Middle Range Powers in Global Governance

Abstract

This article compares and evaluates the contributions of middle range powers to global governance initiatives. Examining participation in terms of personnel, financial and ideational contributions, we test several hypotheses derived from neorealism, critical theory, liberalism, constructivism, and post-internationalism against six cases: Canada, Japan, China, Russia, India and Brazil. We find that material power has a negative impact on contributions, while a country’s leadership’s attitude towards the international order, the length of its membership in major international organisations and the strength of its civil society all seem to have positive effects on its participation in global governance. Trade dependence, however, does not seem to exhibit the expected impact. The article indicates that multiple theoretical approaches may prove useful for evaluating the behaviour of middle range powers, and that further research should be conducted on the relative importance of each of the factors mentioned above in explaining middle range power contributions to global governance.

Notes

1 W Wohlforth, ‘The stability of a unipolar world’, International Security, 24(1), 1999, pp 5–41.

2 C Brown, ‘Do great powers have great responsibilities? Great powers and moral agency’, Global Society, 18(1), 2004, pp 5–19.

3 C Holbraad, Middle Powers in International Politics, London: Macmillan, 1984.

4 R Cox, ‘Middlepowermanship, Japan, and future world order’, International Journal, 44, 1988, pp 823–862; and A Cooper, R Higgot & K Nossal, Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order, Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1993.

5 K Waltz, ‘Structural realism after the Cold War’, International Security, 25(1), 2000, pp 5–41; and J Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, New York: Norton, 2001.

6 R Keohane, After Hegemony, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984.

7 J Rosenau, Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990; and H Hobbs, ‘Beyond Postinternationalism’, in Hobbs (ed), Pondering Postinternationalism: A Paradigm for the Twenty-first Century?, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2002.

8 H Wang & E French, ‘China’s participation in global governance from a comparative perspective’, Asia Policy, 15, 2013, pp 89–114.

9 Staff figures are taken from United Nations, ‘Gender Distribution of All Staff (P1 to USG and GS) by Nationality and Level at Headquarters, Other Established Offices and Project Posts, with Appointment of One Year or More, as at 31 December 2009’, 2010, at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/pdf/Nationalities2010/ITCILO1.pdf, accessed 2013; and ‘Gender Distribution of Staff by Nationality at the P-1 to UG Levels of the United Nations Systems, on contracts of one year or more at all locations, as at 31 December 2011’, United Nations, Office of the Secretary-General, at http://www.unwomen.org/publications/improvement-of-the-status-of-women-in-the-united-nations-system-report-of-the-secretary-general-2012/, accessed 2013.

10 Manpower figures are taken from UN, ‘Peacekeeping Statistics: Troop and Police Contributors’, 2007–11 at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml, accessed 2013.

11 Funds include contributions to the UN International Drug Control Programme (2007–08), UN Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Fund (2007–08), Global Fund to Fight aids, Tuberculosis, and Malaria (2001–12), World Health Organisation (2008–10), UN Population Fund (2007–09), undp multi-donor trust funds and joint programmes (2007–11), UN World Food Programme (2008–11), UN Environment Programme (2009–11), UN Global Environmental Facility Trust Fund (2007) UN Refugee Agency Contributions (2009), International Committee of the Red Cross (2009–11), unicef participation (2009–11), International Fund for Agricultural Development (2011), UN Development Fund for Women (2009), UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (2009–11), and the International Labour Organisation (ilo) (2006–10).

12 Integrated Civil Society Organisations (icso) System Database (ngo Branch of the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs), at http://esango.un.org/civilsociety/login.do, accessed 2012. We used this database to determine the number of ngos headquartered in each state with General, Special, and Roster consultative status with ecosoc, as well as ngos with Commission for Sustainable Development (csd) accreditation. We also used the Conference on ngos in Consultative Relationship with the UN (congo), ‘Membership List’, 2007, at http://www.ngocongo.org/congo/files/congo_membership_directory_2007.pdf, accessed 2012. ngos can apply to receive consultative status with ecosoc if they are involved in some or all the issues handled by it, meet certain standards, and are approved by the Committee of ngos and ecosoc itself. ecosoc facilitates the participation of these ngos in UN conferences, provides resources to enable them to better fulfil their objectives, and collects quadrennial reports on these ngos’ activities. congo is another forum for ngo participation in the UN. It is composed primarily of ngos with ecosoc consultative status and encourages the discussion of substantive issues related to global governance in various ngo committees. Tallying up the number of ngos from each state involved in these various forums provides a general picture of the extent of each state’s ideational commitment to global governance via civil society.

13 icso SystemDatabase. We examined the number of ngos (both with and without ecosoc consultative status) involved in each meeting of the following commissions and forums between 2007 and 2011: the Commission on Sustainable Development, the Commission for Social Development, the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, the Commission on the Status of Women, and the UN Forum on Forests. We then averaged the number of ngos from each state involved in each meeting for each issue area (sustainable development, social development, advancement of women and forest preservation). These data (as well as the data on ecosoc and congo membership) were assessed relative to state population size and gni per capita. These factors are controlled for because countries with larger populations are likely to have more ngos, while countries that are more prosperous are likely to have more capable and active ngos.

14 The division of the six countries into two groups is largely heuristic. The scores for each country represent its ranking in this group of countries. The distance between each country’s score does not measure the actual gap between its actual contributions to global governance.

15 K Waltz, Theory of International Politics, New York: McGraw Hill, 1979.

16 R Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.

17 E Jordaan, ‘The concept of a middle power in international relations: distinguishing between emerging and traditional middle powers’, Politikon, 30(1), 2003, pp 165–181.

18 I Kant, ‘Perpetual peace: a philosophical sketch’, in H. S. Reiss (ed.), Kant: Political Writings, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, pp 93–130; and J Nye & R Keohane, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1977.

19 R Cox, Approaches to World Order, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

20 M Finnemore, ‘Norms, culture, and world politics: insights from sociology’s institutionalism’, International Organization, 50(2), 1996, pp 325–347; and A Johnston, Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980–2000, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007.

21 The different types of norms (regulative, constitutive and prescriptive) are discussed in M Finnemore & L Sikkink, ‘International norm dynamics and political change’, International Organization, 52(1), 1998, pp 887–917.

22 See, for example, R Keohane, ‘International Institutions: Two Approaches’, International Studies Quarterly, 32 (4), 1988, pp 379–396.; and Johnston, Social States.

23 Rosenau, Turbulence in World Politics.

24 Wang & French, ‘China’s participation in global governance from a comparative perspective’.

25 See R Sil & P Katzenstein, ‘Analytic eclecticism in the study of world politics’, Perspectives on Politics, 8(2), 2010, pp 411–431. Sil and Katzenstein have advocated ‘analytic eclecticism’ in social science, which focuses on pragmatic and eclectic answers to key policy-relevant problems, rather than on inter-paradigmatic divisions.

26 Statements indicative of a bystander role included speakers asserting that their country needed to prioritise internal development before assisting with global governance, arguing that their country’s internal development constituted its primary contribution to global governance, referring to their country’s policy as independent or autonomous, emphasising sovereignty in opposition to global governance efforts or initiatives, welcoming a development that their country was uninvolved in, expressing hope that countries would make progress on a global governance issue while not providing assistance or getting involved, or expressing current or past hesitancy to take on a major role in global or regional governance. Statements indicative of a reformist attitude involved the speaker advocating reform or substantial change, reorganisation or improvement of a global governance institution, including the UN, unsc, G8, G20, wto, imf, World Bank, ilo , unesco, npt, unfccc, Millennium Summit, and similar conferences, institutions, regimes, or organisations.

27 We have not included data on participation in political parties because in some authoritarian countries, including China, the ruling political party is the state rather than a civic organisation.

28 R Rosencrance, A Alexandroff, W Koehler, J Kroll, S Laquer & J Stocker, ‘Whither interdependence’, International Organization, 31(3), 1977, pp 425–471.

29 Sen, cited in A Acharya, ‘Can Asia lead? Power ambitions and global governance in the twenty-first century’, International Affairs, 87(4), 2011, pp 851–869.

30 Acharya, ‘Can Asia lead?’

31 B Crosette, ‘The elephant in the room: the biggest pain in Asia today isn’t the country you’d think’, Foreign Policy, January–February 2010.