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Abstract
The International Crisis Group (icg) has the motto ‘working to prevent conflict worldwide’. As an organisation the icg occupies a very specific niche role, which is related to crises of a political nature, specifically armed conflict. While the icg employs a negative understanding of crisis, the academic definition of what a crisis may constitute is broader, as it can actually represent an opportunity for some actors. This article, written from a communication studies perspective, seeks to address how crises are manufactured in icg texts. It argues that the way in which crisis events are viewed and reacted to depends on the level of information and ‘knowledge’ that is produced and circulating about them. The article tackles the issue of the strategic level of the icg in terms of its means and mechanisms of attempting to project influence. It explores the different ploys and strategies used to influence policy makers, especially its communication strategy, the different values and ethics that are highlighted, and the ‘causes’ that are promoted.
Notes
1. Although no direct military intervention has taken place in Syria, there is still indirect intervention – the supplying of arms, intelligence, cash, logistics and training for example.
2. Bernays, “The Engineering of Consent.”
3. Finnish Prime Minister’s Office, Government Communications, 7.
4. Coombs and Holladay, pr Strategy and Application, 238.
5. Ibid.
6. Stern, Crisis Decision-making, 8.
7. See Porfiriev and Simons, Crises in Russia.
8. Feldman and March, “Information in Organisations,” 171.
9. Buck, The Role of Psychological Factors.
10. sema, Crisis Communication Handbook, 11.
11. Ogrizek and Guillery, Communicating in Crisis, xi.
12. Darrock, “Knowledge Management,” 111.
13. Harrison, Disasters and the Media, 106.
14. Berry et al., Media Interaction with the Public, 55–58.
15. Coombs, Applied Crisis Communication, 7.
16. Caton et al., Information as Power, 65.
17. Stern, Crisis Decision-making.
18. Simons, “Understanding Political and Intangible Elements.”
19. Svedin, Ethics and Crisis Management.
20. DeFranco, Media Power and the Transformation of War, 170.
21. Calhoun, War and Delusion, 147.
22. Carruthers, The Media at War.
23. Simons, “Understanding Political and Intangible Elements.”
24. Simons, “Selling Conflict in the 21st Century.”
25. Carruthers, The Media at War.
26. Feldman and March, “Information in Organisations,” 172.
27. Desouza and Vanapalli, “Securing Knowledge in Organisations,” 85.
28. In this context, knowledge is understood as being the active processing and use of information and data.
29. Koraeus, Who Knows?, 33.
30. cb3 Communications, Selling the Big Issue.
31. Feldman and March, “Information in Organisations,” 177.
32. Ibid., 177–178.
33. Cf. also Bliesemann de Guevara’s introduction to this issue.
34. Blumer and Kavanagh, “The Third Age of Political Communication,” 211.
35. Perloff, The Dynamics of Persuasion, 11.
36. Ibid., 12.
37. Ibid. This definition is largely in line with the definition offered by Jowett and O’Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion.
38. Perloff, The Dynamics of Persuasion, 12–15.
39. Ibid., 24–25; and Jowett and O’Donnell, Propaganda and Persuasion, 33–34.
40. Weaver, “The Changing World of Think Tanks,” 564.
41. Weidenbaum, The Competition of Ideas.
42. Weaver, “The Changing World of Think Tanks,” 567.
43. Abelson, Capitol Idea.
44. Weaver, “The Changing World of Think Tanks,” 568–569.
45. Cf. also Bliesemann de Guevara’s introduction to this issue.
46. The reports were: International Crisis Group, Holding Libya Together: Security Challenges After Qadhafi; Women and Conflict in Afghanistan; Sri Lanka’s Potemkin Peace: Democracy Under Fire; Fire on the City Gate: Why China Keeps North Korea Close; Anything But Politics: The State of Syria’s Political Opposition; and Mali: Reform or Relapse?
47. icg, The Pogroms in Kyrgyzstan.
48. Ibid., 28.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid., 29.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid., 27.
53. icg, Afghanistan: Exit Versus Engagement; Georgia: Making Cohabitation Work; Eastern Congo: The adf-nalu’s Lost Rebellion; Somalia: Puntland’s Punted Polls; Marching in Circles: Egypt’s Dangerous Second Transition; Not a Rubber Stamp: Myanmar’s [Burma] Legislature in a Time of Transition; and Armenia and Azerbaijan: A Season of Risks.
54. The CrisisWatch bulletins analysed were: no. 90, February 1, 2011; no. 94, June 1, 2011; no. 100, November 1, 2011; no. 101, January 1, 2012; no. 106, June 1, 2012; no. 113, December 30, 2012; no. 114, February 1, 2013; no. 118, June 1, 2013; no. 124, December 1, 2013; and no. 125, January 2, 2014.
55. Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, French Intervention in Mali.
56. See Myers and Shane, “Risks of Syrian Intervention.”
57. Ahmed and Norris, “A ‘Moderation’ of Freedom.”
58. Ahmed, “Don’t Sacrifice Afghan Women.”
59. Smith et al., Prospects for Afghanistan in 2014.
60. Lobe, “Realists Rule?”
61. Sokirianskaia, “Winter Games, Caucasian Misery.”
62. Simons, Mass Media and Modern Warfare.
63. Arbour, “The List.”
64. See McGann, 2012 Global Go To Think Tanks Report and Policy Advice.
65. For more detail, see Bliesemann de Guevara’s introduction to this issue.