Corruption in the aftermath of war: an introduction

Abstract

‘Corruption in the aftermath of war’ brings together an interdisciplinary group of scholars to enquire into the dynamics of corruption in post-conflict societies. This introduction discusses five themes, problematising and summarising key findings from the 10 articles included. First, we discuss the problems with the corruption concept, related to its moralising connotations and definitional vagueness, and propose viewing corruption as a collective action dilemma as a way of avoiding these moralising aspects. Second, we discuss post-conflict societies, and highlight the great varieties of ‘peace’ that that label can refer to. We suggest that the causes, dynamics and effects of corruption in post-conflict societies bear many similarities with those in other societies, but that the post-conflict situation often generates an intensification and entrenchment of corruption-related problems. Third, we analyse the dynamics between international interveners and domestic actors, and show the contradictions and tensions in international–domestic relations. Fourth, we argue that the inter-linkages between inequality, mistrust and corruption deserve consideration in the study of post-conflict societies, and that inequality in particular merits more attention. Finally, we discuss some methodological challenges encountered by the contributors in their studies of corruption in post-conflict societies.

Keywords:

• corruption
• post-conflict societies
• peace building

Corruption is a serious concern for people and societies as it risks undermining state legitimacy, exacerbating inequality, generating mistrust between different social groups and making development less sustainable.¹ Such effects of corruption are particularly problematic in societies that have gone through violent conflict, and are struggling to rebuild institutions, restore social trust and recover economically. Corruption impacts and is enabled in post-conflict societies in a variety of ways. It has been argued that high levels of corruption – both among political leaders and in local administration – may threaten the legitimacy of the post-war order by hampering reconstruction efforts and fuelling grievances, and thus risk undermining reconciliation efforts. While anti-corruption measures are increasingly integrated into post-conflict programmes, war-time structures and practices of corruption often prevail. In fact, turning a blind eye to various types of corruption is sometimes seen as necessary to sustain a fragile peace, while the influx of foreign funds in support of reconstruction may further extend the opportunities for corruption. For people living in post-conflict societies both the large-scale corruption of leaders and the petty corruption that affects their everyday life tend to contribute to a sense of powerlessness which influences the way they understand and take part in social conflicts and reconciliation.²

This special issue aims to take the debate on corruption in post-conflict societies further, both conceptually and empirically. In this introduction we identify and discuss five themes which are of high relevance to the debate and to which the 10 articles in the issue speak. First, we discuss the problems with the corruption concept which are related to its moralising connotations and definitional vagueness, and suggest viewing corruption as a collective action dilemma, as a way of avoiding these moralising aspects. Second, we discuss post-conflict societies and highlight the great varieties of ‘peace’ that that label can refer to. Based on the articles here we suggest that the causes, dynamics and effects of corruption in post-conflict societies bear many similarities with those in other societies, but that the post-conflict situation often generates an intensification and entrenchment of corruption-related problems. Third, we analyse the dynamics between international interveners and domestic actors, and find that corruption remains a problem regardless of whether there is a strong international peacebuilding involvement or not. Fourth, we argue that the inter-linkages between inequality, mistrust and corruption deserve consideration in the study of post-conflict societies, and that inequality in particular has received far too little attention. Finally, we discuss some of the methodological challenges that the contributors have encountered in their studies of corruption in post-conflict societies.

The corruption concept

When putting together this special issue the first question we had to ask ourselves was whether to use the corruption concept at all. From one perspective corruption could be seen as a tool of ‘othering’ and domination, both at a global level and within countries. Brown and Cloke, for example, have suggested that there is often a paternalistic, moral undertone to the way corruption is conceptualised as an endogenous problem mainly pertaining to ‘less developed’ societies, which are then conceived of as backward in terms of political development.³ One way of avoiding a moralising approach to corruption is to conceptualise it as a collective action problem, rather than as an ethical or a principal–agent problem.⁴ The principal–agent approach remains the dominant theoretical entry point in corruption research and postulates that corruption can be restrained through ‘principals’ taking on various informational, monitoring and punishment roles in society. However, as argued by Mungiu-Pippidi, the actors which tend to be denominated as principals, and hence are assumed to be morally above corruption – eg ministries, control agencies and anti-corruption bodies – often use their discretionary powers to serve as gatekeepers for, or to be the actual perpetrators of, corruption.⁵ To Mungiu-Pippidi this insight implies that there is a need for an active and enlightened citizenry, at the grassroots level, which can play the role of principals through collective action.⁶ Rothstein takes the critique of the principal–agent approach further and argues that neither rulers nor citizens are as highly principled as assumed by the principal–agent approach.⁷ If the expectation in society is that everyone else will act corruptly, he argues, the short-term cost of not being corrupt is very high. The general reaction in such societies – ie where corruption is systemic – would be to choose corrupt alternatives over non-corrupt ones, even for people who condemn corruption. Hence, understanding corruption as a collective action problem is to understand it as a structural – rather than a moral – problem and is thus a way of avoiding the paternalistic undertone so often detected in the corruption debate.

Yet this still leaves us with the whole question of what corruption is. In her explicitly political approach to corruption, Koechlin understands it as an empty signifier, in the sense that the concept generally refers to a deficiency, a lack of a particular ‘ideal’ social order, while the kind of social order that is implied by this reference differs widely.⁸ Furthermore, different actors’ views of such an ‘ideal’ social order may in fact be incommensurable. A pertinent question is thus whether there is a universal understanding of what the practice of corruption is about. Many researchers would rather suggest that we should look for particular understandings of corruption in different contexts.⁹ For example, conventional notions of corruption are often construed around the existence of a clear and rather unproblematic distinction between public and private social spheres. However, many researchers question the universality of such clear-cut distinctions, and see these rather as a result of Eurocentrism. Olivier de Sardan writes about how corruption in Africa is socially embedded in logics such as gift giving, solidarity, negotiation, and so on.¹⁰ As such, he argues, social mechanisms of corruption, as well as the related processes of legitimation, must be seen from the actors’ point of view and be anchored in their everyday practices, rather than being condemned with reference to any supposedly universal moral standard. Olivier de Sardan emphasises that his position is not to be confused with an essentialist view of traditional African cultures, but rather that logics of corruption and the blurring of roles between different social spheres is the result of different overlays from pre-colonial, colonial and postcolonial eras.¹¹

Adopting a more universalist position, Rothstein proposes a way around the dilemma of corruption being an empty signifier.¹² He argues that conventional definitions of corruption – eg as the abuse of public trust for private gain – are severely constrained by the lack of specification as to what it is that is actually abused. In this sense he would agree that corruption can be an empty signifier. In contrast to Koechlin, however, Rothstein makes the argument that there is a universally agreed – or at least very widely shared – norm of what should govern behaviour in the public sphere, and that this norm is the one of impartiality.¹³ Different societies have different delimitations of what are to be regarded as public and private spheres but the idea that the public sphere should be governed impartially is rarely questioned.¹⁴

We have decided to use the corruption concept in this issue, and in many of the articles, despite the many flaws of the concept. We do this because corruption has become such an important part of public discourse; it is central to many people’s ways of understanding society, and the concept is also prominent in policy making at various levels. The contributions to the issue share a critical engagement with the corruption concept and show a spectrum of different positions in relation to corruption and its definition. Both Smith and Orjuela, for example, illustrate how discourses and practices of corruption are intertwined with the construction and contestations of identity.¹⁵ Funaki and Glencorse criticise existing anti-corruption efforts in Liberia for being based on faulty assumptions about Liberian social relations and public perceptions, and propose an alternative accountability framework as a better way of practically addressing issues which are now framed as corruption.¹⁶ Erikson Baaz and Verweijen, finally, illustrate with their case about military–civilian relations in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), how the logics of these practices – as well as public perceptions of them – cannot be properly understood if we do not situate them in institutionalised forms of sociability.¹⁷

‘Post-conflict’ situations

This special issue focuses on corruption in what are often referred to as post-conflict societies. The ‘post-conflict’ label has come to be widely used both in academic and policy circles to name societies which have gone through violent conflict. The growing popularity of the concept comes in the wake of an increased international interest in the rebuilding of war-affected societies. In fact, what can be described as a ‘global peacebuilding industry’ has emerged, consisting of UN agencies, international ngos (ingos) and government institutions engaging in a range of activities aiming to prevent further outbreaks of violence and promote sustainable peace in war-torn areas.¹⁸ The ‘post-conflict package’ includes a number of measures, such as disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of combatants, demining, reconstruction of infrastructure, economic reforms and recovery, return of refugees, organisation of democratic elections, transitional justice processes, the protection of human rights and the establishment of legitimate state institutions.¹⁹

‘Post-conflict’, however, is a seriously misleading term. Although a war may have ended, conflict certainly persists in so-called post-conflict settings. Moreover, new conflicts emerge, while different forms of violence may also continue. In fact, a strong focus on the ‘post-conflict’ situation as a distinct period risks obscuring the continuity between pre-war, war and post-war conflicts in societies. It is important, in our view, to see conflict and post-conflict phases as different manifestations of ongoing struggles over power, identity and resources. In addition to this, we would like to highlight the problem of using ‘conflict’ in the singular in the study of post-conflict settings, as this may give the false impression that there is one single conflict in a society that has experienced war. A closer contextual understanding, on the contrary – as is obvious from some of the articles in this issue – reveals that there is a multiplicity of conflicting interests and actors which need to be understood in order to more fully grasp the ‘post-conflict’ condition.

When, in spite of its shortcomings, we use the term ‘post-conflict societies’ in this special issue we do so because we want to contribute to the policy and academic debate about the challenges faced by societies after war – not because we believe that there are no longer any conflict(s) in such societies. We broadly understand post-conflict societies as societies which have reached some type of peace after armed conflict and/or as societies labelled ‘post-conflict’ by international actors engaging in post-conflict peace building.

It must be noted, however, that there is a huge diversity in the types of ‘peace’ that we find in post-conflict societies. The armed conflict may have ended through a military victory by one side, through a negotiated peace agreement, or less distinctly in a stalemate. Armed conflict may even still be continuing, even though ‘the international community’ has embarked on a mission of ‘post-conflict peace building’, as was the case in Afghanistan after 2001 and in Iraq after 2003. When considering what peace means in post-conflict settings, Kristine Höglund and Mimmi Söderberg Kovacs’s discussion of the variations of peace after peace settlements is highly enlightening.²⁰ The authors show that the way conflict issues have been dealt with (or not) may result in different types of peace: unresolved peace, where an agreement has not solved the core problems; restored peace, where grievances remain even though core problems are dealt with; and contested peace where new conflicts emerge from the peace agreement. The behaviours of the parties may also differ, leading to further different types of peace: partial peace, where one or more actors continue using arms to pursue their goals; regional peace, where fighting continues in certain geographical areas; and insecure peace, where violent crimes increase after the end of the war and the population continues to be insecure. Moreover, the different attitudes of conflict actors may result in yet other types of peace: polarised peace, where the polarisation of the conflict remains; unjust peace, where there is continued impunity and no reconciliation; and fearful peace, where peace is upheld by a ruler who controls through fear.²¹ This enormous diversity of situations is often lumped together under the concept of ‘peace’ or ‘post-conflict’. From Höglund and Söderberg Kovacs’ systematisation of different types of peace it is also obvious that the lines between war and peace are often blurred, and that there is often a continuity of conflict patterns across the (somewhat artificial) divide between war and post-war periods.²²

The empirical cases discussed in the issue – Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cambodia, the DRC, Kosovo, Liberia, Nigeria, Sri Lanka and Uganda – offer an opportunity to understand different post-conflict situations. We have cases of a victor’s peace, where government forces defeated separatist rebellions in Nigeria in 1970 and in Sri Lanka in 2009. Negotiated settlements were reached in Cambodia in 1991, Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995, Kosovo in 1999, the DRC in 2003, Liberia in 2003 and Uganda in 2008, but under very different conditions and with varied outcomes. In Kosovo an agreement was negotiated between nato and Serbia and enforced by nato military intervention. Bosnia-Herzegovina, Liberia and Cambodia also reached peace agreements through strong international involvement and pressure. In the DRC the peace agreement signed between the government and rebel groups was followed by continued fighting. These cases provide ample examples of how peace can be unresolved, contested, partial, insecure, polarised, unjust and fearful. They also display the multiplicity of conflicts in each society. In the Ugandan case the end of the war between the government and the Lord’s Resistance Army did not mean an end to the longstanding conflicts and grievances along geographical (north–south) lines. In the DRC multiple armed groups continued their struggles, while conflicts and violence are intimately connected to regional conflict dynamics. In the Nigerian case the civil war over Biafra ended decades ago, while new violent conflicts have emerged along religious and other lines more recently. The ‘post-conflict’ conditions in the cases investigated in this issue are varied and are also tied up with other conditions, as the societies in question may also, for instance, be ‘post-socialist’ or ‘postcolonial’.

Corruption and ‘post-conflict’ situations

One question we have struggled with when putting together this issue is whether, to what extent and how post-conflict societies are affected by corruption in different ways than are other societies. Based on the articles presented here, we suggest that the causes, dynamics and effects of corruption in post-conflict societies are in many ways similar to those in other societies. However, in post-conflict situations we often see an intensification and entrenchment of the corruption-related problems. This is linked both to the war experience and to post-conflict reconstruction efforts.

Although all societies experience conflicts, those who have gone through war face particular challenges related to issues such as the experiences of abuses and violence by the population, social divides, mistrust and enemy images fostered during conflict escalation and war, a militarisation of society, displacement, physical destruction, a culture of fear, and lack of freedom of association and expression.²³ So-called post-conflict societies are also often subject to an international response modelled around the idea of ‘the liberal peace’, and accompanied by an influx of (sometimes substantial) funds for reconstruction. The post-war situation is a period full of tensions, dilemmas and conflicting interests.²⁴ On the one hand, outside assistance can be seen as essential to rebuild society, while, on the other hand, it can undermine the capacity and independence of war-affected societies. Short-term efforts to end violence and prevent renewed fighting may conflict with long-term goals of building a peace which has addressed the root causes of conflict. In the same way short-term priorities related to stability may necessitate the acceptance of impunity and the inclusion of unscrupulous actors in power-sharing arrangements. Building a justice system and police which are impartial is crucial for the legitimacy of the post-conflict order, but often challenges the interests of powerful actors. Moreover, there may be a tension between the peacebuilding package promoting a free market economy and democracy and the risk of a relapse into violence through disruptive privatisation procedures and competitive electoral processes.²⁵ In the negotiation and implementation of peace agreements cessation of violence may have to be traded for political opportunities or economic advantage. In the post-conflict situation conflicts prevail and surface in connection with these dilemmas, but are (mostly) dealt with by other means than direct violence. These tensions and dilemmas are also relevant in understanding the problem of corruption and attempts to combat it in post-conflict societies.

Le Billon’s article on extractive sectors in post-conflict societies highlights one such dilemma, as it shows how, after the end of a war, opportunities open up in resource-rich countries for extraction of sought-after natural resources, something that may improve the economy and enable peace building in the country.²⁶ At the same time, however, the extractive sector is one with a high risk of corruption and rent-seeking in its various stages, which risks further entrenching conflict divides, grievances and weak state legitimacy. The case of Bosnia-Herzegovina illustrates well how the priority given to stability in peacebuilding interventions has contributed to undermining good governance by granting power to corrupt leaders.²⁷ In Cambodia corrupt allocation of forest and mineral extraction opportunities were used by the national leadership to end the conflict with the Khmer Rouge.²⁸ The experience of international interveners as tolerant of corruption in the name of stability is, however, not unambiguous, as in many cases the tolerance of some corruption is combined with measures imposed to fight (other types of) corruption. Dilemmas related to a continued strong role of the military are discussed in Eriksson Baaz and Verweijen’s article on the DRC. They show how the military involves itself in civilian affairs (in this case dispute processing) as a way to wield power and extract resources – an involvement which in some cases contributes to escalated violence as violence becomes an acceptable dispute management mechanism and as civilians seek help from different armed groups in the volatile ‘post-conflict’ situation.²⁹ Several of our articles analyse the ways in which corruption in post-conflict situations can deepen grievances along ethnic lines and increase the stakes involved in ethnic competition. In this way corruption and patronage may undermine reconciliation efforts, as old perceptions of ‘the corrupt other’ are entrenched and new corruption-related grievances are added.³⁰ We see from some of our cases, for instance Cambodia and Sri Lanka, that mistrust and lack of state legitimacy are often both a cause and a consequence of violent conflict.³¹ When this is the case, the proliferation of corruption in the post-conflict phase risks undermining peacebuilding efforts. This is also seen in the study of local business actors in northern Uganda, who see grand corruption as fuelling conflict-related grievances.³² The effects of corruption are amplified by the often large influx of resources meant for reconstruction to societies with weak accountability structures.³³

Despite the continuity between war and post-war conflicts, the transition from war to peace is seen as offering opportunities to drastically remake and rebuild institutions. The understanding of corruption as a collective action dilemma, discussed above, implies that strategies to fight corruption need to be quite drastic in order to break the expectations of corruption. War-to-peace transitions can offer opportunities for this.³⁴ At the same time impartiality is particularly difficult to achieve in conflict-affected societies as a result of entrenched social divides, experiences of war, a climate of fear and the unbroken power of unscrupulous and sometimes armed actors.

International–domestic dynamics

The building of a ‘new’ and better – prosperous, democratic and peaceful – post-conflict society has been closely tied to global discourses of liberal peace building, where the ‘good’ society is to be built through international intervention. However, the uncritical interventionist approach which has often dominated the thinking of international actors, as well as of many researchers, has recently been challenged by a ‘local turn in peace building’ and an emerging critical scrutiny of the interface between international and local actors.³⁵ The focus has to some extent shifted towards everyday experiences of peace in post-conflict societies and the friction that arises between international actors and various actors and interests domestically.³⁶ It has been recognised that the liberal peace and its associated strategies are reinterpreted, negotiated, adapted or resisted in post-conflict societies, and that these processes of contestation may lead to a number of hybrid outcomes.³⁷ The power politics involved in peacebuilding interventions have also been emphasised. In fact, post-conflict peace building ‘may become a convenient smoke-screen, used to justify the institutional mandate of international agencies or to defend a security agenda’.³⁸ The fact that strong powers intervene in relatively weak states, often with a variety of motives, leads to a number of inconsistences and double standards, which relate both to peacebuilding interventions in general and to post-conflict anti-corruption interventions more precisely.

Several problems related to this are apparent in the contributions to this special issue. The authors observe that, while many international actors are eager to prescribe policies to deal with corruption, at the same time they often signal a tolerance of it. A nice facade is, it seems, often more important for intervening powers than a real end to corruption.³⁹ The fact that international interveners are not always non-corrupt and impartial themselves is an additional serious problem for their credibility. The contradictions inherent in interventions in post-conflict countries often manifest themselves in incoherent policies. For example, economic liberalisation with quick privatisation can undermine the good governance and anti-corruption agenda, as can be seen in the cases of Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina.⁴⁰ Moreover, a problem in anti-corruption interventions is the lack of understanding that international actors often have of the local context – this includes the corruption definitions and priorities of the local population – as Funaki and Glencorse draw our attention to when analysing the case of Liberia.⁴¹ International anti-corruption interventions are often reinvented and made use of in domestic power struggles, as is evident in the politicisation of anti-corruption efforts, which are used to discredit and undermine opponents.⁴²

The relations between international interveners and domestic actors look very different in the different cases we investigate here. For example, post-conflict Nigeria in the 1970s looked radically different from post-conflict Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Cambodia or Liberia in the 1990s. Nigeria is one of the largest and richest countries in Africa and the end of the Biafra secessionist war in 1970 came long before the emergence of a global peacebuilding agenda. Hence international post-conflict interventionism was minimal. Peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Cambodia and Liberia, on the contrary, involved massive international engagement, including interim structures of governance. The experience of Sri Lanka brings in one further aspect of international–domestic dynamics, as this is a case where Asian donors and allies, most importantly China, are hugely influential, while the importance of Western actors has shrunk.⁴³

In such different settings the possibilities for international actors (the UN, donor governments, ingos etc) to encourage good governance and take action against corruption are very different. However, it is clear that a strong international presence has not necessarily meant more substantial achievements in fighting corruption. Corruption remains a significant problem in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and Cambodia, and is to some extent even fuelled by international actors or by initiatives to resist international actors.⁴⁴ This is linked to the contradictory policies and double standards discussed above. The case of Sri Lanka, for its part, shows that an increased role for Asian powers can lead to a decreased focus (both rhetorically and practically) on anti-corruption and (possibly) a preference for large corruption-friendly reconstruction projects and an increased tolerance of corruption.⁴⁵ Consequently, while corruption is a serious problem in all post-conflict settings under study, it may take different shapes and be politicised in different ways depending on the power dynamics of international–domestic post-conflict relations.

The inequality–mistrust–corruption trap

(Re)building trust is a central concern for post-conflict peace building, when it comes to both trust in institutions and trust across social divides. The fear, hatred, prejudices, impunity and experiences of violence that characterise post-conflict societies risk undermining the peace. Therefore, post-conflict peacebuilding efforts seek to build trust and bridge divides through economic development, transitional justice processes and the rebuilding of efficient state institutions, among other measures. There is a well developed academic literature which deals with corruption and trust, often using a quantitative approach.⁴⁶ However, research on post-conflict societies and corruption has so far not to any great extent taken this literature into consideration. One contribution this special issue wishes to make is to bring the findings about an inequality–mistrust–corruption trap into the debate about corruption in war-affected societies. According to Eric Uslaner and Bo Rothstein, inequality, trust and corruption are closely interlinked, since they reinforce each other and cause societies to get trapped in vicious circles that are difficult to break.⁴⁷ The roots of corruption, they argue, are to be found in economic inequality and low trust in people ‘who are different from yourself’. Corruption, in turn, leads to less trust and more inequality.⁴⁸ A transition from war to peace, with the often drastic social and political changes it involves, can open up opportunities to break the inequality–mistrust–corruption trap. However, it also entails risks of deepening it.

Many of the articles in this issue engage with, and highlight the importance of, questions of trust and inequality as they discuss corruption in post-conflict contexts. One distinction of importance here is the difference between generalised and particularised trust. Generalised trust (ie trust in people in general) is, according to Uslaner, negatively affected by corruption, while corruption tends to increase particularised trust (trust in your own group), creating deeper divides between ‘us’ and ‘them’.⁴⁹ It is particularly important to be attentive to such processes in societies which have gone through large-scale violence, with the polarisation it entails. It is relevant in this regard to analyse what divides there are in a post-conflict society, and how corruption enforces or transcends those divides. In the Sri Lankan case ethnic divides continue to be deep after the war. Perceptions of corruption and of ethnically based marginalisation in a corrupt political system further deepen those divides.⁵⁰ A similar dynamic can be found in Nigeria, where an Igbo sense of marginalisation is closely related to the corrupt rule of other ethnic groups. However, the Nigerian case also shows how corruption complaints can also be directed towards one’s own group.⁵¹ Cambodia, on the other hand, offers a case study where society is not polarised along ethnic lines, but where corruption instead may be seen to deepen class divides.⁵² What is clear is that, to understand corruption in post-conflict societies, we need to ask questions about who – in terms of class, ethnicity and gender – benefits and loses from corruption. Several of the papers point to the potentially divisive effects of corruption or perceptions of corruption. Politicisation of and mobilisation around issues of corruption could in such circumstances deepen conflicts. However, there are also examples of how certain types of corruption can be seen as a shared problem that cuts across conflict divides, as seen in the Ugandan case.⁵³

Another important question of relevance is what kind of corruption has most effects on trust. In some cases people on the ground in these societies distinguish between ‘need corruption’ and ‘greed corruption’, recognising the necessity in certain contexts to engage in corrupt behaviours.⁵⁴ Another important distinction can be made between grand and petty corruption. Uslaner argues that grand corruption is most detrimental to social trust, something which is supported by our case study of Uganda.⁵⁵ On the other hand, the Sri Lankan experience suggests that petty corruption does indeed have a major effect on trust in day-to-day interactions.⁵⁶

Lastly, the academic debates and practical measures on post-conflict peace building have predominantly focused on trust and corruption but paid much less attention to the third component in the trap – inequality. While it is recognised that inequalities are often a root cause behind violent conflicts, measures against inequality do not have a natural place in the post-conflict peacebuilding tool-kit. Indeed, market liberalisation is often prioritised over a levelling out of economic inequality. A study of seven post-conflict countries has shown that improvements in equality achieved in some societies tended to be offset and rendered ineffective by new forms of group inequalities which follow from neoliberal reforms and global economic integration.⁵⁷ Given the interrelations between inequality, mistrust and corruption, post-conflict peace building needs to involve a fight against inequality, as Le Billon argues in relation to the extractive sectors in post-conflict societies. As seen in some of our articles, the way in which corruption is often politicised – as something bad when done by the ethnic ‘other’ and something that may be necessary for one’s own group to engage in in a highly competitive environment – conceals the class dimensions of corruption.⁵⁸ It is clear that inequality needs more attention in both policy and research related to post-conflict peace building, both in its own right and because it makes up an important link between corruption and conflict.

Methodological issues

The study of corruption in post-conflict societies entails great methodological challenges. Some of these challenges relate to how corruption is conceptualised. Corruption is closely interlinked with issues such as reciprocity, networks and power relations, and can therefore not easily be disentangled from them. At the same time conventional definitions of the concept often encompass many different practices that may have different logics and remedies, for instance nepotism, favouritism, bribes, embezzlement, fraud etc.⁵⁹ Corruption may also be understood differently in different contexts, something which adds further complexity to research and also means that a shared conceptualisation of corruption as impartiality could be seen as valuable also from a methodological perspective.

Given the sensitivity of the corruption issue, particularly in post-conflict societies, it is difficult to find out about and verify ‘real’ practices, and studies of corruption are hence often based on people’s perceptions. There are of course risks in taking such a focus on perceptions, since these are always open to contestation. A major such risk relates to how corruption may be linked to processes of ‘othering’ and the tendency for human beings to attribute fault to others rather than the self, ie to identify corruption as an attribute of ‘others’. This has implications for what is perceived as ‘corruption’ and what is not, but also for the ways in which particular stories around corruption cases are retold. This is something which researchers of corruption need to acknowledge if they want to say something about ‘real’ practices of corruption. However, as suggested by many of the contributors to this issue, an equally important object of study are corruption allegations as strategies of othering and political mobilisation, given how perceptions and stories of corruption may be linked to grievances and social unrest. Another important methodological issue relates to the security issues involved in studying such a sensitive topic as corruption, and on top of this doing it in conflict-affected societies. Such research may put both researchers and respondents at risk; several of the contributors emphasise the importance of trust and established networks for building rapport with respondents. Equally important is publishing the findings in ways that do not endanger the well-being of the respondents.

The contributions to this special issue represent a diversity of methodological approaches. Three of the papers are more general and conceptual (Orjuela, Rothstein, Le Billon), with the latter two explicitly opening the way to quantitative research endeavours. The rest of the papers are based on in-depth understandings of local contexts (Eriksson Baaz and Verweijen, Nystrand, Smith, Biddulph, Belloni and Strazzari, Funaki and Glencorse, and Lindberg and Herath). We do not see these different approaches as conflicting, as they mainly focus on different aspects of corruption dilemmas in post-conflict societies. As a complement to large-scale and comparative research endeavours we believe that local dynamics need to be taken seriously, and many of the articles bring out the experiences and perceptions of people on the ground in post-conflict societies – whether these concern land conflicts, military–civilian relations, identity politics or entrenched structures of patronage. By providing much space for local dynamics we wish to shift the focus of the debate from external intervention and actors to local contexts. The contributors to this special issue have taken on the methodological and conceptual challenges discussed here, representing different ways of handling them. Although the conclusions we are able to draw about corruption in post-conflict societies are not unequivocal, they point to the need for further problematisation and discussion.

Notes on Contributors

Jonas Lindberg is Associate Professor in Human Geography, Department of Economy and Society, University of Gothenburg. His key publications have concerned issues relating to education, development and rural livelihoods, mainly with Sri Lanka as an empirical case. Apart from the focus on corruption in post-conflict societies, he is currently involved in a research project attempting to understand the politics of the ‘new aid architecture’, with empirical focus on aid to the education sector in Rwanda.

Camilla Orjuela is Associate Professor at the School of Global Studies, University of Gothenburg. Her research has focused on civil society and peace building, post-conflict reconstruction and reconciliation, diaspora politics, and corruption. She has extensive experience of research in Sri Lanka. She is the author of The Identity Politics of Peacebuilding: Civil Society in War-torn Sri Lanka (2008) and has also published articles in journals such as the Journal of Peace Research, Security Dialogue, Peacebuilding, Global Governance and Critical Asian Studies.

Acknowledgements

The authors wish to thank the participants in the workshop ‘Corruption in post-conflict societies’ in Gothenburg, Sweden, October 2013, for their input to this introduction, and are also grateful for research funding provided by the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida).

Notes

1. undp, Tackling Corruption, Transforming Lives; and Rose-Ackerman, “Corruption and Government.”

2. Cheng and Zaum, Corruption and Post-conflict Peacebuilding; Rotberg, Corruption, Global Security, and World Order; and Pugh et al., Whose Peace?

3. Brown and Cloke, “Neoliberal Reform, Governance and Corruption.”

4. Cf. Rothstein, this issue; Persson et al., “Why Anti-corruption Reforms Fail”; and Marquette, “‘Finding God’ or ‘Moral Disengagement’?”

5. Mungiu-Pippidi, “Controlling Corruption through Collective Action.”

6. Ibid.

7. Rothstein, this issue.

8. Koechlin, “Corruption as an Empty Signifier.”

9. See, for example, Gupta, “Blurred Boundaries”; and Olivier de Sardan, “A Moral Economy of Corruption.”

10. Olivier de Sardan, “A Moral Economy of Corruption.”

11. Ibid.

12. Rothstein, this issue.

13. Ibid.

14. See also Torsello and Rothstein, “Bribery in Pre-industrial Societies.”

15. Smith, and Orjuela, this issue.

16. Funaki and Glencorse, this issue.

17. Erikson Baaz and Verweijen, this issue. See also Olivier de Sardan, “A Moral Economy of Corruption.”

18. Eastmond, “Introduction.”

19. Berdal and Zaum, Political Economy of Statebuilding; Paris, At War’s End; and Chetail, “Introduction.”

20. Höglund and Söderberg Kovacs, “Beyond the Absence of War.”

21. Ibid.

22. Cf. Richards, No Peace, No War.

23. Paris, At War’s End.

24. Cf. Ramsbotham et al., Contemporary Conflict Resolution, 214.

25. See Paris, At War’s End.

26. Le Billon, this issue.

27. Belloni and Strazzari, this issue.

28. Biddulph, this issue.

29. Erikson Baaz and Verweijen, this issue.

30. See Lindberg and Herath, Smith, and Orjuela, this issue.

31. Biddulph, and Lindberg and Herath, this issue.

32. Nystrand, this issue.

33. See also Cheng & Zaum, Corruption and Post-conflict Peacebuilding; and Rose-Ackerman, “Corruption and Government.”

34. Rothstein, this issue

35. Richmond, “Resistance and the Post-liberal Peace”; and Mac Ginty, International Peacekeeping and Local Resistance.

36. Björkdahl and Höglund, “Precarious Peacebuilding”; and Millar et al., Peacebuilding Plans and Local Reconfigurations.”

37. Mac Ginty, International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance; and Belloni, “Hybrid Peace Governance.”

38. Chetail, “Introduction,” 25.

39. Belloni and Strazzari, this issue.

40. Ibid.

41. Funaki and Glencorse, this issue.

42. See Orjuela, this issue.

43. Lindberg and Orjuela, “Corruption and Conflict.”

44. Belloni and Strazzari, and Biddulph, this issue.

45. tisl, Sri Lanka Governance Report.

46. See Rothstein and Uslaner, “All for All”; Uslaner, Corruption, Inequality and the Rule of Law; and Rothstein, The Quality of Government.

47. Rothstein and Uslaner, “All for All”; and Uslaner, Corruption, Inequality and the Rule of Law.

48. Uslaner, Corruption, Inequality and the Rule of Law, 4.

49. Uslaner, Corruption, Inequality and the Rule of Law.

50. Lindberg and Herath, this issue.

51. Smith, this issue.

52. Biddulph, this issue.

53. Nystrand, this issue.

54. Cf. Smith, A Culture of Corruption.

55. Nystrand, this issue.

56. Lindberg and Herath, this issue.

57. Langer et al., Horizontal Inequalities and Post-conflict Development.

58. Smith, and Orjuela, this issue.

59. See Cheng and Zaum, Corruption and Post-conflict Peacebuilding.