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Abstract
This article explores the relationship between the International Crisis Group’s (icg) interpretation of the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone and the main academic ‘greed and grievance’ debate at the time. It shows that the icg’s early policy recommendations were basically in line with the interpretation of these wars as caused by ‘opportunistic warlordism’. However, this supposed causal link is less evident in the analytical parts of its early reports, and in the policy recommendations of later reports. These contradictory findings point to both internal developments within the icg and to its ‘two faces’: it seeks to influence policy makers using detailed empirical analysis on the ground in countries in conflict or transition, but is also aware that policy makers do not generally read long reports, thus it produces executive summary and policy recommendations for this target audience. The article argues that policy recommendations cannot work without the analytical parts of the reports: the analysis sections’ main function is to add legitimacy to policy recommendations and the organisation overall, contributing to its image as a genuine ‘on-the-ground producer’ of crisis knowledge and fostering its expert authority.
Acknowledgements
The comments from the editor of this special issue, Berit Bliesemann de Guevara, and from the two anonymous reviewers were highly appreciated. The author would also like to thank the former icg staff members who shared their views about the work of the organisation.
Notes
1. See Kaplan, “The Coming Anarchy”; and Kaldor, New and Old Wars.
2. Fukuyama, The End of History.
3. Cf. Bliesemann de Guevara’s introduction to this issue.
4. Cf. Bøås and McNeill, Global Institutions and Development.
5. See all International Crisis Group publications between 2001 and 2005 listed in the bibliography.
6. Ibid.
7. Bøås, “Making Plans for Liberia.”
8. Ibid.
9. icg, Sierra Leone: Managing Uncertainty, 2.
10. Collier, Economic Causes of Civil Conflict; and Abdullah, “Bushpath to Destruction.”
11. Bøås, “Making Plans for Liberia.”
12. icg, Fifteen Years on the Frontlines, 6.
13. See icg, Liberia: The Key; and icg, Liberia Unravelling.
14. Bøås and Hatløy, “Getting In, Getting Out.”
15. See Brown, “Politics as Ritual”; Bøås and Dunn, “African Guerrilla Politics”; Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy; Hoffman, The War Machines; Huband, The Liberian Civil War; Liebenow, Liberia: The Quest; Liebenow, Liberia: The Dissolution; Liebenow, Liberia: The Evolution; Reno, Warlord Politics; Reno, “Liberia”; Sawyer, Beyond Plunder; and Utas, “Malignant Organisms.”
16. Bøås, “The Liberian Civil War.”
17. Bøås and Utas, “The Political Landscape.”
18. icg, Sierra Leone: Managing Uncertainty.
19. Global Witness, Making it Work.
20. Hirsch, Diamonds; Global Witness, Making it Work.
21. Collier, Economic Causes of Civil Conflict; Smilie et al., The Heart of the Matter; and Abdullah, “Bushpath to Destruction.”
22. Richards, “Green Book Millenarians?”
23. See, for example, Collier, Economic Causes of Civil Conflict; and Berdal and Malone, Greed and Grievance.
24. Bøås and Dunn, “African Guerrilla Politics.”
25. Examples include the UN Panel of Experts on Liberia (e.g. UN, Report of the Panel) and the various civil society campaigns on ‘blood diamonds’ (e.g. the Fatal Attractions newsletter published at www.niza.nl).
26. icg, Sierra Leone: Managing Uncertainty; and icg, Liberia Unravelling.
27. Meisenberg, “The Final Judgement.”
28. icg, Tackling Liberia.
29. Collier, Economic Causes of Civil Conflict; Berdal and Malone, Greed and Grievance; and Klare, Resource Wars.
30. Reno, Corruption and State Politics; Richards, Fighting for the Rain Forest; Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy; Utas, Sweet Battlefields; Keen, Conflict and Collusion; Bøås, “Liberia and Sierra Leone”; and Bøås, “The Liberian Civil War.”
31. Kaldor, New and Old Wars.
32. See, for example, Kaplan, “The Coming Anarchy”; Richards, Fighting for the Rain Forest; Richards, “New War”; Abdullah, “Bushpath to Destruction”; Bøås, “Liberia and Sierra Leone”; and Fithen and Richards, “Making War, Crafting Peace.”
33. Abdullah, “Bushpath to Destruction,” 207–208.
34. icg, Liberia Unravelling.
35. icg, Sierra Leone: Managing Uncertainty; icg, Sierra Leone: Time; icg, Liberia: The Key; and icg, Liberia Unravelling.
36. Huband, The Liberian Civil War.
37. See icg, Sierra Leone: Managing Uncertainty, which also argues that this is a much-heard comment about Taylor. It is quite hard, however, to find any source for this other than the icg itself.
38. Ibid., ii.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
41. Sesay, “La Gouvernance sans Etat.”
42. Richards, Fighting for the Rain Forest; Richards, “Green Book Millenarians?”; and Richards, “New War.”
43. Bøås and Hatløy, “Getting In, Getting Out.”
44. icg, Sierra Leone: Managing Uncertainty; icg, Sierra Leone: Time; icg, Liberia: The Key; and icg, Liberia Unravelling.
45. icg, Sierra Leone: Managing Uncertainty, ii.
46. Ibid., iii.
47. Ibid.
48. icg, Sierra Leone: Time, i.
49. Ibid., 8.
50. Ibid., 12.
51. icg, Liberia: The Key, i.
52. Ibid., ii.
53. See ibid., 9–11, where we are told that lurd has learned from the ruf failures, emphasises the need to avoid civilian casualties and that its troops have been strongly warned against attacking civilians and to treat prisoners humanely. There is clearly a number of people of Loma origin from Lofa County who have another story to tell.
54. Ibid., 11.
55. icg, Liberia Security Challenges; icg, Tackling Liberia; icg, Sierra Leone: The State; icg, The Special Court; icg, Liberia and Sierra Leone; icg, Rebuilding Liberia; and icg, Liberia’s Elections.
56. Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy.
57. Cf. Bliesemann de Guevara’s introduction to this issue.
58. See also Bøås and McNeill, Global Institutions and Development.