Stable instability: the Syrian conflict and the postponement of the 2013 Lebanese parliamentary elections

Abstract

Given the morass of the Syrian civil war and Lebanon’s exposure to the consequences, this article seeks to explore how the intersecting dynamics of Lebanese domestic conflicts and the multiple implications of the bloodbath in Syria have influenced the behaviour of Lebanese political parties in their ongoing struggle over the formulation of a new electoral law, leading to a broad consensus among the country’s parties to postpone the 2013 parliamentary elections. The article argues that, while the usual attempts to profit at the expense of other groups in society are still present and external patrons still wield great influence, the decision to postpone the elections also demonstrates a degree of pragmatism and political development since, despite dire predictions to the contrary, Lebanon has not succumbed to the return of its own civil war. Instead a complex mixture of pragmatism, elision of interests and external influence, combined with local agency, has led Lebanon into a situation of stable instability.

Keywords:

• Lebanon
• elections
• Arab Spring
• participation and power
• democratisation
• political parties

Notes

1. For a good outline of this traditional narrative, see Zahar, “Power Sharing in Lebanon.”

2. Kahn, On Escalation, 293.

3. Jabbra and Jabbra, “Consociational Democracy in Lebanon.”

4. Lijphart, “Consociational Democracy,” 216.

5. Andeweg, “Consociational Democracy,” 509.

6. For a full introduction to the Lebanese political system, see Salamey, The Government and Politics of Lebanon, Parts I, III.

7. In a 2000 article Brenda Seaver explores the causes of the civil war and concludes that ‘the Lebanese case confirms Lijphart’s theory that elite consensus backed by consociational mechanisms is crucial for stable democracy in divided societies...Specifically, the Lebanese civil war supports the hypothesis that a turbulent regional system can strain the domestic elite consensus upon which power-sharing is based and can ultimately contribute to regime collapse.’ Seaver, “The Regional Sources of Power-sharing Failure,” 268.

8. Chandra, “Ethnic Parties and Democratic Stability,” 235.

9. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, 297.

10. This also applies to the cabinet.

11. Interview, Beirut, May 8 and 15, 2012.

12. Securitisation theory is rarely applied to Lebanon but provides a useful framework through which to examine the way in which issues are politicised, then securitised through the discourse of elites. It is a powerful tool for exploring symbolic politics and the use of fear for political purposes in a divided and ethnically based polity. See Buzan et al., Security.

13. Diamond and Gunther, “Types and Functions of Parties,” 23.

14. Kota, “Undemocratic Lebanon,” 121.

15. Interview, Beirut, May 15, 2012.

16. Hudson, The Precarious Republic, 9.

17. For example, the Lebanese civil war of 1975–90.

18. Salloukh, “The Limits of Electoral Engineering,” 640.

19. What is noticeable is the absence of direct foreign intervention to exert pressure on domestic parties to reach an agreement on a new electoral law, as was the case in the formulation of the previous electoral laws. This can, in part, be explained by the immersion of the main foreign players in Lebanon (Syria, Saudi Arabia and Qatar) in the Syrian conflict and their betting on its consequences, which may endow them with greater influence over Lebanese domestic politics at a later stage.

20. Salloukh, “The Limits of Electoral Engineering.”

21. el-Khazen, Lebanon’s First Postwar Parliamentary Election, 21–22.

22. The Christian community’s boycott came about because of opposition to the Syrian military presence, as well as to the Taif Agreement, which limited the powers that were given to the main Christian position in the political system, the presidency.

23. Salem, Skirting Democracy, 27.

24. Hanf, Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon, 629.

25. Khashan, “Lebanon’s 1996 Controversial Parliamentary Elections,” 25.

26. Salloukh, “The Limits of Electoral Engineering,” 642.

27. Haddad, “The Lebanese Parliamentary Elections”; and Haddad, “The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws.”

28. The short timeframe to formulate a new electoral law between the Syrian military withdrawal in April and the specified deadline of the polls in June 2005 led Lebanese political parties to adopt the 2000 electoral law.

29. The violence erupted between Hizbollah, the Amal Movement and the SSNP on one side and the Future Movement and the PSP on the other, after the then government decided on 6 May 2008 to dismantle Hizbollah’s private telecommunications network. The conflict between these two rival blocs culminated in an outbreak of violence, when Hizbollah used its military power to force the government to withdraw its decision to dismantle the network. Armed Hizbollah members took to the streets of Beirut and forced the evacuation of the offices of the Future Movement. A power-sharing agreement, ending the violence, was engineered on 21 May 2008 and known as the Doha agreement.

30. The Christian parties requested the adoption of an electoral law based on small districts. This law would allow Christian voters to have a greater influence on the election results compared with electoral laws based on large districts. Despite this improvement, for the 2013 parliamentary elections the Christian parties requested further reformulation, with the aim of further improving Christian voters’ influence on election results.

31. On 8 March 2005 a major demonstration in favour of Syria took place. Syrian troops had been present in the country since the earliest days of the civil war and Syria was immediately suspected of being behind the assassination of the former prime minister, Rafic Hariri, in a massive car bomb in Beirut on 14 February 2005. This protest, clearly designed as a pre-emptory show of strength, was headed mainly by Hizbollah, but also comprised several other political parties, including the Shi’a Amal Movement, the Druze-led Lebanese Democratic Party (LDP), the secular Syrian Socialist National Party (SSNP), and the Christian (mainly Maronite) el-Marada movement, which became a political party in June 2006. This alliance was later bolstered by the addition in February 2006 of the Maronite Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) under Michel Aoun, who ironically had previously been known for his desire to end the Syrian occupation. At this point it should be noted that the FPM, the LDP, el-Marada, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation and the Solidarity Party are officially known as the Change and Reform Bloc, which is allied with the March 8 Alliance. For simplicity this article makes reference to the March 8 coalition as the wider movement which supports the March 8 Alliance bloc. As a direct response to the Hizbollah-led demonstration, large crowds gathered on 14 March to condemn the murder of Rafic Hariri and to call for the withdrawal of Syrian troops. This demonstration is also referred to as the ‘Cedar Revolution’, and was spearheaded by the Future Movement. The alliance was composed of a number of political parties, the most prominent of which were the Kataeb party and the Lebanese Forces Party (LFP), both Maronite, and the Druze Progressive Socialist Party (PSP). The alliance accused Syria of assassinating Rafic Hariri and several anti-Syrian politicians and journalists, including key figures such as Gebran Tueni and Samir Kassir. Gebran Tueni was an MP and the editor-in-chief of Annahar newspaper. Samir Kassir was a scholar, journalist and a staunch opponent of the Syrian military presence in Lebanon. The March 14 coalition is considered a close ally of Saudi Arabia and the USA, and was able to win 69 of the 128 seats in 2005 and 71 in 2009.

32. It should be borne in mind here that, while many of the parties discussed so far are avowedly secular and at times can and do attract votes and candidates from other communities, they tend to think and act in sectarian terms and are known as representing the interests of particular communities. There is also an element of tactical voting at times with, for example, isolated Shi’a communities in Christian areas voting for the FPM of Aoun, in part because of his charisma but mainly because he is allied with the two main Shi’a groupings of Amal and Hizbollah.

33. “Election Results 2009.” According to the Lebanese constitution, the government is considered to have resigned when more than a third of its ministers resign. Thus, the March 8 coalition sought to hold the blocking third to be able to veto government decisions. Also, a sectarian party that represents the overwhelming majority of its community is able to veto government decisions, since its exclusion from the decision-making process would mean the exclusion of the whole sectarian community that this party represents.

34. Interview with the former Deputy of the Speaker of Parliament and head of the Orthodox Gathering, Elie Ferzli, Hazmieh, November 27, 2014.

35. Kossayfi, “Al-Muqabala.”

36. Bassil, “Saad,” 8. Because of the geographic dispersion of the Christians in many electoral districts, Christian candidates are often forced to weave electoral alliances with Muslim parties and elites, which often means supporting their political views and advancing the interests of their Muslim voters, such as employment opportunities. Thus, a law that enables Christian MPs to be elected by mainly Christian voters will ensure that their political views are more reflective of the Christian voters’ political aspirations and hopes, and they will seek to advance their community’s interests.

37. For more detail on the Maronite role and preference in Lebanese politics, see Haddad, “The Maronite Legacy.”

38. The ‘Orthodox Gathering’ electoral law, which is based on PR, if adopted, would lead to the victory of the March 8 coalition. This is because the Future Movement’s parliamentary bloc would lose about half its MPs, who are non-Sunnis. The political opponents of the Future Movement within the Sunni community, such as the Nasserites, who are close to the March 8 coalition, would be able to win parliamentary seats, since the Future Movement does not represent the overwhelming majority of its sect. Also the PSP would not be able to win all the seats in Druze-dominated districts, since many of these districts include its political opponents.

39. Hajj, “Lebanon’s Electoral Law.”

40. The Lebanese president is voted for by parliament and is a position reserved for Maronites, at the time of writing and despite the presidential term being over on 25 May 2014, the Parliament has been unable to vote to appoint a new president – despite 15 attempts, no candidate has been agreed. The system is made harder by the need both for a quorum, which was only met in the first round of voting on 23 April 2014, and for a two-thirds majority. In the only round to go ahead the LFP’s leader Geagea could only amass 48 votes or 37.5%.

41. National News Agency, “Aoun.” Elie Ferzli also confirms the point that the LFP received an offer from the Future Movement to reject the ‘Orthodox Gathering’ electoral law, which involved an increase in the number of the LFP MPs in the next parliamentary elections. The Future Movement parliamentary bloc is composed of several non-partisan Christian MPs, who represent Christian minorities in the districts dominated by Sunnis, such as the ‘North’. The Future Movement’s offer was thus to allow the LFP to run elections for Christian MPs’ seats in these Sunni-dominated districts. Interview, Hazmieh, November 27, 2014.

42. “Geagea defends LF.”

43. Reda, “Muwajaha ‘Masihiyya’ Bayn Geagea.”

44. Interview with the scholar and MP in the FPM parliamentary bloc, Farid el-Khazen, Beirut, December 9, 2014. El-Khazen attended the Christian parties’ meetings in Bkirki (the residence of the Maronite Patriarch) to discuss the electoral law.

45. Interview, Hazmieh, November 27, 2014.

46. The Muslim Brotherhood’s Lebanon offshoot.

47. The weakness of the Syrian military and its political support of from Hizbollah will undermine Party of God ability to combat Israel, which might weaken its claim that it is defending the country. This may lead to it losing popularity within its community. In such a situation it may not be able to win the elections as the main representative of its sectarian community.

48. Salem, “Can Lebanon Survive the Syrian Crisis?”

49. For more background on Islamist politics in Lebanon (both Sunni and Shi’a), see Hamzeh, “Lebanon’s Islamists and Local Politics.”

50. These groups became very active after the eruption of the Syrian conflict. The conflict represented an opportunity for them to strengthen their sectarian leadership. Thus, they spoke extensively about defending the rights of the Sunnis in Syria and Lebanon against Hizbollah and the Syrian regime. For Sunni Islamist groups the Syrian conflict is essential to undermining the political and military power of that country’s domestic ally, Hizbollah. Their hatred of the Asad regime is linked to their repression in Lebanon during Syria’s military presence and the repression of allies in Syria. For more discussion about the implications of the Syrian conflict for the Sunni parties in Lebanon, see Lefèvre, The Roots of Crisis.

51. Clashes erupted between the Lebanese army and pro-Syrian opposition armed groups in Arsal when the Lebanese army attempted to capture Khaled Humayyad, who is accused of terrorist offences. These clashes left two military officers dead and several soldiers wounded in February 2013. Arsal is a mainly Sunni Lebanese village located next to the Syrian–Lebanese border; it is known for hosting Syrian opposition activists.

52. “Arsal Fi Qabdat Al-Jjayash Al-Llubnany,” 42.

53. Nasrallah, “Al-ʾamin Al-ʿaam.”

54. Qusayr is a Syrian city located next to the Lebanese–Syrian border.

55. Nasrallah, “Sayyed Nasrallah.”

56. Ibid. Several suicide bombings took place in Lebanon after Hizbollah’s intervention in Syria. Jabhat al-Nusra and the Abdullah Azzam Brigades, both extreme militant groups opposed to the Asad regime, claimed responsibility for these attacks. The aim of these suicide bombings was to exert pressure on Hizbollah to withdraw its armed forces from Syria.

57. Akkoum, “Al-Druze Fi Lubnan.”

58. In 2011 the government of the former prime minister, Saad Hariri, was forced to resign after the resignation of the March 8 coalition, which held a third of its posts. Their resignation was in protest at the March 14 coalition decision, which held the majority of the cabinet posts, to fund the Special Tribunal for Lebanon that indicted four Hizbollah members over the Rafic Hariri assassination. Therefore, the March 8 coalition and the PSP nominated Najib Mikati (2011–13) to be the new PM to replace Saad Hariri, who had been Riyadh’s closest Lebanese ally. As a result, Saudi Arabia broke its relations with the PSP.

59. Interview with Elie Ferzli, Hazmieh, November 27, 2014.

60. Akkoum, “Al-Druze Fi Lubnan.”

61. Lebanon Files News, “Kalimat Michel Aoun.”

62. “Samir Geagea.”

63. Ibid (emphasis in the original).

64. Nassar, “Samir Geagea.”

65. It is striking that Geagea is the only militia leader to have been punished for crimes committed during the civil war.

66. “Milyuwn Wa-200 ʾalf Nazah Suri Fi Lubnan.”

67. Manipulation of the Syrian refugee issue by the FPM is connected to Christian grievances regarding the settlement of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, in what, to many, seems like a re-run of history, since ‘the Christians of Lebanon were the party most concerned about the settlement of Palestinians – the majority of whom are Muslims – in Lebanon, for fear of them disrupting the political and numerical balance there.’ Chararah, “Lebanon Struggles.” The concern is that the refugees could become a source of instability, as was the case with the Palestinian refugees during the civil war, not least because these refugees could be recruited by extremist groups with the aim of carrying the Syrian conflict into Lebanon. Salem, “Can Lebanon Survive The Syrian Crisis?,” 21.

68. Lebanon all but closed its borders to further refugees in October 2014. “Lebanon Sharply Limits Syrian Refugee Entry.”

69. He clearly framed the issue in such a way as to mobilise the popular support of Christians in his electoral district of Batroun. It is important to note that Bassil is Michel Aoun’s son-in-law and is not an MP, having twice failed to be elected under two different electoral laws in both 2005 and 2009.

70. Aziz, “Syrian Armed Groups among those Displaced.”

71. International Crisis Group, A Precarious Balancing Act, 12.

72. Interview, Beirut, December 9, 2014.

73. The MP from the Future Movement Ammar Houri’s justification for his party’s rejection of the ‘Orthodox Gathering’ electoral law was that it violates the Taif Agreement, which emphasised the confessional coexistence between Lebanese communal groups. He argued that this law would spark intra-sectarian conflicts between the political parties and elites to mobilise the popular support of their respective sects. Interview with Houri, Beirut, December 12, 2014.

74. Parliamentary elections in Lebanon usually take place in June every four years and the Parliament was supposed to postpone the elections for one year so they could be held in June 2014. However, as a result of the presidential elections, which were supposed to take place in May 2014, the Parliament delayed parliamentary elections until November, especially since the previous presidential elections in 2007 lasted more than seven months before the parties agreed on the election of President Michel Sulieman (2008–14).

75. Younes, “Naaʾib ʿaouni Li-'Now.”

76. Abu-Habib, “Postponing Lebanon’s Elections.”

77. The 2009 parliamentary elections left the PSP with seven seats (more than Kataeb and only one behind the LFP, making it the fifth largest party in Parliament), meaning that it held the balance of power in Parliament between the two coalitions. The March 14 coalition, now without the PSP, has 61 MPs (48% of all parliamentary seats) and the March 8 coalition has 57 MPs (45%). Thus, the Druze party was able to secure its participation in the governments that have been formed since 2009 (2009, 2011 and 2014) because neither coalition was able to pass a vote of confidence in Parliament without its support.

78. Abu-Habib, “Postponing Lebanon’s Elections.”

79. Abdel-Latif, Lebanon’s Sunni Islamists, 2.

80. Interview with Elie Ferzli, Hazmieh, November 27, 2014.

81. Interview, Beirut, December 9, 2014.

82. Ibid. Mikati and Safadi broke the alliance with the Future Movement after the parliamentary elections in 2009. They consider themselves ‘centrists’.

83. Interview with the scholar and MP, Farid el-Khazen, Beirut, December 9, 2014.

84. Bouyoub, “The Free Patriotic Movement and Hizbullah.”

85. Abu-Habib, “Postponing Lebanon’s Elections.”

86. Ghattas Saab, “West Fears Postponement of Lebanon’s Elections.”

87. Interview, Farid el-Khazen, Beirut, December 9, 2014.

88. Aziz, “Lebanese Politics Affected.”

89. An element of this may also come from the lessons of 2008, when other militias proved no match for Hizbollah.

90. “Lebanon Names Tamam Salam as New Prime Minister.”

91. See Makdisi, “The Modernity of Sectarianism,” Conclusion.

92. For an interesting study examining earlier trends in this regard, see el-Solh, Lebanon and Arabism. This is a complex area but engagement with the literature shows some resurgence in Lebanese identity (however contested this may be). See, for example, Volk, Memorials and Martyrs; Kaufman, Reviving Phoenicia; and Abdelhady, “Representing the Homeland.”

93. See, inter alia, Barak, “Commemorating Malikiyya”; Barak, The Lebanese Army; Gaub, “Multi-ethnic Armies”; and Knudsen, “Lebanese Armed Forces.”

94. “Poll Finds Overwhelming Majorities.”

95. Wickberg, “Overview of Corruption and Anti-corruption.”

96. Karam, “Lebanon is too Corrupt to Care.”

97. For more background on corruption in Lebanon, see Farida and Ahmadi-Esfahani, “Corruption and Economic Growth.”

98. Leenders, Spoils of Truce.

99. Ibid., 231.

100. The phrase is prevalent in the corruption literature. See, for example, Scott, “The Analysis of Corruption”; and Donaldson and Dunfee, “Ties that Bind in Business Ethics.”

101. For more on clientelism in Lebanon, see Hamzeh, “Clientelism, Lebanon.”

102. Again it should be borne in mind here that consociationalism as a tool for understanding Lebanon is not without its issues but is a factor frequently used in the literature on Lebanon. For more discussion of this (albeit with a more pessimistic conclusion on Lebanon’s stability), see Haddad, “Lebanon.”

103. In this sense the findings of this article are slightly different from those of other examinations, while many of the same factors hold true, in contradiction to Adham Saouli’s finding of: ‘a causal relation between the intensity of regional conflict and level of stability in Lebanon...The more intense the regional conflict, the more unstable Lebanon has tended to become, and vice versa (p.701).’ Saouli, “Stability under Late State Formation.” It seems that something has changed in Lebanon to ensure a much higher degree of stability in the face of the most intense conflict the region has ever experienced.

104. Holmes, “Lebanese Parliament Extends Own Term.”