parliamentary commission on genocide ideology and divisionism.

50 Ibid.

51 Ibid, p 34.

52 S Takeuchi, ‘Rwandan Gacaca: Its institution and implications for rural societies in Rwanda' [Ruwanda no gachacha: Sono seido to nouson shakai ni totteno imi], in S Takeuchi (ed), Between war and peace: the international society in African peace processes [Sensō to heiwa no aida: Funsō-boppatsu-go no Afurika to kokusai-shakai], Tokyo: JETRO, 2008, p 332.

53 For examples of how the genocide framework restricts dissident voices in Rwanda, see Human Rights Watch, Country Summary: Rwanda, New York: Human Rights Watch, January 2010; F Reyntjens, ‘Rwanda, ten years on: from genocide to dictatorship’, African Affairs, 103(411), 2004, pp 177–120; and ‘Rwanda opposition leader arrested for “genocide denial”’, Politics Africa, 21 April 2010.

54 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, ‘The Rwanda Diaspora Policy’, p 9.

55 Amnesty International, Safer to Stay Silent, p 22.

56 Information provided by iom mida staff, 20 October 2011.

57 Information obtained from a Rwandan official at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, 27 September 2011. See also Diaspora General Directorate, ‘Rwandan Diaspora Guide’, p 32.

58 iom, International Migration Law: Glossary on Migration, Geneva: iom 2004, p 19; and iom, Engaging Diaspora for Development: iom Policy-Oriented Research, Geneva: iom, 2008.

59 In other words, the possibility of return to the country of origin through mida is highly contingent upon various factors, including the mida selection processes and posts available for diaspora members. Information provided by iom mida staff, 20 October 2011.

60 For each phase of mida gl, iom establishes a new selection committee.

61 Information provided by iom mida staff, 13 July 2011.

62 This ‘outside’ status attached to the temporary return of diaspora is interpreted both negatively and positively. See oecd, The Contribution of Diaspora Return to Post-Conflict and Fragile Countries, pp 10–11, p 33.

63 Information obtained from former staff at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation in Rwanda, 22 June 2011.

64 F Reyntjens, ‘Constructing the truth, dealing with dissent, domesticating the world: governance in post-genocide Rwanda’, African Affairs, 110(438), 2011, p 31.

65 J Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1987.

66 S Thomson, quoted in Reyntjens, ‘Constructing the truth, dealing with dissent, domesticating the world’, p 31.

67 Eltringham & Van Hoyweghen, ‘Power and identity in post-genocide Rwanda’, p 222.

68 Reyntjens, ‘Constructing the truth, dealing with dissent, domesticating the world’, p 33.

69 L Wedeen, Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric, and Symbols in Contemporary Syria, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1999.

70 See also T Carothers, ‘The end of the transition paradigm’, Journal of Democracy 13(1), 2002, pp 5–21, and N Van de Walle, ‘Africa's range of regimes’, Journal of Democracy, 13(2), 2002, pp 66–80.