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Abstract
Russia’s challenge to the post-cold war order, and the rise of Islamic State have resulted in a call for increased military spending among NATO members. Despite the increased demand for UN peace operations, any expansion is unlikely to benefit the world organisation. Instead we see an increasing reliance upon regional organisations like the African Union, European Union and NATO, in particular, for robust peace operations. An analysis of Western states (France, Germany and the USA) suggests that future investments in weaponry, technology and staff will primarily benefit NATO and the EU, but not the United Nations.
Acknowledgements
The authors thank the anonymous reviewers as well as Wolfgang Seibel for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article.
Notes
1. Weiss and Welz, “The UN and AU in Mali and Beyond.”
2. UN, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations.
3. See NATO Wales declaration, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm, para 101.
4. Cameron, “Huge Investment in Armed Forces.”
5. Jones, “NATO Members’ Spending.”
6. A cottage industry of research developed, including the UN’s publishing for the first time a series of ‘blue books’ on peace operations. Probably the best independent compendia of analyses were edited by Durch, The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping; and UN Peacekeeping, American Politics.
7. Wallensteen and Bjurner, “The Challenge of Regional Organizations,” 1.
8. See the annual reports from New York University’s Center on International Cooperation, the most recent being Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2014.
9. UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Monthly Summary of Contributions.
10. UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Summary of United Nations Peace-keeping Forces.
11. Perry and Smith, Trends in Uniformed Contributions.
12. Data are drawn from Perlo-Freemann et al., “Military Expenditure Data.” All data refer to 2012, with the exception of Nepal, for which only data for 2011 are provided.
13. UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Monthly Summary of Contributions.
14. Data taken from Perlo-Freemann et al., “Military Expenditure Data.” All data refer to 2012, with the exception of Nepal, for which only data for 2011 are provided.
15. Diehl, International Peacekeeping; and Sotomayor Velázquez, “Why Some States Participate.”
16. UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Summary of United Nations Peace-keeping Forces.
17. George et al., “Appendix 6N.”
18. Data taken from Perlo-Freemann et al., “Military Expenditure Data.” All data refer to 2012, with the exception of Nepal, for which only data for 2011 are provided.
19. Calculated with data provided by the World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ NY.GDP.MKTP.CD/countries?display=default, accessed August 20, 2014.
20. Murphy, “Ireland, the United Nations.”
21. UN, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations.
22. UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, New Partnership Agenda, 31, v–vi.
23. Cutillo, Deploying the Best.
24. UN General Assembly, Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, paras 77–78.
25. Data for this section refer to the most recent numbers provided on the missions’ websites, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/current.shtml, accessed August 28, 2014; updated on March 30, 2015 for the Central African Republic.
26. See, for example, Weiss, Beyond UN Subcontracting.
27. Diehl and Cho, “Passing the Buck in Conflict Management”; and Daniel, “Contemporary Patterns in Peace Operations.”
28. Wallensteen, “International Conflict Resolution,” 13.
29. van der Lijn, “Regional Developments in Peace Operations,” 77.
30. Dundon, “Global Trends in Peace Operations,” 64.
31. Gaibulloev et al., “Demands for UN and Non-UN Peacekeeping,” 828.
32. Neack, “UN Peace-keeping”; and Neack, “Multilateral Responses to Risky States.”
33. Luttwak, “Where are the Great Powers?”
34. Pape, “When Duty Calls.”
35. Sotomayor Velázquez, “Why Some States Participate,” 193.
36. Bove and Elia, “Supplying Peace,” 699.
37. Bellamy and Williams, “Explaining the National Politics,” 423–424.
38. Sotomayor Velázquez, “Why Some States Participate,” 193.
39. Zaman and Biswas, “Bangladesh.”
40. Vines, “A Decade of African Peace and Security Architecture,” 99.
41. Jakobsen, “The Nordic Peacekeeping Model.”
42. Madsen, “Military Responses.”
43. “Suppression de postes dans l’armée.”
44. Gebreworld, “Comprehensive Security versus Competing Interests,” 265.
45. Ibid; Hansen, “Backgrounder”; Kroslak, “France’s Policy towards Africa”; and N’Diaye, “Francophone Africa.”
46. Interviews with UN officials and diplomats, Cape Town, August 2013.
47. Tull, France’s Africa Policy, 2.
48. Interview with a UN official, Addis Ababa, February 25, 2014.
49. Interviews with senior AU officials and senior UN officials involved in both operations, Addis Ababa, February 2014.
50. Welz, “Briefing.”
51. Tardy, “The Reluctant Peacekeeper,” 1.
52. Fraczek, “Germany’s Minimalistic Role.”
53. Kulish, “Decades of German Pacifism.”
54. Brok, ARD Morgenmagazin.
55. Fraczek, “Germany’s Minimalistic Role.”
56. German Ministry of Defence, Defence Policy Guidelines.
57. Angela Merkel, speech on the occasion of ‘50 Jahre Bergedorfer Gesprächskreis der Körber-Stiftung’ Berlin, September 9, 2011.
58. Luck, Mixed Messages.
59. US Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review 2014.
60. “The Security and Defense Agenda.”
61. Carr Center for Human Rights Policy et al., MARO.
62. Crook, Providing the Right Troops.
63. Bjurner and Wallensteen, “The Future Relations,” 244.